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Showing 41 to 60 of 478 Records
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2001 (4) TMI 918 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... he findings of the Tribunal on limitation, these civil appeals are dismissed without going into the other questions involved. No order as to costs. C.A. No. 6872/2000 Having regard to the facts of this case, the civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. C.A. No. 1071/2000 Having regard to the facts of the present case, the order that we have just passed in Civil Appeal No. 6872 of 2000 will apply. Accordingly, the civil appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 917 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... condoned. The civil appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 916 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... t has no basis since no such example could be pointed out on behalf of the respondents... It is settled law that when decisions are taken under a particular statute/scheme/rules, the same shall be taken only in accordance with the provisions and no extraneous consideration will be considered for taking such decisions. Since in the Incentive Scheme there is no such condition/requirements, the State Level Committee has taken this decision on the basis of extraneous consideration, which it was not entitled to do. 9. As a result, this writ petition is allowed-, the impugned communicated dated 14.10.1998 (Annex. 5) as well as the directions issued by the State Level Screening Committee dated 25.9.1998 (Annx. 4) are quashed and the respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner in accordance with law without taking into consideration anything de hors the provisions of the Scheme within a period of one month from the date of service of this order on them. No Costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 915 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... id Act. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the statements of the accused cannot be used as evidence for prosecution in the form of confession. 49. Considering the above points raised by the defence counsel, this Court is convinced that the prosecution has not been able to prove the cases beyond doubt against the accused-appellants herein and therefore this Court is of the considered view that the accused-appellants herein are entitled for benefit of doubt. 50. Therefore, the following order is passed The order of conviction and sentence passed against the accused-appellants herein in Sessions Case No. 164 of 1995 recorded by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad is hereby set aside. The accused-appellants herein are acquitted of all the charges levelled against them. They are set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. The fine amount, if any paid, shall be refunded to them. In the result, all the Criminal Appeals are allowed.
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2001 (4) TMI 914 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f religions that they threw themselves into the cauldron of communal delirium which was burning up to boiling point. That was a time when the minds of the rioters turned demented and no sensible thoughts would enter into them. The leaders and the society have not played their part to teach them that religions are not meant for killing fellow human beings. If ignorance had prompted people to take up cudgels in the name of religion for indulging in carnage or murders they are no doubt liable to be convicted and sentenced for the offence committed by them. But we have great difficulty to treat such a case as rarest of the rare cases in which the alternative sentence of life imprisonment can unquestionably be foreclosed. Thus, we alter the sentence passed on Nasim Naso for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and impose the next alternative (imprisonment for life) for the said offence. Subject to this modification of the sentence we dismiss both these appeals.
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2001 (4) TMI 913 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty can only be tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty and for the offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings. In view of the aforesaid position in law, both on international law as well as the relevant statute in this country, we dispose of these cases with the conclusion that a fugitive brought into this country under an Extradition Decree can be tried only for the offences mentioned in the Extradition Decree and for no other offence and the Criminal Courts of this country will have no jurisdiction to try such fugitive for any other offence. This Writ Petition and Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (4) TMI 912 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... On the facts of this case no ground is made out to admit the appeal. It is dismissed accordingly.
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2001 (4) TMI 911 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Appeal No. 53/2001, Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-I v. TELCO Ltd., Pimpri, Pune 2001 (130) E.L.T. A260 . In view of this, the civil appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 910 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... he question of maintainability of the appeal in the light of Section 130-E(b) is left open to be considered at the time of final hearing.
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2001 (4) TMI 909 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sition Act? 2. whether a person who has received the compensation without protest pursuant to the award of the Land Acquisition Collector and has not filed an application seeking reference under Section 18 is "a person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 28-A?" 9. Though various other suggestions have come forth from the Bar but the questions noticed in Jose Antonia's decision (supra) in our view would otherwise cover the field for which difficulties are being experienced as noticed herein before. 10. On the wake of the aforesaid we do feel it expedient also to record that above noted two questions require examination by a larger Bench of at least five Judges by reason of the pendency of the various matters in this Court. 11. Notices thus be issued to the respondents returnable within four weeks. Dasti service to be taken out in addition. 12. The Registry is directed to place these matters before the Hon. Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
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2001 (4) TMI 908 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ents of the High Court, which are under appeal, are accordingly set aside and the writ petitions filed by the two respondents are directed to be dismissed. However, consistently with the observation made by this court vide para 18 of Major Dharam Pal Kukretys case, we would like to impress upon the Chief of the Army Staff and the Central Government, as the case may be, that the incidents leading to action against the two respondents are referable to late 70s. By this time a period of more than 20 years has elapsed in between. Before any decision to initiate disciplinary action against any of the two respondents is taken, the conduct and behaviour of the respondents concerned during the intervening period shall also be taken into consideration while deciding upon the desirability of proceeding further in the matter at this belated stage, and keeping in view, of course, the requirement of military discipline and the high traditions of the Indian Army. No order as to the costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 907 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Section 195 of the Code. Needless to record here that on a proper appreciation of judgment in Baliram (supra), there cannot be two opinions as the scope and effect of Section 195 (3) of Code and we thus record our concurrence with the view expressed by this Court in Baliram The law thus laid down by the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra) cannot be said to be good law and thus stands over-ruled even on the basis of the state of law under the 1940 Act (being a repealed statute presently). On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions made in support of the appeal that the Arbitrator can be termed to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Cr. Procedure Code, as such question of applicability of Section 340 Cr.P.Code in a proceeding before the Arbitrator does not and cannot arise. The issue thus is answered in the negative. The Appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 906 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... as the show cause notice did not allege mis-statement, fraud, suppression etc. which was necessary to cover the extended period. The Commissioner made two observations. The first was that the plea was not raised before the Assistant Commissioner and the second was that the show cause notices mentioned that the credit wrongly taken was sufficient. In the appeal against this order, Shri J.C. Patel strongly stressed this point. 3. I have carefully read the show cause notice and find that it does not make such allegations as are required to be made in terms of proviso to rule 57(1)(i) for the extended period to be covered. By implication also this (sic) cannot be read into the show cause notice. The fact that the ground was not raised before the Assistant Commissioner was not material. It is well settled that a point of law can be agitated at any stage. 4. Finding that the demand confirmed was hit by limitation, without going into the merits of the issue, the appeal is allowed.
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2001 (4) TMI 905 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat the Defendants' offending business activity is not carried out is New Delhi. The Act permits the Plaintiff to make a choice of the Court, and since Plaintiff No. 2 has its Registered Office in New Delhi the choice is well founded. The Trademark PANADOL is registered in India. There is an assertion that Plaintiff No. 2 has its registered office at E-46, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. The legal property of piercing the corporate veil should not detain the decision at this threshold stage since it is intrinsically a mixed question of fact and law. For all these reason I am satisfied that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 13. In this analysis, I.A. No.8797/199 being the Plaintiffs application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. is allowed, and the interim Orders passed on 7.9.1999 are confirmed. The Defendant No. 2's application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 C.P.C and under Order VII Rule 10 C.P.C. are dismissed with costs of ₹ 5000/-.
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2001 (4) TMI 904 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se to the law in terms of the provisions under the said rules in respect of the sand, if any, deposited at the land of the pattadars. 45. The deposit of sand on the land owners/pattadars' land is an act of God, but, even by reason thereof, no right is vested in them, having regard to the provisions of the A.P. Estate Abolition Act. We are, therefore, of the view that no relief can be granted to the land owners/pattadars. 46. For the reasons aforementioned, no relief can be granted in WP Nos. 22740 and 25644 of 2000, 1270, 4255, 4398, 4407, 3617, 3277, 3303, 3581, 3526, 4628 and 4639 of 2001 and they are accordingly dismissed. 47. WP Nos.4640 of 5405 of 2001 are disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the matter with regard to the exemption of ban orders on a rational basis keeping in view the observations made hereinabove and also the expert reports of the Ground Water Department in relation to the areas concerned. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2001 (4) TMI 903 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... ion of the recipients. It is sufficient that in my opinion the present arrangements clearly do so. For these reasons, as well as those given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley, I would dismiss the appeal. Lord Cooke of Thorndon 40 My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches of my noble and learned friends Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Hoffmann. I agree with them and for the reasons they give I would dismiss the appeal. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough 41 My Lords, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons which have been given by my noble and learned friends, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Hoffmann. Lord Scott of Foscote 42 My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speeches of my noble and learned friends Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Hoffmann. I agree with them and for the reasons they give I would dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors Brachers Solicitor for the Customs and Excise.
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2001 (4) TMI 902 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... d under section 14 of the Act before the first appellate authority, as contemplated under section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. In such circumstances, we find that there is no case to consider this original petition and accordingly, it is dismissed, giving liberty to the petitioner to seek alternative remedy before the first appellate authority. As the original petition itself is dismissed as above, the miscellaneous petition therein does not survive. 8.. The time taken in pursuing the original petition before this Special Tribunal, shall be deducted for the purpose of calculation of period of limitation for filing statutory appeal. 9.. The original papers, if any filed, shall be returned to the petitioners. 10.. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. 11.. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 24th day of April, 2001. Petition dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 901 - TAMIL NADU TAXATION SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... first respondent. 12.. As mentioned above, the respondents 1 and 2 are at liberty to follow the proper course to amend the agreement, pursuant to the amendment made to the eligibility certificate. At the same time, we are also bound to mention that though as per the Government orders, the petitioners are not eligible to avail of more than Rs. 1,02,04,495, but somehow they have been allowed to exceed this limit up to Rs. 1,18,08,729 the petitioners cannot claim to avail the benefit up to Rs. 1,35,30,000 as fixed in the original eligibility certificate. The benefit that goes to the petitioners is only up to the amount they have availed so far. Subject to these observations the O.P. No. 1513 of 2000 is ordered. 13.. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. 14.. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 4th April, 2001. O.P. No. 1513 allowed. O.P. No. 1514 dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 900 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aged under the Act to recover the tax amount to subserve the public interest. The first respondent is armed with necessary power in that regard by the provisions of section 17(1) of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action initiated by the first respondent under section 17(1) of the Act is arbitrary and unreasonable. 18.. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Consequently, W.P.M.P. No. 2526 of 2001 is also dismissed. However, we direct the Joint and Additional Commissioner (CT) (Legal), Hyderabad, to dispose of the revision (stay) petitions of the petitioner, if not already done, as expeditiously as practicable, in any event not later than one week after the receipt of a copy of this order. The registry is directed to send a copy of this order forthwith to the Joint and Additional Commissioner (CT) (Legal), Hyderabad. Writ petition dismissed.
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2001 (4) TMI 899 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... manifestly unfair because there could be the equal possibility that the authorities were satisfied and therefore waived the scrutiny. There can also be the possibility that the check-post authorities were negligent and therefore, since there are many possibilities we refrain from recording any adverse conclusion against the appellant. On merits we find that the order of the appellate authority which is a speaking order is perfectly justified and that the interference by the revisional authority was uncalled for. Apart from this, we have often pointed out that where a superior authority interferes with a logically well sustained order that it will be necessary to replace that order with a better one. That has not been done in this case and it only confirms our finding that interference itself was unjustified. 2.. The appeal accordingly succeeds. The revisional order is quashed and set aside. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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