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Showing 21 to 40 of 581 Records
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2005 (4) TMI 630 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... can also adduce evidence to oppose grant of succession certificate. The trial court erroneously held that the documents produced by the respondents were not sufficient or relevant for the purpose of adjudication and DNA test was conclusive. This is not a correct view. It is for the parties to place evidence in support of their respective claims and establish their stands. DNA test is not to be directed as a matter of routine and only in deserving cases such a direction can be given, as was noted in Goutam Kundu's case (supra). Present case does not fall to that category. High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity. We, therefore, uphold it. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case relating to succession application. Above being the position, the direction for DNA test as was given by the trial court is clearly unsustainable and the High Court has rightly set it aside. Appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 629 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Deduction of depreciation allowed on plinth platforms - Storage facility to store food grains - issuing notice for limited scrutiny - disallowance of expenses - HELD THAT:- The CBDT Circular No. 8/2002, clarifies the stand of the Revenue to the effect that the Assessing Officer does not have the powers to make the entire assessment of income in limited scrutiny cases. There is no doubt that the power of the CIT(A) are co-terminus with the power of the Assessing Officer. So however, in this case when the Assessing Officer does not have the power to make full-fledged assessment in limited scrutiny cases, in my considered view, the CIT(A)'s power cannot be enlarged beyond the power of the Assessing Officer in limited scrutiny cases.
Since the notice u/s 143(2)(i) was issued for limited scrutiny, the Assessing Officer is precluded from considering any other issue while making the assessment u/s 13(3) under limited scrutiny. The decision of the CIT(A) in considering the other claim of the assessee not covered in the notice issued u/s 143(2)(i) for limited scrutiny is contrary to the provisions of the Act and accordingly is set aside. The Assessing Officer shall consider the allowability of the claim of depreciation in respect of the plinth aggregating amount in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity or being heard to the assessee.
In the result, the appeal of the assessee as well as that of the revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
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2005 (4) TMI 627 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted to the status of a covenant in international law. Therefore merely because India is a party to these documents does not cast any binding legal obligation on it. Further, all the above cases which Hon. Sabharwal, J. has relied upon deal with the obligations of the Indian State pursuant to its being a party to a covenant/ treaty or a convention and not merely a declaration in the international fore or a U.N. General Assembly Resolution. 19. Apart from the above, the fact that the field in relation to the constitution of the NHRC is covered by an Act of the Indian Parliament, it follows that neither the Paris Principles nor the U.N. General Assembly Resolution can override the express provisions of the Act. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the decision of Hon. Sabharwal, J. After-considering the views expressed by Hon. Dharmadhikari, J. on this aspect of the case, we are in agreement with the same. 20. For the reasons stated above this petition tails and is dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 626 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Woodward Governor India (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 2002 253 ITR 745 2, the Bench also noticed that whether there was reasonable cause or not for the assessee not to deduct tax at source, is a question of fact which has to be determined by the Tribunal and normally would not give rise to a question of law. With respect, we would adopt the reasoning of the Division Bench in the Itochu Corpn.’s case (supra). In the present case, the Tribunal has come to a finding of fact that the reasonable cause can be reasonably said to be a cause which prevents a man of average intelligence and ordinary prudence, acting under a normal circumstances without negligence or inaction or want of bona fide. It then recorded a definite finding that the act on the part of the assessee was bona fide and it acted under a reasonable belief. 5. We find no merit in this appeal as no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. Dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 625 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d all the material facts and circumstances of the case and also the conduct of the appellant in prosecuting the proceedings before the first Court which had no jurisdiction. We find that there is no lack of bonafides on the part of the appellant and the appellant has diligenrly prosecuted the matter before the other Court and immediately after coming to know ‘the lack of jurisdiction of the court filed a memo seeking withdrawal of the appeal and immediately after getting the endorsement from the court the same was represented before the lower court which is the jurisdictional court. 12.. Thus, we are of the view that the lower court was not right in dismissing the suit after holding that none of the provisions of the Limitation Act is applicable. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed. by the lower Court is set aside. The matter is remanded to the lower Court and the lower court is directed to proceed with the matter accordance with law.
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2005 (4) TMI 624 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appellant. On the other hand, the appellant has made out a prima facie strong case for the hearing of the appeal on its merits and further a case that public interest would be better served by the amount being retained by the appellant during the pendency of the appeal. While making these observations, we should not be understood as having made any observation touching the merits of the case amounting to pre-judging any of the issues arising for decision in the appeal and ex abundanti cautela we clarify that the appeal shall be heard by the High Court on its own merits uninfluenced by anything said in this order. The appellant has already furnished security of immovable property to the satisfaction of the Trial Court pursuant to the order dated 31.2.2004 passed by this Court. The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders of the High Court are set aside and instead the interim order dated 30.1.2004 passed by this Court is substituted in place thereof. No order as to the costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 623 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ns made by the Assessing Officer is directed to be deleted. We may also incidently point out that the CIT(A) has merely endorsed the view of the Assessing Officer and, therefore no reference is made to the conclusions of the CIT(A). The ld. counsel for the assessee also placed reliance on several decisions, copies of which have been placed in the compilation of judicial pronouncements. We have not made any reference to those decisions for the reason that factually we have found non-applicability of relevant provisions of DTAA with UK as was sought to be made out by Assessing Officer. The other grounds of appeal raised by the assessee regarding the quantum on amounts that was brought to tax is therefore not considered for adjudication. The ld. counsel for the assessee has also filed before us a memo seeking to withdraw grounds 13 and 14 regarding challenge to levy of interest under section 234A and B of the Act. 16. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.
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2005 (4) TMI 622 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... that against the impugned order, appeal lies before the High Court. In this view, he seeks leave to withdraw the special leave petitions with liberty to approach the High Court. Ordered accordingly.
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2005 (4) TMI 621 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ifferent from the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 can have application only if what is settled by way of lease is a premises and in order to decide whether the settlement is such or not, we are governed by the well settled principle laid down by three-Judge Bench of this Court in Uttamchand vs. S.M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC 716 followed by a later Bench of four hon'ble Judges in Dwarka Prasad vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, AIR 1975 SC 1758. In our view, what was settled in the present case was not the premises for carrying on a particular business but the businesses itself and therefore, it cannot come within the purview of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 No other view was urged before us. For the reasons stated above we do not find any infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and the same is affirmed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 620 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d in pursuance of the resolution dated June 14-15, 1993 and likewise under notification dated September 3, 1994 when the route from Muzaffarnagar to Bijnor had been notified, no permit could have been granted on the aforesaid route as both schemes are of total exclusion.. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (Supra), the question no more remains res integra and it is settled principle of law that no private operators could be permitted to operate on a notified route except by modifing Scheme and after making provisions for the same. As a result of our above discussion, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad cannot be sustained and accordingly we allow all these appeals and set aside the impugned order dated September 26, 1997 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Writ Petition Nos. 9990, 23496, 15746 and 20187 of 1997 and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 619 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ved is more than ₹ 10.00 lakhs. Admittedly, in the present case, the security interest of the petitioner bank involved is ₹ 8.00 lakhs and that of respondent No.2 is ₹ 4,90,000/-, i.e., below ₹ 10.00 lakhs. There are, the Debts Recovery Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter and the bar of Section 34 of the Securitisation Act would also not apply. In such a case, only the Civil Courts would have jurisdiction to entertain the matter and hence the injunction granted by the Trial Court is maintainable. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is restricted and it is only where there is a jurisdictional error or illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction that this Court can interfere. It is well settled that in exercise of jurisdiction, the finding of fact recorded by the courts below cannot be reversed. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the petition. Dismissed.
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2005 (4) TMI 618 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... soured. Therefore, I am of the view that granting the prayer of the petitioner for rectification of the register of members would not be in the interest of the company and the most equitable relief would be to direct the 2nd /3rd respondents to pay consideration for the shares. At the time of dissolution of the marriage of the 5th and 3rd respondents, the former transferred 28119 shares for a particular consideration. I am of the view that the price per share at which the shares of the 5th Respondent were transferred to the 3rd Respondent could be applied for the impugned shares. Accordingly, I direct the 2nd /3rd Respondent to pay the consideration for the 39741 shares at the same price on or before 31.5.2005, failing which the Board of the Company is directed to rectify the register of members by removing the name of the 2nd Respondent and inserting the name of the petitioner in respect of the impugned shares by 15.6.2005. 8. The petition is disposed of on the above terms.
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2005 (4) TMI 617 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... Act. The learned Accountant Member has rightly held that decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Khatau Junkar Ltd. (supra) was attracted in this case. All other High Courts have taken a similar view of section 143(1)(a) of Income-tax Act. The disallowance made was unjustified and rightly deleted by the learned Accountant Member. 61. The learned DR stated that disallowance was confirmed in the regular assessment of the assessee made under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act. Copy of said assessment has not been placed on record nor the learned Members in their dissenting orders have made any reference to such assessment. I therefore, make no comment on subsequent assessment, if any, made under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act on the point involved before me. For the aforesaid reason I agree with the proposed order of the learned Accountant Member. The matter now be placed before the Regular Bench for passing an appropriate order in accordance with law.
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2005 (4) TMI 616 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hin his jurisdiction, the said orders will not be affected by this judgment and are saved. But from today onwards, the jurisdiction shall be exercised by the Land Tribunal, including the matters pending before the Deputy Commissioner. This, however, will not prevent the parties from challenging the vires of the Amendment Act of 1979 in so far as it relates to Mysore Act 1 of 1955. However, we should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the merit of the cases, nor on the validity or invalidity of the other provisions of the Amendment Act 1979 (Act 26 of 1979) or Mysore Act 1 of 1955. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the impugned judgment and order in Writ Appeal Nos.5678, 5580 and 5622 of 1996 is set aside and the matters remitted to the High Court for disposal on merit in accordance with law. Since these matters have remained pending before us for quite some time, we request the High Court to dispose of the aforesaid appeals as expeditiously as possible.
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2005 (4) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 30-E of the Act." See also West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission vs. CESC Ltd. (2002) 8 SCC 715 and Commissioner of Customs, Chennai vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and another (2004) 4 SCC 367 It may be, as has been held in Asha Devi (supra) that the power of the Appellate Court in intra court appeal is not exactly the same as contained in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is also well-known that entertainment of a Letters Patent Appeal is discretionary and normally the Division Bench would not, unless there exist cogent reasons, differ from a finding of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge. Even as noticed hereinbefore, a court of first appeal which is the final court of appeal on fact may have to exercise some amount of restraint. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 614 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... f Joint Commissioner. From the impugned judgment we do not find that this issue has been raised before the Tribunal. However, the leaned senior counsel points out from the grounds of the SLP that such grounds have been raised but not reflected in the judgment. If that be so, the appropriate remedy for the petitioners is to approach the High Court by way of Review Petition to point out these deficiencies. Learned counsel seeks permission to withdraw these petitions. Prayer is granted. The special leave petitions are dismissed as withdrawn.
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2005 (4) TMI 613 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pex Court in the case of Devkaran Nenshi Tana (supra), supports the proposition of law that if a state rent control legislation makes a specific mode of fixation of fair rent and of increase of such rent, the same must be fixed or increased only in accordance with that mode and not by the agreement of the parties even if there be any. 22. We, thus, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge and allow the appeal. Since there is no default in payment of rent till the date of delivery of vacant possession at the rate which the tenant last paid, the previous interim direction given by a Division Bench of this Court for depositing specified amount with the Registrar General is recalled. We, thus, permit the appellant to withdraw the amount deposited with the learned Register General of this Court. The appeal is, thus, allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances there will be, however, no order as to costs. R.N. Sinha, J. I agree.
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2005 (4) TMI 612 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... opposite party has not made an appointment within 30 days of demand, the right to make appointment is not forfeited but continues, but an appointment has to be made before the former files application under Section 11 seeking appointment of an arbitrator. Only then the right of the opposite party ceases.” (emphasis in original) 6. The case at hand is squarely covered by the abovesaid view of the law taken by this Court. The learned designated Judge of the High Court, as also the Division Bench were not right in taking a contrary view. 7. The appeal is allowed. The order of the learned designated Judge dated 2-4-2004 and the order of the Division Bench dated 7-9-2004 are both set aside. The application filed under Section 11(6) shall stand restored before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court and taken afresh for consideration and appointment of arbitrator in accordance with section 11(6) of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996. 8. No order as to the costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 611 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e of eighteen per cent. This Court held that it would be appropriate if interest at the rate of six per cent is awarded. In our view, however, a relevant and germane factor weighed with the Arbitrator in awarding eighteen per cent interest that at that rate HCL had given advance to BOL. In view of the said circumstance, in our opinion, even that part of the award passed by the Arbitrator did not deserve interference and learned single Judge and the Division Bench were not right in reducing the rate of interest. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals filed by BOL deserve to be allowed and are accordingly allowed by setting aside the order passed by the learned single Judge and confirmed by the Division Bench and by restoring the award passed by the Arbitrator. In view of the order passed in the appeals of BOL, the appeal filed by HCL deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (4) TMI 610 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sequent assessment years in consonance with the income returned for the year under consideration and upheld by the Tribunal. However, in light of the fact that this Court has held that the entire interest income is taxable in Assessment Year 1995-96 the same income cannot be proportionately brought to tax in any of the subsequent years. In the circumstances it will be open to each individual assessee to move an appropriate application and seek refund, if any, of the proportionate tax relatable to the interest income in each of the subsequent years in question. Needless to state that, in case any such application is moved revenue shall not deny the legitimate claim by raising any plea of limitation in light of the order made today for Assessment Year 1995-96. 32. Tax Appeal No.157 of 2000 is, therefore, allowed and similarly Tax Appeal No.328 of 2000 is also allowed and both the appeals stand disposed of accordingly. Registry to place a copy of this order in connected matter.
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