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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 568 Records
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1999 (8) TMI 1003
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... ... ..... y of the writ petitions in the High Court, the Graphite has not been paying electricity charges on the basis of revised rates which was the subject matter of the challenge in the High Court. We have upheld the validity of the revised tariff from April 8, 1991. Graphite is, therefore, bound to pay the differential amount with such charges for delayed payment as per agreement dated January 21, 1984. 30. Respondent Durgapur Projects Ltd. has pointed out that on that account an amount of ₹ 11,02,90,654,83 with delayed payment surcharge at the agreed rate as per Clause (23) of the agreement dated January 21, 1984 is due from Graphite to it. If there is any dispute regarding the amount claimed by the respondent the same shall be considered by the High Court and for that the party shall move the High Court which may pass appropriate orders. The amount which is not disputed by the Graphite shall be paid by it to the respondent within four weeks with charges for delayed payment.
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1999 (8) TMI 1002
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... ... ..... ion made by the petitioner, if any, shall be considered. (5) If any licensee has reduced seating capacity in anticipation of sanction by the Licensing Authority, the Licensing Authority may inspect the theatre and give further directions as may be appropriate to avoid abuse or misuse of reduced seating capacity. This direction is in accordance with the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in WP No. 9640 of 1984 dated 30-10-1984. (6) The licensee shall not be entitled to enhance the rates of admission which has been already sanctioned by the Government vide G.O. Ms. No. 218 dated 14-7-1995 and any further enhancement by the licensee will be in accordance with further sanction by the competent authority. (7) It is further directed that the Licensing Authority has to consider any application filed at any time seeking reduction of seating capacity subject to the provisions of Rule 10A without any restriction as to cut off date. And (8) There shall be no order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 1001
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... ... ..... g reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court did not commit any jurisdictional error in reversing the order of the Rent Controller and upholding the landlord's claim for eviction. Inspite of excluding from consideration, the documents' which were proposed to be filed by the landlord on the record of the High Court, the ultimate finding of the High Court is liable to be upheld. On the material available on record, the only conclusion which could have been drawn is the one drawn by the High Court. The order of the Rent Controller was not according to law and was, therefore, rightly set aside. 24. The appeal is dismissed. The tenant appellant is however granted six months time to vacate the premises subject to filing usual undertaking within a period of one month on the affidavit of the appellant to deliver vacant and peaceful possession over the premises to the landlord at the end of the extended time and in between regularly paying the rent. Costs as incurred.
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1999 (8) TMI 1000
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... ... ..... This have to be determined from the entirety of facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. Finally, we have no hesitation to hold that the pleading as made by the plaintiff not only shows his readiness and willingness to perform his part of obligation under the contract but by tendering total amount shows he has performed his part of the obligation. We also construe such a plea to be a plea of 'readiness and willingness' as required under Section 16(c). In view of the aforesaid findings we hold that the High Court committed an error by defeating the claim of the plaintiff on the basis of wrong interpretation of his plea in terms of the said Section. 15. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High Court dated 22nd October, 1986 is set aside and the plaintiff suit as decreed by both the courts below is confirmed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. 16. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, costs on the parties.
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1999 (8) TMI 999
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... ... ..... r to the matter to the Arbitrator has been filed later on, by the same party viz., the defendant, then it cannot be said that the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act was not complied with. This is because the copy of the arbitration agreement was already produced on record by the defendant in the given case. Similarity, in this case also a copy of the arbitration agreement Ex. P1 has been produced on record by the plaintiffs themselves and the application for referring the matter to the Arbitrator was filed by respondent defendant. This being the position the appellants cannot be allowed to raise this technical plea of non-compliance of provision of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act. 4. At this stage of dictation, learned counsel for the appellants does not press for other contentions raised by him. In view of the above, this appeal is without merit and deserves to be dismissed. 5. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1999 (8) TMI 998
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... ... ..... red those drafts for crediting the same to his account. Though the learned Adjudicating Officer has not disbelieved the stand taken by the appellant, there is nothing to disbelieve the same. Furthermore, it ought to have been appreciated that the appellant has subserved the purpose of the Act by getting the amount of the draft credited to his account, in the circumstances, even if there was a violation of the term of the money changer’s licence the violation did not warrant any penalty much less, confiscation of the amount credited to his account after conversion. 17. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. I also set aside the order of confiscation of ₹ 45,354.78, being the proceeds of the said drafts. 18. The respondents are directed to refund the amount of ₹ 45,354.78 as well as the amount of penalty of ₹ 55,000, if deposited by the appellant by way of re-deposit, within 45 days of the receipt of this order.
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1999 (8) TMI 997
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... ... ..... tion was done mala fide or that because of the aforesaid act on the part of the plaintiff any injury has been caused to the defendant. When a suit is instituted misde- scribing the plaintiff an amendment of the plaint is allowed substituting the real plaintiff in question no question of limitation also arises and the plaint on such amendment is deemed to have been instituted in the name of the real plaintiff on the date of which it was originally instituted. The trial court while passing the impugned order legally exercised its jurisdiction vested in it and also in accordance with the settled proposition of law. There is no infirmity in the said order. 8. As the order allowing the amendment of the plaint is upheld the order passed by the trial court dismissing the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is also upheld as the said application has been rendered infructuous. 9. The petition has no merit and is dismissed in terms of the aforesaid order.
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1999 (8) TMI 996
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... ... ..... amount found due. According to the learned counsel for the defendants, inasmuch as the transactions are governed by the Sale of Goods Act, the plaintiff would not be entitled to interest at any rate higher than 6 . I heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff on that aspect and I am inclined to agree that the plaintiff is entitled to interest only at 6 p.a. from 1.12.1981 on the amount found due by the learned trial Judge. Accordingly that portion of the decree relating to interest and as modified alone is set aside. In all other aspects the appeal stands dismissed without costs. It is on record that the acknowledgments of liability were brought on record only for the first time during trial. Had they been disclosed in the plaint, it is not possible to decide as to what course of action the defendants would have taken, inasmuch as they have not disputed the transaction. Under these circumstances I am inclined to order that there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1999 (8) TMI 995
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... ... ..... ers acting for and on its behalf are further restrained from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising directly or indirectly dealing in rubber chappals or any other footwear under the trade mark RELAXO or any other trade mark which may be deceptively similar to the plaintiffs registered trade mark RELAXO. 9. The plaintiffs have sought rendition of accounts to ascertain the profits earned by the Defendants, which had been tentatively ascertained as ₹ 5 lacs so that a decree can be passed for the amount so found due on the basis of sales. No defense of the Defendants is forthcoming in these proceedings. I think it appropriate to decree a sum of ₹ 3 lacs as damages. For this reason the prayer for rendition of accounts is disallowed. The plaintiffs will, however, be entitled to all the costs incurred in these proceedings. 10. After payment of additional court fee a decree be drawn up accordingly. 11. Suit & I.A. stand disposed of in the above terms.
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1999 (8) TMI 994
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... ... ..... own that the search should be conducted in the presence of such officer it cannot be held that there was no need to inform him of that right. 7. In view of the change in the legal position with the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench decision in the aforesaid case the search conducted in this case must be held to have been vitiated. Consequently, it must be inferred that prejudice has been caused to the accused. The evidence concerning the search is not acceptable in view of non-compliance with the requirements of Section 50. There is no other evidence, apart from the search, to prove that appellant was in possession of the forbidden article. As such we are unable to sustain the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court which were confirmed by the High Court. 8. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant. We acquit him and direct the jail authorities to set him free unless he is required in any other case.
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1999 (8) TMI 993
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... ... ..... ge, we told learned Counsel for both the parties to verify and tell us whether he had stated in his evidence that the appellant was informed about his right to be searched in presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. After going through his evidence, both the learned Counsel stated that the evidence of the witness is silent on this point. The settled position of law is that the person to be searched under the N.D. P.S. Act, 1995 is required to be told about his right under Section 50 before he is searched and that is a mandatory requirement. No presumption to that effect can be raised. As there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant was informed about his said right, it has to be held that the said mandatory requirement of Section 50 was not complied with in this case. On this short point, this appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and also quash the order of sentence passed against him.
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1999 (8) TMI 992
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... ... ..... but had not produced any evidence in support of their pleas. Even an affidavit in support of what they had stated in the written statement was not filed before the Commission. Their case, thus was not supported by any evidence and the Commission, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was justified in decreeing the claim of the respondents. 15. Learned Counsel for the parties have stated before us that in terms of the judgment passed by the Commission, the entire amount due from the appellants has already been paid to the respondents including interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum on the principal amount of ₹ 9,51,000. That being so, we are not prepared to entertain the plea of the appellants that the decree passed by the Commission in respect of ₹ 1 lakh as compensation on account of the pain and suffering undergone by the respondents may be reversed. 16. We find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 991
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... ... ..... at the plea or finding which has been HC-NIC Page 1 of 2 Created On Thu Nov 09 16 38 55 IST 2017 recorded in the assessment of former exists for or against the interest of the assessee in later case, it is always open for the revenue to reach a different conclusion in the two assessment proceedigns on the basis of material placed in respective proceedings. Moreover, except to the extent statute permits, the assessment proceedings are confidential between the revenue and assessee and are not in a way open to be disclosed to other parties. 3. It is also to be understood that present petition does not concern the merits or demerits of respective claims but concerns jurisdiction of concerned statutory authority to initiate proceedings for reasons to be recorded in writing by him. In this controversy no stranger can have any role. 4. We therefore see no reason to permit the applicant to be impleaded as a party or permitting him to intervene in the matter. Application is rejected.
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1999 (8) TMI 990
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... ... ..... rn to duty she did not which clearly depicts a picture that termination order cannot be held to be invalid. Thus both the courts, viz., Tribunal and the High Court committed wrong in setting aside the order of termination passed against her by the appellant. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 lastly submitted that her termination order puts stigma on her which would effect her future and other employment. On the facts of this case we have no hesitation to hold that this termination order is an order of termination simpliciter and it does not put any stigma on respondent No.2. Even if it could be construed as such we protect her not to be read as so by this order. For all these reasons, the appeal filed by the appellant succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 25th September, 1989 confirming the order of the Tribunal dated 13th February, 1980 is hereby set aside and we uphold the order of termination dated 26th February, 1979. Costs on the parties.
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1999 (8) TMI 989
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... ... ..... uting an offence, the Court must not hasten to abort the proceedings whether the averments made in the complaint in the light of the evidence produced before the trial Court satisfy the requirements of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are questions of fact which have to be decided during the trial. Considering these circumstances, I am not inclined to hold that this is a case where the discretion of the Court to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. PC can be invoked. 13. It may be mentioned here that the observations made herein as to the role of the petitioner are meant strictly for the purpose of deciding the petition and the trial Court shall not feel fettered by these observations in coming to its own conclusions as to whether the requirements under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are satisfied or not in the light of the evidence that may be produced during the trial of the case. 14. With these observations, the petition is dismissed.
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1999 (8) TMI 988
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... ... ..... itioner had retired after August 12, 1996. Such quashing is hereby made. 41. All the arrears due to the writ petitioner should be released with immediate effect, in any event not later than four weeks from the date hereof. Since the writ petitioner had retired by serving an appropriate notice after August 12, 1996, but the respondents had not accepted such retirement wrongfully, they will pay interest 6 per annum on all arrears payable to the writ petitioner from August 13, 1996 until payment, except for the sum of Rupees one lac which has been released by way of an interim payment, on which no interest need be paid and which, naturally, need not be paid once again. 42. The writ petitioner is entitled to the costs of both the applications which is assessed at ₹ 10,000/- each. Costs and interest be also paid within four weeks from the date hereof. 43. Xerox certified copy of the order be made available to the parties expeditiously, preferably within fortnight from date.
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1999 (8) TMI 987
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... ... ..... fide dealer and all the documents were in order in accordance with the Government Order dated 24th May, 1994, the seizure was not justified and, as such, the security demanded was also illegal. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has relied upon a decision reported in 1998 U.P.T.C. 1140, Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P., Lucknow v. S/S. Tien Yuan India Pvt. Ltd., Raigarh. Which is fully applicable in the present case. The case before the Tribunal was confined only as to whether the seizure and security demanded was justified or not and the other finding recorded by the Tribunal was beyond the matter in issue. 5. In view of the aforesaid facts, the revision petition has no force. It is accordingly dismissed. However, if any proceeding is initiated against the opposite party or the principal dealer in regular assessment, the finding recorded by the Tribunal will not be a binding and the Assessing Authority will decide the matter in accordance with law.
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1999 (8) TMI 986
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... ... ..... . The learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority held against the appellant on this aspect. The High Court did not consider this aspect in the view it had taken of Section 11(8) of the Act. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that even after holding that bona fide requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation for personal use is established, the relief under sub- section (8) of Section 11, cannot be granted to him without recording a finding under the first proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act in favour of the landlord. Since, the High Court did not consider this aspect, we are of the opinion that the matter has to go back to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light of this judgment. The judgment and order of the Division Bench under appeal is, therefore, set aside and the case is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed as indicated above. No costs. o p /o p
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1999 (8) TMI 985
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... ... ..... f the appellants that as the respondent had allegedly not paid the whole amount, she was not entitled to the directions as were issued by the State Commission. The respondent had categorically stated in para 5 of her complaint that the consideration amount had been paid which was not denied by the respondent. They had only stated that a sum of ₹ 20,000/- was still recoverable from her regarding which she had preferred the claim of compensation for the repairs done to the flat as it was found to be constructed of the sub-standard material. The findings of fact arrived at by the State Commission do not require any interference. The National Commission was also justified in holding that there was no error of jurisdiction or material irregularity pertaining to the jurisdiction in the order of the State Commission requiring any interference. There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed but under the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1999 (8) TMI 984
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... ... ..... Scheme on the same day, i.e. 30th March, 1987, and subsequently getting the gold converted into ornaments through Karigars on more or less the same day and subsequently selling the ornaments to the assessee-firm in the same year of account without the planning, controlling and coordination of a central agency and that agency in the surrounding circumstances appears to be only the assessee-firm. The apex Court has held in the case of Jamnaprasad Kanhaiyalal (supra) that there is no doubt taxation in taxing the person to whom the income actually belonged with the persons who falsely declared them in their returns filed under the Voluntary Disclosure Scheme. That is a risk which an assessee resorting to unfair tax saving devices has necessarily to run and an assessee who has resorted to such devices has to thank himself for it. 15. For the above reasons we uphold the findings of the AO. We set aside the order of the CIT(A) and restore that of the AO. 16. The appeal is allowed.
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