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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 664 Records
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2005 (8) TMI 666
Whether the sign boards fixed above the ATM Centers of the ICICI Bank do amount to an advertisement and therefore the action taken by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay by issuance of notice is in accordance with the law?
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2005 (8) TMI 665
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... ... ..... appellant that the issue of limitation will not be raised by it in the event the respondent gives an answer to the show cause notice. In any event, we extend the time consequent upon this appeal being allowed. We extend the time for the respondent to show cause to the notice within a period of six weeks. It will be open to the respondent to file the answer in the form and manner required by the appellant without prejudice to the respondent’s submission before the authority concerned that such a compliance was not necessary having regard to the application already made for refund by it on 28-9-1999. It is made clear that this Court has decided the appeal purely on a question of law. All the issues of fact as well as the issue relating to the form of answer to the show cause notice will be decided by the authorities concerned. The authorities will take such decision uninhibited by any observations of the High Court on the merits of the respondent’s case. No costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 664
Whether the High Court remitting the matter to the Magistrate on a finding that the Magistrate had issued process against the respondents without taking cognizance of the offence, and since taking of cognizance was a condition precedent, the issuance of process was bad?
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2005 (8) TMI 663
Whether Section 120B applies to POTA offences or Section 3(3) alone applies is not a matter on which a definite conclusion should be reached ahead of the trial?
Whether the appeal filed by Mohd. Afzal and the death sentence imposed upon him to be confirmed?
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2005 (8) TMI 662
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... ... ..... rounds of appeal made by the Revenue have no merits. In the grounds of appeal, the Revenue has elaborately discussed the difference between the modvat scheme and the money credit scheme. In our view, these differences are not at all relevant. The main question is whether alight conferred by law and acquired in terms of certain provisions of the notification can be extinguished, by rescinding of that notification. The Supreme Court and the various High Courts have answered this question in the negative. In other words as far as the present case is concerned, the accumulated money credit would not lapse. They would be entitled for payment of duty on vanaspati from the date of the introduction of duty on vanaspati. However, the duty payment shall be subject to the conditions mentioned in the notification by which the money credit was accumulated, namely Notification No. 45/89. Hence Revenue's appeal has no merits. The same is rejected. Pronounced in open Court on 26.8.2005.
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2005 (8) TMI 661
Whether the grant of benefits to such phantoms masquerading to be freedom fighters?
Whether the pensionary benefits be cancelled to see the number of persons falsely claiming to be freedom fighters?
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2005 (8) TMI 660
Whether the selection of the appellants for retail dealership of Indian Oil Corporation Limited (in short ’IOC’) at different places valid?
Whether the selected person was ineligible?
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2005 (8) TMI 659
Admissibility of credit of the duty paid on "inputs" namely, explosives, lubricating oils and welding electrodes and admissibility of credit on "capital goods" namely, limestone crusher, mining equipment etc. under Cenvat Credit Rules, 2000,2001 and 2002 arise for determination
Held that:- The definitions of the words "input" under the erstwhile Modvat scheme stood scattered under Rules 57A and 57B whereas under the Cenvat scheme, the definition of the words "input" and "capital goods" have been consolidated.
In the light of the provisions of the Cenvat scheme vis-a-vis Modvat scheme reproduced hereinabove, we are of the view that the observations made in paragraph 9 of the decision of the Division Bench, quoted above, in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur v. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd. [2004 (9) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] needs reconsideration. We are, therefore, of the view that this case requires consideration by a Larger Bench. The papers may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for further directions.
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2005 (8) TMI 658
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... ... ..... t thereto, whether or not such building is owned by the payee." In the light of the aforesaid provision, it is apparently clear that the agreement is related to the use of plant and machinery and not to the use of land and building. The Tribunal has given a categorical finding that the assessee on the basis of the agreement was not found paying rent in respect of use of land and machinery including factory building but was making payment for use of plant and machinery on monthly production basis. Consequently, for the reasons stated aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the assessee was not liable to deposit tax at source under Section 194-I of the Act on the amount paid by the assessee towards hiring charges on plant and machinery. Consequently, no case for payment of penalty could be made out against the assessee. For the reasons stated aforesaid, the questions of law are answered against the Department and in favour of the assessee. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2005 (8) TMI 657
Whether the goods and materials imported by the Company in the form of FEEP comprising of Equipments, Drawings, Designs and Plans are classifiable under Chapter Heading 49.01 or 49.06 of Schedule I of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Company is entitled to the benefit under Notification Nos. 107/93-Cus. and 38/94-Cus. or they are classifiable under Chapter Heading 4911.99 as contended by the department?
Held that:- The Counsel is right in submitting that when the expression ‘book’ is not defined in the Act, natural and ordinary meaning of the said expression must be kept in view. According to him, nowhere it is provided that all the nine characteristics or ingredients as highlighted by the learned Attorney General in Parasrampuria Synthetics Ltd. and referred to by this Court in paragraph 10 must be considered essential or sine qua non. As CEGAT has disposed of all the appeals merely on the basis of Larger Bench decision in Parasrampuria Synthetics Ltd. [2000 (5) TMI 66 - CEGAT, COURT NO. III, NEW DELHI] and has not considered rival contentions on merits nor recorded findings thereon, it would be appropriate and in the fitness of things to remit the matters to CEGAT, now to Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) to decide them on all points in accordance with law in the light of observations made in this judgment. Appeal allowed.
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2005 (8) TMI 656
Challenging the withdrawal of the exemption that the State was bound by the principle of promissory estoppel by the Government Order in 1995
Held that:- Granting exemption from general sales tax uptil 2000 As noticed there was nothing either in the notification or in the Policy which provided that the negative list would not be amended or altered. On the contrary clause (vii) of paragraph 7 to G.O. 10 of 1995 expressly reserved the Government's right to amend the negative list. The right if any of the appellants was a precarious one and could not found a claim for promissory estoppel.
As observed, the edible oil industries were entitled to the benefit of S.R.O. 93 since edible oil was not an industry mentioned in the negative list. The State Government, in view of the decision of this court in Shree Mahavir Oil Mills [1996 (11) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] had no other option but to place edible oils in the negative list.
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2005 (8) TMI 655
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... ... ..... the statute. The statute cannot be complied with according to the whims and fancies of the assessee and it has to be complied with as ordered in the statute. It is well established legal principle when a thing has to be done in a particular manner it is to be done in that manner. Any other mode or manner of performance be necessarily forbidden in law. The Joint Commissioner, while passing revisional order, confirming the penalty imposed under section 15(2), reduced the penalty imposed under section 15(1) to a considerable amount of Rs. 10,000 from Rs. 5,89,590. Even for reducing, that too, to such an extent, the revisional authority has given a reason taking shield in the judgment of the Supreme Court Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand v. Union of India reported in 1983 53 STC 289. In the above said facts and circumstances, I do not find any illegality or irregularity so as to interfere with the order of the Joint Commissioner. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 654
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... ... ..... for sports and games. Thus there is no representation by the respondents which was relied on by the petitioner to believe that aquatica was nothing but complex for sports and games and it acted on such belief. Thus we hold that the permission accorded by the concerned department accepting the scheme that aquatica is a water complex for sports and games does not estop the respondents from taking steps to initiate assessment proceeding and to levy tax under the Act, 1922. We, therefore, hold that the provision of sub-section (3) of section 3 shall apply in this case and the petitioner is liable to pay tax for the period prior to March 26, 2002. The subsequent amendment made in sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act, 1922 does not help the petitioner to support his case. In view of the findings made above, we find no merits in the present application and it is liable to be dismissed. The application is thus dismissed without costs. B.K. MAJUMDAR (Technical Member). - I agree.
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2005 (8) TMI 653
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... ... ..... spirit of the enactment. A penal provision has to be strictly construed. The assessing officer has not dealt with the aspect relating to penalty but has a spacious observation that the penalty was imposed on the basis of the assessment. In my considered view, the said order is vulnerable and affirmation thereof by the revisional authority is also susceptible and accordingly, the said orders are quashed. However, it is open to the assessing officer to proceed in accordance with law from the stage of issue of show cause. To elaborate no further show cause shall be issued, as the petitioner is presently aware that the notice to show cause is under section 69(2) of the Act. The petitioner shall file his show cause within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order passed today and the assessing officer shall proceed in accordance with law. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs. Carbon copy as per rules.
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2005 (8) TMI 652
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... ... ..... nment notification of the year 1998, and being in consonance with the same, there is no occasion to declare the condition in the notification of the year 2000, i.e., the notification dated June 5, 2000 as bad either. The Government order dated September 5, 1998 in modification of the earlier Government order dated February 26, 1997 in itself being the primary notification extending the kind of benefit and the condition subject to which it is extended, particularly as the petitioner bargained for modification of the Government order dated February 26, 1997 and consequently the Government order dated September 5, 1998 having come into existence and it is being independent of any concession or benefit that is attributable to new units covered under heading 5 of the annexure II to the policy notification, there is no occasion to grant any declaratory relief as sought for by the petitioner in this petition. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed, without issuing the rule.
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2005 (8) TMI 651
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... ... ..... nd of availability of alternative remedy. We find it difficult to sustain the order which is contrary to section 16 of the Act which provides for filing of revision petition even against the order of the assessing authority. In such view of the matter, we hold that the revisional authority is bound to decide the revision on merits. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is set aside. The revision petition filed by the petitioner shall revive to its file for its hearing and disposal on merits, in accordance with law by the revisional authority. The revision petition shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be an order accordingly. It is needless to direct that pending the revision petition, no coercive steps as against the petitioner shall be taken. The writ petition is accordingly allowed without any order as to costs. That Rule Nisi has been made absolute.
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2005 (8) TMI 650
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... ... ..... ve. Notification is not meant to give extension of the exemption to a particular industry but to the industrial units manufacturing cement using fly ash. The above concession was originally granted in tune with the policy of the Government of India to avoid environmental pollution due to the piling up of hazardous fly ash in the country. The order was issued considering the role of fly ash based industries in checking environmental pollution as a general issue. The notification covers a class of industry. We are therefore of the view, there is sufficient justification for issuance of S.R.O. No. 78/ 2003. Petitioner 39 s case will not fall within that category. Therefore the contention of the petitioner that the same benefit be extended to the petitioner 39 s unit cannot be sustained. In the above mentioned circumstance we find no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge to be interfered by us. Writ appeal lacks merits and the same would stand dismissed.
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2005 (8) TMI 649
Revision u/s 11 of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (the Act) - liability to tax u/s 3F - hiring charges - transportation of the employees - Whether, there was any transfer of effective control of the buses by the assessee to the two companies - HELD THAT:- The bare perusal of section 3F of the Act shows that the provision of section 3F is applicable only in cases where there is transfer of right to use the goods.
In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Company Circle, Visakhapatnam [1989 (12) TMI 325 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT], the petitioner which owned the Visakhapatnam Steel Project, for the purpose of the steel project, allotted different parts of the project work to contractors. To facilitate the execution of work by the contractors with the use of sophisticated machinery, the petitioner had undertaken to supply the machinery to the contractors for the purpose of being used in the execution of the contracted works of the petitioner and received charges for the same. The respondents made a provisional assessment in view of the enlarged definition of "sale".
Thus, it is clear that for the transfer of right to use the goods and to invoke the provision of section 3F of the Act, it is necessary that there should be transfer of effective control of the goods in favour of the party.
On Perusal of the terms of the contracts shows that the effective control of the buses has never been transferred to the aforesaid two companies and it always remain with the assessee. The assessee only provided the buses for transportation of employees of the companies from one place to another place and the price was stipulated only for the purposes of transportation and not for the leasing of the entire bus as such for a definite period. The entire expenses for running of the buses, namely, diesel charges, salary of driver/conductor, road tax, passenger tax, etc., are to be borne by the assessee. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that there was no transfer of right to use the vehicles by the assessee to the aforesaid two companies and the provision of section 3F of the Act is not applicable. The order of the Tribunal is upheld.
In the result, revision fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2005 (8) TMI 648
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... ... ..... works in connection with the development of software programming to their customers. In view of the aforesaid factual finding of the revisional authority, which is again based on the relevant material available in the assessment records, we are of the view, that the law laid down by the apex court in the case of Tata Consultancy Services 2004 137 STC 620 AIR 2005 SC 371 2005 1 SCC 308, would squarely apply to the business activity of the appellant before us. Therefore, the question of law raised by the appellant for our consideration and decision requires to be answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. According, the following ORDER - I. The appeal is rejected II. The impugned order passed by the revisional authority for the assessment years 1989-90 and 1990-91 under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, in No. SMR/KST/BCD-I/CR.3/95-96, dated July 15, 1996 is confirmed III. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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2005 (8) TMI 647
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... ... ..... d as part of the petitioner 39 s sales tax liability. If the petitioner had paid any taxes for this period, without claiming such benefit at that time when the assessment was concluded, any part of tax paid, assuming that the petitioner was entitled to certain concessions can be refunded only on correction of such corresponding assessment order and not otherwise. Reliance placed on the Government Notification No. DE 210 EEB 95, Bangalore, dated November 23, 1995 also does not help the petitioner for claiming refund, inasmuch as, this notification is not one which permits any refund to be granted. At any rate, it is not under this notification that the petitioner claims any benefit or tax concession as the notification is subsequent to the period during which the petitioner had paid sales tax. I do not find any occasion either to quash the impugned order or for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to direct the respondents to grant any refund in favour of the petitioner.
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