|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 452 Records
-
2002 (3) TMI 939 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... power under Section 17 of the notification dated 29.11.94 is required to be adjudicated upon. In our considered opinion, having regard to the facts and circumstances narrated above, the exercise of power under Section 17 by the State Government, cannot be held to be illegal or mala fide and consequently, the impugned Judgment of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court cannot be sustained. The learned Judges of the High Court have been totally swayed away by the fact of non-implementation of the directions of Batabyal J, in his order dated 25.8.1994, but that by itself would not be a ground for annulling lawful exercise of power under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. We, therefore, set aside the impugned Judgment of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court and hold that the acquisition in question is not vitiated on any ground. The acquisition proceeding, therefore, is held to be in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2002 (3) TMI 938 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the decision of the arbitrator. We do not think that the cited cases have any relevance for deciding the question arising for consideration in this appeal. None of the cases is an authority for the proposition that the question whether a claim is an 'excepted matter' or not must be left to be decided by the arbitrator only and not adjudicated upon by the Court while disposing of a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. We cannot subscribe to the view that interpretation of arbitration clause itself can be or should be left to be determined by arbitrator and such determination cannot be done by Court at any stage. 20. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the view of the 'excepted matters' taken by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is allowed, the impugned decision of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is restored. No order as to the costs.
-
2002 (3) TMI 937 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... N), on August 26, 1999. 31. In view of the aforesaid position, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for grant of a temporary injunction and accordingly, I restrain the defendant, their directors, servants, agents and all other acting on their behalf from using the domain name Naukri.Com or any other mark, which is identical or deceptively similar to that of the domain name of the plaintiff and also from hyperlinking the said domain name to the defendant's website JOBSOURCEINDIA.COM., till the disposal of the suit. Application stands disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order. 32. Before parting, it is made clear that whatever views and opinions are expressed herein, are all my tentative opinions for the purpose of deciding the present application and shall not be construed to be final opinion on merit and the same shall be subject to final decision in the suit. S.No. 1971/2001 Renotify on 23.4.2002 for further orders. dusty.
-
2002 (3) TMI 936 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... which in the opinion of the adjudicating officer, may be useful for or relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied that the person has failed to comply with the provisions of any of the sections specified in sub-section (1), he may impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of any of those sections." 54. Since the adjudication by itself is a separate process and the Adjudicating Officer is required to hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard for the purpose of imposing any penalty and that the adjudication order is appealable to the Tribunal, no intervention by this Tribunal, at this stage in this regard is felt necessary. The respondent is empowered by the Act to order adjudication under section 15-I and the decision taken in this regard in the present case is well within its powers. 55. The appeal, is disposed of in the above lines.
-
2002 (3) TMI 935 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the 3rd defendant and met the expenses of the litigation for the 3rd defendant. In consequence of that, the defendants made the 3rd defendant take false contentions and let in false evidence through the 3rd defendant so as to suit the case of the defendants (plaintiffs in O.S. 122/92)." We are, therefore, of the view that the appellants-plaintiffs shall be permitted to carry out the amendments in the plaint barring the portion in para 4(d) extracted above. At the same time, in view of the latches on the part of the appellants-plaintiffs, we consider it a fit case to award costs to the respondents-defendants. We direct that the plaint shall be allowed to be amended subject to payment of costs of ₹ 2,000/- (Rs.1,000/- each to the respondents-defendants) within four weeks and the proof of payment being produced by the appellants in the Trial Court. The order of the High Court as well as the order of the Trial Court are set aside and the appeal is allowed accordingly.
-
2002 (3) TMI 934 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... es and may also enter into the premises for the said purpose; and (b) such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." Section 6A can be invoked against any person, who is not a tenant or who remains in occupation of any government premises without written order of the prescribed authority. The respondents were tenants under the erstwhile company and continued to do so as held by us. Therefore, they cannot be evicted by invoking powers conferred on the Authority under Section 6A of the Act of 1976. However, we are not deciding the controversy as to whether this Act would apply only to residential premises, as held by the High Court. For what has been stated above we hold that the action of the State Government cannot be justified in law and accordingly we uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court. In the result appeals are dismissed. Cost on the parties.
-
2002 (3) TMI 933 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... guarantee for the remaining suit claim within a period of two months. In our view these terms are onerous, harsh and unreasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case and that too even before the trial of the suit on merits. On 29.10.2001, the learned counsel for the appellants stated that within two weeks, a sum of ₹ 50,000/- shall be deposited in the trial court and notice was issued on that day. During the course of hearing the learned counsel informed that a sum of ₹ 50,000/- is already deposited in the trial court. We are of the view that it would be just and appropriate to direct the appellants to deposit a further sum of ₹ 50,000/- in the trial court within a period of four weeks from today. The terms to deposit ₹ 2,00,000/- and to furnish a bank guarantee for the remaining suit claim shall stand modified as indicated above. The impugned order shall remain undisturbed in all other respects. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
-
2002 (3) TMI 932 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... my Raju, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2002 (3) TMI 931 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... writ petition is that the application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has not been disposed of by the Commissioner, Bareilly, respondent No. 1. In our view, there is no apparent error on the face of the record, which is required to be considered and, as such, we cannot accept the plea raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner. 3. There being no merit, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, it will be open to the writ petitioner to prefer an appeal before the Tribunal if the same is already not time-barred.
-
2002 (3) TMI 930 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... any ground, observing as under - "Furnishing of stamps paper was an act entirely within the domain and control of the appellant and any delay in the matter of furnishing of the same cannot possibly be said to be putting a stop to the period of limitation being run-up am can tale advantage of his own wrong; as a matter of fact, in the contextual facts ..... Any other interpretation would lead to an utter absurdity and mockery of the provision of the Statutes. Suspension of the period of limitation by reason of one's own failure cannot be be said to be a fallacious argument." 23. Thus, in view of the above, I find no ground to interfere. The case is limited only to the extent whether the application filed by the petitioner was within time. As per his won admission, it was time barred, therefore, I am of considered opinion that it has been rightly rejected. As no legal question is involved, revision cannot be entertained. 24. The revision is accordingly dismissed.
-
2002 (3) TMI 929 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the case in 11 Hen 4 c.2, conspiracy against two, and only one of them is found guilty, it is void, for one alone cannot conspire." In this view of the matter, when rest of the accused who are named in the confessional statement are not convicted or tried, this would not be a fit case for convicting the appellant solely on the basis of so-called confessional statement recorded by the police officer. Finally, such type of confessional statement as recorded by the investigating officer cannot be the basis for awarding death sentence. In the result, Criminal Appeal No.993 of 2001 filed by the accused is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Designated Court convicting the appellant is set aside. The accused is acquitted for the offences for which he is charged and he is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. In view of the above, Death Reference Case (Crl.) No. 2 of 2001 would not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.
-
2002 (3) TMI 928 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o the forum of appeal. In other words it provides that the appeal will be to the High Court and not any other Court e.g. the District Court. The term "an appeal" does not restrict it to only one Appeal in the High Court. The term "an appeal" would take within its sweep even a Letters Patent Appeal. The decision of the Division Bench rendered in a Letters Patent appeal will then be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. Read in any other manner there would be a conflict between Section 54 and the provision of a Letters Patent. It is settled law that if there is a conflict, attempt should be made to harmoniously construe the provisions. 15. We, therefore, hold that under Section 54 of the said Act there is no bar to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal. We therefore agree with the view taken in Basant Kumar's case. The reference is answered accordingly. 16. The case be now placed before a Division Bench for consideration of the other aspects.
-
2002 (3) TMI 927 - ITAT AGRA
... ...
... ... ..... sions of s. 145(3) are invoked. The only reasoning for invoking s. 145(3) appears to be non-maintenance of separate issue of stock register. The reasoning is not so grave to warrant rejection of books of account. We, therefore, hold that CIT(A) was not justified in directing to apply 4 per cent net profit rate on contract receipts/work-in-progress. The AO is directed to accept the book results declared by the assessee in respect of business carried on contract basis. The ground of appeal directed by the assessee is allowed. 26. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed. 27. Before parting, we may keep on record with deep appreciation the manner in which the Revenue's case was placed before us by the learned Departmental Representative, Smt. Sunita Bainsala. The learned Departmental Representative with all her might placed the arguments of the Revenue. Learned counsel of the assessee, Shri Prakash Narain, Adv., was thorough as usual. We order accordingly.
-
2002 (3) TMI 926 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... violative of Article 14 cannot be entertained. We record this conclusion of ours, as in course of hearing of this matter. Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, had often repeated that the provision of the Emergency Recruitment Rules has permitted even a beetle shop owner with the minimum income as indicated therein to appear and compete at the test and on being selected, the period for which he had been earning the aforesaid amount could be taken into account for the purpose of seniority in the cadre even though there has been no nexus between that period and the service to which he has been recruited. Apart from making such submission on a hypothetical basis, no material has been produced to indicate if anyone of the persons recruited under the Emergency Recruitment Rules has reaped any undue advantage in respect of his past experience by adoption of the formula in the Emergency Recruitment Rules for the purpose of allotting year of allotment as 1976 (N 1).
-
2002 (3) TMI 925 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... laid down in the section). In this connection, attention is invited to sections 22 to 27 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which refer to income from house property. These sections are applicable to income from house property whether the house property is residential or it is used for business. In the circumstances, it is presumed that the exemption to house property under section 5(1)(iv) is available both to residential as well as business premises whether used by the Association or let out. Please confirm." The letter/circular issued by the department in the absence of statutory provisions or the rules repugnant to that, is binding on the department. For this also we are of the view that the assessee is entitled to claim exemption under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act of 1957 to the extent of its proportionate share in the partnership property i.e., house which have been used as non-residential or commercial property. The questions referred to above are answered accordingly.
-
2002 (3) TMI 924 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... Delay condoned. Appeal admitted. No stay.
-
2002 (3) TMI 923 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... alification being much earlier to the circular of the Government dated 6.11.1990, we see no infirmity with the impugned judgment requiring our interference. The special leave petitions are dismissed accordingly.
-
2002 (3) TMI 922 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tter taken care of by his continuance in legal services and consequently continued stay at Gauhati, we dispose of the appeal in terms of the following directions - o p /o p 1) The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside insofar as findings on questions of law are concerned; o p /o p 2) Within a period of six weeks from today, the State of Assam shall take a decision if the respondent No.1 can be posted in an office other than that of Secretary (Judicial) and Legal Remembrancer in which case he shall continue in Assam Legal Service and need not be repatriated; o p /o p 3) If the abovesaid direction cannot be carried out then at the end of six weeks the respondent No.1 shall be repatriated to the High Court as a member of judicial service and he shall be given a posting accordingly and consistently with the assurance given on behalf of the High Court. o p /o p The appeal stands disposed of in the abovesaid terms without any order as to the costs. o p /o p
-
2002 (3) TMI 919 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the BDA Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case (ILR 1997 Kant 1419) to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11-A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to the proceedings under the BDA Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant have no merit whatsoever and do not commend themselves for our acceptance. The wall (sic wail) about the inordinate delay or laches in passing the award cannot be countenanced at the instance of the appellant who contributed mainly to the same by institution of litigation causing through prohibitory orders obtained, impediments in the expeditious implementation of the portion of the scheme by taking further course of action under the BDA Act, including the passing of the award. For all the reasons stated supra, we see no merit in the appeal and the same shall stand dismissed, but with no costs.
-
2002 (3) TMI 918 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ires that the accused persons never doubted the factum of their names being mentioned by the witnesses in the FIR and in their statements recorded at the trial. We also do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that statement of Kiran (PW7) should not be given any weight because her name is not mentioned in the FIR. There is no requirement of law for mentioning the names of all the witnesses in the FIR, the object of which is only to set the criminal law in motion. Kiran (PW7) herself was injured and being the niece of Hari Ram (deceased), had no reason to involve innocent persons in the commission of the crime. Merely because PWs 7, 12 and 22 happen to be the relations of the deceased, cannot be made a ground to discard their evidence. In the circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly found the aforesaid witnesses to be natural witnesses of the occurrence. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
........
|
