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Showing 21 to 40 of 530 Records
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2002 (4) TMI 981 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he following terms - "These cases exemplify two obvious propositions first, that though money may be received by one person, it may be the income of another, and, second, that from the fact that the source of a cash credit is unexplained, it does not follow that the money does not belong to the recipient. Neither of these is a principle of law. They are commonsense to be applied to the facts. The real, and only, question is whether a cash credit is the assessed's income. Notwithstanding that it is the cash credit which originates this question, the inquiry into its source is only a part of the process of finding the answer. When the source is unexplained, it depends upon the facts whether the conclusion that it is the assessed's income can be immediately drawn." 8. For the reasons aforementioned, having regard to the aforementioned question of fact, no question of law arises for this Court to express its opinion. 9. This reference is accordingly disposed of.
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2002 (4) TMI 980 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... .N. Variava, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 979 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ential relief. The prayer made in the suit is that the sale deeds dated 28.4.2000 and 27.4.2000 may be set aside as the same have been the result of fraud, misrepresentation and collusion. The consequential relief of permanent injunction has also been prayed restraining defendant-respondents No. 2 and 3 from alienating, selling or transferring the suit land or any part thereof to anyone on the basis of the aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deeds and many other consequential reliefs. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the Full Bench does not in any manner advance his case. On the contrary, the Full Bench laid down the principle that the Court should find out the substantive relief claimed without going into the form. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed. However, I do not make any other as to costs. Revision dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 978 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... based on a suit, they cannot be regarded as a trial of a suit and hence, the suit for recovery of money is pending before the trial Court could not be stayed. 8. This is very clear from the reading of Section 10 C.P.C. While interpreting the said Section, the Rajasthan High Court gave the same ruling in PUNJAB NATION BANK v. GAJENDRA SINGH (2001 (1) Civ.C.R. 431 (Raj.)); JAIPUR VASTRA VYOPAR SANGH LTD v. SHYAM SUNDER LAL PATODIA ; and LADU LAL JAIN v. MANAGER, BANK OF BARODA (1997 DNJ (Raj) 260). 9. It is now submitted that the said suit has been transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. As held by the Supreme Court in ALLAHABAD BANK v. CANARA BANK (AIR 2000 S.C. 1535), the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is exclusive and as such, the jurisdiction of civil Court or Company court is ousted. 10. In view of the above ruling, there is no merit in this Civil Revision Petition and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P.No.855 of 1997 stands dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 977 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... impugned order so far as it held that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties and the matter is required to be settled through the named arbitrator in the agreement is correct and deserves to be upheld. However, the finding so far as it holds that the suit was not maintainable leaving the matter at that without making reference to the sole arbitrator cannot be upheld. 8. In the result this revision petition is partly allowed and the impugned order is modified to the extent that the reference shall now be made for the remaining/subsisting dispute to the sole arbitrator of Member (Service), Department of Communication, New Delhi, who shall enter the reference forthwith and shall make his award within four months from the date of receipt of this order. Copy of the order shall be sent to the named sole arbitrator viz Members (Service), Department of Communication, New Delhi forthwith. 9. With these observations CR 411/99 stands disposed of. CMs also stand disposed.
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2002 (4) TMI 976 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... llant. We find no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2002 (4) TMI 975 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o the Gram Panchayat and utilised in such a manner which does not contravene the provisions of the Forest Conversation Act. viii) No part of the land, the subject matter of the controversy shall be utilised or transferred to any person or authority other than specified in Sections 5A and 5B of the Act, without prior sanction of the Central Government. ix) Under the circumstances of the case we do not issue any direction for the registration of any criminal case against the respondent No. 7 or its office bearers. x) The respondent No. 7 is held liable to pay costs of ₹ 25,000/-. Such costs shall, initially, be paid by the State Government and later recovered from the amount found payable as compensation to the respondent No.7. Out of the costs recovered, a sum of ₹ 20,000/- shall be paid to Mr. U.U. Lalit, the learned amicus curaie who has very ably assisted the Court in the disposal of this petition. The balance ₹ 5,000/- shall be payable to the petitioner.
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2002 (4) TMI 974 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the date of the accident. From all these, we are of the definite opinion that the Claims Tribunal must consider what the Rules prescribed at the time of making the order for payment of the compensation." 5. In view of authoritative pronouncement made by this Court under similar circumstances, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. Consequently we direct the Railway Administration to pay to the appellants a total sum of ₹ 4 lakhs instead of ₹ 2 lakhs as awarded within a period of three months from the date of this judgment with interest as awarded by the High Court. If the amount of ₹ 2 lakhs as awarded by the Tribunal has already been paid, the appellants would be entitled to interest on the balance amount of ₹ 2 lakhs from the date of the petition till the actual payment and not on the whole amount as awarded by us. The appeal is allowed accordingly. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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2002 (4) TMI 973 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... te of Andhra Pradesh 1957CriLJ1320 and it was held that the word 'shall' occurring in Sub-section 4 of Section 173 and Sub-section3 of Section 207A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the scheme of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 also makes it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is not precluded. If further investigation is not precluded then there is no question of not permitting the prosecution to produce additional documents which were gathered prior to or subsequent to investigation. In such cases, there can not be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be sustained. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the Special Court is set aside. The application filed by the appellant for production of additional documents is allowed. The Special Court to proceed with the matter in accordance with law.
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2002 (4) TMI 972 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e more amount is offered, the learned counsel for the appellants agreed on behalf of his clients for payment of ₹ 40 lacs in lump sum within a period of six months commencing from today. Having regard to the offer made in the letter coupled with the oral representation made today and to mete out justice to the parties, we direct that the undertaking to pay the sum of ₹ 40 lacs within six months should form part of the decree in the suit. This shall be in addition to the sale price already deposited in the Court. The same shall be deposited in the Court within a period of six months and the appellants are entitled to withdraw the same in addition to the amount already deposited. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed subject to the direction as given above. With regard to the deposit of the said additional sum of ₹ 40 lacs, the decree of the trial Court shall stand modified accordingly. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2002 (4) TMI 971 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to one community, were massacred. Thus, after taking into consideration the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, in which 35 persons have been deprived of their lives by the accused persons who were thirsty of their blood, I have no doubt in holding that culpability of the accused persons assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that a special reason can legitimately be said to exist within the meaning of Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case on hand and it would be mockery of justice if extreme penalty of death is not imposed. Thus, I am clearly of the opinion that the Designated Court was quite justified in upholding convictions of the appellants and awarding the extreme penalty of death which punishment alone was called for in the facts of the present case. In the circumstances of the case, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed but the reference is accepted and death penalty awarded against the appellants is confirmed.
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2002 (4) TMI 970 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... may refuse to grant any avoidable adjournment at the trial which may have the effect of delaying the hearing of the suit. The suit shall be expeditiously heard and decided. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has assured that the defendants shall co-operate therein. 6. To avail the benefit of the orders passed by the High Court and this order the defendants shall pay cost of ₹ 50,000 to the plaintiff- appellants within four weeks as a condition precedent. During the execution of decree an amount of ₹ 20,00,0,00 (Rupees twenty lakhs only) is said to have been attached by the executing court. As the ex-parte decree has been set aside and the suit stand re-opened, the plaintiff-appellants shall be at liberty to move an application for attachment before judgment of such amount and/or such other interim relief as may be available to them before the trial court. However, we express no opinion on this. The appeal stands disposed of in the terms abovesaid.
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2002 (4) TMI 969 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the revenue, and as such, development and security of the State. We are not oblivious of the fact that the penalty provisions cannot be used as a revenue-yielding provision. The object to the penalty provision is to ensure compliance in the larger public interest." 48. Thus, in view of the above, so far as the first case is concerned, there had been no declaration From like St. 18-A alongwith the goods, the question of mens rea, even if it is applicable, is not attracted at all and petitioner is liable to pay penalty as an additional tax for having breached the statutory provisions of the Statute. 49. So far as second revision is concerned, as there had been no proper description of the goods in the declaration, it cannot be accepted as a valid document as required under Rule 22-A (3) and, thus, petitioner was also correctly penalised for committing the breach of the statutory requirement. 50. The petitions are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2002 (4) TMI 968 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... these respondents have lost their earlier business, we think it appropriate that we should direct the State Government to consider the applications of these respondents for the grant of licences for the sale of foreign liquor as sought for by them, provided these respondents surrendered their existing excise licences and approach the concerned excise authorities for the grant of new licence. If this is done and if the respondents are otherwise not disqualified, we direct the State Government to consider their application on a preferential basis. If for any reason, these respondents cannot be granted the new licence sought for by them, then the appellants shall restore the surrendered licence. The above concession given to the respondents will not, in any manner, entitle them to claim any other exemption from the requirement of the Excise Act. For the reasons stated above, the order of the High Court is set aside. This appeal is allowed with the directions made herein above.
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2002 (4) TMI 967 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... act, hence we are not inclined to interfere with such findings decided by the Tribunal. Therefore, these appeals are dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 966 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... are satisfied that the summons was not served on the defendant-appellant. He did not have an opportunity of appearing in the Trial Court and contesting the suit on merits. The Trial Court and the High Court have committed a serious error of law resulting in failure of justice by refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree. The appeal is allowed. The orders of the Trial Court and the High Court are set aside. The application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C. filed by the defendant-appellant is allowed. The ex-parte decree dated 9.10.1993 is set aside. The proceedings of the Trial Court shall stand relegated back to 23.2.1993. The parties through their respective learned counsel are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 5.8.2002, on which date, the Trial Court shall appoint a date of hearing and proceed ahead with the hearing of the suit in accordance with law. No costs. Let the record of the Trial Court be transmitted back at the earliest accompanied by a copy of this Order.
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2002 (4) TMI 965 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... nsel for the appellant. We find no merit in the appeal. The civil appeal is dismissed with costs.
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2002 (4) TMI 964 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... facts wrong inference of law has been drawn or the conclusions on facts are manifestly perverse and based on no evidence. No such infirmities could be successfully substantiated on behalf of the appellants in this case, to warrant any such interference. So far as the quantum of sentence also we are not persuaded to differ from the view taken by the courts below. A grave act of depravity, to kill an innocent person only for the purpose of enriching themselves of the fortunes brought by the deceased, who unaware of their diabolical scheme got lured into their company for a safe travel to his destination, deserves to be dealt with iron hand and the imposition of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence of robbery under Section 392, IPC and rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence of murder under Section 302, IPC cannot be considered to be either harsh or so grossly disproportionate as to shock the conscience of this court. The appeals fail and shall stand dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 963 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... -250 "The claim of the assessee';s counsel that cash balances were available with the firm for advances to the partners, their relatives and the sister concerns does not advance the assessee';s case. If cash balances are available, the borrowing itself is not for the purpose of the business. An assessee with liquidity cannot claim that it can give interest-free advances to the partners and others and then borrow funds from the bank on interest for business purposes. Such borrowings will not be for business purposes, but for supplementing the cash diverted by the assessee without any benefit to it. Therefore, so long as the assessee is not the beneficiary of the investments made by the partners, their relatives and sister concerns, and so long as the advances are interest free, the Assessing Officer is perfectly justified in disallowing the interest in proportion to the advances made." 11. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee-company is dismissed.
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2002 (4) TMI 962 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... irdly, we are deleting the bars of limitation on the twin grounds that it amounts to judicial legislation, which is not permissible, and because they run counter to the doctrine of binding precedents. The larger question of powers of this court to pass orders and issue directions in public interest or in social action litigations, specially by reference to Articles 32, 141, 142 and 144 of the Constitution, is not the subject matter of reference before us and this judgment should not be read as an interpretation of those Articles of the Constitution and laying down, defining or limiting the scope of the powers exercisable thereunder by this Court. And lastly, it is clarified that this decision shall not be a ground for re-opening a case or proceeding by setting aside any such acquittal or discharge as is based on the authority of 'Common Cause' and 'Raj Deo Sharma' cases and which has already achieved finality and re-open the trial against the accused therein.
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