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2005 (11) TMI 493
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... ... ..... e compounding fee does not exceed the fine prescribed by the penal section, the same cannot be declared to be either exorbitant or irrational or bereft of guidance." It is indisputable that the power of compounding vests with the State Government, but the notification issued in that regard cannot authorize continuation of the offence which is permitted to be compounded by payments of the amounts fixed. If permitted to be continued, it would amount to fresh commission of the offence for which the compounding was done. The State Governments which have not yet withdrawn the notifications shall do it forthwith. So far as the practical difficulties highlighted are concerned, it is for the State Governments concerned to make necessary arrangements to ensure that the difficulties highlighted can be suitably remedied by the State Government themselves without in any way overstepping statutory prescriptions. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2005 (11) TMI 492
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... ... ..... ether the duty was paid under protest, whether it was recovered from the purchaser of the goods, etc. are issues which could be decided only after recording facts and appreciating evidence which has come on record. It goes without saying that a legal proposition cannot be invoked and applied in abstract. It has to be preceded by a foundation of facts and evidence on record. In the impugned order CESTAT has singularly failed to undertake the said exercise. 10 In these circumstances, it is not possible to let the impugned order made by CESTAT to operate. Hence, Order No. A/621/WZB/2005/C-III dated 22/3/2005 (Annexure-F) made by CESTAT is hereby quashed and set aside. 11 The appeal of the petitioner, in the circumstances, is restored to the file of CESTAT and CESTAT is directed to hear the same on merits afresh after giving proper and reasonable opportunity of hearing to both sides. 12 Rule made absolute. The petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (11) TMI 491
Chargeability of interest under ss. 234A and 234B - Whether the Tribunal was justified in declining permission to raise additional grounds merely on the ground that these grounds were not raised within a period of limitation for filing appeal against the order of CIT ? - Unexplained Investments - HELD THAT:- It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the power to permit additional grounds to be raised vests in Tribunal. Subject to permission of Tribunal, additional plea can be raised at any time. No period of limitation is prescribed for raising additional plea. The Tribunal could not have refused to consider the question of grant of permission for raising additional plea or ground solely on the basis of the fact that when such plea was raised, period for filing appeal against order under appeal had already expired.
The principle was reiterated and explained in wide amplitude in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] in which it was noticed that the power to allow additional ground to be raised at the time of hearing vested in the Tribunal which has direct nexus with the object of the taxing powers. It was a case which arose in like circumstances as the present case. The assessee has sought to ascertain the conditions before the Tribunal by drawing its attention to its decision by claiming that the assessee is entitled to certain relief in respect of certain conditions made by the section officer which the Tribunal had earlier not found to (be) taxable. The Tribunal has declined to undertake the plea. The assessee was unsuccessful in his plea before the High Court, on a reference being made about the jurisdiction of Tribunal to allow raising of such grounds which were not urged before the appellate authority earlier.
The Tribunal in refusing to entertain the plea raised by the assessee on the anvil of binding decisions in respect of chargeability of interest under ss. 234A and 234B has declined to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law by ignoring the well settled principle, that it owes a duty to determine correct tax liability which in the context include liability arising on account of charging section, penalty or interest leviable under the Act and as per the binding precedent of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in JDB Srinivasan's case [1993 (7) TMI 323 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and of this Court in Shilpa Associates case [2003 (3) TMI 55 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT].
As a result, the first question reframed as above must be decided against the Revenue. We hold that the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to allow the assessee to raise additional ground which required application of mind by the Tribunal and by the High Court which otherwise binds the authority in correctly assessing the tax liability on the ground of limitation.
So far as merit of the contention that no notice of demand claiming interest under any of the provisions under ss. 234A, 234B and 234C can be issued unless there is a specific order to that effect in the assessment order, the matter appears to be concluded by the reasoning given in decision of the Patna High Court in Uday Mistanna Bhandar & Complex vs. CIT & Ors. [1996 (7) TMI 126 - PATNA HIGH COURT] and which decision of Patna High Court has been merged in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on appeal, when it was dismissed.
The present case is no different. The assessment order in the present case only speaks about charge of interest as per rules as was the case in Ranchi Club Ltd. (supra), wherein the principle was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it was not sufficient to make interest payable as a consequence of order passed under the Act.
Unexplained Investments - Apart from the legal fiction created under the provisions contained in ss. 68 and 69C no other provision has been brought to our notice where investment found to be in the name of wife and disclosed by her; on rejecting the source of such investment, the AO can be allowed to deviate from statutory presumption required to cause and jump on unproved presumption to assume such investment to be from undisclosed income of assessee's spouse. No such presumption is permissible in law, nor it arose from fact. If the AO wanted the investment disclosed by wife to be clubbed in the hands of her husband, on finding that explanation about sources of such investment submitted by her was not satisfactory, it was for the Revenue to bring on specific material on record to link such investment with the husband of Smt. Huma. No such material has been referred to or brought on record. In the present appeal automatic substantive assessment in the hands of assessee by clubbing the same with his income cannot be sustained on any ground. The reason adopted by the authority only permits it to be assessed as the income of the wife from explained source in her hands.
Accordingly, the question No. 3 as reframed in the case of Zakir Hussain has to be decided in negative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue relating to clubbing of income of Smt. Huma Hussain with the income of appellant Zakir Hussain and raising a demand on account of interest under ss. 234A and 234B without any specific order.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal as well as CIT(A) and the AO are set aside to the extent indicated above.
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2005 (11) TMI 490
Validity Of Notification regarding the acquisition of the land - whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of Section 3A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land - award of additional 30 per cent amount as compensation - HELD THAT:- In the present case in view of an order dated 3rd April,2002 passed by the High Court final compensation could not be determined by the competent Authority. Therefore, there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required u/s 3E(1) of the Act, which means the possession could not have been taken. But the fact is that possession was taken on 19th February, 2003 on deposit of provisional amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of court to take possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being passed on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only one day's notice when the Act requires 60 days notice. Moreover, the possession is to be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector. This was not done. Neither of the three statutory requirements for taking possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present case is in total violation of the statutory provisions.
The learned counsel for the acquiring authority submits that possession was taken on basis of oral observations of the court. This is a totally misconceived plea. Court orders are always in black and white. Oral orders are never passed. Moreover, this plea is wrong because the Division Bench observed in its order dated 27th March,2003 that it never dealt with question of possession. The result is that taking possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot be said to be in accordance with law in this case and does not improve matters for the NHAI.
Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more.
Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action.
Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately compensated.
Accordingly appeals filed by the Competent Authority and the National Highways Authority of India are hereby dismissed while the appeal filed by Ridh Karan Rakecha & Anr. allowed in terms of the above judgment.
There shall be no order as to costs
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2005 (11) TMI 489
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... ... ..... fall within the category of advertising agency. He relies on the Board’s Circular No. 64/13/2003-S.T., dated 28-10-2003 wherein it was clarified that mere space selling does not fall under the category of advertisement services. He relies on several rulings of the Tribunal on the very issue and submits that the issue is covered in favour of the appellants. 4. Heard the learned SDR in the matter. 5. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the sides. In view of the Board’s Circular No. 64/13/2003-S.T., dated 28-10-2003 and the Tribunal rulings relied on by the learned Counsel, the appellants have made out a strong prima facie case in their favour. The stay application is allowed by granting waiver of pre-deposit of service tax and penalty amounts and staying its recovery till the disposal of the appeal. As the issue is a covered one, the matter to come up for final hearing on 27th January 2006. (Pronounced and dictated in the open Court)
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2005 (11) TMI 488
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... ... ..... social or cultural but purely religious one. 3. The appellants have challenged the correct calculation of service tax also. They contend that the show cause notice does not speak about the amount of service tax demanded and that there is no application of mind in working out the service tax. The plea taken is justified. The authorities ought to have correctly given the calculation of service tax. The question relating to the activity of letting the auditorium for prayers and the same coming within the ambit of “mantapam” has not been answered by the authorities and also the correct amount of service tax has not been calculated, therefore, the matter is sent back to the Original Authority to consider both the pleas. However, penalties imposed are set aside. The adjudicating authority shall follow the principles of natural justice and decide the matter expeditiously within 4 months from the date of receipt of this order. (Pronounced and dictated in Open Court)
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2005 (11) TMI 487
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... ... ..... lerks making entries do not put their signatures. Even where signatures of clerks appear, the entries are not countersigned or certified by the appointing authorities. In such cases, we are of the view that the State Governments should take steps to maintain proper records of the services rendered by the daily wagers; that these records should be signed by the competent designated officers and that at the time of termination, the concerned designated officers should give certificates of the number of days which the labourer/daily wager has worked. This system will obviate litigations and pecuniary liability for the Government. Accordingly, we find merit in this appeal. We set aside the impugned judgment of the division bench dated 3.9.2000 and we restore the award of the labour court dated 27.10.1999 in I.D. Reference No.59/97. The name of the appellant will be restored as a daily wager in the nominal muster roll. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2005 (11) TMI 486
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... ... ..... idered. Thus, after considering the submissions raised by assessee and the relevant provisions, the Tribunal took a conscious decision that non-resident assessee was not entitled to exercise the option under section 55(2) (b) (i) of the Act. Thus, in our opinion, it cannot be held that any mistake was committed by the Tribunal. Assessee, in fact, seeks the review of the order, which is not permissible under section 254(2) of the Act. If the order of the Tribunal is erroneous then the remedy lies elsewhere. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Ramesh Electric & Trading Co. (1993) 203 ITR 4971 also held that failure to consider an argument would not amount to mistake apparent from record. This decision also supports the view taken by us. 14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the impugned order of the Tribunal does not suffer from the mistake apparent from the record. As a result thereof, the Misc. application filed by assessee is dismissed.
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2005 (11) TMI 485
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... ... ..... rged and the same was applicable prospectively with effect from 1-6-2002. 5. On consideration of the above fact, we find that ground No. 1 is covered by the order of the ITAT, Mumbai Bench in the case of B.D.A. Ltd. (supra) in which it was held that losses computed in block assessment had to be set off against the undisclosed income computed in respect of other previous year falling within the block period. Similarly, this Bench in the case of Dy. CIT v. Sai Metal Works, Jalandhar, etc. vide order dated 17-1-2005 held that the levy of the surcharge was provided in the proviso to section 113 of the Income-tax Act, however, amendment has been made applicable prospectively with effect from 1-6-2002 and is not applicable to the searches carried out under section 132A prior to 1-6-2002. 6. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the appeal of the Revenue. The same is accordingly dismissed on both the grounds. 7. As a result, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2005 (11) TMI 484
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... ... ..... nder Section 116. For this reason, the fact that the period allowed by Parliament to assessees for payment of tax arrears was extended by the Supreme Court up to 2nd Dec. ’03 and the fact that the Service tax in question was paid by the recipient within such extended period become irrelevant. None of the decisions of the Tribunal cited by the ld. SDR offers any ratio to be followed in the instant case inasmuch as the periods of dispute are not discernible from the cited judgments. Ld. SDR has also relied on the Service tax (Amendment) Rules, 1998 which came into force on 16-10-1998. Any amendment making the recipient of Clearing and Forwarding Service liable to pay tax on such service, in the Service tax Rules, is of no avail in the absence of the requisite charging provision under the Finance Act, 1994 for the period subsequent to 16-10-1998. 5. In the result, the impugned order stands affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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2005 (11) TMI 483
Disallowance u/s 37 - Loss on account of valuation of non-moving stores and spares - Prior Period Adjustments - Interest on electricity duty' falls u/s 43B - Peripheral Development Expenses - Payment towards contribution to Mineral Development Fund set up by Government of India - Water charges' payable to Government of Orissa and interest on 'Water charges' payable to Government of Orissa) as 'fees' - Contribution towards Mineral Development Fund set up by Government of India - Contribution towards benevolent fund.
HELD THAT:- From reading of the notes on accounts of the 3 public sector undertakings we are of the opinion that the diminution of value because of obsolescence at 20 per cent of historical cost cannot be said to be without any basis. Neither this can be said to be improper. We are further of the opinion that although the stores and spares relate to past years, the appellant had made the revaluation during the current year and subsequent years on the basis of audit objections by the C&AG when they pointed out that the profit has been overstated. Accordingly, the bona fides of such change also should not be doubted. The change effected by the assessee is bona fide and aimed at obtaining correct business profit as such obsolete stocks/non-moving spare parts went on losing their values thereby distorting the true profits of the appellant.
Relying on the case of Chainrup Sampatram vs. CIT [1953 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT], we set aside the order of the CIT(A) on this ground and direct the AO to allow the claim of loss on account of value of non-moving stores and spares. We direct accordingly. The ground of appeal No. 1 by the appellant is accordingly, allowed.
Prior Period Adjustments - We find that the learned CIT(A) had confirmed an amount under other manufacturing expenses and under 'administrative, selling and distribution expenses'. As regards other manufacturing expenses, we find that the appellant had issued 18.675 kgs. of nitric acid for consumption during the financial year 1992-93. However, by mistake the issue voucher was prepared at 1867.5 kgs. This difference was found out during the inventory verification in the financial year 1993-94 and the amount short charged during the financial year 1992-93 was debited to the P&L a/c during the financial year 1993-94 as prior period expenses. We find that this is the only way in which the assessee could rectify this mistake by debiting the prior period expenses. Accordingly, we direct the AO to delete the above addition.
As regards administrative, selling and distribution expenses, we find that the appellant during the course of appeal hearing had filed only item-wise expenses amount on 14 items. However, no further details were filed for which it was impossible on the part of the learned CIT(A) to conclude that liability in regard to the above items had crystallized in the relevant previous year. We further find that at the time of hearing before us, apart from the said submissions, the appellant had not furnished any further evidence to this effect. Accordingly, considering the totality of the facts of the case and in the interest of justice, we restore the issue back to the file of the AO directing him to give one more opportunity to the appellant to produce the details. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the appellant are partly allowed for statistical purposes.
In the result, the appeal file by the assessee for the asst. yr. 1994-95 is partly allowed.
Interest on electricity duty' falls u/s 43B - delay in payment - We are of the considered opinion that the interest on electricity duty is compensatory in nature and has to be allowed as a general business expenditure. The provision of s. 43B is not applicable for such interest. The AO is directed to allow the same as business expenditure. Accordingly, the ground by the appellant is allowed.
Peripheral Development Expenses - We find that the appellant had incurred certain expenses on its employees and persons who have been displaced when the plant was constructed. We further find that some of the expenses have been incurred on the directions of the authorities like Orissa State Pollution Control Board, Ministry of Environment and Forest as per condition to review its clearance certificate. We also find that money has been spent by the appellant as a good corporate citizen and to earn the goodwill of the society thereby creating an atmosphere in which the business can succeed in a greater measure with the aid of such goodwill.
In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed.
Water charges' payable to Government of Orissa and interest on 'Water charges' payable to Government of Orissa) as 'fees' - We find that the appellant has made provisions towards water charges as per the notification of the Government of Orissa, Ministry of Water Resources. We further find that there is no dispute that the water charges are in the nature of statutory liability. We further find that the learned CIT(A) while deciding the appeal against the assessee relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Orient Paper & Industries Ltd.[1994 (1) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT].
Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the remaining amount has to be allowed as business expenditure u/s 37 of the IT Act. We direct accordingly. The ground of appeal No. 3 by the appellant is accordingly, allowed.
Provision of unpaid interest on water charges amount, we are of the considered opinion that the same is compensatory in nature and does not fall within the purview of s. 43B as per our earlier findings in ground of appeal No. 2 for the asst. yr. 1995-96 on account of interest on electricity duty. Accordingly, we direct the AO to allow the interest on such unpaid water charges as a general business expenditure u/s 37(1) of the IT Act. We direct accordingly. The ground raised by the appellant is partly allowed.
Contribution towards Mineral Development Fund set up by Government of India - We find that the payment is not a voluntary one and it is a payment on the basis of the direction given by the Government of India, Ministry of Mines, under which the appellant comes and has been paid as per the proven deposit of Bauxite on the basis of proven data. When a Government undertaking is under the obligation to make certain payments as per specific direction of the Government of India, it cannot but be in the business interest of the assessee-company to abide by such directions of the Government of India which also owns the assessee-company.
Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the above payment is a statutory requirement and the expenditure has been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business and has got a direct nexus with the business activity of the company. We further find that the above amount has been released on 31st Dec., 1998. Since the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting and the provision has been made on the basis of office order, the same has been rightly accounted for in the year of accruing of the liability. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the above expenditure has to be allowed as a business expenditure u/s 37(1) of the IT Act. We direct accordingly. The grounds of appeal filed by the appellant is accordingly, allowed.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
Contribution towards benevolent fund - We find from the said scheme that the membership is voluntary. We further find that as per the said scheme the deceased person's family shall get @ ₹ 10 multiplied by the number of employees. The sum of ₹ 10 includes contribution by each member @ 5 and matching contribution of ₹ 5 by the company per employee. Thus, we direct the AO to allow the expenditure as a deductible expenditure.
In the result, all the appeals filed by the appellant are partly allowed.
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2005 (11) TMI 482
Disallowance of expenses to leasehold improvements - HELD THAT:- We find that the authorities below erred in treating the above expenditure claimed as revenue expenditure by the appellant as capital in nature and it brought enduring benefit to the appellant. We agree with the arguments of Sri K.R. Pradeep, that the expenditure incurred on redesigning and restructuring the leasehold premises by providing better fittings, electrical work, civil work, wood work, etc., to make the premises suitable for business needs and for carrying on the business more profitably and efficiently are all in the nature of repairs and revenue expenditure and it does not bring any benefit of enduring nature to the appellant. The advantage obtained by the appellant is advantage in commercial sense, i.e., for the purpose of business and not for the acquisition of capital assets].
The issue is covered by the decision in Instalment Supply (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1983 (9) TMI 67 - DELHI HIGH COURT] mentioned supra. Accordingly, we hold the above expenditure as revenue in nature and reverse the orders of the authorities below on this issue and direct the AO to allow the entire expenditure as revenue as claimed by the appellant. The appellant succeeds on this issue.
Addition made on account of reduction of the exemption u/s 10A - profits earned from SEEPZ unit at Bombay and STP unit at Bangalore - It is a case of joint venture listed Indian company, where all arrangements are open for scrutiny and acceptance not only by digital group worldwide but also from joint venture partners and shareholders. Digital group overseas will not pay undue sum, which it cannot recoup entirely to exclusion of others. Hence nothing can be arranged to the exclusive benefit of overseas partner. One cannot presume the existence of close connection or possibility of an arrangement for earning more than ordinary profits. In this case the profits earned is comparable with the profits earned by other companies in the same industry. Hence there is no case for further verification. The AO has compared the profit of software unit with that of hardware unit. Thus the foundation itself is on wrong premise. There cannot be comparison between an orange and an apple. It is known fact that profitability of software units is always higher than hardware unit.
The test whether the appellant has earned more than ordinary profits, in this case, the answer is obvious NO, even as found by the AO. When the profits earned are reasonable and not excessive, there is no reason to sustain the addition. Further there is no evidence of existence of any arrangement as contemplated u/s 80-I(9).
If the unit books are combined with other activities, the appellant should make efforts to cull out or separate the entries pertaining to the unit and maintain and produce records or statement separating the results. Such an effort would be sufficient to comply with the condition. In fact 80-I(9) nowhere mentions maintenance of separate books. We find that the addition made by AO in invoking 10A(6) r/w 80-I(9) is not well founded. For these reasons we uphold the order of the CIT(A) deleting the additions made by AO for asst. yr. 1995-96. Since the facts and circumstances are similar for asst. yrs. 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99, the same findings and directions would hold good for these years also. Accordingly the grounds of the Department on the above issue are dismissed.
Addition made on ad hoc basis - We find from the records that the AO has disallowed the sum on an ad hoc basis without any cogent reasons nor has brought any evidence on record for making such disallowance. We are in agreement with the findings given by the GIT(A) in deleting the additions made by the AO on ad hoc basis. The assessee's accounts are audited by a qualified auditor and they have not pointed any inadmissible expenses. In absence of any adverse material or evidence, no disallowance of any genuine expenditure on ad hoc or notional basis can be made. Thus, we do not find any infirmity in the orders of the CIT(A) in deleting the disallowance made on ad hoc basis. Accordingly, the ground of the Department is dismissed.
In the result the appeals of assessee are partly allowed. The appeal of Revenue for asst. yr. 1992-93 is partly allowed and for other years are dismissed.
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2005 (11) TMI 481
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... ... ..... xemption. This Court relied upon the various decisions of this court and the Apex Court and held that the exemption could not be disallowed because zip crane was not essentially required for cutting and polishing granite, rocks. In the present case, admittedly the said old mixer machine valuing ₹ 1,500/- was used in the laboratory for mixing purposes and was not used in the manufacturing unit for the manufacturing of paints and varnishes. Thus, mixer was not essentially required for the manufacturing. This fact is also established from the fact that the unit had carried on the manufacturing for the period of two years without mixer. In the circumstances, the period of exemption could not be curtailed In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and the Divisional Level Committee is directed to modify the eligibility certificate granting exemption for the period of five years i.e. from 27th October, 1992 to 25th October, 1997. Dated.24.11.2005.
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2005 (11) TMI 480
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... ... ..... oned. Appeal admitted. Tag with C.A. No. 3139/2002.
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2005 (11) TMI 479
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... ... ..... He submitted that the Board also clarifies the provisions of the Act which does not bring this item within the definition. Therefore he submits that the Commissioner’s (Appeals) order is bad in law and the order is not a speaking order. 2. The learned DR defends the order and submits that the definition is not exhaustive and this charge also falls within the definition of “Banking and other financial services”. 3. On a careful consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, we notice that prima facie, the appellants have made out a strong case in their favour. As the present charges pertaining to processing fees for working capital limit is not mentioned in Rule 8 enumeration, the stay application is allowed unconditionally by granting waiver of pre-deposit of service tax and penalty amounts and staying its recovery till the disposal of the appeal. The appeal to come up for hearing in its turn. (Pronounced and dictated in the open court)
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2005 (11) TMI 478
Dispensation of pre-deposit - Goods transport operator - Applicants engaged in manufacture and selling of casting on specific rate of contract
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2005 (11) TMI 477
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... ... ..... g the records of the lower courts. The paper books may be prepared in any manner not necessarily by printing.
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2005 (11) TMI 476
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... ... ..... ribunal by various decisions. Reference may be made to the Tribunal's decision in the case of PSL Holding Ltd., vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Rajkot, reported in 2003 (156) ELT 602 (Tri-Mum); Vinayak Industries vs. CCE, reported in 2003 (159) ELT 456 (Tri.); Silvassa Wooden Drums vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vapi, reported in 2005 (184) ELT 392 (Tri. - Mum). Reference has also been placed upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara vs. Narmada Chematur Pharmaceuticals Ltd., reported in 2005 (179) ELT 276 (SC), wherein modvat credit sought to be denied by the revenue on the ground that the final product was exempted, was held available to the assessee on the ground that the entire exercise was revenue neutral. The ratio of the above decisions fully applied to the facts of the instant case. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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2005 (11) TMI 475
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... ... ..... ting Authority dated 27.3.2001 cannot be legally sustained as the same have resulted into miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the only course left is to remit back the matter to the Adjudicating Authority for a fresh consideration and decision in accordance with law after affording the parties due opportunity to put-forth their case. 11. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders of the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange dated 19.5.2003 and that of Adjudicating Authority dated 27.3.2001 are hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Adjudicating Authority for deciding the proceedings arising out of show cause notice No.T-4/60-B/SDE/PKA/99 dated 17th June, 1999 issued to the respondent. The Adjudicating Authority shall afford reasonable opportunity to the parties to put-forth their case and will make a fresh decision in the matter expeditiously, preferably within a maximum period of six months. 12. Appeal stands disposed of.
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2005 (11) TMI 474
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... ... ..... llant. We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
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