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Showing 41 to 60 of 452 Records
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2002 (3) TMI 917 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court. Bound by the law laid down by the Supreme Court, judicial propriety and discipline, I have no option but to hold that where the trial court has appreciated the evidence and there is no illegality by admitting inadmissible material or nay perversity, it would not be open for this Court to set aside its order merely because another opinion is possible on the same evidence. 79. Before parting, I must express my appreciation for the labour put in by learned counsel for the parties and for rendering great assistance in this case; a special mention is due in the case of learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri K.K. Sud, who has conducted the case with great fairness and professionalism. 80. In view of the above discussion, I allow Crl.A. 638 of 2000 and Crl.A. 621 of 2000, set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence of the Special Judge dated 29.9.2000 and 12.10.2000 and acquit the appellants of all charges. I also dismiss Criminal Revision Petition No. 33 of 2001.
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2002 (3) TMI 916 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ble. The ground in this regard is also accepted. The assessee is right in contending that the cash credits during the year are out of the addition made in the earlier year on cash credits and/or interest disallowed on account of unexplained cash credits. 33. The last ground of appeal is with regard to confirmation of the disallowance of loans of earlier years. 34. The learned CIT(A) has held that such a disallowance would depend upon the finding given in respect of the addition made on account of unexplained cash credits in the earlier years. It was, therefore, that the Assessing Officer was directed to verify the facts in this regard and to restrict this disallowance to the interest paid on these loans, which are added in the earlier years. 35. We find that the finding arrived at by the CIT(A) is perfectly legal. The same, hence, does not require any interference on our part. 36. Resultantly, this ground of appeal is rejected. 37. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed.
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2002 (3) TMI 915 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roached this Court without exhausting the revisional remedy, this Court would have, perhaps, asked it to exhaust the remedy before coming to this Court but as the appellant cannot be treated as a certificate debtor and he is not personally liable for the certificate dues, as already indicated above, it would be harsh to compel him to file revision tantamounting to asking him to deposit over ₹ 5 lacs without which the revision cannot be entertained. If he is not personally liable for a single paise of the certificate dues asking him to deposit sum of ₹ 5 lacs would be too onerous and arbitrary. It is for this reason that we have proceeded to examine the case of the parties on merit rather than relegated the appellant to the internal remedy under the Act. 8. In the result, the impugned order of the Collector is modified to the extent and the manner indicated above, and subject to the clarifications made hereinabove. The writ petition and the appeal are disposed of.
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2002 (3) TMI 914 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er in issue cannot be termed to be so perverse so as to authorise this Court to scan the evidence and reappreciate the same. This is where Mr. Ramachandran contended that scope of Article 136 being limited and by reason of definite allegation of fraud in the matter of bringing forth the document of adoption interference with the orders of three different forums would not arise. We do find a great deal of substance thereon since the appreciation of evidence as noticed above cannot be had at this stage of the proceedings unless the order can be ascribed to be totally perverse. In the present fact situation of the matter we do feel it expedient to record our concurrence to the statement of Mr. Ramachandran that perversity is a far cry in the matter and the order of the High Court does not call for any interference in the contextual facts. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal thus stands dismissed without, however, any order as to costs.
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2002 (3) TMI 913 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... the Tribunal. No interference by this Court is called for. The civil appeals are dismissed. No order as to cost.
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2002 (3) TMI 912 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... om the previous term of membership or otherwise than in succession. The provision on its plain reading does not disqualify or make ineligible a person from holding the office of a member of the Council for more than two terms in his life. The use of the words 'retiring' as qualifying 'member' coupled with the use of word 're-nomination' clearly suggests that a member is disqualified for being a member for the third term in continuation in view of his having held the office of membership for more than two terms just preceding, one of which terms, the later one, was held on re-nomination. Such an interpretation does not lead to any hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly and, therefore, the rule of ordinary and natural meaning being followed cannot be departed from. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned single Judge is restored. No order as to the costs.
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2002 (3) TMI 911 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... judgment in Air India case shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final." In the present case, the appellants were not absorbed by the principal employer. Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision in Steel Authority of India Ltd. case(supra) cannot be applied. The directions issued by the learned Single Judge were modified by the Division Bench of the High Court and never given effect to. Therefore, the directions issued by this Court in the Steel Authority of India Ltd. case(supra) are applicable on all force. ‘ We do not find any reason to interfere with the directions given in the impugned Judgment. They are to be complied with subject to the observations made above and also having due regard to the decision rendered by this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. case(supra). The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (3) TMI 910 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 6(2) and Section 6(3) have no applicability. It is a case of composite lease as aforesaid. Section 6(1)(b) has thus been rightly applied by the High Court. The land did not vest in the State Government and, therefore, Section 19 of the ULC Act has no application. Under these circumstances, the contention urged for the first time in this appeal du ring the course of hearing that the proceedings under the ULC Act were without jurisdiction and the appellants could ignore the orders passed under that Act, the same being without jurisdiction is an argument of desperation. That is not even the ground on the basis whereof the proceedings were initiated under Section 57A. As already observed, the appellants did not take such a stand in the earlier writ petition filed by the respondents. From the aforesaid discussion it is evident that even on merits there is no substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the appellants. For the foregoing reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs.
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2002 (3) TMI 909 - SUPREME COURT
Can the decision of this Court dated 6th February, 1986, upholding the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act of 1971 reversing the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.A. Nos. 398 and 1385 of 1972 (State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Venkatagiri and batch), and further indicating that the period during which interim payments are payable under the Act ends with the date of the original determination made by the Director under Section 39(1) of the Act, be held to be a law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, or it can be said to be per incurium, as contended by Mr. Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondents?
The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in favour of the respondents passed in Writ Petition Nos. 3293 and 3294 of 1975 not being challenged by way of appeal to the Supreme Court even though it merely followed the earlier decision of the High Court in Venkatgiri's case, whether has conferred an indefeasible right on the respondents notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment of the High Court in Venkatgiri.s case by the Supreme Court?
Whether the High Court would be justified in issuing a mandamus in the changed circumstances, namely, Supreme Court reversing the judgment of the High Court in Venkatgiri's case inasmuch as for issuance of a mandamus one of the condition precedent, which is required to be established is that the right subsisted on the date of the petition?
Whether the judgment of this Court in Shenoy's case [1985 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME Court] requires any re-consideration?
Held that:- Our answer to the first question is that the decision of this Court dated 6.2.1986 must be held to be a 'law declared' within the ambit of Article 141 of the Constitution and the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act 1971 is not open to be re-agitated and that the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court holding the Amendment Act to be constitutionally invalid had been set aside by this Court.
No indefeasible right on the respondents could be said to have accrued on account of the earlier Judgment in their favour notwithstanding the reversal of the Judgment of the High court in Venkatagiri's case.
No hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in issuing the mandamus in question for enforcement of the so-called right which never subsisted on the date, the Court issued the mandamus in view of the decision of this Court in Venkatagiri's case. In our view, therefore, the said conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous.
We do not think that a case has been made out for referring the Shenoy's case to a larger Bench for reconsideration. On the other hand, we respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the three Judge Bench of this Court in Shenoy's case. In Shenoy the Court was considering the applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution and its effect on cases, against which no appeals had been filed. A law of the land would govern everybody, and the non-consideration of the principle of res judicata will not be a ground to reconsider the said judgment
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2002 (3) TMI 908 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... etrospective omission of serial No. 70A and insertion of serial No. 137 of Schedule IV respectively. Secondly, the appellate order dated January 3, 2001 relating to the period for four quarters ending on March 31, 1999 is also not against the law since it was remanded for holding fresh assessment in view of the judgment of the honourable High Court and finally, two causes of action have been joined together. 8.. The application being not admitted at this stage for the reasons stated above is dismissed summarily without costs. Liberty is, however, given to the petitioner to move before this Tribunal at the appropriate stage after agitating the matter before the appellate and revisional authorities, if necessary. It is also made clear that the application since has not been decided on merits all points of disputes are left open for proper adjudication. 9.. The order is ready and delivered in open court. The application has been disposed of without costs. Application dismissed.
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2002 (3) TMI 907 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ers of assessment made against the petitioner and the notices issued as per annexures A and A1 is directed not be given effect to till the disposal of appeal in STA No. 944 of 2001 pending before the Tribunal, subject to the condition that the petitioner deposits 25 per cent of the tax amount due and 20 per cent of the penalty levied within two weeks from today and another 25 per cent of tax amount and 20 per cent of the penalty within two weeks thereafter. If the petitioner fails to pay the amount as stated above, the authorities are reserved liberty to take coercive steps to recover the amount due from the petitioner. 8.. Further, the second appellate authority is also directed to dispose of the appeal STA No. 944 of 2001 as expeditiously as possible, at any event of the matter, not later than four months from the date of receipt of this order. 9.. Sri T.K. Vedamurthy, learned Government Pleader, is given four weeks time to file his memo of appearance. Ordered accordingly.
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2002 (3) TMI 906 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tice to the petitioner and hear the petitioner on merits on the question of liability of penal interest for these two years. The petitioner will produce a copy of this judgment before the Deputy Commissioner. The Commissioner will hear the petitioner and dispose of the revision petitions within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Since the demand of tax stands confirmed vide findings above, the petitioner will remit another rupees twenty-five thousand towards tax in addition to the amount of rupees twenty-five thousand already paid pursuant to the interim order of this Court. If the amount of Rs. 25,000 is paid within one month from today, recovery of the balance mainly representing penal interest due under exhibits P5 and P6 will stand stayed till disposal of the revisions by the Deputy Commissioner. Original petition is disposed of as above. Order on C.M.P. No. 61523 of 2000 in O.P. No. 36033 of 2000M dismissed. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (3) TMI 905 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the BIFR . Since the notifications under section 17A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act like G.O. Ms. Nos. 31 and 62 have emanated only out of the aforementioned Government Orders, i.e., G.O. Ms. Nos. 5 and 18, they cannot be read de hors the instruments which have conceived them. Paragraph 3 of the Govern ment order, G.O. Ms. No. 18, is clear enough for that proposition. Therefore, the criticism that the language of the aforementioned Government order suggests a ceiling less sales tax deferral for one full year and, therefore, the intendment of such Government order should be ignored cannot be accepted. In our opinion, since G.O. Ms. No. 62 and G.O. Ms. No. 31 have to be read along with G.O. Ms. Nos. 5 and 18 respectively, such contention has to be rejected. 18.. For all these reasons, the writ petitions have no merits and they are, accordingly, dismissed but without any orders as to the costs. W.M.P. Nos. 18935 to 18938 of 1998 are closed. Writ petitions dismissed.
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2002 (3) TMI 904 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heme? Mr. B.C. Joshi, however, did not press for the date of entitlement under the eligibility certificate for the period prior to the date of application made on September 3, 1998. In view of this, the petitioners shall be entitled to the date of entitlement from the date of application. In this view of the matter, the respondents are directed to issue the eligibility certificate effective from September 3, 1998. It is expressly made clear that the issue of granting eligi bility certificate prior to the date of application under 1993 scheme is kept open. 15.. In the circumstances set out hereinabove, the petition succeeds. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms and the respondents are directed to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioners with entitlement effective from September 3, 1998 and grant all of consequential reliefs and entitlements under the 1993 scheme. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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2002 (3) TMI 903 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entry clearly militate against the contention that any sale made before June 26, 2001 has to be ignored. 24.. In view of the above, it is held that the sale of stocks which had been purchased by the petitioners till the midnight of June 25, 2001 in the State of Haryana would not attract the levy under the Act as it would not be the first sale in the State of Haryana. Resultantly, the demand as sought to be made on the basis of the stocks existing on June 25, 2001 cannot be sustained. 25.. Resultantly, the authority is directed to re-consider the matter on the hypothesis that the sales tax shall not be leviable on the sale of the stocks purchased by the petitioners till the midnight of June 25, 2001 in the State of Haryana. The competent authority shall pass the order of assessment. The petitioners shall be entitled to seek their remedy, if so advised, in accordance with law. 26.. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (3) TMI 902 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he factory had been closed. The proprietors had to flee from the factory to save themselves. The stock which was lying inside has become rotten. He prays that the authority may be directed to hear the appeal without insisting on pre-deposit. Mr. Berry appearing for the respondents opposes this. 4.. Keeping in view the totality of circumstances it is directed that if the petitioner makes a deposit of rupees one lac within one month from today, the competent authority shall hear and decide the appeal on merits. 5.. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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2002 (3) TMI 901 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t merit any interference in the present writ application. 11.. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to agree with Mr. Gupta that rule 212 read with section 69 clearly empowers the authority concerned not only to intercept a consignment while being transported on a vehicle but also empowers the authority concerned to verify the correctness of the way bill and other documents relating to the goods in respect of description, quantity, weight or value. In the present case, the goods stored in the godown were found to be undervalued and were accordingly seized in keeping with section 70(2) of the aforesaid Act. 12.. Having regard to our aforesaid finding, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal has correctly assessed the provisions of law and the order passed by it does not merit any interference by us. 13.. The writ application is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Writ application dismissed.
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2002 (3) TMI 900 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods described in Schedule III and the liability to pay tax shifts to the contractor. In view of the above, after the Assam General Sales Tax (Amendment) Rules, 1999, the works contractors have become eligible to use declaration in form A. 17.. In the light of the aforesaid directions we hold that the provisions of section 27 of the Act and rule 8(3)(iv) of the Rules are not ultra vires and illegal and that cannot be said to be confiscatory in nature. Deduction of tax at source is permissible under the law and the above provision of law are to be read down as provided above. We may also mention here that deduction of tax at source under section 27 of the Act is not an end of the matter and the dealers/assessees are at liberty to claim all permissible deduction if any available to them while final assessment is being made. In the result all these batch of writ petitions stand disposed of in the light of the observations as stated above. No costs. Writ petitions disposed of.
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2002 (3) TMI 899 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ) in clause (29-A) in article 366 of the Constitution of India and likewise, the new charging section 3-A and section 2(g), 2(n) and 2(r) of the TNGST Act, 1959 as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 24 of 1988 as ultra vires, whereas the entire sub-clause (29-A) of article 366 as amended by 46th Amendment of the Constitution has been upheld as early as 1989 in Builders Association of India v. Union of India 1989 73 STC 370 (SC) referred above. However, the earlier writ petition has been filed in the year 1992. Hence, we are of the view that the filing of the earlier writ petition is not bona fide and the petitioner are liable for payment of interest under section 24(3) of the Act. 26.. In view of the above reasoning, we are of the considered view that the order of the Special Tribunal requires no interference. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.Ps. are closed. Writ petitions dismissed. Here italicised.
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2002 (3) TMI 898 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onfirmed view that the Special Tribunal was also right in taking that view. 9.. In so far as the second question is concerned, since we have affirmed the view taken by the Special Tribunal in respect of the proceedings having attained finality, we need not go into the further question. But, before closing we may only point out that even the subsequent judgment of the apex Court does not deal with the question under section 7-A(1)(c) and is applicable to the declared goods like iron scrap and in the present case, there is a finding of fact that the goods purchased by the petitioner were not iron scrap but machinery covered under item 41-D of the First Schedule. We would not go beyond this as it is not really a controversy pending before us. The writ petitions have no merits and the same are dismissed, but not before appreciating the efforts taken by the learned counsel. Consequently, connected W.M.P. Nos. 28775 and 28777 of 1998 are closed. No costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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