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Case Laws
Showing 421 to 440 of 474 Records
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2000 (10) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... on 125 of the Customs Act duty amount is payable in addition to fine. 3. The dispute pending the High Court was on the question as to whether goods were of foreign origin and if not whether Department was entitled to confiscate. Petitioner opted for KVS. But there was no dispute in respect of duty amount. The dispute was only for redemption fine. Hence we cannot order release of goods without payment of duty. This is also clear from the definition of Tax Arrears under KVS. Hence rejected. This order will not prevent the petitioner from raising legal contentions before the A.O.
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2000 (10) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reference to High Court ... ... ... ... ..... laration not having been filed under Rule 57G of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 a manufacturer is entitled to claim Modvat credit. This is a matter which gives rise to a question of law which requires our consideration. 3. The Tribunal is, therefore, directed to refer the following question of law, and submit a statement of case together with the relevant records and documents Whether the Modvat credit can be extended on inputs even in cases where the manufacturer has not made the necessary declaration under Rule 57G .
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2000 (10) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
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... ... ..... for the manufacture of final product which are exigible for payment of excise duty, and for final products which are exempted from chargeable to nil duty, does not on that score release the manufacturer from the duty to expunge the credit on input used in the manufacture of exempted final product prior to the introduction of the Rule as Rule 57CC read with Rules 57C and 57D clearly indicates that Modvat credit can be availed of only in respect of the inputs utilising the manufacture of excisable final product on which duty is paid excepting in the circumstances set out under Rule 57A. We must also notice that in this case there were no dispute at all before the authorities about the amount of the Modvat credit taken by the assessee on the quantity of inputs used in the manufacture of exempted final product. We therefore answer the question referred to us in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances parties are directed to bear the respective costs.
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2000 (10) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Refund - Unjust Enrichment ... ... ... ... ..... n to its being passed on to another person would take it within its ambit not only the passing of the duty directly to another person but also cases where it is passed on indirectly. This would be a case where the duty paid on raw material is added to the price of the finished goods which are sold in which case the burden or the incidence of the duty on the raw material would stand passed on to the purchaser of the finished product. It would follow from the above that when the whole or part of the duty which is incurred on the import of the raw material is passed on to another then an application for refund of such duty would not be allowed under Section 27(1) of the Act. 3. The respondent in this had sought refund of duty paid on Chlorine which was consumed by it captively in the manufacture of Hydro Chloric Acid. The incidence of the duty paid on Chlorine had been passed on to others. It s claim for refund was, therefore, rightly rejected on the grant of unjust enrichment.
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2000 (10) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... arent on the face of the record and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 3. A reading of the Order-in-Original passed by the first respondent shows that the above-said letters dated 27-8-1983 and 9-6-1985 have been brought to the notice of the authority and the same have been dealt with by the first respondent in the Order-in-Original. Such being the case. It cannot be said that the petitioner has suppressed the material facts. The findings arrived at by the second respondent Tribunal basing on the orders passed by the first respondent in the Order-in-Original is liable to be interfered with and the same is set aside. The matter is remitted to the second respondent Tribunal for considering the matter afresh. The second respondent Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed. No costs, consequently W.M.P. No. 29699 of 1992 is closed.
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2000 (10) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Settlement of Excise and Customs Disputes by Settlement Commission ... ... ... ... ..... try of Finance, filed in compliance with the direction of this Court, it is stated, That the differential customs duty provisionally worked out on the consignment arrived in the name of M/s. Sonata Marketing on the basis of evidence available is Rs. 2,16,250/- (Rupees two lakhs sixteen thousand two hundred fifty only) . . 7.In view of these averments, we direct the appellant to furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 2,20,000/- (Rupees two lakhs twenty thousand only) to the Commissioner of Customs in addition to the bank guarantee directed to be furnished by the Settlement Commission. On the appellant furnishing the bank guarantees, as directed above, the Customs Authorities shall release the goods in question provisionally. However, we make it clear that the working out of the customs duty as well as the release of the goods will be subject to such further orders as may be passed by the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 958/2000. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2000 (10) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the release by the assessee, who was one of the partners in the firm of 3-Aces, of his rights in the assets of the firm for a consideration of ₹ 3,00,000 when the market value of the assets of the firm in proportion to his share was in excess thereof, did not amount to a gift within the meaning of the Gift-tax Act ?
Held that:- The High Court having rightly stated that the decision of Getti Chettiar (1971 (9) TMI 61 - SUPREME Court) which supported the case of the appellant and even the observations made were binding on it, wrongly did not apply the ratio of the said decision to the facts of the case in hand. Further, the High Court committed an error in stating that the said decision had no application to the distribution of the assets as between the partners whose shares inter se are specific and determined at any given point of time and that the said decision had to be read and understood in the light of the subsequent decision of this court in Kantilal Trikamlal's case [1976 (7) TMI 61 - SUPREME Court]. As in the case of the Hindu joint family, the coparceners do not have exclusive rights in any specific property of the family, the property allotted to their shares become specified only on partition ; the same is the position in the case of a partner of a firm. No partner of a firm can claim exclusive or specific right in any specific asset of the property of a firm. Coparceners also have definite share in the Hindu undivided family. So also the partners have definite share in the partnership. In favour of assessee.
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2000 (10) TMI 47 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Income, Business Income, Unclaimed Balances, Precedent ... ... ... ... ..... r the assessment year 1997-98 and subsequent years, the expression loss or expenditure or some benefit in respect of any such trading liability by way of remission or cessation thereof in section 41(1) of the Act would include the remission or cessation of any liability by any unilateral act of the assessee. In view of the above amendment, the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. 1999 236 ITR 518 would not be applicable to assessment for the assessment year 1997-98 and subsequent years. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the clear opinion that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that no part of the sum of Rs. 41,453 was chargeable to tax under section 41(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2000 (10) TMI 46 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... TR 574 . The decision of this court in the above case, at the material time, being the subject-matter of appeal before the Supreme Court, it was incumbent on the part of the Tribunal to refer the came to the High Court. The Tribunal should have reframed the question to bring out the real controversy in the case, which it failed to do. We, therefore, reframe the question as below Whether, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the extension of the Wealth-tax Act, originally enacted, to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was unconstitutional? and answer the same by holding that the Wealth-tax Act, as originally enacted, falls within entry 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and its extension to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was perfectly constitutional. In the premises, we answer the above reframed question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. This reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2000 (10) TMI 45 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Competency Of Appeal, Interest, Reference, Writ, Recovery Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nd decided against the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the same arose in the same assessment year for which the present petition is filed. In my opinion, the issue sought to be urged has attained finality in reference proceedings and the same cannot be now again examined nor it can be allowed to be reagitated in the writ petition. Even otherwise, the issue sought to be urged has no substance. It has been expressly dealt with and answered against the petitioner by this court while answering the reference. It was held by this court that in the absence of any provision of law under which the amount, if any, refundable to the assessee under any other Act could be set off against the amount of tax payable by the assessee under the Act, no Orders could be passed for adjustment. In my opinion, the same reasoning applies to repel the submission urged in this writ. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the writ. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (10) TMI 44 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Loss, Return ... ... ... ... ..... lause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment (see Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 672 Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt.) v. K. Devi, AIR 1996 SC 1963). Section 41(5) enacts an exception to the general rule that after a business has ceased to exist, any loss relating thereto cannot be further carried forward and set off against the income of a subsequent year as laid down in section 72(1)(i) read with the proviso. But that does not introduce a concept of assessing loss for a period for which no return has been filed. Such a power does not exist. That being the position, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that on a combined reading of sections 41(2) and 41(5), operation of section 80 of the Act was ruled out. In view of the clear language used in section 80, the view of the Tribunal is indefensible. Our answer to the question is in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2000 (10) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Salary, Life Insurance Corporation ... ... ... ... ..... oyer-employee relationship. It was found by this court, on the facts, that the reimbursement was not a salary. In the circumstances, the judgment has no application to the present case. Mr. Jasani, learned counsel for one of the assessees, tried to contend before us that the contract in question was a contract of agency between the Life Insurance Corporation and the Development Officers. This point has not been raised before the lower court. Hence, we did not permit the assessee to raise the said contention. Before concluding, we may mention that the above question which has been referred to this court in Income-tax Reference No. 52 of 1993, has also been raised in the conjoint income-tax references which are disposed of by this judgment. It is the main question. Accordingly, the said question is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Accordingly, the above references stand disposed of with no order as to costs. C. C. expedited.
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2000 (10) TMI 42 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Legal Representative, Refund, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... s for that year. Any income which was received before the death of the original assessee and which was paid subsequent to his death and received by his heirs and legal representatives but paid in the same year should be treated as income of the assessee and the legal representatives will be assessed on behalf of the original assessee. As observed by the Supreme Court, at the time when the income was received, the persons should be alive. Here, refund is availed only when it is ordered and it could be received only subsequently. The fiction cannot be extended beyond what it was intended. It was then submitted that on the basis of equity, this interest should have been treated as income of the deceased. As it is well known, tax and equity are strangers. Hence, according to us, income received by the petitioners as interest on refund of the amount deposited by the father, the original assessee, is to be treated as income of the petitioners. The original petitions are dismissed.
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2000 (10) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Concealment Of Income, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... own in the profit and loss account actually does not belong to the firm by giving other independent evidence. So also, we are of the view that the Tribunal went on relying on a subsequent assessment order in favour of Bhaskaran and Company. Merely because of this assessment order, where this amount has been included as income of the firm, the Tribunal cannot say that there is no offence committed. The Tribunal will have to dissect it as it is subsequent to the order of assessment, and find out the basis on which it found that the income mentioned in the profit and loss account belongs to another firm. Hence, we are of the view that the matter requires fresh consideration at the hands of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, if it finds that any further evidence is necessary, can remand the same to the original authority or the appellate authority. We are of the view that it is not necessary for us to answer the questions of law referred to us. The I. T. Rs are disposed of accordingly.
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2000 (10) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Rectification Of Mistakes, Writ, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... e learned Commissioner did not render any specific finding on the merits as to whether any case is made out for rectification under section 154 or in other words whether the grounds urged by the petitioner in their application under section 154 ibid makes out any case for rectification so as to empower him to modify the earlier order dated November 27, 1995. In the absence of any specific finding rendered by the Commissioner under section 154 of the Act, the matter has to be remitted to the learned Commissioner for rehearing of the application and decide the same on the merits keeping in view the aforesaid observation. Accordingly, and in view of the aforesaid discussion the petition is partly allowed, the impugned order dated March 24, 2000 (annexure P-3), is set aside and the matter is sent back to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Indore, with a direction to decide the application made by the petitioner under section 154 of the Income-tax Act afresh on the merits, No costs.
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2000 (10) TMI 39 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Special Deduction, Winnings From Lotteries, Words And Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... r purchasers are indicia of a lottery . It is necessary that winner must not only be a contributor to the prize money, but also be a participant. In Webster s Dictionary, a lottery is defined to be a distribution of prizes by lot or chance ---and a similar definition is given in Johnson. The word lottery embraces the elements of procuring through lot or chance, by the investment of a sum of money or something of value, some greater amount of money or value. The expressions winnings from lotteries and winnings from horse races have been used in different contexts at different places in the statute. Section 80TT permits deduction in respect of winnings from lotteries. As the winnings from races including horse races have been treated differently under different statutory provisions, the claim of the assessee for deduction under section 80TT has been rightly refused. Our answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2000 (10) TMI 38 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... deed of partnership if the partnership is at will. We do not think that specific mention relating to the power of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 to withdraw from partnership jointly and severally made the case distinguishable from the present case. The above being the position, the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the order of the Revenue authority, i.e., in refusing registration. But that brings us to the question as to whether was the assessee per se entitled to be granted registration. One of the grounds on which registration was refused by the Revenue was non-distribution of profits. The Tribunal will consider this aspect afresh as it had not done so, as on the other aspects it had upheld refusal of registration. In the circumstances, we direct the Tribunal to rehear the appeals on the question of granting registration. The effect of non-distribution of profits on the question of registration is to be decided afresh by the Tribunal. Reference is accordingly disposed of.
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2000 (10) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business, Words And Phrases, Gratuity, Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... ry or more common meaning is something given or obtained as an equivalent . The large number of ways in which this expression compensation has been interpreted has one common factor running through them all, that is, that compensation is regarded as an equivalent or recompense, that which makes good the lack of variation of something else. Flowing from this concept enlargement of the meaning of this expression takes in that which compensates for loss or provision, amends, remunerates or recompenses. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In view of our answer to the first question, there is no necessity to answer the second question. So far as the third question is concerned, in view of our answer to the first question, the Tribunal shall decide afresh whether in the background of what has been held by us, viz., section 28(ii)(a), the allowance under section 10(10) is permissible to the assessee.
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2000 (10) TMI 36 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ies were questioned in appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (in short the AAC ) who upheld the penalties levied. The matter was carried in appeals before the Tribunal. After considering the rival stands, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was reasonable cause for not paying the instalment in time. It was noted that while considering the case of liability for penalty under section 140A(3) of the Act, the same was held to be not leviable and ultimately in the assessee s own case in Addl. CIT v. Free Wheels India Ltd. 1982 137 ITR 378(Delhi), it was held that the finding regarding acceptance of reasonable cause was a finding of fact. We are of the view that the same logic also applies to a case of levy of penalty under section 273 of the Act. Therefore, the conclusions of the Tribunal being essentially factual, no, question of law is involved. Accordingly, we decline to answer the questions referred. The references are accordingly returned unanswered.
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2000 (10) TMI 35 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Mercantile System Of Accounting, Retrenchment Compensation ... ... ... ... ..... compensation. In fact compensation is payable at the time of termination of services. Admittedly, the services were not terminated during the relevant previous year and were terminated and payments were made in the subsequent year. Therefore, there was no liability to pay retrenchment compensation during the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal s view is clearly indefensible. What is allowable as a deduction is ascertainable liability in praesenti. Retrenchment compensation under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the I. D. Act ), is allowable as a business expenditure, in the case of an assessee following the mercantile system of accounting, in the year wherein the liability therefor is incurred. Till then, it is not a liability in praesenti, but only a contingent liability with the result that a provision, therefore, is not allowable. The question therefore has to be answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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