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Showing 1 to 20 of 386 Records
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1999 (5) TMI 636
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... ... ..... e definition to the first category. When the subsequent notification was issued, the intention was that limit of Rs. 5.000 should apply to the entire item No. 11. But the semi-colon continued as it was in earlier notification. Nothing turns upon it. If this was so, then we see no reason why the limit of Rs. 5,000 will not apply to the instruments mentioned in the first category. The State will do well to remove the ambiguity. In view of the fact that we have these points in favour of the State, the 4th point does not arise for consideration. CONCLUSION These writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Let a copy of this order be placed in the record of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24530 of 1988 M/s. Lakshmi Varnish Udyog, Kulyalpar, Nainital v. Divisional Forest Officer and others Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 24532 of 1988 ; M/s. J. P. Resin and Turpentines and others ; and Civil Misc. Writ Petition Wo. 23890 of 1988 M/s. Jageswar Resin v. Divisional Forest Officer and others.
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1999 (5) TMI 635
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... ... ..... s should be disclosed in advance if they were to file written statement in the civil suit. 18. Thus, giving due consideration to all the aspects of the matter, I am constrained to hold that there will be miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court in the case the impugned orders are set aside. The facts and circumstances clearly reveal the fact that the petitioner is determined to arrest the speedy disposal of the proceeding before the Tribunal and thereby to frustrate the object of the Act of 1993 by filing one application after another. The present applications under Article 227 of the Constitution are really devoid of any substance and I find no justification to interfere with any of the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal. The applications are dismissed with costs assessed at 200 Gms. The Tribunal is directed to proceed with the application of the opposite party No. 1 bank under Section 19 of the Act of 1993 as early as possible in accordance with law.
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1999 (5) TMI 634
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... ... ..... had not been finalised and culminated into select list, the candidate did not have any right to appointment and that recruitment process could be stopped by the Government at any time before a candidate has been appointed and as the candidate has no vested right to get the process completed except that the Government could be required to justify its action on the touchstone of Article 14. 22. In this view of the matter, we hold that the amendment brought to the general rules (Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules) by the Notification dated 5th December, 1992 or as pointed out when it was published in the gazette, i.e. 2nd February, 1993 is not repugnant to special rules and that there is no question of taking away the rights of the candidates who were selected by the Public Service Commission. 23. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench is set aside and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is restored.
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1999 (5) TMI 633
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... ... ..... iod have been passed. 728. The conviction for the offence under Section 120-B read with Section 302, Indian Penal Code as against A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan alias Raviraj) A-3 (Murugan alias Thas ), A-9 (royert Pauyyas), A-10 (Jayakumar), A-16 (Ravichandran alias Ravi) and A-13 (Perarivlan alias Arivu), is confirmed. 729. We set aside the conviction and sentence of the offences under Section 302 read with Section 120B passed by the trial court on the remaining accused. 730. The sentence of death passed by the trial court on A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan), AA-3 (Murugan and A-18 (Aivu), is cofirmed. The death sentence passed on A-9 (Royert), A-10 (Jayakumar) and A-16 (Ravichandran) is altered to imprisonment for life. The reference is answered accordingly. 731. In other words, except A-1 (Nalini), A-2 (Santhan), A-3 (Murugan, A-9 (Royert Payas), A-10 (Jayakumaro, A-16 (Ravichandran and A-18 (Arivu), all the remaining appellants shall appellants shall be set at liberty forth with.
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1999 (5) TMI 632
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... ... ..... e the trial court that the averments made in the affidavit are not based on the personal knowledge of the deponent or that the evidence contained in the affidavit suffers from inherent probability as to make it completely unbelievable. Nothing prevents the petitioners from placing reliance on the circumstantial evidence and documentary evidence if any to show whether the plaintiffs case is or is not prima facie good and even if an order is passed against the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., there is nothing to prevent the petitioner from filing an appeal against that order. It would premature to hold at this stage that any irreparable injury is likely to be caused to petitioner if the impugned order is allowed to stand. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in the cases referred above, there is no alternative but to dismiss the revision petition at this stage and it is hereby dismissed.
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1999 (5) TMI 631
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... ... ..... 1 could only if the grant expresses it "only in terms of acreages or cawnies etc." In the present case admittedly the description is by a definite name of the area, namely, Mela Thattimal Padugai and Kizha Thattimal Padugai, also by the survey numbers. Hence it cannot be said that the grant was only in terms of acreages or cawnies. We find merit in the said submission also. 21. For the aforesaid reasons and also in view of the findings recorded by both the Tribunal and the High Court concurrently that the grant could not be said to be only in terms of acreage. Hence the notification issued under Act No. 30 of 1963 was rightly held to be illegal. On the other hand the Settlement Officer findings to the contrary that it was a grant in terms of acreage was without proper appreciating the evidence and was based on no evidence, hence, was rightly set aside. We do not find it to be a fit case to interfere. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. Costs on the parties.
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1999 (5) TMI 630
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... ... ..... of Section 29, after deducing and adjusting the costs and charges, etc., under the said provision, in discharge of the debt due to the Financial Corporation, as on the date on which the unit was sold and consideration was realized, the residue of the consideration amount would be payable to the respondent-petitioner. In this view of the matter, we find that the learned single Judge was perfectly justified in directing the appellant-Corporation to pay the residue amount. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge in allowing the claim of the respondent-petitioner. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation requests for continuing the interim relief. Having regard to the number of years that the litigation has taken and to the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no warrant for continuing the interim relief. The request is, therefore, rejected.
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1999 (5) TMI 629
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... ... ..... nuine. We think a solution has to be worked out in the interest of justice. 4. After hearing both sides we direct the ACJM, Rai Singh Nagar, Rajasthan to return the passport of the appellant on his executing a bond for a sum of ₹ 3,00,000 with two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of the said Court. 5. To ensure his attendance in the court when trial begins, we may make a provision. We agree that it would be difficult for the appellant to be present on all posting dates in the trial court. Therefore, we permit him to appear through counsel except on days when his presence is imperatively needed. He must file an application before the trial court through counsel and seek dispensation of his personal presence and ensure that his counsel would be present on his behalf on days except when his presence is indispensable. If he makes such an application the trial court shall dispense with his physical presence in court. 6. With the above reliefs we dispose of these appeals.
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1999 (5) TMI 628
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... ... ..... ing with the procedure can provide for all cases and that Court should have inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law which are necessary for the proper discharge of duties. In our view, application of the aforesaid maxim for interpreting Section 482 would have only limited operation as stated above. 22. In the result, we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Court has power to pass 'such orders' (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases, (i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extraordinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Costs may be to meet the litigation expenses or can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid purposes. 23. In view of the aforesaid findings, this appeal is dismissed.
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1999 (5) TMI 627
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... ... ..... the learned counsel that this being a welfare legislation enacted for the benefit of tenants should be construed in a liberal manner. He also submitted that the heirs of the landlady had not given any intimation to the appellant about her death and therefore he could not have known who were the heirs of the landlady and given intimation to them. He submitted that the period of one year should be counted from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. We cannot accept this submission because language of the Sections 32F and 31 is quite clear and the period of one year will have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions and not from the date of the knowledge of the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in such a case relief on the basis of equity. 5. In our opinion, the High Court was right in dismissing the Writ Petition. This appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant shall hand over possession as directed by the Tehsildar within one month from today.
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1999 (5) TMI 626
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... ... ..... hat particular month, but for a subsequent month, it is not the same cause of action. 82. Although the matter is clear on principle, the strain of authority that runs through the decisions quoted above, only fortifies the conclusion that I have come to. Not a single decision, which might have held that a dismissal for default of a suit for ejectment debars under Rule 9 of Order 9, CPC a subsequent suit for ejectment based on a fresh notice to quit, was cited before me. The contention of the petitioner is not only unsupported by precedent, but is wrong on principle. 83. Accordingly, the order of the learned ADJ is upheld. The Civil Revision is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs. 84. Before closing I make it clear that except for the fact that the second suit is not barred under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC, the other observations made herein will not affect the right of the petitioner to assail the decree for ejectment passed on 11.3.1999 in the appeal filed there against.
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1999 (5) TMI 625
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... ... ..... ty and Modvat credit on the inputs.” 8. In this case a further question will arise whether the adjudicating authority was right in claiming invoking larger period of limitation. It is an admitted fact that classification list has been approved from 12-3-1993 without any questions. RT 12 returns have been approved without any objection. If that were to be so, it is not possible for us to accede to the impugned reasons given by the adjudicating authority invoking larger period of limitation. Finally invoking provisions of Section 11AC wholely unsustainable and the period involved in dispute is 1992-93. Section 11AC came into existence only in 1996. That provision is not retrospective in operation. The impugned orders are therefore, wholly devoid of any substance and merit. In view of the above, we are not touching on any other points raised in the appeal as we are allowing the same. Hence they are set aside. Appeals allowed with consequential relief according to law.
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1999 (5) TMI 624
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... ... ..... ch duty has been paid, that availing of Modvat credit does not make the inputs as non-duty paid. In the similar circumstances, the benefit of Notification No. 53/88 was made available in the case of C.C.E., New Delhi v. Bharat Seats Ltd., Final Order No. 301/99-C, dated 17-4-1999 1999 (108) E.L.T. 847 (Tribunal) . He also placed reliance on a decision in the case of Jain & Jana v. C.C.E. vide Final Order Nos. 1257-1258/98-C, dated 21-12-1998. 4. We have considered the submissions made by both the sides. The waste, paring and scrap has arisen from the material on which the duty has already been paid and as such the benefit of Notification No. 53/88 is available to the respondents as they have fulfilled the condition of the notification. It is a settled law that the duty paid character of the inputs is not taken away by mere fact of availing of Modvat credit. Accordingly, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order and reject the appeal filed by the Revenue.
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1999 (5) TMI 623
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... ... ..... reveals that the letter dated March 20, 1990 which is sought to be filed on record is a photocopy. There is no stamp on the said letter. There is neither any signature nor the date when it was received by the Receipt Clerk. There is nothing to show as to what action was taken by the Municipal authorities on receipt of the said letter though the letter is dated March 20, 1990. Thus the said letter does not inspire confidence. 8. There is another aspect of the matter. It is a well settled principle of law that a photocopy of a copy is not admissible in evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. To the same effect are the observations of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court as reported in Ramgopal Naicker Muthukrishna Ayyar and another, . Thus if the said letter cannot be admitted in evidence, it would serve no useful purpose to take the same on the file of this Court. 9. In view of the above I do not find any force in the present application. It is hereby dismissed.
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1999 (5) TMI 622
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... ... ..... d in both the suits 1) the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 25.7.1972 filed by the respondents is directed to be dismissed; 2) the appellant shall return the amount of consideration paid by the respondents to the appellant with interest calculated @ 12% p.a. from the date of payment to the appellant till the date of return by the appellant to the respondents; 3) the appellant shall also pay an amount of ₹ 3,25,000/- by way of compensation in lieu of specific performance to the respondents which amount shall carry interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the dateof decree (that is, today) till realisation; 4) possession over the part of the property admeasuring 45 sq.yards (approximately) shown in red in theplan attached with the plaint filed by the appellant shall be delivered by the respondents to the appellant by removing structures, if any, raised by the respondents; 5) the costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred throughout.
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1999 (5) TMI 621
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... ... ..... hat when there was no plea or issue on the question of title, no evidence whatever was admissible regarding the same. He acted beyond his jurisdiction in permitting addditional evidence to be filed in appeals. 11. We have already extracted the summary of conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. That shows that his conclusions were vitiated by his view that the appellant had title and possession followed title. It is quite obvious that the learned Single Judge had not taken note of the principle of possessory title or the principle of law that a person who has been in long continuous possession can protect the same by seeking an injunction against any person in the world other than the true owner. It is also well settled that even the owner of the property can get back his possession only by resorting to due process of law. 12. In the circumstances of the case, we do not find any merit whatever in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1999 (5) TMI 620
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... ... ..... 90 was sustained. Further, it appeared that the unaccounted expenditure on the renovation of the house was quantified on the basis of bills/vouchers found during the search, some of which pertained to the assessment year 1988-89 and some to the assessment year 1989-90. Yet, it was not very clear that as to which bills were actually paid in which assessment year and as such because the assessee on promise by the department offered the entire renovation expenses amounting to ₹ 13,80,000 in the assessment year 1990-91 and the same was taxed by the Assessing Officer, it was not at all justified to tax the same unexplained expenditure in the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90. As regards charging of interest under section 215/234B was concerned, the same is not chargeable during the course of reassessment in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. v. CIT 1995 216 ITR 759/ 82 Taxman 377 . In the result, the appeals were partly allowed.
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1999 (5) TMI 619
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... ... ..... ere are sufficient prima facie materials to exercise our powers under Section 237(b) of the Companies Act to order an investigation into the affairs of the company. Accordingly, we hereby direct the Central Government to carry out an investigation into the affairs of the company and take appropriate further action on receipt of the investigation report. This investigation should be completed at the earliest as the element of public interest is involved. The Bench officer will send a copy of the petition and also a copy of the chartered accountant's report to the Central Government along with a copy of this order. Further, in exercise of our powers under Section 402 of the Act, we also direct the Central Government to appoint a suitable professional person as a director on the board of the company for a period of three years from the date of appointment to effectively monitor the conduct of affairs of the company. 4. With the above directions, we dispose of this petition.
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1999 (5) TMI 618
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... ... ..... a negative covenant in the agreement, the same will be confined in its application to the period of subsistence of the contract and the restriction imposed therein is operative only during subsistence of the main contract. In the instant case, the agreements are no longer in operation since they have been terminated and so the question of enforcing the alleged negative covenant by granting the interim injunction does not arise. 22. For the reasons discussed above, I find and hold that the petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction. The balance of convenience also does not lie in favour of grant of the interim injunction as it would do more injury to the respondents than its refusal would occasion to the petitioner. Consequently, the petition is dismissed. Before I part with this order, I would like to make it clear that nothing stated herein shall affect the rights of the parties that are being agitated before the Arbitral Tribunal.
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1999 (5) TMI 617
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... ... ..... edly issued by the decree holders which would show that there is no amount due and payable as the decree has been satisfied or adjusted. Adjournment was sougnt on me ground that juagment deotors requirea time to get me original. Adjournment was refused and matter was heard as, in my opinion, the judgment debtors could in terms of Order XXI, Rule 2 apply to this Court and point out that the decree had been satisfied. As no prejudice would be caused to the judgment debtors adjournment was refused and matter proceeded with. 11. Having said so, I am clearly of the opinion that the foreign judgment can be executed. The objections under section 13(b) have no merits and consequently, deserve to be dismissed. In that light of the matter, leave is granted to the decree holder to execute the judgment dated 3rd July 1996 passed by the Supreme Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division. On the application of the judgment debtors, order is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today.
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