|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 623 Records
-
2007 (1) TMI 531 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ner of Trade Tax. No reliance can be placed on the decision of this court in the case of dealer in Trade Tax Revision No. 877 of 2000 under the Central Sales Tax Act, because in the said case, the decision of the apex court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Girja Shanker Awanish Kumar 1997 104 STC 130 1997 UPTC 213 has not been considered, inasmuch as, there was a difference in the stock found at the time of survey. However, the Tribunal has not given any basis for estimating the suppressed sales at Rs. 20 lacs. In this view of the matter, the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the issue of quantum of turnover afresh. The Tribunal may consider the suppression and the other material on record and estimate the turnover by way of best judgment assessment. In the result, revision is allowed in part. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in the light of observations made above.
-
2007 (1) TMI 530 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... li, falls under the bone product. The apex court observed as follows . . . The word 39 product 39 is defined in Webster 39 s Comprehensive Dictionary as 39 anything produced or obtained as a result of some operation or work 39 . The expression 39 bone products 39 therefore, merely means anything produced or obtained from bones. Whether such derivation is by a simple physical process or by a chemical reaction would seem to make no difference to the end-product . . . Thus, in view of the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the apex court and by this court, wood-wool being obtained as a result of grinding of wood or timber in which some action, operation or work are involved is a timber product or wood product and liable to tax at six per cent under the Notification No. ST-2-5785/X-10(1)-80-U.P. Act XV/48-Order-81, dated September 7, 1981. For the reasons stated above, order of the Tribunal is accordingly, upheld. In the result, revision fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 529 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ch as, dealer had only received commission from the purchasers. Whether the view of the assessing authority in original assessment order was correct or incorrect, is the different issue. The question is that once in the original assessment, a issue relating to freight had been adjudicated, whether on the basis of same material, a different view can be taken in the proceeding under section 21 on account of change of opinion. Perusal of the assessment order reveals that on the same facts, the assessing authority had reviewed its earlier order on account of change of opinion and had held that the freight would be the part of the turnover. It is settled principle of law that the proceeding under section 21 of the Act cannot be initiated and the tax under section 21 of the Act cannot be levied merely on account of change of opinion. Thus, I do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal and is, accordingly, upheld. In the result, revision fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 528 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... are necessary to be made as to the price at which trucks were sold at the regional sales offices, the court cannot stop him from making such enquiries. 5.. Mr. Sorabjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has complained that the assessments are going on endlessly and without due regard to an earlier judgment of the Patna High Court in respect of an earlier assessment year on the very same issues. Whether the controversy raised in this case is covered by an earlier judgment of the High Court is a matter to be decided by the Assistant Collector. He will have to decide all questions of fact and law. He has to make whatever enquiries he thinks necessary for determination of the value of excisable goods. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction cannot give guidance to Assistant Collector about the manner and mode in which the assessment should be made. Hence the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 527 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a) of the Act to milk obtained in its natural form only. The exemption under section 4(a) of the Act has been granted on the sale of milk which in my view include milk of all nature. Therefore, even if various nature of milks are different commercial commodities, the expression milk in section 4(a) of the Act equally applies to all those commodities. In this view of the matter I find no reason in denying the exemption to the artificial milk, reconstituted or recombined milk prepared by mixing of milk powder, butter and butter oil, etc. In view of the aforesaid view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the Explanation which has been added subsequently is clarificatory or not. In the result, all the three revisions are allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and it is held that the milk sold by the applicant after adding milk powder, white butter, etc., was exempted from tax. The Tribunal is directed to pass appropriate order under section 11(8) of the Act.
-
2007 (1) TMI 526 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Tribunal desired the examination of those documents by the assessing authority, it cannot be said to be illegal. The examination of those documents and further enquiry in the matter is more appropriately possible at the stage of the assessing authority. In the circumstances, I do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the applicant are not applicable to the present case and are clearly distinguishable. There are the cases where case was remanded for providing fresh inning to the assessing authority. Present is not the case of remand for providing fresh inning to the assessing authority to adjudicate the matter afresh. As stated above, in the present case the applicant could not produce the relevant documents, which were asked by the assessing authority to produce, which has been held relevant to adjudicate the correctness of the transactions. In the result, revisions fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 525 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e appropriate authorities for such purpose. (b) Upon the capacity assessment being determined, we direct that the eligibility certificate for sales tax exemption under IPR 1989 be issued on the basis of such determination and in the manner contemplated under the circular as well as guidelines for assessment of capacity of industrial unit issued by the Director of Industries. (c) The exercise of determination of installed capacity be completed within a period of two months and as a consequence thereof the eligibility certificate for sales tax exemption be issued within one month therefrom. (d) The connected sales tax proceedings may remain in abeyance for a period of four months for compliance with the direction made hereinabove and shall thereafter be disposed of by the appropriate authorities in terms of the certification that will be issued by the Director of Industries in compliance the directions contained hereinabove. (e) No order as to costs. A.K. GANGULY J. - I agree.
-
2007 (1) TMI 524 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ee was held not liable to pay any tax on such resale. It was in the said circumstances, the clause in the assessee 39 s bills inclusive of sales tax was interpreted. Same is not the case in hand. The whole tender process, supply order and the contract agreement about which a mention has been made above, clearly indicated that the quoted rate was inclusive of all taxes. Clause 4 of the contract agreement referred to above clearly indicated that the quoted rate should be for supply and delivery per MT(G) of bamboo and inclusive of all charges like deposits, i.e., the purchase tax or sales tax. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that no case of any interference to the action of the respondents in deducting the purchase tax from the bills of the petitioner has been made out and accordingly the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders passed in each of the writ petitions stand vacated. Writ petitions are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 523 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rder dated February 8, 1999 is set aside and consequently, all the impugned orders passed by the Tax Board following the reasons given in the order dated February 8, 1999 and which are impugned in these revisions are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tax Board to decide all the appeals including the appeals decided by the order dated February 8, 1999 afresh in accordance with law and after considering the evidence which may be produced by the Revenue in rebuttal to the evidence produced by the assessee before the Tax Board. Since this court held that the order dated February 8, 1999 has been passed with material illegality and irregularity, therefore, the appeals which were decided by the order dated February 8, 1999 shall also stand revived by this order and the Tax Board may consider the evidence in those revisions after affording opportunity to the Revenue to rebut the evidence. Both the parties are directed to appear before the Tax Board on February 19, 2007.
-
2007 (1) TMI 522 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... admitted facts of the case, I am completely unable to justify the finding that there was any attempt by the petitioner to evade the levy of entry tax and the consequential imposition of the heavy penalty. Further, as much as the imposition of penalty was unjustified, the demand notices and the attachment of bank account(s) for realisation of the demand were even more arbitrary and unwarranted. I am constrained to observe that such methods are bound to cause more harm than good to the cause of collection of State revenue. In light of the discussions made above, the conclusion is inevitable that the levy of entry tax on paddy, rice and wheat imported by the petitioner during the period April 1, 2006 to June 30, 2006 was unauthorised, bad and illegal. The impugned order, dated September 12, 2006 and the consequent demands and the actions taken by the authorities for realisation of the demand are accordingly quashed. This writ petition is allowed. SMT. REKHA KUMARI J. - I agree.
-
2007 (1) TMI 521 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... name of Indian principal in respect of the transactions which were entered into with the foreign buyers to establish that the sale was in fact export sale. It has been held that where an assessee entered into an export sale through agent and this mode of transactions is evidenced by the record, the fact that the foreign buyers are unaware of this circumstance would not detract from the fact that the sales are really those of the assessee. In all the aforesaid cases, sales to the foreign buyers through the agent have been held as sale in the course of export. Moreover, there is no material on record to show that the movements of the goods from Mathura to Bombay were in pursuance of any contract of sale between the dealers and Bombay party. Thus, it cannot be treated as inter-State sales by the dealers to Bombay party. For the reasons stated above, all the revisions have no merit and are liable to be dismissed. In the result, all the revisions fails and accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 520 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ...
... ... ..... Assistant Commissioner by order dated July 3, 2002 (with effect from April 1, 2002) we have no hesitation at all to hold that the impugned notice under form No. 44A issued by respondent No. 1 upon the petitioner is quite good in law. On cumulative consideration of the aforesaid facts and materials on records and the provisions of the Act and Rules cited above we are not inclined to hold that respondent No. 1 had/has no authority to issue the show cause notice under form No. 44A of the said Rules of 1995 and/or that the petitioner has neither acted as the importer nor as the transporter of the goods in question as is contended by Mr. Chakraborti, learned Advocate for the petitioner. In the result, the instant application under section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 bears no merit to succeed and it is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the application stands dismissed but in the circumstances without any cost. DEB KUMAR CHAKRABORTI (Technical Member). - I agree.
-
2007 (1) TMI 519 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
... ...
... ... ..... r making computer stationery from paper. The activity as asserted by the petitioner is conversion of electronic data into printed form using computer machine run by electricity, paper and ink. It amounts to manufacturing. The section 2(42)(d) of the WBST Act, 1994 excludes manufacturing referred to in clause (17) of section 2 of the 1994 Act. The rule 2(mm) takes manufacturing of computer stationery out of the ambit of manufacture . The petitioner 39 s activity of printing of computer paper and stationery using his own papers, ink and computer under agreement is therefore not a works contract within the meaning of the section 2(42) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994. The application is therefore allowed without cost declaring that the activity of printing of computer paper and stationery using own materials and computer under agreement is not works contract within the meaning of the section 2(42) of the WBST Act, 1994. DEB KUMAR CHAKRABORTI (Technical Member). - I agree.
-
2007 (1) TMI 518 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ficate of registration referred to in clause (b) or for the packing of any containers or other materials specified in the certificate of registration referred to in clause (c). Perusal of the aforesaid clauses shows that the case of the dealer does not fall under any of the above clause and inasmuch as dealer had not failed to use the goods for the purposes specified in the aforesaid clauses. As stated above, dealer was admittedly granted registration certificate for the purchases of papers for use in the manufacturing of books. Papers which were purchased at Delhi were admittedly used in the manufacturing of books. Therefore, it cannot be said that the paper had been used for any other purposes specified in clauses (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Central Act. In the circumstances, the Tribunal has rightly deleted the penalty. The order of the Tribunal is, accordingly, upheld. In the result, all the four revisions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 517 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to be supplied in the execution of the works contract but by using the various items bio-gas plant was to be fabricated, commissioned and erected at site. Thus, it was not the bio-gas plant, which was subject-matter of tax but it was the various parts and components used in the execution of the works contract which were subject-matter of tax. In the circumstances, no benefit could be allowed for the alleged claim of bio-gas plant. If it would be a case that the bio-gas plant as a goods would be used in the construction of the effluent treatment plant then while determining the turnover, the value of bio-gas plant being a goods itself could be considered but in the present case, bio-gas plant was to be commissioned at site, out of the various parts, as a part of the effluent treatment plant and thus, the claim of the applicant that to the extent of value of bio-gas plant, the penalty should be reduced is misplaced. In the result, revision fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2007 (1) TMI 516 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Constitutional validity of the Bihar Entry Tax Act - levy and collection of tax on entry of goods into local areas for consumption, use or sale - direction of the Supreme Court in order in Jindal Stainless Limited v. State of Haryana [2006 (4) TMI 120-SUPREME COURT] - amendments introduced in Patent Act, without the previous sanction of the President - violative of the proviso to article 304(b) - HELD THAT:- It is noted that on November 5, 2001 and again on August 22, 2003 basic and major amendments were introduced in the Act. These included (i) the change in the definition of "entry of goods", (ii) enlargement of the Schedule, and (iii) raising the maximum limit in the rate of entry tax from 5 to 20 per cent of the import value of goods. All these amendments were undeniably made without the previous sanction of the President.
It is significant to note that Jyothi Home Industries[1986 (2) TMI 331 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] also considered in detail the Supreme Court decision in Syed Ahmed Aga [1975 (5) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT]. The facts of the case and the nature of the amendments also appear to be very close to the case in hand. In light of all those decisions, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the amendments sought to be introduced in the Parent Act vide amending Act 10 of 2001, dated November 5, 2001 and the amending Act 9 of 2003, dated August 22, 2003 were bad and violative of article 304(b) of the Constitution for want of the Presidential sanction/assent.
It is well-settled by a catena of decisions that only in case an Act is violative of article 301 of the Constitution, its validity is required to be tested with reference to article 304(b). The levy of the tax in its present form being compensatory in character, the need to satisfy the requirements of article 304(b) of the Constitution does not arise.
Hence, I may summarise the conclusion as follows: (i) The levy under the Parent Act of 1993, before its amendments, was not compensatory in character and was, therefore, violative of article 301 of the Constitution.
(ii) The Parent Act of 1993, before its amendments, was nevertheless saved by virtue of article 304(b) of the Constitution and the decision in Bihar Chamber of Commerce [1996 (2) TMI 430 - SUPREME COURT] to that extent remains subsisting till date.
(iii) The amendments introduced in the Act by amending Acts 10 of 2001 and 9 of 2004 were bad because the former made the Act violative of article 304(a) of the Constitution and further because both the amendments were made without the previous sanction of the President.
(iv) The introduction of imported goods within the definition of "entry of goods" was bad for being retrospective as also for want of the Presidential sanction/assent.
(v) After the 2006 Amendment the levy under the Act acquired the nature of a compensatory tax and the Act in its present form is a valid piece of legislation.
Thus, the two cases are fit to be allowed because they relate to the period 2001-2006. But I would refrain from making any order or direction in that regard since the matter is already pending before the Supreme Court.
The two cases are thus disposed of as directed by the Supreme Court in Jindal Stainless Limited.
-
2007 (1) TMI 515 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... was not communicated to the assessee on or before March 31, 2000 the original order of assessment is barred by limitation. We may indicate that the specific case of the assessee is that he had stopped his business in September 1997, even before the alleged affixture of assessment order on March 28, 2000 and in the business premises of the assessee a new business venture by name Konkan Gas Agency had already started functioning. In spite of the direction of the Tribunal the assessing authority had not considered the question as to whether it had followed the provisions of rule 63(a), (b) and (c) before carrying on the affixture of notice. Under such circumstance there is no justification in further remanding the matter back to the assessing authority. We are therefore in agreement with the counsel appearing for the assessee that the assessment is barred by limitation and we hold so. Revision is allowed as above and the questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee.
-
2007 (1) TMI 514 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Constitutional validity of the U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000 ("the Act") - entry tax levied on crude oil imported - whether the "entry tax" is "compensatory tax" - violative of articles 301 and 304, Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- It is to be appreciated that we are not called upon to adjudicate or define parameters of "compensatory tax" or vires of the "Act", which is outside the scope of the "issue" remitted to High Court vide Supreme Court judgment and order dated July 14, 2006(1) whereunder High Court/s, after affording opportunity to the parties to furnish relevant data (to discharge its "burden") decide nature of "entry tax", i.e., whether the "tax" under the Act, is "compensatory" in nature. Undisputedly it is to be done on the parameters/touchstone laid down by the apex court in the case of Jindal Stainless Ltd.[2006 (4) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT].
It is clear from the perusal of documents annexed with the affidavit of Amitabh Mishra that the amount of revenue earned from "entry tax" under the Act is pooled in the "consolidated fund"—which is utilised under budgetary-allocation to the States, which is also utilised as "grant-in-aid" by "State" to make up budgetary deficit of a local body to discharge their statutory/constitutional obligations—which apart from others include construction of roads, bridges, etc. The respondents have placed figures relating to the "funds" given as "grant-in-aid" to panchayats/local bodies from "consolidation fund"—as part of its share received by State of U.P. There is, therefore, no occasion for us to probe reasonableness or proportionality of the same in the instant case.
"Aims and objects" of the Act, even though not decisive as held by the Supreme Court, merely refer "to augment revenue of the State " and hence support the contention of the petitioners that "tax" under it is not compensatory in nature. The State has failed to pin-point or establish through its data, the specific/additional service/facility provided to its tax-payer(s). It is obvious that the apex court remitted the issue of "compensatory tax" (after parties are given opportunity to file "data" to discharge their burden) apparently for the reason that it found "aims and object" of the Act irrelevant and none of the provisions of the Act (including its sections 4, 4-A and 6 read with the Schedule) reflect that the amount of "entry tax" is to provide "additional " or "specific" facility to the scheduled trades visa-vis those who are not subjected to this "tax". There is no co-relation between the "levy of entry tax" and the "scheduled trades".
Finding There is not even an iota of evidence/material on record to give required data/statistics to prove/establish that the amount collected as "tax" and its expenditure on providing additional/specific advantage/facility provided to trade/s in particular mentioned under the Schedule of the Act. In absence of such a data it is not possible for this court to hold that "entry tax" is "compensatory tax". We hold accordingly.
In the nature of the case we make no order as to costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 513 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... no quarrel over the proposition with regard to the interest of the consumer. However, while considering the denial of exemption notification, this court has to go only by the clause in the notification and the clause unfortunately did not apply to the present set of circumstances. However, we once again deem it proper to observe that the State would be well-advised in re-drafting the exemption notification at least in future so that the ultimate consumer is benefited on account of grant of exemption to a new industrial unit. We do hope that the Government would bestow its best attention while drafting the exemption notification so that even consideration aspect can result in denial of exemption. It is for the Government and Governmental authorities to consider this aspect of the matter and take appropriate steps. In the result, on the facts of this case, we answer questions of law against the Government and accept the findings of the majority view of the Tribunal. No costs.
-
2007 (1) TMI 512 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n which Mr. Borah, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance touching the merit of the case need not be referred to which the petitioner will be entitled to refer before the appellate authority, if they are of any help to the case of the petitioner. In case of preferring any appeal by the petitioner before the appellate authority against the impugned orders of assessment, the appellate authority shall consider the prayer of the petitioner, if made, for condonation of delay, in accordance with law taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner was pursuing his remedy before this court and in fact, some interim protection was also provided to the petitioner. For the foregoing reasons, discussions and findings, the writ petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. The dismissal of the writ petition shall not stand on the way of the petitioner to approach the appellate forum, if so advised. Writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
............
|
