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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 538 Records
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2000 (5) TMI 1013
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... ... ..... materials in a publication called Platt rsquo s Petro Chemical Assessment. He cited decision of this Tribunal in Adani Exports Ltd. v. CC 2000 (116) ELT 715. In a matter involving similar issue in Appeal C/1035/99 and others M/s. Wavin India Limited and Others v. CC 2001 (137) E.L.T. 257 (Tribunal) . We have noted the fact that operation of this decision having stayed by the Supreme Court could not affect its precedential value in the stay application. 3. emsp Accordingly we waive deposit of the duty demanded and stay their recovery. 4. emsp These appeals may be linked to the appeals filed by M/s. Wavin India and others for listing at the appropriate time. Annexure Details of Duties and Penalties Applicant Duty (Rs.) Penalty (Rs.) M/s. Sahil Trends M/s. M.S. International Ltd. M/s. Euro Exports M/s. M.S. Universal Exports Ltd. 20,20,363/- 66,19,373/- and 31,13,829/- 1,59,60,483/- 2,81,75,067/- 20,20,363/- 66,19,373/- and 31,13,829/- 1,59,60,483/- and 6,00,000/- 2,81,75,067/-
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2000 (5) TMI 992
Eligible to benefit of exemption under Notification No. 11/97-Cus. ... ... ... ... ..... . CC, Mumbai - 2000 (126) E.L.T. 986 (T) 2000 (40) RLT 249 and also in Hutchison Max Telecom Ltd. v. CC, Mumbai - 2001 (132) E.L.T. 774 (T) 2001(43) RLT 967. In both these cases, identical issue was involved and benefit of notification was allowed. The Commissioner has, by following the ratio of law laid down in both these cases, allowed the benefit of the notification in question to the respondents. 7. emsp The learned JDR has not been able to cite any law to the contrary. He has rather fairly admitted that PACS software was imported by the respondents on 3-12-97, before the issuance of amending notification dated 11-2-98, wherein term lsquo software rsquo has been defined. Earlier to that, the definition was not restricted and the software imported by the respondents were covered by Notification No. 011/97-Cus., dated 1-3-97. 8. emsp We do not find any illegality in the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and uphold the same. The appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2000 (5) TMI 987
Whether under the provisions of the Entry Tax Act, the possessor of the goods can be subjected to entry tax in the absence of his giving particulars of his local purchases?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. No provision in the said Act is brought to our notice which may enable the authority to raise the presumption that a possessor of the specified goods, who fails to produce before the authority his accounts, register or document on being required to do so, has imported the goods into the Calcutta metropolitan area without payment of tax. On the facts and circumstances of the case, it is impossible for a court to infer that the respondent has imported the goods into the Calcutta metropolitan area without payment of tax. Thus we cannot but uphold the impugned judgments of the Tribunal
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2000 (5) TMI 980
Whether a State can levy sales tax on transfer of right to use goods merely on the basis that the goods put to use are located within its State irrespective of the facts that-(a) the contract of transfer of right to use has been executed outside the State; (b) sale has taken place in the course of an inter-State trade; and (c) sales are in the course of export or import into the territory of India?
Held that:- In the light of discussion, as the equipment involved was unspecified goods and indeed an order for purchase of an unspecified equipment was made by the respondent after the lease, the respondent did not become owner of the equipment till the same was despatched to the hirer so the transaction under sub-clause (d) could be complete only after the completion of the sale of the equipment which happened only when the equipment was actually delivered to the hirer in Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Therefore, the transaction of deemed sale under sub-clause (d) cannot be said to be complete on the execution of the contract of master lease. If that be so, the question of the deemed sale being an inter-State sale would not arise
In the instant case, the purchase of the equipment was by the respondent, the fact that the hirer wanted to hire the equipment might have prompted the respondent to place an order for its purchase but that fact is irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion whether the lease in respect of non-existent unspecified equipment would be complete on the execution of the master lease. On this aspect, we have held that before an unspecified equipment reaches the hirer, the sale of the equipment by the respondent itself would not be complete. The deemed sale under sub-clause (d) is only a consequential transaction which follows the completion of the sale in favour of the respondent and cannot precede it.
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2000 (5) TMI 977
EXEMPTION FROM TAX ON RAW MATERIALS — ELIGIBILITY CERTIFICATE — INCLUDING IN ADDITION TO RAW MATERIALS GUNNY BAGS - PERIOD OF EXEMPTION FIVE YEARS
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2000 (5) TMI 968
Amalgamation of companies ... ... ... ... ..... ed to above. If the two companies are being amalgamated, the idea of getting a loan of Rs. 8,50,00,000 has not been explained. The said loan is stated to have already been paid. Similarly, there has been injection of external commercial borrowing of Rs. 382.50 lakhs from Exedy Corporation, Japan. There was no such point of commercial borrowing by the petitioner. If the same is being amalgamated with the other company, the only purpose that one could conclude is that it would be defeating certain provisions of law which otherwise may be passing of the property to the transferee-company. These conditions certainly look unfair and in fact, without the permission of the court have already been given effect to as have been indicated in the affidavit. These conditions clearly reveal that what is being projected is not correct. Therefore, the permission as such cannot be granted. 15. For these reasons, the company petition being without merit, must fail and is accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (5) TMI 967
Annual return ... ... ... ... ..... filing the return within sixty days under section 159 of the Act does not arise. Therefore, the revisionists have not committed any offence under section 162 of the Act. It is contended that the annual general meeting under section 166 can be held only after a statutory meeting is held. That no statutory meeting was held and, therefore, there was no question of annual general meeting and submission of return under section 159 of the Companies Act. 11. In the circumstances, therefore, it is clear that no offence has been committed by the revisionists under section 162 of the Act. 12. Accordingly, I find that the complaints are not maintainable because they are barred by time and secondly prima facie, no offence under section 162 has been committed. The learned Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, therefore, has erred in rejecting the application of the revisionists. All the revisions are, accordingly, allowed and the complaint against all the revisionists are quashed.
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2000 (5) TMI 966
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... g either party, it can conveniently be stated that defence cannot be outright rejected. It would be appropriate that this controversy as to in what circumstances the payment, if any, which was made to Nanda Bros. should be investigated. The defence cannot be outright rejected to be sham. 9. There is another way of looking at the matter. The respondent claims and asserts on the basis of the documents referred to above that it has made the payment to another person. In these circumstances, even by adjudging as to if the respondent is unable to pay the debts on commercial basis, still it cannot be held that ingredients of section 433(e) in the facts of the present case would be satisfied. Consequently, at this stage, the petition does not require to be admitted. 10. For these reasons, the petition fails and is dismissed. It is clarified that nothing said herein should be taken as any expression of opinion on merits of the matter, if the petitioner chooses to file the civil suit.
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2000 (5) TMI 965
Appellants’ notice of motion dismissed - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Neither appellant No. 1 nor respondent No. 1 shall preside in any of the meetings of the board of directors.The appointment of 12 additional directors cannot be sustained. Hence resolutions dated 8-11-1997 and 29-3-1997 and 17-4-1997 stand obliterated in view of the consent order dated 30-6-1997/ 2-7-1997.
So far resolution dated 17-4-1997 for the induction of 57 life members, in view of our findings, they not be deemed to have been inducted on that date as member but their induction as such would be placed for consideration before the annual general meeting to be held later.
Annual general meeting shall be held under the chairmanship of Mr. A.P. Kothari, Company Registrar, who shall expedite the holding of annual general meeting at a very early date, possibly within three months of this order being communicated to him.
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2000 (5) TMI 963
Whether compensation can be awarded for ‘mental agony’ suffered by the claimants ?
Whether in the absence of any contract or promise held out by the Ghaziabad Development Authority any amount by way of interest can be directed to be paid on the amount found due and payable by the Authority to the claimants ?
If so, the rate at which the interest can be ordered to be paid ?
Held that:- Compensation for mental agony could not have been awarded as has been done by the MRTP Commission. Thus the direction made by the MRTP Commission for payment of Rs. 50,000 as compensation for mental agony suffered by the claimant-respondents in Civil Appeal is set aside. In all the other cases the direction for payment of interest at the rate of 18 per cent shall stand modified to pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
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2000 (5) TMI 960
Propriety of the procedure followed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Held that:- As in all the cases, the Commission has not considered the objections to the award or not allowed the parties to file objections, therefore, set aside the final orders of the Commission in all these matters and remit all these matters back to the Commission. Also direct that the Commission shall permit the parties, who have not filed their objections, to file their objections to the award within a period of 4 weeks from today.
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2000 (5) TMI 959
Provisions of section 45S challenged - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. A number of petitions had been filed in this Court seeking transfer of writ petitions pending in different High Courts. By order dated 17-2-2000, those transfer petitions were dismissed as not pressed. Besides the writ petitions, in respect of which, those transfer petitions had been filed, a number of other petitions are pending disposal in various High Courts. In quite a few of them the High Courts have granted an interim injunction staying the operation of the implementation of the amended section 45-S. For the view we have taken now, it is imperative that these petitions, pending in the different High Courts, are formally disposed of at an early date. We, therefore, request all the High Courts, in which the petitions are pending challenging the provisions of section 45S, to dispose them of within a period of three months. Needless to say inasmuch as the validity of section 45S has been upheld by us, the said provision shall be liable to be enforced notwithstanding any interim orders to the contrary which may have been passed by any High Court, which interim order must necessarily now lose all its significance.
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2000 (5) TMI 958
Offence allegedly committed by the respondents under section 113 of the Companies Act, 1956 - Held that:- Apart from overlooking the provisions of section 621, the High Court erred in construing the provisions of section 113(2) with reference to section 113(3). The objects of the two sub-sections are desperate. Section 113(3) is primarily compensatory in nature whereas section 113(2) is punitive. An application under section 113(3) can only be made by the transferee. And as already seen, a transferee who is not an existing shareholder of the company cannot file a complaint under section 113(2) at all.
Thus the appellant as a person aggrieved would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 469(1)(b). It is not in dispute that the appellant came to know of the offences on 20-7-1992. The commencement of the period of limitation of six months for initiating the prosecution would have to be calculated from that date. The complaint was filed on 20-8-1992 well within the period specified under section 468(2).
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2000 (5) TMI 957
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be would be ... ... ... ... ..... ished from Lucknow. Publication has also been made in Gazette dated 1-5-2000. Despite that, none has turned up to file any objection. The case was listed on 1-5-2000 but it was thought desirable to wait for about for a week and the case was directed to be listed after one week. It has been listed today. However, none has appeared from the side of the respondent-company. 4. In view of the above discussion, a case is made out for winding up of the respondent-company. Accordingly, the respondent-company Bhartiya Gramin Vikas Vitta Nigam Ltd., having its registered office at Indalganj near Railway Station, Mohibullahpur, Sitapur Road, Lucknow is wound up. The official liquidator, High Court, Allahabad is appointed as Liquidator of the respondent-company as provided by section 449 of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner shall take necessary steps as per rule 113 of the Company (Court) Rules, 1959. The office shall take proper steps as per rules 109 and 111. I order accordingly.
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2000 (5) TMI 956
Deposits - Repayment of ... ... ... ... ..... any the respondent No. 1 could have arrived at the conclusion which he has arrived at by the impugned order at Ex. 5. In that case, if such order was appealable then this Court would not have interfered and relegated the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal. 7. In view of the above discussion, this petition is allowed. The impugned order at Ex. 5 is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondent No. 1 is directed to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner-company in accordance with law as early as possible preferably within three months from today after extending an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-company. 8. At first instance, the petitioner company shall appear before the respondent No. 1 through its representative on 25-5-2000. On that day, the respondent No. 1 shall give a fix date of hearing to the petitioner-company and after hearing the petition it shall decide the representation in accordance with law as directed above. Petition allowed.
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2000 (5) TMI 954
Whether any industrial company had become a sick industrial company in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The words no proceeding for winding up of the industrial company or for execution distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, leave no doubt in our mind that the effect of the section would be applicable even after the winding up order is passed as no proceeding even thereafter can be proceeded with further under the Companies Act. The High Court appears to have not taken note of the aforesaid words, i.e., to be proceeded with further. As the impugned judgment is based upon wrong assumption of the provision of law and completely ignoring the vital words noticed hereinabove, the same cannot be sustained.
The board of directors in the instant case were not in any way by any judicial order debarred from taking recourse to the provisions of the Act for the purposes of rehabilitation of the company. If there existed a power, its exercise cannot be termed to be mala fide only because it was initiated after availing the opportunity to make the payment of the amounts due and passing of the order of winding up of the company.
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2000 (5) TMI 951
Whether the order passed by the Commission that appellant has indulged in restrictive trade practice and further directions to file affidavit not to repeat such practices in future are at all justifiable ?
Whether the decision rendered by the Commission in UTPE/RTPE No. 15 of 1994 holding that appellant has indulged in restrictive and unfair trade practice attracting section 2(o)( ii) and section 36A(1)(i) and (vi) is at all justifiable?
Held that:- There is no allegation or evidence to hold that the appellant has indulged in restrictive trade practice. In this view of the matter the learned counsel for the respondents were not in a position to support the said finding. Hence, the direction given by the Commission that the appellant shall discontinue alleged restrictive trade practices and not repeat the same in future and shall file an affidavit in compliance within six weeks from the date of the order passed in both the matters requires to be set aside.
The Commission has not considered the necessary evidence and has accepted the plea of the respondent in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant board has indulged in unfair trade practice. We would again note that the Commission was not very clear about the application of the provisions of section 2(o)( ii) and it proceeded on the basis that the said section is also applicable. Further, as there is no proper finding of facts based on necessary evidence, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 30-5-1996 passed by the Commission in UTPE/RTPE No. 15 of 1994 holding that the appellant Board has indulged in unfair trade practices under section 36A(1)(i) and (vi) is unsustainable.
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2000 (5) TMI 922
Appeal by department - Adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... udgment. Even if he is a functionary of the department, in his capacity as an adjudicator he ceases to be a functionary and becomes an independent dispenser of justice. It is an extremely dangerous suggestion that any evidence placed before him by the defence has to be referred back by him to the investigating authority. Such submission destroys the very foundation on which the structure of quasi-judicial adjudication is based. 8. emsp We are also unable to appreciate the claim that the Additional Collector was controlled or governed by an external agency. The so-called other agency in these proceedings was Additional Drugs Controller who is also a responsible officer of the Government of India whose report was entirely factual. 9. emsp It is our wish and desire that Revenue should desist from making such submissions in the appeal memoranda. 10. emsp As far as the merits are concerned, we find nothing in this appeal. Upholding the lower order we dismiss this batch of appeals.
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2000 (5) TMI 914
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... Central Excise classification product is a responsibility of Central Excise Officer. In fact the approving any of classification list granted Rule 173B is presumed to have been given by the proper officer after satisfying himself about the nature of the goods. In these facts and circumstances the allegation of mis-declaration or suppression of facts is not sustainable. Since, I am in agreement with Member (Judicial) on time bar issue which will result in allowing the appeal as proposed by him, I do not feel it necessary to go into other issues raised by both sides. Accordingly, the view expressed by the Member (Judicial) is concurred with on time bar issue. Case file is returned to the bench to pass an order accordingly. Sd/- (G.A. Brahma Deva) Member (J) MAJORITY ORDER 65. emsp We hold that the demand is barred by limitation, set aside the order and allow the appeal on the ground of time bar. emsp emsp Sd/- (V.K. Agrawal) emsp Member (T) Sd/- (Jyoti Balasundaram) Member (J)
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2000 (5) TMI 904
Seizure and confiscation of goods - Adjudication - Accountal of goods - Import ... ... ... ... ..... s that initially 3200 Kgs. of silk yarn were imported, out of which 2000 Kgs. were sent to the weavers and 1200 Kgs. were still lying with Shri Prakash Chandra at his premises in Bangalore, which was also verified by the Officers. As such, we find that the weight, description and other factors tally with silk yarn imported by the appellants in the year, 1995. Even in the absence of fully tallying with the marks, we hold that benefit of doubt is to be extended to the appellants inasmuch as the Department has not been able to prove by production of any tangible and concrete evidence that the silk yarn in question was illegally imported, the onus of which lies upon the Department. 7. emsp We also do not find any justification in imposition of penalty upon Shri Atma Ram Maheshka who is only a small type of weaver of the goods and was to receive the silk yarn in question for weaving purposes and consequently, we set aside the impugned Order and allow the appeals of the appellants.
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