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Showing 81 to 100 of 551 Records
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2000 (7) TMI 935
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... ... ..... P. and had been sold elsewhere. Thus, in the absence of any material having been produced by the applicant before the authority it is established that the applicant had failed to discharge the burden which was upon it under section 12-A of the Act. Thus, there is no infirmity in the order of the authorities concerned including Tribunal in holding that the applicant had imported remaining quantity of coal within the State of U.P. 6.. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that the rate of Rs. 400 per ton as fixed by the Tribunal is wholly arbitrary. 7.. It may be mentioned here that the applicant had not maintained any books of accounts. The applicant had not produced any books of account before the assessing authority. No proof of selling rate has been given by the applicant. In these circumstances, the Tribunal had not committed any error of law in the fixing the turnover as mentioned above. 8.. The revision lacks merit and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 934
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... ... ..... erala v. Vijaya Stores 1978 42 STC 418 (SC) 1978 KLT 802. In the light of the above decision, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order the enhancement of the taxable turnover under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. In the light of this, the order of the Tribunal enhancing turnover is set aside and the assessment order is confirmed. Tax revision case is disposed of as above. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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2000 (7) TMI 933
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... ... ..... . The order of the Higher Level Screening Committee is also liable to be quashed because the said Committee has done nothing more than to confirm an illegal order passed by the Lower Level Screening Committee. 18.. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The decision of the Lower Level Screening Committee rejecting the petitioner s application for grant of eligibility certificate is declared illegal and quashed. The order passed by the Higher Level Screening Committee dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner is also declared illegal and quashed. The Lower Level Screening Committee is directed to decide the issue relating to grant of eligibility certificate to the petitioner afresh and pass appropriate order within four months after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to it. The respondents are directed to pay costs of Rs. 5,000 which shall be recovered from the officer who filed a distorted version of the notice issued to the petitioner. Writ petition allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 932
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... ... ..... cer concerned, who shall act accordingly. The court shall have due regard to the principles of natural justice when it makes such summary determination, and that shall include an opportunity to the claimant to adduce evidence in respect of his claim, and an opportunity to either of the parties to the proceeding to lead evidence to rebut the same. Claimant, in the event he is aggrieved by such determination, may approach the Civil Court to establish his title to the property concerned. 6.. Petition allowed. Impugned order set aside. The State Government may take note of the observations made above in the matter of making rules under section 421(2) of Criminal Procedure Code. Till such time the State Government makes Rules under section 421(2) of Criminal Procedure Code the courts that issue warrants under section 421(1)(a) of Criminal Procedure Code, and the officers who execute the said warrants, shall comply with the directions issued above in that regard. Petition allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 931
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... ... ..... in section 22 of the Income-tax Act by the Financial Bill, 1987 was declaratory/clarificatory. 17.. Thus from the Statement of Objects and Reasons reproduced above it will be clear that section 3-AB of the Act has been inserted to clarify the provisions. Even though the aforesaid section was inserted with effect from August, 1990, it only clarifies the intention of the State not to levy any tax on packing materials where the goods sold in the said packing material are exempt from tax. The effect of the aforesaid insertion of section 3-AB is of a declaratory/ clarificatory amendment. 18.. Thus, the insertion of section 3-AB in the U.P. Trade Tax Act by (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1991) is retrospective. 19.. In view of the aforesaid discussions it is held that the Tribunal was not at all justified in levying tax on gunny bags used by the applicant in the packing of sugar. In the result, all the revisions succeed and are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 930
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... ... ..... ity is the best judge of the situation. It is his best judgment and not of anyone else. The High Court could not substitute its best judgment for that of the assessing authority. In the case of best judgment assessments, the courts will have to first see whether the accounts maintained by the assessee were rightly rejected as unreliable. 13.. The next case as relied by the learned Government Advocate is 1997 104 STC 453 (Gauhati) (1996) 3 GLT 661 (Fatikcherra Tea Estate v. State of Tripura) and this judgment is on two points, one the best judgment and the other is the proviso of section 20 of the Act which has been quoted above. The learned single Judge of this Court on both the counts found in favour of the authority and rejected the writ applications. 14.. This being the position of law and fact as indicated above, I do not find any merit in these writ petitions and accordingly the same are dismissed. The stay orders passed earlier stands vacated. Writ petitions dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 929
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... ... ..... unched, we have come to the conclusion that any direction relating to release of the goods can be obtained only from the concerned Magistrate before whom the prosecution is launched. If for any reason the petitioner seeks release of the goods and at the same time face prosecution, his only option is to pay the tax and double the amount, as demanded by the respondent, namely, the compounding fee of Rs. 48,000 under protest, and claim refund if he succeeds in the prosecution. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the determination of the compounding fee, his only remedy is to file a revision petition before the appropriate authority. In these circumstances, we are unable to grant any relief to the petitioner and the original petition is dismissed. And this tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 28th day of July, 2000. Petition dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 928
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... ... ..... oners had to pay tax at the rate of 4 per cent. We cannot accept the argument of learned Standing Counsel. The proviso to section 25 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act states Provided that no notification having the effect of increasing the liability to tax of a dealer shall be issued with retrospective effect under this section. Even apart from this proviso, the general legal principle is that ordinarily a delegated legislation cannot be made with retrospective unless the statute permits. A notification fixing the rate of tax is a piece of delegated legislation and hence it cannot be with retrospective effect unless there is a clear provision in the statute in this connection. 4.. In view of the above this petition is allowed. We direct that the petitioner shall be charged at the rate of 2 per cent and not 4 per cent from July 1, 1990. Corrigendum dated October 23, 1990 will be treated prospective and not retrospective. The assessment order be modified accordingly. Petition allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 927
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... ... ..... inescapable conclusion is that the applicant transferred the right to use machineries to M/s. Central Concrete and Allied Products Limited which in turn got the machineries utilised according to its own requirement with the help of the operators, and paid hire charges. The transaction comes within the purview of section 2(g)(ii) and is subjected to tax. Hence the application is liable to be dismissed. 12.. In this situation it is not possible for this Tribunal to accept that the Board committed a mistake when it proceeded on the basis of the undisputed facts, without considering them in conjunction with other facts mentioned by the applicant. We hold that there is no indication anywhere that evidence were ever produced in support of those factual contention. We have therefore, no reason to interfere with the order of the Board. 13.. In the result, the application is dismissed. There will be no order regarding costs. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 926
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... ... ..... nt Commissioner will confine himself to dispose of only the appeal against the order dated July 31, 1991 of the assessing authority and that there is no need to file a separate appeal as ordered by him in view of lapse of so many years and also in view of the order of remand passed by the Appellate Tribunal. As far as the issue relating to the assessment made by the assessing authority on March 27, 1991 for the assessment year 1989-90, it has become final and the appeal is also time barred. The tax revision case is allowed as indicated above and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is directed to dispose of the case in regard to penalty proceedings dated July 31, 1991 at the earliest. The tax revision case is disposed of in the above manner. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 7th day of July, 2000. Petition allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 925
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... ... ..... tanding the fact that section 3(7) imposes a tax on the sale of the I.V. fluid which cannot be sold without the containers and therefore, the containers are also subjected to tax at the sale point. 6.. It follows therefore that vice versa, the sale of empty tins would attract tax unless there is concrete proof that such tins had independently suffered tax earlier at the time of sale to the assessee. Consequently, we approve the orders of the lower authorities that the sale of empty tins to Reported as Apollo Saline Pharmaceuticals (P) Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu 2000 120 STC 493 (TNTST). the extent of Rs. 55,058 is exigible to tax and the claim of second sales exemption was rightly rejected. In fine, the tax revision case is dismissed. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 18th day of July, 2000. Petition dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 924
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... ... ..... end or pattern for similar assessments which, on a broad reckoning, the Commissioner might think to be prejudicial to the revenue administration. The prejudice must be prejudice to the revenue administration. Thus, it is not a mere loss of revenue that should be the sole consideration for invoking the power of revision. In matters fixing the estimate, there may be difference of opinion. But this difference of opinion cannot be equated with an erroneous view in law. 11.. Thus, considering the entire matter, we are of the view that the exercise of power by the Deputy Commissioner under section 35 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 when the appeal is against the original assessment was illegal and consequently, annexure D order and the order in T.A. No. 28 of 1994 of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram are set aside. The appeal filed by the revision petitioner against annexure A will be restored to file and will be disposed of by the competent authority.
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2000 (7) TMI 923
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... ... ..... ating to the petitioner twice. Incidentally, when the Revenue filed second appeals before the Tribunal, he had become its Accounts Member and sat in judgment over his own order when he passed the same as the first appellate authority. It is true that there is no allegation of personal bias against him. He may have acted bona fide, nonetheless, the principle of natural justice, fair play and judicial discipline required that he should have abstained from hearing the second appeals. For the aforesaid reasons, he was disqualified to hear the second appeals as he should not have sat in judgment on his own decision. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the Tribunal in second appeal Nos. 1215 and 1216 of 1988-89 at annexure 2 cannot be supported by law and is hereby quashed. The matter has to go back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal according to law. We order accordingly. The writ application is accordingly allowed. C.P.K. MISRA, J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 922
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... ... ..... inside the State of Orissa was not generally exempt under the State law and the same was hedged by specified condition and restriction. Accordingly, sales made by it in course of inter-State trade would not be exempt from payment of Central sales tax. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted with. 8.. Before parting with the case, we may state that the judgment of this Court in Magnetix (India) Ltd. (1993) 75 CLT 405, was based on the ratio of the Supreme Court in the first Pine Chemicals case, i.e., 1992 85 STC 432 (Pine Chemicals Ltd. v. Assessing Authority) which judgment has now been reversed in 1995 96 STC 355 (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jammu and Kashmir v. Pine Chemicals Ltd.) In view of this, the judgment of this Court in Magnetix (India) Ltd. 1993 75 CLT 405, no more holds the field. In the result, we do not find any merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. CH. P.K. MISRA, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 921
Whether transfer of shares in a Co-operative Society is subject to levy of stamp duty under the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958?
Whether the State Legislature has legislative competence to levy stamp duty on transfer of shares?
Held that:- The question whether or not a transfer of shares in a Co-operative Society is subject to levy of stamp duty on the basis that it is a conveyance has already been answered by this Court in the case of Veena Hasmukh Jain and Another v. State of Maharashtr a and Ors.[1999 (1) TMI 521 - SUPREME COURT] whereinheld that such agreements would be covered by Article 25 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. It is held that stamp duty would be leviable as if it is a conveyance. This Court has held that these are in effect agreements to sell immovable property as the possession of such property is transferred to the purchaser before or at the time of or subsequent to the execution of the agreement. It is held such an agreement to sell must be d emed to be a Conveyance. It is fairly conceded that this Judgment fully covers question (a) set out hereinabove.
As seen above stamp duty is sought to be levied under Article 25, Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act. The stamp duty is being levied not on transfer of shares but on the basis that the agreement is a conveyance. There is no dispute that there is legislative competence in the State Government to levy stamp duty on a conveyance of property. Question No. (b) has been raised On the footing that the instrument of transfer is a form of transfer of shares. Now that it is held that such an instrument is not an instrument of transfer of shares, but it is, in fact, a conveyance question (b) no longer survives. Appeal dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 920
Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not?
Held that:- Appeal partly allowed. The High Court directed the Board to discharge its obligation under the contractual provisions. It was noticed that earlier the Board had made payment to the contractor for enhanced wages from 1st April, 1983 to 31st December, 1984. Under the circumstances, declining to accept the second contention, we refrain from interfering with the directions for payment given in the impugned judgment except in respect of the rate of interest awarded by the High Court.
The High Court has directed the Board to pay to the contractor the amounts shown in the Statement EX.P-20 alongwith interest @ 18% per annum. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, we feel that it would be just and proper to award interest @ 9% per annum instead of 18%. In the statement EX.P-20, the contractor has calculated interest @ 18% per annum. The interest amount would now be calculated at 9% instead of 18% per annum. The impugned judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly.
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2000 (7) TMI 919
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... ... ..... d. and it was held that an order passed by the Commissioner without giving an opportunity of being heard is unreasonable and bad in law. Though the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax is in his administrative capacity, yet the principles of natural justice demand that an order affecting the party is passed after giving him an opportunity of being heard. We hold accordingly. The contentions on behalf of the Revenue that the assessee should approach the High Court for redress in this is rejected as we consider it our duty not to burden the High Court with unnecessary litigation. When the Tribunal has the power to redress the grievance of taxpayers, it is our duty to exercise that power in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience. This contention is also accordingly rejected. Since the demand of Rs. 19,43,000 is stayed till the disposal of appeal, we direct the Registry to fix the appeal for hearing on October 11, 2000. The application of the assessee is allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 918
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... ... ..... d, as such, changed the accounting system from mercantile to cash. The addition was made by the Assessing Officer without accepting the contention of the assessee which was upheld by the Tribunal. That ipso facto cannot give rise to the order of penalty. Merely, addition made by the Assessing Officer and confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is not a ground for levying penalty by the Assessing Officer under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Considering the circumstances involved in the present case I am of the view that there has been no concealment of particulars of income on the part of the assessee for attracting levy of penalty in the present case. Further, I find that in the assessment year 1987-88 the order of penalty has been passed mechanically without any application of mind. Considering the entire circumstances of the case, the finding recorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) requires no interference. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 917
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... ... ..... th these activities required, even originally, considerable storage space and the assessee was already using one godown at Amnatolla Road. The hiring of another godown must, therefore, be considered to be in the interest of the existing business only, looking to its future prospects. Hence, from this angle, we are of the opinion that the expenditure must have to be allowed as a part of the existing business expenditure. Taking into consideration all these aspects, we are of the view that the lower authorities have not acted correctly in disallowing the claims of the assessee towards payment of rent for all the years under consideration. We, therefore, reverse their orders and delete the disallowances of claims of rent of the amount of Rs. 3,78,000 for all the five years. In the result, the appeals for the assessment years 1992-93 to 1995-96 are partially allowed to the abovementioned extent, whereas the assessee rsquo s appeal for the assessment year 1996-97 is fully allowed.
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2000 (7) TMI 916
Refund - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... n by appellant at any point of time. No reason is assigned in that regard. The appellant has not taken proper precaution in paying the amount. He has not tried to show his refund claim in time. There is a safeguard under Section 11B of Central Excise Act regarding the payment of amount as confirmed and demanded by department, which is set aside in appeal later on, which is not utilised by appellant, and in the absence of it, the appellant cannot get back the amount paid, as refund. Section 11B of Central Excise Act does not specifically exclude the refund claim based on the orders of appellant authorities. As contended by appellant, even if it is outside the purview of Section 11B, under what provision he can get the refund is not pointed out. So under these circumstances his case can not be upheld. Accordingly it is rejected. Point raised is answered in the negative. Hence I pass the following. ORDER For the reasons discussed above, appeal cannot be allowed. It is Dismissed.
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