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Showing 41 to 60 of 662 Records
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2007 (10) TMI 681 - SUPREME COURT
Allegations of criminal misconduct - Refusal to grant sanction u/s 197 of CrPC for prosecution of Ms. Mayawati (Chief minister) and Shri Naseemuddin Siddiqui - Project known as 'Taj Heritage Corridor Project' - CBI investigated into the matter and asked to furnish a self-contained note as regards its findings against the erring officers and holders of public posts - A detailed report was submitted by it - HELD THAT:- It is one tiling to say that this Court will not refrain from exercising its jurisdiction from issuing any direction for protection of cultural heritage and the ecology and environment; but then in discharge of the said duty, this Court should not take upon itself the task of determining the guilt or otherwise of an individual involved in the criminal proceeding. It should not embark upon an enquiry in regard to the allegations of criminal misconduct so as to form an opinion one way or the other so as to prima facie determine guilt of a person or otherwise. Any direction which could be issued, in our opinion, has already been issued by us on 27.11.2006.
We may observe that while entertaining a public interest litigation in a given case, this Court may exercise a jurisdiction to set aside the decision of a constitutional authority, but we are not concerned with such a situation. We, therefore, are of the view that we need not go further than what we have already said in our order dated 27.11.2006 to go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of the Governor. If no sanction of the Governor was required or if he has committed an error in passing the said order, the appropriate court, in our opinion, would be entitled to deal therewith, but not this Bench.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that this Bench should not entertain the application filed by the learned Amicus Curiae. The said application is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
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2007 (10) TMI 680 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... licate. The case of the petitioner is that they are using the power for processing colour fixation by passing steam or applying sodium silicate but the case of the Department is that the assessee is engaged in dyeing of various types of cotton woven fabrics, with aid of power, on a machine called “Jigar dyeing or Peding Mengal” in common parlance. When there is a disputed question of fact i.e. whether the petitioner is engaged in colour fixation by passing steam or applying sodium silicate or engaged in dyeing of various types of cotton woven fabrics, we cannot entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when there are disputed questions of facts involved. Petition stands dismissed.
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2007 (10) TMI 679 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Respondents waive service. To be heard along with Central Excise Appeal No. 119 of 2007. Hearing of the appeal expedited.
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2007 (10) TMI 678 - SUPREME COURT
Suit for Perpetual Injunction - Right of worship in temple upon inheritance thereof from their predecessor - turn of Pooja comes after every 12 years - High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that in terms of condition No.2(C) of the agreement, the first respondent was not entitled to gold, sliver and money etc. which were offered to the deity and not to himself in his personal capacity - consent decree - HELD THAT:- It is equally well settled that which construing a decree, the court can and in appropriate case ought to take into consideration the pleadings as well as the proceedings leading upto the decree. In order to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court has to ascertain the circumstances under which these words came to be used. {See Bhavan Vaja & Ors. v. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang & Anr.[1972 (2) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT]}.
It is now also a trite law that in the event the document is vague, the same must be construed having regard to surroundings and/or attending circumstances.
The nature of the document also plays an important part for construction thereof. The suit filed by the parties, inter alia, involved the question of interpretation of the said consent decree. Parties adduced evidences, inter alia, in regard to the nature of poojas and offerings made to the priest in their individual capacity. Their rights in regard to offer poojas in the temple are itself not in dispute. In a case of this nature where a consent decree does not refer to the entire disputes between the parties and some vaguness remained, the factual background as also the manner in which existence of rights have been claimed by the parties would be relevant.
The consent decree, appears to be meant to be operative for a limited period viz. 1956 and 1961.
If any of the party to the suit was entitled to keep with him even such non-perishable goods which were to be offered to the Deity, the question of using the terms in his individual capacity was not necessary. The parties, therefore, were allowed to lead evidence, to show as to what ceremonies are performed by the Priest in his individual capacity and not necessarily offering pooja to the Deity. A devotee may arrange a special ceremony or a special pooja and entrust the same to be done by one or the other Priest of the said temple. The courts, therefore, were required to construe the terms implied in the consent decree having regard to the customs in regard to holding of religious and other functions in the temple by the devotees.
Equally important was the conduct of the parties soon thereafter. We have noticed hereinbefore that the father of the defendant No.1 executed deeds of sale in favour of the plaintiff s father. The relationship between the parties and their status were referred to therein. Defendant No.1 s father in the said document accepted the right of the plaintiff s father of having equal right to the offerings and offer poojas during the turn of said Neelawwa. It is not the case of the defendants that such statements came to be made by reason of any fraud or inducement or threat on the part of the plaintiff s father.
That being so, the said statements were relevant. The learned Trial Judge as also the Court of the First Appeal, in our opinion, cannot be said to have committed any mistake in taking the same into consideration for determining the rights of the parties. The High Court, in our opinion, was, thus, not correct in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge as also the Court of Appeal.
We, however, make it clear that we have not gone into the question as to whether any offerings made in Hundies for development shall go to any of the parties or not. Such a question having not been gone into by the courts below, we refrain ourselves from doing so.
Thus, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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2007 (10) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cific obligations and responsibilities contained in the Appendix(s) and Enclosures attached and incorporated by reference as an integral part of the agreement and having regard to the words used in Clause 10 of the agreement and having regard to the fact that the parties have failed to determine an even number of arbitrators as per the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act, the requirement of Section 10(2) of the Act is fully attracted in the present proceedings, in other words, the arbitration agreement deemed to be one providing for a sole arbitrator. 30. In the above-said circumstances, taking into consideration the fact that the disputes and differences between the parties emanating from the contract are required to be resolved through arbitration, Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Sujata V. Manohar, retired Judge of this Court, is hereby appointed to act as a sole Arbitrator. 31. The Arbitration Application, accordingly, stands disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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2007 (10) TMI 676 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s/ MOUs are claimed to be unenforceable), as a principle, directorial complaints cannot be a ground in a petition under Sections 397/398 as the complaints in such a petition should be relating to the rights qua a member. It is only in case of family companies or companies in the nature of partnership, depending on the facts of the case, directorial complaints have been adjudicated by this Board in Sections 397/398 proceedings. In this view of the matter, I find no justification to allow the petitioner's prayer in this regard. The petitioner's other prayers regarding sale transactions of 50 of the project property as well as his prayer regarding audited statement of accounts of the project property being the matter in issue of the MOU/Agreement before the Arbitrator cannot be adjudicated upon by the Company Law Board. 26. With the above directions, the Company Petition and the Company Applications are disposed of. All interim orders stand vacated. No order as to cost.
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2007 (10) TMI 675 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Judgment and final order passed by the High Court - Grant of probate - validity of the Will - suit for declaration and permanent injunction - Joint Hindu family properties - HELD THAT:- In our view, the High Court as well as the Civil Court have acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction in dismissing the suit on the aforesaid preliminary issue by holding that after the probate having been granted by the competent probate court and affirmed by this Court, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the suit.
We do not find any reason as to how the High Court as well as the civil court could come to a conclusion that after the probate of the Will executed by late S.Kirpal Singh was granted, the suit for declaration for title and injunction on the above allegation could not be said to be maintainable in law. The High Court also while holding that the suit was not maintainable, in view of the probate granted of the Will of late S.Kirpal Singh had relied on a decision of this Court, as noted herein earlier, in the case of Rukmani Devi (supra). We are not in a position to agree with the High Court that this decision could at all be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. A plain reading of this decision would not show that after the grant of probate by a competent court, the suit for title and permanent injunction cannot be said to be maintainable in law. What this Court held in that decision is that once a probate is granted by a competent court, it would become conclusive of the validity of the Will itself, but, that cannot be decisive whether the probate court would also decide the title of the testator in the suit properties which, in our view, can only be decided by the civil court on evidence. It is true that the probate of the Will granted by the competent probate court would be admitted into evidence that may be taken into consideration by the civil court while deciding the suit for title but grant of probate cannot be decisive for declaration of title and injunction whether at all the testator had any title to the suit properties or not.
Such being the position, we, therefore, hold that the High Court as well as the trial court had acted illegally in dismissing the suit of the appellant on the aforesaid sole ground after framing the preliminary issue. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgments of the High Court as well as of the trial court are set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The trial court is now directed to decide the suit after framing issues, including the issue of maintainability of the suit after the probate being granted, if not already framed in the meantime and dispose of the same within a year from the date of production of a copy of this order before the trial court.
Before parting with this judgment, we may express one more aspect. As noted herein earlier, a suit was dismissed by the trial court which was affirmed by the High Court in revision after framing preliminary issue which we have already noted herein earlier. A question may arise whether the preliminary issue could be raised without deciding the other issues and the suit could be dismissed in view of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of our decision in this matter, we do not feel it proper to dwell on this aspect which is kept open for future consideration.
Thus, the impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2007 (10) TMI 674 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ELT 47, holding Welding Electrodes to be capital goods upto 23.7.1996 ? (B) Are the words used in or in relation to the manufacture not wide enough to encompass the process by which the Raw Mill and the Cement Mill are rebuilt through welding, without which the Mill cannot carry out activity of cement manufacture ? Shri F.T. Mirza, the learned Counsel waives notice on behalf of the respondent.
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2007 (10) TMI 673 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner v. Nagammai Cotton Mills Ltd. Reported in 2003 (153) ELT A94 (SC)- wherein the Tribunal held that Rule 57G of the Central Excise Rules 1944 is not mandatory and it is a directory. The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assesse and remanded the matter to the Commissioner of Central Excise to re work out the duty payable by the assesse. This order is called in question raising the substantial question of law as under “Whether MODVAT benefit can be extended suo moto when filing declaration for availment of such facility was a mandatory pre-requisite under Rule 57G of Central Excise Rules, 1944?” 3. In view of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Commissioner v. Nagammai Cotton Mills Ltd. - 3003 (153) ELT A94 (SC), we do not consider that such a question of law arises in this appeal as the same has been already covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. 4. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (10) TMI 672 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -1993 by registered post, which was the last date of limitation. There is no way that the notice could have been received by the assessee on the same day unless the notice was sent by hand, which is not so in the present case. 4. In CIT v. Vardhman Estate (P.) Ltd. 2006 287 ITR 368 (Delhi), a notice was sent by speed post one day before the period of limitation was to expire that is, on 30-10-2002 and the contention urged by the revenue in that case was that the notice sent should be deemed to have been served on the assessee. This argument was rejected by this Court and it was made clear that what is required by the statute is not merely the dispatch or issuance of the notice but its actual service. 5. Since in the present case it is admitted that as a matter of fact notice was issued by registered post on the last day of the period of limitation and by no other method, there was no possibility of it being served in time. No substantial question of law arises. 6. Dismissed.
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2007 (10) TMI 671 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
CENVAT/MODVAT credit - capital goods - cement - steel bars - waste - rule 57(U) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - Held that: - the cement, steel plates and bars in respect of which modvat credit has been availed of by respondent no.2 have been used for providing support to machines - decided against Revenue.
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2007 (10) TMI 670 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he larger Bench, and presuming that the question referred to it is answered in the affirmative, we proceed to examine the assessment order in the instant case in order to find out whether the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer that penalty proceedings should be initiated against the Assessee under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act is discernible therefrom. Having examined the assessment order ourselves, we are unable to discern therein any satisfaction recorded by the AO that penalty proceedings should be initiated. While it is true that the Assessee could not file confirmation from the parties from whom the amounts were received, that by itself does not indicate that there was furnishing of incorrect particulars. In fact we do not find that the assessment order was so much about concealment of particulars as about the interpretation of the information furnished by the Assessee. In the circumstance we find no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. Dismissed.
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2007 (10) TMI 669 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... dit of service tax paid on mobile phones, which in any case is fast replacing fixed line phones in many establishments. 5. In the absence of any express prohibition, under the new Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, I am of the view that Service Tax paid on Mobile Phone is available as credit to eligible service providers of output service and manufacturers. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential benefit to the appellants. (Dictated and pronounced in Court)” 6.4 Following the ratio of the above decision, after allowing waiver application, I pass the following order.” 5. I find that the Commissioner (Appeals) has correctly followed the law as has been laid down by the Tribunal in the case of Indian Rayon & Industries Ltd. v. CCE, Bhavnagar (supra). Respectfully following the said decision I uphold the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appeal filed by the Revenue is rejected. (Dictated in Court)
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2007 (10) TMI 668 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ision cannot override a larger bench decision of the Court. No doubt, Maneka Gandhi s case (supra) does not specifically deal with the question of regularization of government employees, but the principle of reasonableness in executive action and the law which it has laid down, in our opinion, is of general application. 19. In the present case many of the writ petitioners have been working from 1985 i.e. they have put in about 22 years service and it will surely not be reasonable if their claim for regularization is denied even after such a long period of service. Hence apart from discrimination, Article 14 of the Constitution will also be violated on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness if employees who have put in such a long service are denied the benefit of regularization and are made to face the same selection which fresh recruits have to face. 20. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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2007 (10) TMI 667 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ellant is liable to be penalized under the provisions of Section 11AC and Rule 27 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. As the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) has not considered these provisions of law while upholding the adjudication order, to my mind, the impugned order suffers from infirmity. 7. Accordingly, the impugned order to the extent it upholds the imposition of penalties on the appellant is set aside and remanded back to the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) to consider the issue afresh, in light of the submissions of the appellants as regards the bonafide and the short levy has taken place in a quarter, wherein there was no delay in filing the return. The impugned order to the extent it upholds penalty is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) to consider the issue afresh after granting an opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant. The appeal is allowed in respect of the penalties as indicated above. (Pronounced in Court on18/10/2007)
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2007 (10) TMI 666 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... clarification issued by the C.B.E. & C. The adjudicating Commissioner has discarded the said orders saying that these decisions are not binding on her. She has also failed to take note of the Finance Minister’s Budget Speech clarifying the duty structure for the textile industry, notified under Notification No. 14/2002-C.E., which was issued as a part of the Budget 2002-03. 3. In view of the foregoing, we are of the view that the Commissioner has misdirected herself to apply the higher rate of duty in the case of the appellants, whereas the concessional rate under Notification No. 14/2002-C.E. has been allowed in respect of other units similarly situated. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order with consequential relief to the appellants....” 8. Respectfully following the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal, we hold that the impugned order passed by the Commissioner is not sustainable. The same is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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2007 (10) TMI 665 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner of Income Tax (Appeals) 'CIT(A)' was incompetent and not maintainable and that the challenge by the assessee before the CIT(A) to the levy of interest for a part of the month did not amount to denying the liability to pay interest charged u/s.139(8) and 215?" In a simple language, we are required to first answer whether an appeal with regard to the interest charged under Section 139(8) and 215 is maintainable or not. In the case of this Assessee itself in J.K.Synthetics Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1991) 95 CTR 267 a similar question of law had arisen in a petition made under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. While rejecting the reference petition, this Court held that such an appeal was not maintainable. We do not find any reason to disagree with the view expressed by this Court. The question of law is therefore answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee. The reference is disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (10) TMI 664 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... #39;D' New Delhi in Appeal No. 4688/Del/2002 for the Assessment Year 1997-98. In view of the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Woodward Governor India (P) Limited 2007 162 Taxman 60, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Dismissed.
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2007 (10) TMI 663 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the instant case, as we have already stated, the petitioner by using a printed polythene cover which has got a logo and the products name would clearly demonstrate that the petitioner is a brand name holder and the sales effected by him is not exempt on the ground that it is not a second sale for the purpose of the Act. 22. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that neither the assessing authority nor the Tribunal has committed any error whatsoever on a question of law which would call for our interference in this revision petition. Therefore this revision petition requires to be rejected and the question of law framed by the assessee requires to be answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Accordingly, we pass the following ORDER i) The revision petition is rejected. ii) The questions of law framed by the assessee are answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 6506 of 2002 is dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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2007 (10) TMI 662 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quashing the assessment made by the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax?" 3. Filing of paper book is dispensed with. 4. In view of our order in CIT v. Bindal Apparels IT Appeal No. 1706 of 2006, dated 24-8-2007 the question of law is required to be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The matter has not been dealt with by the Tribunal on merits. Therefore, we remand the matter to be heard by the Tribunal on merits. 5. Parties will appear before the Tribunal on 14-11-2007. 6. This order will cover the order passed by the Tribunal in ITA No. 2157/Delhi/2004 and C.O. No. 244/Delhi/2006. 7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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