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Showing 21 to 40 of 551 Records
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2000 (7) TMI 995
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... ... ..... required to be constituted to interpret the changes in the said section. Under the above circumstances, the Assessing Officer was not justified in making an adjustment under section 143(1)(a) by computing the deduction under section 80HHC after reducing the profits on account of the deduction admissible under section 32A. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that section 143(1)(a) cannot be invoked by the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer was free to invoke the provisions of section 143(2)/(3) and proceed by way of regular assessment. 2. Hence, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 994
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... ... ..... rent after Ex.A2 notice. From his conduct it is clear that he was indifferent in paying rent and he intentionally did not want to tender rent to landlords. The question whether PW2 is to be believed or not also cannot be agitated in revision. Rent Controller had the opportunity to see the witness and appreciate his demeanowr. Appellate Authority also reconsidered the entire evidence and held that PW2 is to be believed. Learned counsel for petitioner did not have the case that authorities below did not consider material piece of evidence and have given importance only to irrelevant evidence. It is also not his case that authorities below did not decide the case in accordance with law. Even if another view is possible that also cannot be a ground for interference under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The concurrent findings of authorities below are not liable to be interfered with. 17. In the result the revision petition is dismissed with costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 993
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... ... ..... merely because such charge is created by Court different procedure could apply for putting the property on sale. (31). In view of aforesaid, we regret our respectful inability to the proposition laid in Tripura case that charge created by Court automatically results in attachment of such property. (32). In view of the aforesaid conclusions that the principles of res judicata including constructive res judicata operates in execution proceedings and that the order made under Rule 22 clause (1) and (2) of O. XXI CPC, which result in closure of preliminary stage and commencement of next stage operates as res judicata, and precludes the judgment-debtor, from raising objections to continuance of proceeding thereafter unless such order is appealed against as a decree. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the subsidiary issues on which we entirely agree with the reasons and conclusions recorded by the learned Single Judge. 33). Appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 992
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... ... ..... l court, specially in view of the said specific plea taken in the written statement. The High Court felt that since it is a legal matter it could be adjudicated notwithstanding a different stand in its pleading. This approach was not proper. Once a stand infact is taken, that fact cannot be controverted by any legal proposition. In the present case, the insurance company has not led any evidence to dissolve the stand taken in the written statement that it was done by mistake nor was there any application to amend such pleadings. In view of this, the High Court was not correct to decide the issue through legal inferences de hors of and without adverting to the glaring facts on the record. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and confirm that of the trial court. The present appeal is accordingly allowed, cost on the parties. 10. We have no hesitation, in case the appellants make an application to the Executing Court, the Court will consider it expeditiously.
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2000 (7) TMI 991
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... ... ..... m for abatement would not be permissible even for the periods subsequent to the intimation, we find that condition (a) of sub-rule (2) does not contemplate denial of abatement on account of delay in filing the intimation. In the present case, appellants’ submission is that they had filed intimation on the date of closure itself. The Rule does not contemplate denial of abatement from the date of filing of intimation regarding closure even if the closure has taken place prior to the date of intimation. Therefore, we find the Commissioner’s interpretation of condition (a) of sub-rule also to be erroneous. In the circumstances, we hold that appellants would be eligible for exemption from the date of intimation. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of by way of remand for the Commissioner to reconsider their claim and to allow the same for the period of closure subsequent to the date of intimation. Appellants shall be given hearing before passing of the order in remand.
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2000 (7) TMI 990
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... ... ..... y stated "I submit that the accused have together forged the subject certificate (letter) of viz. inspection extract in respect of Award No. 1316 (2-2A) BBB-12...". 11. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case so that no prejudice is caused to any party, we are of the opinion that the complaint which was filed specifically alleged that all the three accused had in a sense together forged the document which was presented in the Court. It is possible that this allegation may be incorrect, whole or in part. We are not considering this question at this stage. 12. The High Court, in our opinion, in the facts of the present case, was not justified in quashing the order of the Magistrate who had issued summons to accused Nos. 1 to 3. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is upheld. The appeal is allowed. All the accused will be entitled to raise such pleas as are open to them in accordance with law.
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2000 (7) TMI 989
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... ... ..... lhi, inter alia, 4 gms. of Heroin, one vacuum sealer, small weighing scale were recovered. This would show that some activity in drug is also being done at the house where the petitioner lives. This must be in the knowledge of the petitioner. The use of the car in the present case in the circumstances may not be without her knowledge. 18. The learned Trial Court has exercised discretion in disallowing the request of the petitioner for the return of the car primarily on the ground that it is liable to be confiscated under the Act. In the facts and circumstances, for the reasons given above, it cannot be said that the exercise of the power by the Trial Court is unreasonable and unwarranted which calls for interference under inherent powers of Section 482 of this Court. 19. For these reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. 20. Nothing stated herein shall be taken as expression of opinion on the merits of the case during trial/inquiry.
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2000 (7) TMI 988
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... ... ..... ed turnover of the applicant at ₹ 5,18,962 and the tax liability of ₹ 2,06,689.17. However, it had held that the applicant is liable to pay interest under Section 8 (1) of the Act on the amount of tax admitted by it in the return. 4. As already mentioned above the Commissioner of Sales Tax did not raise nay grievance in the memo of appeal regarding charging and calculation of interest by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial). The Tribunal had not permitted any additional ground to be raised and no additional ground was taken by the Commissioner of Sales Tax at the time of hearing of the appeal. Thus, the Tribunal was not justified in adjudicating upon the question of calculation of the interest by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) in the absence of any grievance to that effect being made by the Commissioner of Sales Tax. 5. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Tribunal in so far as it modifies the levy of interest is set aside.
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2000 (7) TMI 987
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... ... ..... as in accord with the provisions of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Merely because the plaintiff claims damages in a suit for specific performance of contract as alternative relief, it cannot be said that the is not entitled to the main relief of specific performance of contract itself. 13. None of the reasons given by the High Court is sustainable in law to justify setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside and accordingly we do so and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. 14. Inasmuch as the plaintiff had already deposited the balance of consideration pursuant to the judgment and decree of the trial court, the legal representatives of the defendant (respondents herein) are ordered to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months from today. The appeal is allowed. The plaintiff is entitled to receive his cost from the defendant/respondents.
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2000 (7) TMI 986
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... ... ..... ent or of any understanding between the parties or for any other reason, the remedy of the appellants would be to seek compensation for wrongful termination but not a claim for specific performance of the agreements and for that view of the matter learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had sought for an injunction seeking to specifically enforce the agreement. Such an injunction is statutorily prohibited with respect of a contract, which is determinable in nature. The application being under the provisions of Section 9(ii)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, relief was not granted in view of Section 14(i)(c) read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. It was rightly held that other clauses of Section 9 of the Act shall not apply to the contract, which is otherwise determinable in respect of which the prayer is made specifically to enforce the same. Consequently, there being no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 985
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... ... ..... examined the relevant facts involved in these appeals and having examined the judgment of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the Full Bench rightly interfered with the judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court. In OURVIEW/the payment of penalty under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act would not absolve the employee fully from all other liabilities/nor. would it debar the employer from initiating a departmental proceedings for the alleged misconduct of the concerned delinquent employees Such initiation of a departmental proceedings by no stretch of imagination, can be held to be a violation of provision of Article 20 of the Constitution of India in this view of the matter, we uphold the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and necessarily therefore, the Civil Appeals filed by the State Government are allowed and the Civil Appeal filed by the delinquent is dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 984
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... ... ..... hi, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 983
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... ... ..... ly restoring the possession was not only consequential order to the order without contest, so any claim if at all stood satisfied prior to the Act coming into force. In any case it cannot be construed to be a claim or action taken after Act came into force. Passing an order under Order 21, Rule 35 is an act of the court, it is not an act by way of action or claim made by the appellant What is barred in making claim or action by the original owner. The appellant is the owner and he has not made any such claim. The claim if at all was making application under Section 144 which was prior to the Act, which would be deemed to be pending when Act came into force. Hence all these reasons the submissions on behalf of the respondents, have no force. No bar to these proceedings would be said by virtue of Section 4 of the Act. o p /o p Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned revisional order dated 12th October, 1988 of the High Court. Costs on the parties. o p /o p
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2000 (7) TMI 982
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... ... ..... AC) did not accept the plea. However, this stand was accepted by the Tribunal. On being moved by Revenue, the references have been made. 4. Learned counsel for the Revenue, with reference to s. 7(1) of the Act, submits that s. 16A cannot take away the effect of s. 7(3). The aforesaid question has been examined by various High Courts including this Court and in Sharbati Devi Jhalani vs. CWT & Ors. (1986) 54 CTR (Del) 85 (1986) 159 ITR 549(Del) TC 63R.411 it was held that in view of s 16A of the Act the course adopted by the AO in the present case is not permissible. Reference was also made to a circular issued by the CBDT (Circular No. 96, dt. 25th Nov., 1972) in support of the conclusion. Following the aforesaid decision, or answer to the first question referred is in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, and in view of answer to the first question, the second question is of academic interest. The references are accordingly disposed of.
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2000 (7) TMI 981
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... ... ..... lment of sales and purchases are found. If the manufacturing account as required under the said section has not been maintained the books of account is liable to be rejected as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Girija Shanker Awanish Kumar, reported in 1996 (11) S.C.C. 648 1987 U.P.T.C. 213 (SC) and best judgment assessment is to be resorted to. In the present case, it has been found that the Assessing Officer has taken into consideration the consumption of electricity while determining the taxable turnover. Once the books of accounts having been rejected, the turnover has to be determined by best judgment assessment and element of guess work is always there. In the case of best judgment assessment, the consumption of electricity may be taken into consideration while determining the turnover. In view of the above, the impugned order of Tribunal does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The revision lacks merit and is dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 980
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... ... ..... fied in full. As was pointed out in the Allahabad Full Bench case, AIR 1988 All 593, if the decree-holder perpetrates a fraud on the auction purchaser then certainly the latter would have an independent right of action to recover the purchase-money". 10. In view of the above said decision, and also in view of clause 16 of the terms and conditions of sale, I do not find any reason to grant the relief as sought for by the petitioner. 11. It cannot also be accepted that the non-disclosure of the fact regarding the letter from the Sales Tax Department to the petitioner, by the respondents 1 and 2 amounts to a fraud and on that basis the petitioner can ignore the same. The sale pursuant to the auction has already been concluded by confirmation of the same. 12. For all the reasons stated above, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P.Nos.6141 and 6142 of 2000 are also dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 979
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... ... ..... erved show cause notice on the petitioner but also enclosed therewith all the documents relied upon by the Authority. Instead of giving a suitable explanation, the petitioner did make a request in the letter dated 10-3-1993 asking for the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. This approach, in my view, is not only unwarranted, but also to make the Authority not to decide the issue in the quickest possible time. 11. When there is a Statute which requires the Authority to conduct the proceedings in a particular way, the petitioner cannot ask the Authority to deviate from that way and to allow him to cross-examine the witnesses which is not permissible as per the aforesaid Rule. As such, I do not find any infirmity in the order rejecting the prayer to permit the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. So, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs. Connected W.M.P. No. 15141 of 1993 is also dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 978
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... ... ..... is not in a position to dispute the aforesaid aspect. 4. In view of the above and following the decisions of this Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 9693 of 1996 and 1005 of 1997, this petition is partly allowed and the matter is remanded to the Revisional authority for consideration of the revision, particularly the aforesaid contention and the principle laid down in the aforesaid orders of this Court. The impugned order dated 29.1.1999 (Annexure-E) is accordingly quashed and set aside. The Revisional authority shall decide the revision application in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court or a certified copy of this order whichever is earlier. The petitioner shall be given an opportunity of being heard on all grounds including the aforesaid ground. 5. The petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 977
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... ... ..... not call for interference and no question of law arises. This is more so when no perversity has been shown in reaching such finding so as to raise the question of law relating to the findings of facts by pointing out that finding of fact stands vitiated and not binding on this Court in reference application. The other conclusions are being subordinate to rejection of books also fall in the same category. 3. Application rejected.
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2000 (7) TMI 976
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... ... ..... rovided reimbursement has been received from the Head Office/branch/correspondent abroad in an approved manner. When, in fact, there is no defence for suit filed merely to rely upon an injunction granted or obtained in their favour does no carry the case of the respondent Bank any further. The only basis upon which the respondent Bank sought for and obtained the injunction is that in event the counter guarantee cannot be honoured by reason of the injunction granted by the Italian court the respondent Bank should be extended the similar benefit. But a perusal of the Foreign Exchange Manual makes it clear that none of the claims would be an impediment to make payment under the Bank Guarantee in question. Therefore, in our view, the High Court plainly erred in having granted leave to defend unconditionally. We vacate that order and dismiss the application filed by respondent Bank for leave to defend by allowing this appeal. Considering the nature of the case, we order no costs.
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