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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 520 Records
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2002 (11) TMI 794
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... ... ..... earing was required but still a notice under Section 28 of the Act shall be issued to it with a view to provide an opportunity to satisfy the respondents as to how the conditions stipulated in the guarantee bond had been fulfilled by them. 7. In view of the afore-noted statement made by learned counsel for the respondents, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other contentions urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned letters/orders with a direction that a notice under Section 28 of the Act shall be issued to the petitioner within four weeks from today. The petitioner will be free to file its reply within four weeks of the receipt of the notice. 9. It goes without saying that it will be open to the petitioner to urge all the grounds as may be available to them in accordance with law, including the one raised in the present petition, in support of its stand. 10. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms.
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2002 (11) TMI 793
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... ... ..... had come to the notice of the AO to form the requisite belief that income for the relevant assessment year, on account of grant of excessive depreciation, had escaped assessment. 4. It is well settled that a mere change of opinion does not clothe the AO with the jurisdiction to reopen a completed assessment See CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd. (2002) 174 CTR (Del)(FB) 617 (2002) V AD (Del) 768 (FB) . Even otherwise, insofar as this Court is concerned, it has been held that an assessee is entitled to higher depreciation in respect of the leased out vehicles used in the business of running them on hire by the assessee himself or by the third party. See CIT vs. Bansal Credits Ltd. ITA No. 16 of 2002, decided on 13th Nov., 2002 reported at (2003) 179 CTR (Del)23'Ed. . 5. In this view of the matter, the view taken by the Tribunal cannot be faulted. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, survives for our consideration. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2002 (11) TMI 792
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... ... ..... confirmations bear the permanent account numbers of the creditors. The Assessing Officer did not record any finding that the explanation offered by the assessee was false and the bona fide was not proved. As such, the conditions precedent for invoking Explanation1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act did not exist in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Once it is held that the case of the assessee falls beyond the ken of Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c), the conclusion is irresistible that the case does not come within the sweep of the ratio laid down by the apex court in the case of K. P. Madhusudhanan v. CIT 2001 251 ITR 9 9. It comes within the ambit of the decision laid down in the case of CIT v. Suresh Chandra Mittal 2001 251 ITR 9 (SC). On this factual backdrop I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judicial Member. The matter will now come before the regular Bench for deciding the appeals in accordance with the opinion of the majority.
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2002 (11) TMI 791
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... ... ..... question is concerned, Mrs. Pushya Sitharaman, learned senior standing counsel for the Revenue fairly submitted that the question has to be answered against the Revenue in view of an earlier decision rendered by this Court wherein this Court has considered a similar issue and held that the assessee would be entitled to the deduction of the amount representing the employer's contribution to provident fund and family provident fund, even though the payment was made after the end of the accounting year, but within the grace period. Accordingly, we answer the third question of law referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 5. In the result, we are not answering the question Nos. 1 and 2, but the Tribunal is directed to consider and decide the question Nos. 1 and 2 afresh in accordance with law. Insofar as the third question is concerned, it is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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2002 (11) TMI 790
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... ... ..... erefrom on the factual issue. The Article has been engrafted by the founding-fathers of the Constitution for the purposes of avoiding mischief of injustice on the wrong assumption of law. The justice delivery system of the country prompts this Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution when the need of the society stands established and the judgment, if left outstanding, would not only create prejudice but would have an otherwise adverse effect on to the society it is this solemn objective of administration of justice with which the Constitution-makers thought it prudent to confer such a power on to the Apex Court of the country. It is the final arbiter but only when the dispute needs to be settled by the Apex Court so as to avoid injustice and infraction of law. In the contextual facts we do not find such an infraction. By reason whereof the appeal, in any event, cannot be sustained. There is no merit even otherwise. As such this appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2002 (11) TMI 789
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... ... ..... ty. In the contextual facts, we do not find the brutality of such a nature so as to exercise the discretion of passing an order of capital punishment undoubtedly brutality is involved but that brutality by itself will not bring it within the ambit of the rarest of the rare cases. On the wake of the aforesaid and having regard to the nature of the offence and the methodology adopted, we are convinced that the punishment awarded to the appellants herein is in excess of the requirement of the situation and as such while recording our concurrence with the finding as recorded by the High Court in the judgment impugned, as regards the guilt of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, we are inclined to modify the sentence of death to that of life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code as against the appellants herein, and it is ordered accordingly Except however, as above, this appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2002 (11) TMI 788
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... ... ..... uine. No such evidence is on record. The Assessing Officer would appear to have simply relied on the findings recorded in the assessment proceedings, but these findings, though are good evidence, are not conclusive for the purpose of penalty proceedings as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Khoday Easwarsa & Sons 83 ITR 369 (SC) and Anantaram Veerasinghaiah 123 ITR 457 (SC). No penalty can be imposed merely because the assessee could not prove the expenditure in the manner required by the departmental authorities, viz., by producing the weekly reports from them. The other evidence brought on record by the assessee might be given due weight in the penalty proceedings as also the confirmation letters. No attempt has been made by the departmental authorities to reappraise or make a rehash of the evidence in order to judge the guilt of the assessee. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the penalty is not justified. We cancel the same and allow the appeal.
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2002 (11) TMI 787
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... ... ..... rned a firm finding of fact that the value of the property as shown in the instrument was not less than the market value of the similar property in the, vicinity from where property was sold. In fact, by comparing the value of the property sold by the Department or the Government, in the very locality, a firm finding of fact has been recorded by learned Tribunal that it was not a case of undervaluation. Once, the contention of learned counsel, as noted above, needs to be repelled, there would be no necessity to go into the second contention of learned counsel, which is based upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M.K. Trading Company vs. State of Punjab (1974) STC 237 (P&H), that in case Tribunal had ignored one aspect of the case which, according to him was vital in determining the controversy, the other reasons given by the Tribunal cannot sustain. 14. Finding no merit in this petition, we dismiss the same leaving, however, the parties to bear their own costs.
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2002 (11) TMI 786
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... ... ..... kshman, Adv. Mr. Arvind Kumar, Adv. for M/s Gagrat & Co.,Advs. O R D E R Delay is condoned. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, we find no justifiable reason to interfere with the orders under challenge. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
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2002 (11) TMI 785
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... ... ..... 34 an application for setting aside award has to be made within 3 months and limitation would start running from the date of receipt of award or date of disposal of application under section 33, if made. Proviso appended to the sub-section permits extension for sufficient cause by a further maximum period of 30 days. Filing of application being Suit N0.1582-A/01 under Section 14 of the Act of 1940 and preferring appeal and SLP against the said order of dismissal thereof, by the Objector would show that Objector's counsel was under a bonafide belief that award dated 30th June 2001 was to be governed by the Act of 1940 and not the Act of 1996. In this backdrop, in my view, there is sufficient cause for entertaining the Objections filed on 29th October 2001 and the applications,thus, deserve to be allowed. Consequently, while allowing applications, the Objections (OMP 367/01) is allowed to be entertained under the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Act of 1996.
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2002 (11) TMI 784
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... ... ..... pugned order and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law. It is clarified that all questions raised by the parties are left open. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
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2002 (11) TMI 783
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... ... ..... fer the levies imposed on goods taken for home consumption. 5. Not only exports are allowed to be made without payment of duty under bond or under claim of rebate of duty paid but there are schemes to either allow rebate or draw back of duty on inputs used in the export product or allow manufacture in bond without payment of duty on inputs. The interpretation placed by the lower authorities on Rule 57C, 57CC and Rule 57F resulting in denial of credit of duty paid for inputs used in the export products is clearly against the Government policy to encourage export and free export products from domestic levies. I have, therefore no hesitation in setting aside the orders of the lower authority and allowing the appeal. Before parting with the case, it is suggested that the rule making authority should clarify the rules and issue clear cut directions to the field officials so that credit of duty paid on the inputs is not denied when finished goods are exported. Pronounced in Court.
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2002 (11) TMI 782
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... ... ..... nuineness of the cash credits, it could not be reopened in the course of reassessment proceedings initiated on the basis of information received on an another ground. Proceedings under section 147 of the Act are open only qua items of under-assessment or escaped income. The finality of assessment proceedings on other issues remains undisturbed and the Assessing Officer is not competent to make fishing enquiries on con- cluded matters. This is precisely what the Supreme Court has decided in Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd.’s ( supra). That view was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Vipan Khanna v. CIT 2002 255 ITR 220 1. Since the issue stands concluded by a judgment of the Apex Court and also by a Division Bench judgment of this Court, we are of the view that no substantial question of law arises for the decision of this Court in this case. We are, therefore, unable to entertain the appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (11) TMI 781
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... ... ..... ed. Appeal admitted. Tag with C.A. Nos. 6868-6870/2002.
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2002 (11) TMI 780
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... ... ..... both on the nature of the receipt as also the quantum which is to be subjected to tax. 44. This leaves us with only ground No. 8 in the assessee’s cross objection where the levy of interest has been questioned. This ground is considered as an additional ground not having been raised before the Commission of Income-tax (Appeals) and we also mention that there is a written request available on the record for admission of the aforesaid ground as an additional ground. 45. After hearing both the parties, we admit the aforesaid ground as an additional ground and restored the matter back to the file of the CIT (Appeals) asking him to adjudicate the same after giving reasonable opportunity to both the parties. 46. In the result, the assessee’s appeal for assessment year 1996-97 is dismissed whereas the Revenue’s appeal for assessment year 1994-95 is allowed. The cross objection of the assessee for assessment year 1994-95 is partly allowed, for statistical purposes.
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2002 (11) TMI 779
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... ... ..... dvances or rural advances. According to us, the Tribunal has not approached the issue in the proper perspective with reference to the provisions of sections 36(1)(vii), (viia) and 36(2)(v ) of the Act. Now that we have explained the scope of the provisions of the proviso to clause (vii) of section 36(1) of the Act, we are of the view that the matter requires fresh consideration in the light of the said interpretation. Accordingly, we are of the view that the matter must go back to Assessing Officer for consideration with reference to the interpretation placed by us in this Judgment in the first instance. For the said limited purpose, we set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the first appellate authority on this point and direct the Assessing Officer to re-compute the deduction available under clause (vii) of section 36(1) of the Act in the light of the interpreta-tion placed by us on the proviso to the said clause under the section. These Appeals are disposed of as above.
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2002 (11) TMI 778
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... ... ..... ld that the expenditure of ₹ 15,43,40,694 incurred by the corporate treasury division as allowable expenditure after excluding ₹ 6,91,701 incurred towards donation, which is not allowable. Relying on the decision of SC in India Cements Ltd.’s case (supra) and the circular of the CBDT extracted supra we hold that the expenditure incurred on issue of non-convertible portion of debentures of ₹ 10,77,53,775 is allowable as revenue expenditure in computing of income of the appellant. Accordingly the Assessing Officer shall regard the entire receipts of ₹ 11.07 crores as business income and allow therefrom expenditure incurred by the corporate treasury division of ₹ 15,43,40,694 (excluding donation) and the debenture issue expenditure of ₹ 10,77,53,775 mentioned supra. The Assessing Officer shall also allow consequential relief on the interest levied under section 234B of the Act. In the result the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2002 (11) TMI 777
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... ... ..... se to a question of law, much less a substantial question of law. Similarly, insofar as the question of treating the expenditure incurred by the assessed on maintenance of computer and their upgradation is concerned, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that the same is in the nature of revenue expenditure. It is pertinent to note that the AO, while granting depreciation 33.33 per cent on the software, had himself observed that the life of the software was three years. The percentage of such allowance had been fixed by the AO on his own. In our opinion no substantial question of law arises from this issue as well. 5. The appellant shall file within three months ten copies of the cyclostyled paper books, containing all documents on which reliance was placed before the Tribunal, including any order/orders, either in the case of the assessed itself or in case of any other assessed, which has been followed by the Tribunal. The appeal be listed for hearing in the regular course.
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2002 (11) TMI 776
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... ... ..... that it has complied with the condition referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act. In case the income is derived from commercial activities and the income is accumulated by such trust it cannot be held that the income was accumulated only for charitable purpose. The appellant is thus not entitled to exemption of any amount accumulated by it. 25. The appellant has further raised a question as to whether the Income- Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in remanding the matter in respect of interest under sections 215/217, 133(8) and 234A, 234B, 234C and 220(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the Assessing Officer. As the question raised involves question of fact and we do not find that the view taken by the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal in remanding the matter of interest is erroneous. 26. In view of the above discussion we allow the appeal and remand the matter to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal to consider the matter afresh keeping in view the above observations.
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2002 (11) TMI 775
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... ... ..... condoned. The Civil appeals are dismissed.
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