|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 662 Records
-
2007 (10) TMI 701 - SUPREME COURT
Anticipatory bail - Seeking grant of protection u/s 438 - Whether courts had the inherent power to pass an order of bail in anticipation of arrest? - HELD THAT:- The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally passed. It flows from the very language of the section which requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever". Such 'blanket order' should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Section 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in the background of legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be passed.
Thus, we direct that within a period of four weeks from today the respondents shall surrender before the concerned Court and shall seek regular bail.
We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. When the bail application is moved in terms of Section 439 of the Code before the concerned Court the same shall be considered in its proper perspective in accordance with law. If an application for bail is moved, the concerned Court would do well to dispose it of on the day it is filed. Learned Counsel appearing for the State has undertaken that all relevant records shall be produced before the Court dealing with the bail application and no adjournment shall be asked for on the ground of non-availability of records if the accused-respondents intimate the date on which they purpose to surrender three days in advance.
Further, it is baffling to note that the accused and informant referred to particular positions of case diary. At the stage the bail applications were heard by the High Court, legally they could not have been in a position to have access to the same. The papers which are to be supplied to the accused have been statutorily prescribed. The Courts should take serious note when the accused or the informant refers to the case diary to buttress a stand.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
2007 (10) TMI 700 - SUPREME COURT
Application for grant of anticipatory bail - Commission of an offence punishable under Sections 376, 342 r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and u/s 5 of the Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act - Respondents herein comprise of police officers, politicians and a businessman - HELD THAT:- Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in such a serious offence, being u/s 376, 376(2)(g) IPC, in our opinion, are required to be satisfied. [D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran and Ors.[2007 (2) TMI 701 - SUPREME COURT].
A mistake in regard to her age as recorded in the First Information Report or the first medical document or even in her supplementary affidavit should yield to the public documents which have been produced by the prosecution at this stage. Even before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, she disclosed her date of birth to be 22.06.1991. Therefore, even according to that she was below 16 years of age.
Immoral conduct on the part of police officers should not be encouraged. We fail to understand as to how the police officers could go underground. They had been changing their residence very frequently. Although most of them were police officers, their whereabouts were not known. During the aforementioned period attempts had been made even by Mahananda to obtain the custody of the girl at whose instance, we do not know. On the one hand, Mahananda had been praying for the custody of the girl and Sunita, the mother of the girl, as noticed hereinbefore, had affirmed an affidavit in relation to her date of birth. These may not be acts of voluntariness on their part. It, therefore, in our opinion, is a case where no anticipatory bail should have been granted.
We may also notice that the High Court itself has refused to grant regular bail to the accused against whom charge-sheet has been submitted. The learned Session Judge also did not grant bail to some of the accused persons. If on the same materials, prayer for regular bail has been rejected, we fail to see any reason as to why and on what basis the respondents could be enlarged on anticipatory bail.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have granted anticipatory bail to the respondents. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
The respondents may surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate and move an application for regular bail, which may be considered on its own merit without being influenced, in any way, by the judgment of this Court.
-
2007 (10) TMI 699 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dismissed even on the ground of suppression of material fact of the plaintiff having filed an earlier suit for the same relief of injunction and the said suit having been dismissed. Therefore, even from this angle, the dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff by the lower Appellate Court cannot be termed as erroneous and, as such, I answer the substantial question of law framed by holding that insofar the possession is concerned, the view taken by the lower. 23. Appellate Court, having been based on the appreciation of evidence by it, is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in second appeal as it does not suffer from any of the infirmities which give rise to interference in second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. No occasion, therefore, arises for reversing the view taken by the lower Appellate Court. 24. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff stands confirmed. No costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 698 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the recommendations of the State Government of Uttaranchal as also that of the nodal agency SIDCUL. Learned senior counsel also points out that in fact the appellant’s industry is the only industry in the village which is entitled to grant of exemption from payment of Central Excise. We, therefore, are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for consideration thereof afresh. As the Union of India has also preferred an appeal against the said judgment, being C.A. No.1016/2007, we treat the same on Board and allow the said appeal also. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merit of the matter. We would, however, request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
-
2007 (10) TMI 697 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... (4) of Rule VI would indicate that the marks secured by him in 2002 can also be reckoned. According to him, the word “chances” used in the sub-rule (4) would support the above interpretation given by him to the Rule. The very same contention was raised before the CAT and the same was rejected. We find it difficult to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. We feel that the interpretation attributed to the Rule by the respondents is a plausible view. Further, the Rule has been understood and applied in a particular manner over the years. Normally the courts will be slow to interfere with such interpretations. See the decision of the Apex Court in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax (AIR 1965 SC 1636). In the said decision, the Apex Court has held that the view taken on a legal point which held the field for a long time should not be disturbed, even if a different view is possible. In the result, the Writ Petition fails and it is dismissed.
-
2007 (10) TMI 696 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stituency and Ors. 1952 1SCR218 , the Apex Court has laid down that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed off 8. Here, in the case in hand, the Act under which the Magistrate has passed the impugned order, specifically provide the remedy by way of appeal or by way of modification, alteration etc. 9. So, admittedly the petitioner has got alternative remedy under the Domestic Violence Act which she has not availed of and has straightway approached this Court. 10. Under these circumstances, the present petition is misconceived and is not maintainable and same is hereby dismissed with costs of ₹ 2,500/-. 11. The petitioner is directed to deposit the costs with the trial court within one month from the date of this order, failing which the trial court shall recover the same in accordance with law. 12. Copy of this judgment be sent to the trial court forthwith.
-
2007 (10) TMI 695 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is really a cause of concern that the articles confiscated at the time of seizure of a value of ₹ 3,50,0007- had been auction sold for a paltry sum of ₹ 402/- only. In absence of any explanation as to how the goods lost the value to such an extent, it has been rightly observed by the learned single Judge that there must be some rational between the value of the seized articles at the time of seizure and the price on which it is auction sold. In absence of the pleadings on either side as to how the value of the goods diminished to this extent, we would not like to make any further comment save and except to reiterate the observation of the learned single Judge that in future the respondents in similar matter must maintain transparency and if any articles are auctioned sold at a very low price, the reason for the same must be recorded. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the learned single Judge and dismiss the appeal. However there would be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 694 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ed is admittedly the sole proprietrix of the concern namely, "Kamakshi Enterprises" and as such, the question of the second accused to be vicariously held liable for the offence said to have been committed by the first accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act not at all arise. 7. In view of the above said reasons, this Court is constrained to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner in so far as the petitioner is concerned pending in C.C.No.258 of 2001 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Erode and is hereby quashed. The learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Erode is also directed to expedite the trial as expeditiously as possible and more particularly within a period of five months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order in view of the fact that the case itself relates to the year 2001. With the above direction, the Criminal Original Petition is allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
-
2007 (10) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of plaint - maintainability of the application questioned on the ground that once the court is seized of an application filed by him under Order VII Rule 11 CPC - suit filed within 12 years - Suit barred by limitation - land dispute - Identification of the property - scope of applicability of the Limitation Act vis-`-vis Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure - HELD THAT:- The law of limitation relating to the suit for possession has undergone a drastic change. In terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to aver and plead that he not only has title over the property but also has been in possession of the same for a period of more than 12 years. However, if the plaintiff has filed the suit claiming title over the suit property in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, burden would be on the defendant to prove that he has acquired title by adverse possession.
We have noticed that the defendant, inter alia, on the plea of identification of the suit land the deeds of sale, under which the plaintiff has claimed his title, claimed possession. The defendant did not accept that the plaintiff was in possession. An issue in this behalf is, therefore, required to be framed and the said question is, therefore, required to be gone into. Limitation would not commence unless there has been a clear and unequivocal threat to the right claimed by the plaintiff. In a situation of this nature, in our opinion, the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) was not maintainable. The contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent may have to be gone into at a proper stage. Lest it may prejudice the contention of one party or the other at the trial, we resist from making any observations at this stage.
Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The same is, therefore, set aside. The appeal is allowed with costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 692 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 5 Taxman 593 (Delhi), CIT v. Fibro Tech Chemicals IT Appeal No. 954 (Delhi) of 2006, dated 14-9-2007 , CIT v. Preeti Aggarwala IT Appeal No. 850 (Delhi) of 2006, dated 15-9-2007 and CIT v. Smt. Santosh Sharma 2007 166 Taxman 223 (Delhi). 10. Apart from the above, we also find that the revenue's appeal has been dismissed on merits by the Tribunal. It has been held that the claim of the assessee for depreciation was based on a bona fide belief and that the disallowance of the said claim during assessment proceedings on a difference of opinion could not be treated as concealment of income by the assessee, particularly when all the particulars in respect of the said claim were fully furnished by the assessee in its return of income. 11. Having examined the matter on merits ourselves, we find no infirmity in the view taken by the Tribunal in this regard. Therefore on merits as well no case for interference is made out. 12. No substantial question of law arises. 13. Dismissed.
-
2007 (10) TMI 691 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... r claim remains unsubstantiated Instead of substantiating their claim regarding qualification, they have simply reiterated their contentions made in the petition making bold statements. Their claim as per petition and even as per reply to the CA No. 357/07 remains unsubstantiated. The petitioners have failed to controvert any of the contentions made by the respondents in their preliminary objections on maintainability of this C.P. despite the opportunities provided to them. In the presence of conclusive evidence showing transfer and no proof of requisite membership, I find no justification to uphold that the petitioners have the requisite qualification to maintain this petition. The provisions of the other Sections mentioned in the petition can be attracted only if the petitioners have locus, which I hold they do not have. 10. In view of the foregoing, the CA No. 357/07 is hereby allowed. The C.P No. 88 of 2007 is hereby dismissed being not maintainable. No order as to cost.
-
2007 (10) TMI 690 - COMPANY LAW BOARD. CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... ts have not even furnished the suit number sustaining the action initiated by them, but at the same time, the applicants have made an application, under Section 111A of the Act, only on April 11, 2007, which ultimately resulted in a delay of 1,884 days, from the date of communicating the refusal by the company to register the transfer of impugned shares in the name of the applicants. The application is as vague as could be, disclosing the callous approach and attitude of the applicants in enforcement of their rights diligently, in the facts of the present case, I do not see any "sufficient cause" as envisaged in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, even after liberal consideration to advance substantial justice, as propounded by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions and therefore I am not inclined to entertain the application seeking condonation of delay of 1,884 days on the part of the applicants. 5. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. No order as to costs
-
2007 (10) TMI 689 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... f Arbitration or get the compliance made. Only the competent court can do that. Besides, there is uncondonable delay and latches in the matter. The petitioners cannot approbate and reprobate. They cannot take advantage and benefits of Awards which merged into the judgment and orders of High Court and Supreme Court, and then challenge the Awards, directly or indirectly. It is well settled principle decided by a number of judicial decisions that a person acting in terms of an order or Decree of a competent Court and taking the benefit thereunder cannot challenge the correctness and/or validity of order or Decree or judgment at a subsequent stage. The petitioners are seeking a review or enforcement or execution of the Awards which is not permissible, it is not within the competence of the Company Law Board. 49. In view of the foregoing, these petitions are hereby dismissed being not maintainable. All CAs stand disposed off. All interim orders stand vacated. No order as to cost.
-
2007 (10) TMI 688 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e amount. 3. As such, the said aspects can be considered at the later stage. 4. The only direction can be issued at this stage would be that the OL shall consider the claim found to the extent of admissible limit and for the disputed claim, the matter shall be considered by the OL and the same shall be finalised by this Court at the time when the disbursement is to be ordered. 5. Both the applications are disposed of accordingly.
-
2007 (10) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Under this Section, all duties, penalties and other sums required to be paid under Chapter IV, which includes stamp duty, would be recovered by the Collector by distress and sale of the movable property of the person who has been called upon to pay the adequate stamp duty or he can implement the method of recovery of arrears of land revenue for the dues of stamp duty. By virtue of proviso to Section 48-B, the Collector s power to adjudicate upon the adequacy of stamp duty on the original instrument on the basis of copy of the instrument is restricted to the period of five years from the date of execution of the original instrument. This Section only authorizes the Collector to recover the adequate stamp duty which has been avoided at the time of execution of the original instrument. This Section does not authorize the Collector to impound the copy of the instrument. 16. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. 17. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 686 - ITAT LUCKNOW
... ...
... ... ..... ts considered as income due to lack of evidence". The same was disclosed as fresh share capital acquired in the relevant period. This is not at all equivalent to or reflection of his satisfaction as to the condition existing precedent to assuming jurisdiction under Section 271(1)(c) in respect of the addition of ₹ 49 lacs. Further the assessing officer has made some other addition due to disallowances of expenses out of power and fuel. One does not know whether assessing officer was satisfied, before initiating penalty proceedings in respect of one addition, or all the additions, or which addition. 23. We accordingly hold that assessing officer had not arrived at the requisite satisfaction for the existence of conditions before assuming jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 271(1)(c). Accordingly, we uphold the, order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals). The appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed. 24. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
-
2007 (10) TMI 685 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sons' should be interpreted to mean landless peasants and not landless businessman. If a literal meaning was given to the expression 'landless persons' then even a very rich businessman who possessed hundreds of crores of rupees can claim allotment of a piece of land on the ground that he was a landless person as he owns no land. That could not possibly be the object of the Act. The object of the Act was to give land to landless peasants only. 13. In view of the above discussion we are of the opinion that a purposive interpretation has to be given to the definition of money-lenders. From this angle the appellant could not be said to be a money-lender as he was not really doing the business of money lending in the strict sense but was only advancing loans to secure the regular supply of areca nuts. 14. In view of the above this appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. No order as to costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 684 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ause the High Court itself has arrived at a finding that the learned Trial Judge had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is also not a case where the petitioner had been residing within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court where the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit was actually or voluntarily residing or carried on business or personally worked for gain. He, at the material time, had been residing in Saudi Arabia. 17. The material date for the purpose invoking Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the one of institution of the suit and not the subsequent change of residence. Change of residence subsequent to decision of the Court would not confer territorial jurisdiction in the Court which it did not have. 18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2007 (10) TMI 683 - SUPREME COURT
Commission of an offence u/s 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Execution of the sale deed - False Or Misleading representation - Suit Properties are different from the subject matter of the Deed of Sale - Whether a case of cheating within the meaning of Section 415 of the IPC has been made out or not - civil suit has already been filed - Application for quashing the complaint filled u/s 482 of CrPC - HC dismissed the application - HELD THAT:- While executing the sale deed, the appellant herein did not make any false or misleading representation. There had also not been any dishonest act of inducement on his part to do or omit to do anything which he could not have done or omitted to have done if he were not so deceived. Admittedly, the matter is pending before a competent civil court. A decision of a competent court of law is required to be taken in this behalf. Essentially, the dispute between the parties is a civil dispute.
For the purpose of establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. In a case of this nature, it is permissible in law to consider the stand taken by a party in a pending civil litigation. We do not, however, mean to lay down a law that the liability of a person cannot be both civil and criminal at the same time. But when a stand has been taken in a complaint petition which is contrary to or inconsistent with the stand taken by him in a civil suit, it assumes significance. Had the fact as purported to have been represented before us that the appellant herein got the said two rooms demolished and concealed the said fact at the time of execution of the deed of sale, the matter might have been different. As the deed of sale was executed on 30.9.2005 and the purported demolition took place on 29.9.2005, it was expected that the complainant/first respondent would come out with her real grievance in the written statement filed by her in the aforementioned suit. She, for reasons best known to her, did not choose to do so.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that, no case has been made out for proceeding with the criminal case - Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. Appeal is allowed.
-
2007 (10) TMI 682 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... prejudiced at the time of final decision. The exercise of these powers is not restricted to strict application of law, pleading in evidence, which may frustrate the very purpose of grant of these powers. Clause (g) of Section 402 has illustrated these extraordinary powers in which the Company Law Board may provide for another matter, which, in its opinion, is just and equitable. A failure to exercise these powers on a narrow and pedantic approach that powers under Section 397/398 are only for the purpose of protecting the interest of the companies, is a self-destructive attitude to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 397/398. Keeping in view that the MOU allegedly unenforceable and that it has been specifically challenged by R-3 in the appropriate Court, no findings are necessitated in this regard. 57. With the above directions, the company petitions are disposed of. All company applications stand disposed of. All interim orders stand vacated. No order as to cost.
........
|
