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2001 (3) TMI 1049
... ... ... ... ..... ORDER We find no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1048
... ... ... ... ..... ortunity to forward a second sample to establish that the case alleged by the prosecution is correct and for that purpose seek forwarding of a further sample to a more competent Laboratory. On the facts of the present case, I am satisfied that the motion for sending a second sample to the Laboratory at Trivandrum is well justified. The impugned order is hence set aside and the learned Special Judge for trial of NDPS cases, Ernakulam is directed to forward 'Sample B', if available in Court for analysis. If no such sample is available, or it is not fit for sending to the Laboratory, the Court will pass fresh orders in this matter on the merits. In case sample B is sent and the said Laboratory give's an opinion different from that given by the Regional Laboratory, Kakkanad, the Court will be fully justified in insisting on appropriate oral evidence of the analyst before deciding the question as to which of the reports is acceptable. The Cri.M.C. is allowed as above.
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2001 (3) TMI 1047
... ... ... ... ..... aving at times, such exercise of power to adopt only next to impossibility. Having regard to the provisions contained in proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Act which ensures that the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption and consequent protection of the rights vested with the junior widow in the property left behind by the deceased husband and the real and ultimate object of adoption by the widow, no injustice could be said to be caused to the junior widow on account of the legislature not making it obligatory for the senior widow to obtain the consent of the junior widow to adopt a child which would be deemed to be not only for her but also to the deceased husband as envisaged in Section 12 of the Act. For all the reasons stated above, we find no error of law or infirmity of any kind in the ultimate decision of the High Court to call for any interference at our hands. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1046
... ... ... ... ..... the mandatory directions contained in the Code. Criminal justice cannot be allowed to be defeated solely on account of inaction or lapses of the court in adhering to the mandates of law. When the State of UP moved the High Court of Allahabad, in this case, seeking leave to appeal, the above aspect should have been considered by the learned Judges and set right the grave miscarriage of justice occasioned on account of flouting the directions of law. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the acquittal passed by the trial court. We direct the trial court to proceed with the further examination of PW-1 and examination of other witnesses to whom the court should issue process if so requested by the prosecution. (It is open to the prosecution to produce such witnesses without bothering the Court to issue summons to them). The case shall be disposed of after taking all the remaining steps, in accordance with law. This appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
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2001 (3) TMI 1045
... ... ... ... ..... ing of the company and place the terms and conditions of the lease for its consideration and if the general body were to modify any of the terms and conditions of the lease, then the same will be binding on the 11th and the 12th respondents. 30. Thus on an overall assessment of the allegations, we are of the view that the respondents had been guilty of oppressing the petitioners, by deleting their names from the register of members, by issuing bonus shares against the provisions of the articles, by which the percentage holding of the petitioners was reduced, which was further reduced by issue and allotment of further 25,000 shares and by disassociating the nominees of the petitioners from the Board. In respect of all these acts of oppression, we have, in the relevant paragraphs of this order, given suitable directions to be complied within a set time frame, which the company should adhere to. 31. With the above directions we dispose of this petition with no order as to cost.
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2001 (3) TMI 1044
... ... ... ... ..... Neither the saving clause in Section 100 (1) or Section 4 of the Code can come into the rescue of the respondents in view of Section97(1) of the amending Act. More so by reason of the clarification rendered by the legislature in Section 101 of the Code which provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in Section 100 indicating thereby the further reinforcement to the legislative intent to be obtained from Section 101 as regards the issue of substantial question of law. This refers to substantial question of law having regard to the language of Section 103 cannot however be said to even imply a contra note apart from what is stated herein before. This is so however by reason of the provisions of Section 97 of the Amending Act. By reason of the aforesaid these appeals succeed, the order of the High Court in Second Appeal No.762 of 1986 stands set aside and that of the lower Appellate Court restored. Each party however to pay and bear its own costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1043
... ... ... ... ..... Ltd. (supra) is also followed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mettur Chemical & Industrial Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT 1996 217 ITR 7681 wherein Their Lordships held as under "The profits and gains of an industrial undertaking to which section 84 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, applies have to be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter IV-D of the Act and development rebate has first to be deducted from the total income and it is only thereafter, if any profits and gains remain from this business, that the benefit under section 84(1) of the Income-tax Act would be applicable." In view of the above, we have no hesitation to hold that the Assessing Officer was fully justified in allowing the depreciation before computing the income for the purpose of deduction under sections 80HHC and 80-I. We, therefore, find no merit in the assessee’s appeal. The same is dismissed. 13. In the result, the assessee’s appeal stands dismissed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1042
... ... ... ... ..... stance in the contention of Mr RK Patel for the assessee that the provisions of section 41(2) govern only building, machinery, plant or furniture and that, therefore, other assets cannot be included within the scope of Section 41(2) for taxing the difference between the written down value and the actual cost. We also find that in view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Act, transfer will not attract the provisions of Section 45 relating to capital gains if the transfer of capital assets is by a Company to its wholly owned subsidiary Company and the holding Company as well as the subsidiary Company are Indian Companies. 21. In view of the above discussion, our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative to the above extent i.e. in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Our answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative to the above extent i.e. in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The references accordingly stand disposed of with no order as to costs
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2001 (3) TMI 1041
... ... ... ... ..... gross profit rate accepted by the Assessing Officer, in the petitioner’s case for last number of years varying from minimum of 14.41 per cent to maximum of 24.51 per cent and held that in the peculiar circumstance of the case it is reasonable to accept the quantum of suppressed sales at the figure determined by the sales tax authorities while determining the levy of sales tax under that Act and looking to the material on record, directed to apply 19 per cent as gross profit rate. 6. In the aforesaid circumstances it is clear that the findings about the quantum of suppressed sales as well as the gross profit rate to be applied were founded on appreciation of evidence and these are findings of fact, which do not give rise to any question of law and, therefore, the application was rightly rejected and we do not find that the order of the Tribunal under section 256(2) is erroneous in any manner. The application, accordingly, fails and is rejected with no order as to costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1040
... ... ... ... ..... had not taken place. In the present case, the finding of the Tribunal is that the employees in question had not ceased to be employees but were merely not allowed to do work. This finding of fact arrived at on appreciation of evidence, cannot be faulted with at all. Hence, the right enforced by the employees will not attract the amended provision of the Act which came into force on 15.12.1986. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the award made by the Tribunal is in any way wrong particularly, when the decision has been given on facts that as on the date of the take over the concerned workmen were employees of the appellant management. If that is so, they never ceased to be employees. All that happened was they were prevented from working in the Colliery, which was set right by the award. We find no substance in this appeal. The same shall, therefore, stand dismissed. No costs The questions arising for consideration being identical this appeal is also dismissed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1039
... ... ... ... ..... the SCN was issued on the basis of entries made in RG 23A Part II and receipt of the bill of entry submitted along with monthly RT 12 returns. We note that this is settled position now that where the statutory documents are relied on in the SCN longer period is not invokable. This fact is supported by the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Kirloskar Oil Engine Limited , 1993 (65) ELT 371 , in the case of BHEL , 1997 (18) RLT 573 and in the case of M/s. Tony Electronics Limited, Final Order No. 1198/97 dt. 23.12.97. 8. A small credit of duty of ₹ 31,285/- was disallowed on the ground that the goods were short received and not used. We note that the appellants have already debited ₹ 11,503/- in RG 23A Part II. The remaining amount which was accounted for by the appellants is admissible to the appellants. Thus, both on merits as well as on limitation, the demand is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1038
... ... ... ... ..... e other materials seized from appellants' premises describing the goods as "marine plywood" and solely on the basis of same advertising material; the item cannot be classified as such. Therefore, on this charge, Revenue fails and the duty liability on this ground is set aside. 34. In the result, the aspect pertaining to under valuation and clandestine removal is remanded back to the Commissioner for de novo consideration. The Commissioner shall grant full opportunity to the appellants to plead their case and to cross examine the witnesses. The Commissioner shall give a clear cut finding on evasion in respect of each of the invoices and arrive at a finding of under valuation on the basis of evidence, which should be tested through cross examination. The Commissioner shall take into consideration the law laid down on this aspect of the matter. 35. Appeals are allowed by way of remand on the above terms and to be decided in the light of the findings expeditiously.
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2001 (3) TMI 1037
... ... ... ... ..... independent evidence apart from the circumstances enumerated above, we would be providing a safe jurisprudence for protecting such criminal activities. India cannot now afford to lay down any such legal principle insulating the marauders of their activities of killing kidnapped innocents outside the ken of others. Lastly, learned counsel invited our attention to a note which was recovered by the police from the scene of murder. That note contained the scribbling purported to have been authored by a group styled as Babbar Khalsa, owning the two murders of the deceased. We do not know how the said note would help the appellant unless he shows that he has nothing to do with that self styled Babbar Khalsa, even assuming that the note was left by the murderers without any intention to mislead the investigation. At any rate, we are not persuaded to change our conclusion on the strength of the said note. In the result, we confirm the conviction and sentence and dismiss this appeal.
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2001 (3) TMI 1036
... ... ... ... ..... oximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design are the factors for deciding whether certain acts form parts of the same transaction or not. Therefore a series of acts whether are so connected together as to form the same transaction is purely a question of fact to be decided on the aforesaid criteria. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and on scrutiny of the narration of events in the F.I.R. as well as the complaint, we do not find any infirmity with the conclusion of the High Court in applying Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Code to the case in hand and in coming to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Bhagalpur cannot be held to have been ousted for the offence under Section 304B IPC. In the aforesaid premises, we see no merits in this appeal, which accordingly stands dismissed. The interim order of stay stands vacated and the Magistrate is directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously, in accordance with law.
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2001 (3) TMI 1035
... ... ... ... ..... , therefore, fall within the ambit of article 13 of the Treaty. We answer question No. 13 by saying that the applicant has to file a return of income in India under the provisions of section 139 of the Income-tax Act even if he is entitled to exemptions and deductions under it and also the benefit of the Treaty between India and Mauritius. In view of the answer to question No. 13, question No. 14 need not be separately answered. Question No. 15 is answered by saying if the applicant is liable to pay income-tax in India, he is under an obligation to file a return of income. Non-filing of return will attract penal provisions of section 271(1)(b). Question No. 16 is already concluded by the principles laid down in the judgment of the Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Societe General, France in the order No. A. A. R. 362 of 1997, dated April 4, 1998. Mere charging of a higher rate of tax does not constitute discrimination between a domestic and a non-domestic company.
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2001 (3) TMI 1034
... ... ... ... ..... ly repealed and it is on this score that the decision of this Court in Justiniano's case (supra) stand overruled. There is one general law of limitation for the entire country being the Act of 1963, and the Portuguese Civil law cannot be termed to be a local law or a special law applicable to the State of Goa, Daman & Diu prescribing a different period of limitation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and in any event, question of saving of local law under the Limitation Act of 1963 does not and cannot arise. The submission that without there being a specific mention of repealing statute (since 1963 Act of Limitation does not record express repeal of any other law excepting the Limitation Act of 1908), question of Portuguese Civil Code being repealed does not arise, cannot hold good by reason of the doctrine of implied repeal as noticed above. In the premises aforesaid, these appeals fail and are dismissed without however, any order as to costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1033
... ... ... ... ..... ilable to both such manufacturers who are prosecuted for the offence. When the provision can be interpreted in such a way as to avert absurd consequences in the manner indicated above it is not congenial to the interest of criminal justice to acquit the manufacturers of forbidden medicines or drugs on a technical ground that there is a lacuna in the legislation by not supplying copy of the report of the Government Analyst to the manufacturer in certain situations. To adopt the course of acquitting such offending manufacturers only on the legislative lacuna (if at all it is lacuna) would be hazardous to public health and the lives of the patients to whom drugs are prescribed by medical practitioners would be in jeopardy. Hence, when the legislative provision is capable of being interpreted as we did now, the courts need not feel helpless in administering criminal justice in accordance with the objects sought to be achieved by the statute. In the result we dismiss this appeal.
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2001 (3) TMI 1032
... ... ... ... ..... use of any bona fide view or procedure adopted by the court concerned some delay is caused and in the meantime challan is filed, the Court has no power to direct release under proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code. The present case, where the prosecution was for an offence under the MPID Act, being a case of first impression, the Court concerned was of bona fide opinion that the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code were not applicable. That view of the Special Judge was reversed by the High Court, but before it could fully apply its mind, the challan was filed. In this background, I am clearly of the opinion that the right of the accused to be enlarged on bail under proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code cannot be said to have been availed of in the present case. This being the position, I have no option but to hold that the High Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned order so as to be interfered with by this Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1031
... ... ... ... ..... hence, they are illegal, without jurisdiction and bad in law. The order of CIT(A) is, therefore, set aside. The assessee, therefore, succeeds on the additional ground of appeal pertaining to initiation of proceedings under section 147. 7. As the reassessment was void ab initio, we are of the opinion that any additions made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) in that assessment automatically stand deleted. Though the arguments by both the sides were given on the additions as listed in the original grounds of appeal yet we are of the opinion that no mention of the same is required to be made here and no adjudication is required in respect of the same, the reassessment having been declared ab initio void. Similarly the other additional ground of appeal filed on 20-12-1999 is also not required to be considered as all the additions stand automatically deleted when the reassessment is declared ab initio void. 8. In fine, the appeal of the assessee stands allowed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1030
... ... ... ... ..... ere is any payment, whether before or after, in regard to labour for the free service that the dealer renders to cars of the respondent’s manufacture. The civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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