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2006 (7) TMI 664
... ... ... ... ..... their destination beyond the State of Uttar Padesh. On this issue the following authorities may be seen (i) 2003 U.P.T.C. 1218, Madhya Bharat Transport Corner. v. Commissioner, Trade Tax; (ii) 2005 NTN (Vol. 28) 129, Commissioner, Trade Tax v. S/s. Shagun Khan. 4. The officers of the respondent department in this case appear to have been over enthusiastic in performance of their duties and have detained the goods of the petitioner on the irrelevant reasons about the source and origin of the goods and the addresses and registration of the consigner and consignee. 5. We have no doubt that the petitioner has been harassed in this episode without any valid reason and, therefore, deserves immediate relief. 6. We, therefore, quash the detention/seizure order dated 24th June, 2006, Annexure 7 to this petition, and direct the respondent No. 3 to release the entire goods seized under the aforesaid order to the petitioner forthwith. 7. The writ petition is allowed as above with costs.
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2006 (7) TMI 663
Whether the order of dismissal of the respondent from service valid?
Whether even short remittance amounts to mis-conduct therefore the impugned order ought not to have been passed by the Division Bench ordering reinstatement?
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2006 (7) TMI 662
... ... ... ... ..... the Advisory Board is under an obligation under section 11 (1) of the Act to submit its report to the appropriate government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. The proceedings before the Advisory Board have therefore to be completed with the utmost expedition. " From the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that the right so given to the detenu is vital and important right. Serving notice at 8. 30 a. m. and calling upon the detenu to decide whether he wants to be represented through a friend who is not a legal practitioner or whether he wants to examine witnesses and keep those witnesses ready, within one hour, was not at all a full, sufficient and proper opportunity to the detenu. Therefore, this contention of Mr. Tripathi is required to be accepted, and the petition is required to be allowed. 5. In the result, the petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. Detenu be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Petition allowed.
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2006 (7) TMI 661
Whether the review petition to be maintainable?
Whether when a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the Arbitration Petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition?
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2006 (7) TMI 660
Whether the Notification dated 1.10.1999 issued by the State of Maharashtra empowering the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Bombay, the powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of Sections 18 and 20 of the Act, has been validly made?
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2006 (7) TMI 659
... ... ... ... ..... ore, along with the explanation aims to include only those prepacked commodities which by the very nature are required to be packed before they are sold. 11. Coming to the facts of the present case, can it be said that the watch is a prepacked commodity. The facts as set out earlier will indicate that the watch is removed from its package and displayed. On it being removed there is no decrease in its pre-determined value nor does it undergo a perceptible change. The explanation also will not be attracted as a watch by its very nature, does not require to be pre-packed. The package is only meant for the purpose of safety and/or to keep away dirt or dust. Therefore, considering the Rule and the explanation a watch cannot be said to be a pre-packed commodity. Once we so hold, the petition as filed would have to be allowed. 12. In the light of that petition made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a) and (b). In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (7) TMI 658
... ... ... ... ..... rode the justifiability of the detention order. In view of the legal position as stated and in the present set of circumstances, the non-supply of shipping bills did not cause any prejudice to the petitioner or affect his right of effective representation. Respondents have explained that considering the number of searches carried out, the massive evidence required to be collected and collated as also the recording of statements of the petitioner and his various associates under Section 108 and collection of evidence from the Banks as also of the various exports made, the proposal for preventive detention could be made only on 20.9.2004. The statement of two of the associates of the petitioner was recorded on 27th October, 2004. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the passing of the detention order was unduly delayed which would affect the very purpose of preventive detention. In view of the foregoing reasons, the petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 657
Determination to the cost of the construction - case referred to departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) - HELD THAT:- The order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal cannot be said to be erroneous also on the ground that on the date when the appeals u/s 260A of the Income-tax Act are being decided some other view could be taken, if these appeals are taken as continuance of the assessment proceedings.
We are unable to accept the plea that the appeal u/s 260A is continuance of the assessment proceedings within the meaning of the term used in the proviso to section 142A of the Income-tax Act and that the assessment does not stand finally concluded, on the order being passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
In the case in hand, the Tribunal applied the law as is existed on the date of decision. The Tribunal passed the order in the assessment proceedings on 6-7-2004, i.e., much before the cut-off date 30-9-2004, date prescribed under the proviso. That being so, the appeals do not raise any substantial question of law to be decided by the High Court. The appeals are devoid of force, hence dismissed.
The aforesaid appeals are dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 656
Whether, in a case to which section 115JB applies, the applicant has the option to set off the current year’s profit against the loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation, in its accounts, in a manner different from the manner adopted for determination of “book profit” under section 115JB ?
Whether the applicant has discretion to set off the current year’s profit, either against the loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation ? In the event of such set-off being made by the applicant in one year, can it in the subsequent years adopt a different method of set-off ? Can the applicant set off the current year’s profit partly against the business loss brought forward and partly against unabsorbed depreciation in such proportion as it might decide ?
Whether the applicant having disclosed the aggregate loss comprising loss brought forward and unabsorbed depreciation as a consolidated figure in its profit and loss account, can for the purpose of calculating the book profit under section 115JB bifurcate such consolidated loss into loss brought forward and unabsorbed depreciation and avail of the benefit of reduction envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 115JB in a manner most beneficial to it ?
Whether it is open to the applicant to set off the current year's profit against the loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation in a manner most beneficial to it subject, however, to the provisions of sub-section (2) and whether such adjustment can be changed from year to year ?
Whether the applicant can change the method of setting off the current year's profit against loss brought forward or unabsorbed depreciation from year to year and whether that amounts to a change in the method of accounting and requires the approval of the assessing authority ?
Which of the methods viz. the method adopted by the applicant for calculating the book profit for the assessment years 2004-05 and 2005-06 or the method adopted by the Revenue for the aforesaid assessment years is the correct method ?
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2006 (7) TMI 655
... ... ... ... ..... J.C. Patel, Adv., Mr. Vipin Jain, Adv., Ms. Shilpa Balani, Adv. ORDER Delay condoned. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having considered the reasoning of the High Court, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 654
... ... ... ... ..... For the Respondent Mr.Joseph Vellapally, Sr. Adv., Ms. L. Maitheli, Adv., Mr. K.V.Mohan,Adv. ORDER Heard. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 653
... ... ... ... ..... the assessee contested the account of the Electricity Department in the Court of law and the matter was decided by the Court in its favour. In any case, the revenue has not placed any material on record to controvert the finding of the CIT(A) that the assessee was charged electricity not at the minimum rate but on actual consumption. Thus, there being no specific finding recorded by the Assessing Officer for rejection of the book results and in the absence of any defects in the books of account, we are of the considered opinion that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the impugned addition. We confirm his order and dismiss both the grounds of appeal of the revenue." 5. A bare perusal of the impugned order goes to show that the finding of the Tribunal, confirming the order of CIT(A) was finding of fact based upon the relevant material and no question of law much less substantial question arises for consideration in this appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2006 (7) TMI 652
Whether the Allahabad High Court would have also jurisdiction to deal with grievances of the writ petitioner and can deal with conditions of prisoners in that State more effectively, though the Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction?
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2006 (7) TMI 651
... ... ... ... ..... e decision in M/s Jawahar Engineering Company (supra) will not be applicable to the facts of the case before it. Since the application for registration of trademark in the cases before it had not been made within the territory of Delhi, the Supreme Court in the case of Dhodha House (supra) found and held that the decision in the case of Jawahar Engineering Company (supra) would be inapplicable to the facts of the said case before it. In the said case, the Division Bench of this Court also held that such court will have jurisdiction where the trade mark is sought to be sold and if such trade mark is being sought for sale in Delhi amongst other places, Delhi shall also have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. 20. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the order dated 28th April, 2006, passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. We find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2006 (7) TMI 650
Whether the order of termination passed by appellant No.2 and directed re-instatement of the respondent in service with continuity of service, but without back wages valid?
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2006 (7) TMI 649
Whether appeal by special leave against sentence of imprisonment abates on the death of the accused/appellant?
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2006 (7) TMI 648
Whether Section 14(1)(J-2) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 is prospective in nature and thus, the concerned respondents as also the High Court acted illegally and without jurisdiction in arriving at a finding that the appellant stood disqualified by reason thereof?
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2006 (7) TMI 647
... ... ... ... ..... .1.1994 to 9.4.2002, casting liability oh the appellants and other incumbents to pay tax, is ultra vires the powers conferred under Section 10(3) of the Act. 5. On that reason, the impugned judgment has to be reversed and consequently, Ext. P8 has to be quashed. In the light of these findings, there is no reason for considering the contention on promissory estoppel. 6. We have also carefully considered the contention of the Government Pleader that Ext. P8 does not amount to retrospective cancellation, but only withdrawing the benefit conferred in Ext. P10. But the particular method adopted in Ext. P.8 is cancellation and the power exercised to issue Ext. P8 is that conferred by Sub-section (3) of Section 10, which enabled the Government to cancel or vary the notification only propectively. Anyhow, what is done by Ext. P8 is not a variation of Ext. P1, but only cancellation of Ext. P10. Necessarily, that contention cannot be countenanced. Writ Appeals are accordingly allowed.
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2006 (7) TMI 646
... ... ... ... ..... signed by Under Secretary to the Government of India. Moreover, the opposite party No. 2 did not challenge it by way of any writ petition or other legal recourse so once the sanction has been declined, the Court was not at all competent to take cognizance of the offence because the bar created by Section 197 is absolute and complete. The learned Magistrate committed legal error in holding otherwise. 73. There being a legal bar against the prosecution of the petitioners of Criminal Misc. Case No. 977 of 2005 and there being absolutely no evidence making out any prima facie offence against the petitioners of Criminal Misc. Case No. 978 of 2005, and the prosecution of these petitioners being abuse of the process of Court, this is a fit case where the power under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised. 74. Both the petitions are, therefore, allowed. The impugned order dated 15-2-2005 including the charge-sheet submitted against the petitioners are hereby quashed.
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2006 (7) TMI 645
... ... ... ... ..... e , needless to emphasise, the application for condonation of delay has to pave the path of dismissal but when there is some delay and it has been acceptably explained, the legal forum should not adopt a hypertechnical approach to throw the lis on the threshold. In the case at hand, the application for reference to the High Court was filed. There is delay of one month and 17 days. The explanation was given that the letters sent by the counsel were misplaced. Regard being had to the explanation preferred in regard to the delay, we are of the considered opinion the Board would have been well advised to condone the delay and address itself to the merits of the case and that would have been in the fitness of thing. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we quash the order dated April 17, 2009 passed in Ref. Appli. No. 63/CTAB/05(ET) as contained in annexure P1 and direct the Board to deal with the application under section 70 of the Act on merits. There shall be no order as to costs.
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