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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 332 Records
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1999 (1) TMI 549 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ave not been filed before us because such a contention has not been raised in these proceedings at all. One cannot assume that the cause of action arose on the date of expiry of the contract. As pointed out by this Court in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi's case (supra) in the passage cited above, cause of action can arise later, depending on the facts of the case. Whether the claims were or were not barred by limitation before the Arbitrator can be examined only on the basis of the relevant material, which material has not been produced. We, therefore, decline to examine this contention. 14. In the premises we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore the order of the Sub-Judge, Ranchi. Since the Award has already been made and we are informed that it is also filed in Court, the concerned court/the parties will now have to take appropriate steps in connection with that award in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1999 (1) TMI 548 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... even a person working in a Government company comes within the meaning of a public servant holding an office of profit. 32. It is not in dispute that the authorities, i.e., BEML and ITI have power to recruit the employees to its establishments and the authority is also competent to take disciplinary action and remove or dismiss such an employee. In that view of the matter, the petitioners being holding the office of profit and working in the authority fully controlled by the Government. It is rather difficult to hold that they are entitled to contest and be elected as Councillors for the Municipal Corporation. It has to be noted that there cannot be one rule for the ruler and another for the rule. In that view of the matter, I am inclined to hold that the petitioners are holding the office of profit under 'other authority' and thereby, they are disqualified to contest for being chosen as long as the company does not lose the characteristics of the Government company.
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1999 (1) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s regard is wholly insufficient to establish either of the aforesaid ingredients, though all the ingredients are necessary to be proved. In this view of the matter the conviction of accused Lekh Raj for the offence under Section 212 is unsustainable and, we accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit him of the charge. 22. In the net result, therefore, the conviction of accused Sanjiv Kumar and accused Kamlesh under Section 302/120B IPC and the sentence passed thereunder is set aside. Accused Sanjiv Kumar, however, is convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The conviction of accused Kamlesh under Section 201 IPC is upheld; but the sentence is modified to the period already undergone. She may be released forthwith unless required in any other case. The conviction and sentence of accused Lekh Raj under Section 212 IPC is set aside and is acquitted of the charge leveled against him. 23. All the appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (1) TMI 546 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ated Court for releasing him on bail. As the trial was not concluded till May 1998 an application for bail was filed but that was rejected by the learned Designated Judge. It has been stated on affidavit that the trial of the case was fixed to several dates in May and June 1998 but the prosecution did not produce any evidence on any of the above dates. When the matter was listed on 7th of December, 1998 the counsel for the Delhi Administration wanted two weeks time to file an affidavit indicating the stage of the trial. Thereafter two adjournments have been given. But it is unfortunate that no affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Delhi Administration nor the counsel appearing for the Delhi Administration is present in Court. In the circumstances, we have no other option than to release the appellant on bail. We accordingly direct that the appellant be released on bail to the satisfaction of the learned Designated Judge, Patiala House, New Delhi. 3. The appeal is allowed.
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1999 (1) TMI 545 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... etic yarn, then such an 'exclusive' usage would stand precluded and credit would be available. However, as this is a question of fact, the same needs to be verified by the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner. Since the Order-in-Appeal had already correctly remanded the matters of invoice verification to him (as noted above), therefore this issue also needs to be remanded to the Assistant Commissioner for verification. 8. In view of the aforesaid findings, the Order-in-Appeal is modified only to the extent that credit allowed therein on pro-rata basis is set aside and the matter remanded to the original authority for verification as per above. If on verification it is found that these subject capital goods were, also used for manufacture of synthetic yarn, then since declaration thereof was filed before taking credit, and duty thereon having been paid after 1-3-1994, credit thereon shall be allowed by him to the full extent. Revenue appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1999 (1) TMI 544 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent has paid the amounts to the company for the deprivation of the management of the company by the first petitioner at the rate of ₹ 10,000 per annum for the period commencing on the date on which the management of the textile undertaking of the company was taken over in pursuance of the order made by the Central Government under Section 10-AA of the Act. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the company alone is liable under Section 5 of the Act to pay the damages as the liability was prior to the appointed day and the damages have been levied for the contravention of the provisions of the Provident Funds Act. In this case, there is no dispute mat the liability was incurred prior to the appointed day. Under such circumstances, I reject the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and uphold the order passed by the second respondent. The writ petition shall accordingly stand dismissed. No costs. 9. Consequently, W.M.P No. 1202 of 1991 is dismissed.
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1999 (1) TMI 543 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... DER Delay condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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1999 (1) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... se contained the following words "except as otherwise provided in the contract" all disputes would be referred to arbitration as set out therein. Clause 13-A of the same agreement was similar to Clause 11 in the present case. The Engineer-in-Chief was to determine the rate for any additional work. The decision of the Superintending Engineer was final in the event of a dispute. 6. This Court upheld the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the effect that when an arbitration clause specifically excluded from its purview disputes which were covered by Clause 13-A, these disputes would not be within the ambit of the arbitration clause. The awards, therefore, in that case were without jurisdiction and were void. The ratio of this case applies directly to the present case also. The arbitration award, therefore, insofar as it decides Claims 2, 3 and 6 is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the impugned award and decree is modified to the above extent.
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1999 (1) TMI 540 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e, it must be treated as a settled proposition of law that the arbitration clause does not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the company court to entertain a winding up petition and the party invoking the arbitration clause for making a request to the company court to refer the matter to arbitration must satisfy the said court that there is a bona fide dispute between the parties to the agreement which requires reference to the arbitrator and it is not sufficient for the applicant to say that the court should refer the matter to the arbitration because there is a clause in the agreement for making reference to the arbitrator. 12. As already mentioned above, in the present case, the appellant has not denied its liability to pay the amount. Rather, it has unequivocally admitted the same. Therefore, we do not find any valid ground to interfere with the order of the learned company judge. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is dismissed with costs of ₹ 5,000.
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1999 (1) TMI 539 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... als, there was really no evidence before the court on the basis of which the appellant could be convicted. The court could not fall back on the report of Public Analyst as it had been superseded. The only method of challenging the report of the Public Analyst was by having the sample tested by the Director of the Central Food laboratory. In the present case the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to which he was entitled for no fault of his. It was not, therefore, open to the court to fall back upon the report of the Public Analyst to convict the appellant." These two judgments, in my view, do not deal with the issue raised in the present case. As seen above the report of the Director, CFL is not in the form prescribed inasmuch as it did not show if the Director con-ducted test respecting all the standards laid down the rule.1 would, therefore, rather dismiss the Special Leave Petition on the ground of delay without expressing any opinion on the merit of the case.
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1999 (1) TMI 538 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tection of the country and national security may claim in certain circumstances higher priority. 83. As has been set out by Thomas Jefferson "To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means "(Thomas Jefferson, Writings (Washington Ed.) v. 542-545 and The Constitution Between Friends by Louis Fisher 47.) By the aforesaid approach both justice and power can be brought together and whatever is just may be powerful and whatever may be powerful may be just." In this view of the matter I find myself unable to agree with the view taken by my learned Brother Justice Quadri that detention of the detenue is void and that it should be quashed. Procedural safeguards have been complied with. I would, therefore, rather dismiss the appeal. In view of the majority decision the Appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.
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1999 (1) TMI 537 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... stay in India was very brief. His remuneration was paid by WC, a foreign company. The remuneration which is actually paid by the Indian company is ultimately reimbursed by WC. In other words, the Indian company pays the remuneration only in the first instance which is reimbursed by WC. Therefore, it cannot be said that the burden of payment of the remuneration was actually borne by a permanent establishment or a fixed base or trade or business located in India. Therefore, all the conditions laid down in article 16(2) are fulfilled by the applicant on the basis of facts as stated by him. The questions, therefore, will have to be answered in the following manner. “In view of the specific provisions of article 16 of the India-US treaty and also in view of the facts stated in the application question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the applicant”. In view of the answer as given to question No. 1, it is not necessary to go into the other questions.
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1999 (1) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gularised in those posts. This grievance, to some extent, is justified. But vacancies not being available when they were appointed as Law Assistants it must be held that it is only on ad hoc basis and it is not as though the appellants would not be aware of the same and that is why they made representations to regularise their appointments subsequently and did not challenge the alteration of their promotions on ad hoc basis. Thus the appellants cannot make a grievance now when they are entitled to be regularly appointed as Law Assistants. On this basis we must uphold the order made by the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal. o p /o p However, it is made clear that this order will not preclude the respondents from considering the case of the appellants appropriately and assort (appoint ?) them as Law Assistants on such conditions as they may deem appropriate. Subject to what is stated above the appeal stands dismissed with no order as to costs. o p /o p Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1999 (1) TMI 535 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt in the case of Air India Corpn. (supra) is inapposite in the present context, for the observation therein, that was relied upon was made in the context of determining what is an instrumentality of the State for the purposes of Article 12. 10. We should now add that the issue that we are here concerned with is substantially covered by the judgment of this Court in Municipal Commr. of Dum Dum Municipality v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation and agreeing with that judgment, we see no reason to accept Mr. Raval's submission that it needs to be reconsidered. 11. The civil appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. SLP No. 5706 of 1997 12. By reason of the order that we have passed in CA No. 6734-A of 1983, the SLP is dismissed, the facts being substantially similar. No order as to costs. TC No. 359 of 1983 13. By reason of the order that we have passed in CA No. 6734-A of 1983, the transferred case is dismissed, the facts substantially similar. No order as to costs.
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1999 (1) TMI 534 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... when the disputes arising out of the sponsorship agreement are adjudicated, the question of grant of relief would arise. In view of the arbitration agreement, it is the arbitrator who has to adjudicate on the disputes arising out of this sponsorship agreement and not the Company Law Board in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act which makes it obligatory for a judicial authority to refer such disputes to arbitration, unlike the Arbitration Act, 1940, according to which a judicial authority had the discretion to either refer the matter to arbitration or not. Therefore, we are of the view that the present disputes before us, being disputes arising out of or in connection with the sponsorship agreement which provides for arbitration at Clause 11.4, have to be referred to arbitration in terms of Section 8 of the Arbitration Act and accordingly we do so and thus dispose of this petition noting that the petitioner has already initiated arbitration proceedings.
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1999 (1) TMI 533 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... ot consider it necessary to go into further discussion relating to question No. 2. Regarding question No. 1, learned counsel for the applicant pleaded that the amount received by the applicant on behalf of the sub-consultants should not be subjected to TDS as it amounts to only reimbursement of actual expenses. It was pointed out to counsel that this is a vexed question of fact which is best left to the Assessing Officer to compute as it will not be proper to go into the determination of the profit element or otherwise of the transaction. This is a factual issue that will have to be examined at the time of assessment of income of the applicant. Therefore, the answer to question No. 1 is not necessary and on question No. 2, the rate of deduction of tax would be 15 per cent. as per article 13 of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the U.K. The tax paid will not form part of the income as per section 10(6A) of the Income-tax Act as already mentioned above.
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1999 (1) TMI 532 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nths, as part-heard. Ordered accordingly. In the context of recommendations made for amendment of the environmental laws and rules by the Central Government and notifications issued by the Central and State Governments, we direct copies of this judgment to be communicated to the Secretary, Environment & Forests (Government of India), New Delhi, to the Secretaries of Environment & Forests in all State Governments and Union Territories, and to the Central Pollution Control Board, New Delhi. We further direct the Central Pollution Control Board to communicate a copy of this judgment to all State Pollution Control Boards and other authorities dealing with environment, pollution, ecology and forest and wildlife. The State Governments shall also take steps to communicate this judgment to their respective State Pollution Control Boards and other authorities dealing with the above subjects - so that appropriate action can be taken expeditiously as indicated in this judgment.
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1999 (1) TMI 531 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sufficient compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem. In the present case, however, there has been a long-drawn-out exchange of views, consultations as well as consideration of objections over the issuing of a notification under Section 16 of the Gujarat Industrial Development Act, 1962 which was also linked with the exclusion of this area from the panchayat area under Section 9(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1061. It was precisely because of these consultations that the GR of 30-8-1993 was also issued to provide revenue to the Gram Panchayats from out of the taxes collected from notified areas which were removed from the jurisdiction of Gram Panchayats. Therefore, the appellants cannot complain of any violation of the principles of natural justice in the present case. 23. In the premises, we do not see any reason to take a view different from the view taken by the High Court. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1999 (1) TMI 530 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ance of contribution to Sarva Dharma Maitri Pratisthan ₹ 10,000 Ground No. 15 - restricting the profits of the business for the purpose of section 80HHC by reducing 90 of the interest therefrom. 73. All the aforesaid grounds were not pressed in view of the smallness of the amounts involved and without prejudice to the assessee';s right to agitate such matters in the other years if so advised. Accordingly we dismiss the same, except that in respect of ground No. 11 the Assessing Officer may allow depreciation on the foreign travel expenses added to the cost of the machinery. 74. Before closing, we wish to place on record the very able assistance rendered by both sides before us. Very elaborate and well prepared arguments were advanced before us which have helped us in arriving at our decision. Special mention must also be made of the meticulous manner in which the paper books were prepared and filed by both the sides. 75. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1999 (1) TMI 529 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... t of Italy is "Royalty" as defined in the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Italy and hence liable to tax in India ?" This question alongwith the orders passed by the Members of the Tribunal were sent to the Hon’ble President, ITAT, Bombay. The matter was allotted to Shri Nathu Ram, Accountant Member as Third Member who heard the parties in detail and passed his own order. The Third Member was in agreement with the findings of the Judicial Member. 2. The matter was listed for hearing on 1-1-1999 for passing the order as per the majority view. 3. Now after hearing both the parties and considering the order of the Third Member, this Bench finds that the view taken by the Judicial Member is approved by the Third Member. Therefore, in view of the majority decision we allow the appeal of the assessee. The order passed by the respective Members of the Tribunal form part of this order. 4. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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