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Showing 141 to 160 of 781 Records
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2007 (3) TMI 694 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... esh, he cannot style himself as a 39 promoter 39 and should obtain registration under the provisions contained in the Kerala Act. Any amount of mere assertion by anyone much less the Government of Arunachal Pradesh will not serve any purpose to the petitioner to obtain registration under the Kerala Act unless he is directly appointed by the State of Arunachal Pradesh to conduct the lottery organised by the State of Arunachal Pradesh in the State of Kerala. The above stand of the State Government in W.P. (C) No. 33980 of 2006 is in consonance with the view we have taken in the instant case. We therefore allow W.A. No. 2429 of 2006 as well as W.P. (C) No. 5154 of 2007 and quash exhibits P 3, P 4 orders and the demand notices issued pursuant thereto. In view of the decision in W.A. No. 2429 of 2006 holding that the petitioner is not a promoter and that we have quashed the demand notices, W.P. (C). No. 2513 of 2007 has become infructuous and the same is dismissed as infructuous.
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2007 (3) TMI 693 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of 2001 dated August 14, 2002) wherein this court after pointing out the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer III 1994 94 STC 422 and in the case of India Carbon Ltd. v. State of Assam 1997 106 STC 460 held that no penalty can be levied on additional tax during the period in dispute. The same principle would equally apply in respect of levy of surcharge, additional surcharge and additional sales tax. It was so held in the decision reported in 2004 136 STC 606 in the case of S.P.G. Ramasamy Nadar and Sons v. Commercial Tax Officer, Madras. In the light of the abovesaid ruling, the levy of penalty in respect of surcharge, additional surcharge and additional sales tax cannot be legally sustained. To that extent the order of the Tribunal is modified and the levy of penalty on surcharge, additional surcharge and additional sales tax are set aside. With the above observation, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 692 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner claiming payment of tax at the rate of eight per cent per annum may be false legal plea taken by them for the purpose of claiming payment of tax at the lower rate. That being so, I am in full agreement with the contentions put forth by learned counsel for the petitioner. This is not a case where it can be said that petitioner has submitted a false return within the meaning of section 43Here italicised. of the Act. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I find no justification for imposition of penalty on the petitioner. The petitioner has only taken a legal plea in the return for exemption, no case warranting imposition of penalty is made out. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this petition is allowed. The imposition of penalty order by the authorities as contained in annexures P1 and P12 dated December 30, 2002 are quashed. Petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid order, without any order so as to costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 691 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by article 141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not the ratio decidendi. This is the rule of sub-silentio, in the technical sense when a particular point of law was not consciously determined. Hence, in order to ensure that the accounts should not be manipulated or re-dressed with the help of copies of D7 records, the copies of D7 records can be directed to be furnished only after production of the books of account maintained by the petitioner before the authorities concerned. From the order dated August 26, 2002 which has been relied on by the petitioner it is evident that it has been passed as a concessional order without deciding the lis and giving no reasons ordering dispensation of production of accounts. In view of the foregoing reasons, these writ petitions are dismissed as this court finds no illegality or irregularity in the order impugned in these writ petition. No costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 690 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Section 5BA of the KGST Act is declared as ultra vires and unconstitutional. The State and its officers are interdicted from proceeding with exhibit P12 series notices. It cannot collect any sales tax or licence fee under the KGST Act from the petitioner. O.P. Nos. 20701 and 29544 of 2002 and W.P. (C) Nos. 13011 of 2004, 4898, 4989, 4997, 5000, 5060, 5106, 5200, 5308, 5323, 5546, 5578, 5797, (1)Reported as State of U.P. v. Sugal and Damani 2007 8 VST 469 (SC) 6061, 6067, 6131, 6574, 6592, 6706, 6946, 6961, 7150, 7858, 7980, 8229, 8346, 8524, 8614 and 8631 of 2007 In view of the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 4002 of 2007 and the judgments of the apex court, which are produced as exhibits P9 and P10 in the said writ petition, these writ petitions are also allowed. The respondents, the State and its officials, are restrained from collecting any tax or licence fee under the KGST Act from the petitioners/dealers of lottery tickets. No costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 689 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s this amount is concerned, it has been clearly mentioned in annexure P7 that no penalty would be imposed and no action under the Act on account of any offence or error would be initiated against the petitioner. This being so, the respondents had no jurisdiction to levy penalty on the basis of the liability of Rs. 1,70,474. This order is found to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, annexure P9 as well as its modification vide annexure P13 are hereby set aside. For the same reasonings, it is found that the respondents had no jurisdiction to levy penalty on the basis of liability of Rs. 16,892 (entry tax) and of Rs. 97,438 (Central sales tax) since the cases under the scheme were disposed of and Samadhan Certificates were duly issued in favour of the petitioner. In the results, the writ petitions are hereby allowed and the impugned orders, annexure P9 and annexure P13, in all the three writ petitions (as they are commonly numbered), are hereby quashed. No order as to costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 688 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... granted to him on compliance with the legal formalities. In that view of the matter, no further application under section 47(1)(b)(i) is maintainable before the prescribed authority. The points raised in the review application being of substance, the judgment and order dated September 20, 2006(1) warrants reconsideration. The stand of the respondent-State as outlined in the affidavit in W.P. (C) No. 3 of 2007 does not merit dilation as the same is not of much consequence qua the questions raised to be answered. In the result, the application is allowed. The judgment and order dated September 20, 2006 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3883 of 2006Reported in 2007 7 VST 76. is hereby recalled. In view of the conclusions minuted hereinabove, the petition is adjudged to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Needless to say, while exacting the tax payable by the petitioner, the respondent authorities would scrupulously conform to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. No costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 687 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Validity of sub-section (16A) of section 47 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - Circulars directing to collect sales tax in advance at the border check-posts, at the time of import of certain evasion-prone commodities - entry tax - detention of the goods at the check-post - Another Circular issued for collection of advance tax in respect of twelve evasion-prone commodities at the entry points into the State such as check-posts, ports, airports and railway stations - sustainability of two circulars issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes - violates articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution - HELD THAT:- If evasion of tax is to be prevented, the same can be done only by demanding tax in advance before the occurrence of the taxable event. It is true, while interpreting a taxing statute, if there is any doubt, the same should go in favour of the assessee. But, in this case, if the interpretation advanced by the petitioners is accepted, the same will render the provision ineffective to prevent evasion of tax. So, the "golden rule" of interpretation has to be followed. The "golden rule" is dealt with in Principles of Statutory Interpretation.
In the light of the above principles, sub-section (16A) has to be read as authorising the Commissioner to direct payment of tax before the taxable event takes place. Otherwise, the purpose of the sub-section, namely, prevention of evasion of tax will be defeated. Therefore, the circulars have to be held intra vires of sub-section (16A).
Violates articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution - It is well-settled that the Legislature enjoys a greater latitude for classification in the field of taxation (See the decision of the apex court in Steelworth Limited v. State of Assam [1962 (1) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT]. Demanding tax in advance cannot be said to be an action, infringing the fundamental rights under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Demand and collection of tax may cause some inconvenience. But, the same cannot be described as violation of any fundamental right. Same is the case of attack, relying on article 301 and also on the ground of lack of competence of the State to tax on inter-State movement of goods.
By demanding tax in advance, the State does not impose or levy any tax, which it is not competent to levy. It is only a measure to prevent evasion of tax, which the State is legitimately entitled to collect. It is not an attempt to tax on inter-State sale. The free-flow of goods is also not prevented by demanding tax in advance. Some inconvenience caused at the check-posts cannot be described as violating the rights under article 301 of the Constitution of India. If such a contention is accepted, all the check-posts should be abolished, so as to provide unhindered movement of goods. Such a right cannot be claimed under article 301.
The petitioners submit, if such an interpretation is accepted, it will make sub-section (16A) unconstitutional. They point out that the taxable event is the sale. The Constitution authorises the Legislature to impose tax on sale.
Thus, the challenge against the constitutional validity of section 47(16A) of the KVAT Act is repelled. The validity of the impugned circulars are upheld. The timing of the issuance of the circulars, that is immediately after the rendering of the judgment by this court, in the "Entry Tax Cases" cannot be a ground to condemn the circulars, if they are otherwise valid. The individual grievance caused to certain dealers cannot be a ground for declaring the provision or the circulars unconstitutional. A dealer, whose entire sales are in the course of export may not be liable to pay tax. If (1) Here italicised. advance tax is collected from him and he does not make any local sale and therefore, not liable to pay tax, he can claim refund of the same. In that event, the State shall refund the amount paid by him. Such individual inconveniences or grievances can never be pressed into service, to attack a legislation. I have not dealt with in this judgment, some of the decisions cited by both sides, as they were not strictly relevant. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed.
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2007 (3) TMI 686 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2001 ("the Act") - notifications issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 of the Act - violative of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Art.301 and not saved by Art.304 (b) of the Constitution of India - (a) Whether the levy of entry tax under Tamil Nadu Act 20 of 2001 can be justified as a compensatory tax? - HELD THAT:- The essence of compensatory tax is that the services rendered or facilities provided should be more or less commensurate with the tax levied. Services provided will have a direct co-relation with the trade. The main basis of compensatory tax is the quantifiable and measurable benefit represented by the cost incurred in procuring the facilities/services. The cost, in turn, becomes the basis of reimbursement/recompense for provider of services/facilities. As held in Jindal's case[2006 (4) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT], the compensatory tax is a charge for offering trade facilities and it is based on the principles of equivalence. Applying the above test, it cannot be said that maintaining of roads, providing bridges etc., is compensatory in nature so as to constitute special advantage to trade, commerce and intercourse. Even otherwise, a welfare State is bestowed with the responsibilities of providing good roads and bridges for the benefit of the tax paying citizens and hence to contend that the impugned levy is being raised only for the said purpose is not justified.
Maintenance of roads, bridges, etc., is generally met from the general funds or revenue. Whether goods are transported into the State or outside State or abroad, the State has got a duty to provide facilities like roads, bridges, etc., which are being enjoyed not only by the persons who bring the goods notified for levy of entry tax, but also by others.
It is necessary to bear in mind that the roads, bridges expenditure test was applied in Automobile Transport's case 1962 (4) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT] as the tax impugned therein was the tax on motor vehicles which use the roads/ bridges. Therefore, there was a clear nexus between the purpose of the levy and the purpose for which the tax was spent. As observed in Jindal Stripe Ltd. v. State of Haryana [2003 (9) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT].
This expenditure merely represents the expenditure incurred by the State from its general total taxes revenue and other receipts including the World Bank grants and loans. The said roads and bridges which are constructed or maintained by incurring this expenditure cannot possibly be considered to be a facility or convenience of services, which is provided to a particular importer who imports the goods into a particular local area. Further, the State has conveniently omitted to state that apart from the levy made under the impugned legislation, taxes for the purpose of maintenance of roads are also being levied on the owners of motor vehicles under the Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1974 wherein the parameters of levy are based on the laden weight of the motor vehicle. Different yardsticks of levy are contemplated under the said Act such as stage carriers, contract carriers, private vehicles, etc., which also add to the coffers of the exchequer. The figures of revenue earned by the levy under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act or the money spent out of the said levy have not been disclosed. We, therefore, find substance in the contention of the petitioners that the legislation has been enacted only with an eye of raising or augmenting general revenue and not as reimbursement or recompense as held in Jindal's case.
In Eurotex Industries & Exports Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2004 (1) TMI 651 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], a division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that for an Act to be compensatory in nature, there must be a clear nexus between the tax collected and benefits conferred upon the persons from whom such tax is collected. In the absence of any link between the entry tax on imported goods, and the facilities extended to the importers directly or indirectly, the levy of entry tax which is discriminatory cannot be said to be compensatory in nature. In these circumstances, subjecting the goods imported from outside the State to entry tax becomes unauthorised, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of article 301 of the Constitution. It was held that entry 13 of the Schedule to the Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2002 insofar as it purports to levy entry tax on furnace oil and low sulphur waxy residue oil is unauthorised and unconstitutional.
Thus, we hold that the impugned Act does not satisfy the test laid down for compensatory tax and as no Presidential assent has been obtained under article 304(b) of the Constitution, the provisions of the impugned Act are ultra vires article 301 of the Constitution.
(b) Whether the impugned levy of entry tax is violative of article 304(a) of the Constitution? - In Laxmi Paper Mart [1997 (2) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court has emphatically said that once the discrimination is made out, the enquiry by court ends. The price structure of the imported goods vis-a-vis the locally manufactured goods or the economics of the importer need not be gone into (supra). Even otherwise, the submission of the learned Advocate-General is not factually correct. For example, there is no local sales tax levied on cigarettes and other tobacco products. Therefore, section 4(2) does not have any application to cigarette and other tobacco products and it cannot be contended that there is no discrimination. As regards, any other scheduled goods, which a dealer imports by way of purchase from another State, such importer suffers Central sales tax of four per cent in the exporting State and in addition thereto suffers the impugned entry tax. Thus, over and above the entry tax, the purchaser has suffered Central sales tax in the exporting State. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners filed charts showing entry tax and sales tax structure and the effect of section 4 of the Act on entry of goods into local areas. It is seen from the charts that the importer of goods from outside State is clearly put to disadvantage as compared to a local manufacturer or producer. It may also be noted that the set-off under section 4 of the Act is not available for entry tax paid on the goods used as input raw materials. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the levy of entry tax under the impugned Act is violative of clause (a) of article 304 of the Constitution.
We may mention that the petitioners also raised the issue of legislative competence of the State Government to levy entry tax under entry 52 of List II on goods imported from outside the State. But in view of our foregoing conclusion that the levy is violative of article 301 of the Constitution, it is not necessary for us to express our opinion on this issue.
In the result, we hold that the levy of entry tax on goods imported from other States to the State of Tamil Nadu and from abroad is not compensatory in nature, since the State Government could not discharge its burden by placing materials before the court that payment of levy of entry tax is reimbursement/recompense for the quantifiable/measurable benefit provided or to be provided to the tax payers. The impugned levy imposing entry tax being discriminatory is also violative of article 304(a) of the Constitution.
We, therefore, hold that the demand and collection of entry tax under the Tamil Nadu Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2001 is illegal, unauthorised and violative of article 301 of the Constitution.
The writ petitions are allowed as above and the levy and demand notices issued would stand quashed. Consequently, writ appeals are disposed of.
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2007 (3) TMI 685 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld be left to the administrator to decide. Having noticed the salient features of the Act regulating inter-State movement of goods through the State of Assam, the mutual obligations cast by the statute and the court having held that the reasons for imposition of security should be informed to the affected person, nothing further will survive except that the movement of the coal of the petitioner, which has been alleged to have been stopped, shall now be permitted in accordance with the present directions. As the directions contained in the present order are capable of taking care of grievances that may arise from time to time in the future, it is also considered appropriate to direct the Commissioner of Taxes to incorporate the salient features of the present directions in the form of a circular to his subordinate officials to ensure due compliance of the same by all concerned The writ petition, consequently, shall stand answered and closed in terms of the above directions.
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2007 (3) TMI 684 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal. Observations and legal position explored in the course of passing this order is only for the purpose of examining the question of availability of a statutory remedy to the petitioner and as to whether the court should nevertheless examine the matter in writ jurisdiction. These observations are not any part of determining any legal question that may arise in the case and therefore the appellate authority should examine the appeal on its merits without being influenced by any observation made in the course of this order but by only following the law as declared by the Supreme Court. All contentions of parties are left open. It is open to the petitioner to bring this aspect to the notice of the appellate authority for the purpose of condoning the delay, if any, in preferring the appeal and seek suitable relief in accordance with law. The appellate authority should definitely take note of such development in considering such application. This writ petition is dismissed.
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2007 (3) TMI 683 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s of natural justice, i.e., providing a copy of the same to the petitioner was not complied with. This is clear from the order sheet itself, which indicates that the report was received by the assessing officer on December 16, 2005, i.e., the same day the order of cancellation was passed. This fact is clearly by itself adequate reason/justification for the purpose of quashing/setting aside the order of cancellation of registration. In the aforesaid circumstances, we allow the writ application and quash the order of cancellation dated December 16, 2005 under annexure 7 and declare the same to be illegal and unlawful. The opposite party is directed to deal with the petitioner 39 s application for restoration under section 30(3) of the OVAT Act filed by the petitioner on November 28, 2005 and to dispose of the same expeditiously within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. B.P. DAS J. - I agree.
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2007 (3) TMI 682 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... present case would be met in case not only the impugned order dated May 22, 2006 passed by the VAT Tribunal in rectification application (annexure P11) but even the order dated December 1, 2005 (annexure P10) passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal and further order dated April 16, 2004 (annexure P9) passed by the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner-cum-Revisional Authority, Ludhiana-III are set aside and matter remitted back to the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Ludhiana-III to be dealt with in accordance with law in terms of the order dated July 30, 2002 passed by Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner-cum-Revisional Authority. The respondent-assessee, through its counsel, is directed to appear before the authority concerned on March 19, 2007 for further proceedings. We hope that thereafter proceedings shall be completed by the concerned authority without any delay. The writ petition is disposed of in the manner indicated above with no order as to costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 681 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Nagapattinam reported in 1969 24 STC 459 in which a direction similar to the one above granted for adjustment of tax already paid was made by this court as early as in the year 1969, wherein it was held as follows It will be much better for the assessing authorities to give credit to the amounts collected from the assessee under the assessment made under the Madras General Sales Tax Act when making a demand for the assessment at the higher rate levied under the Central Sales Tax Act so that the assessee is not compelled to pay over any part of the sum twice. But if he had already paid any and twice over the simplest way is to give credit to what has already been paid twice over, and collect only the balance and make the necessary adjustment between the amounts due to be collected under the Central Sales Tax Act and the Madras General Sales Tax Act under the appropriate heads of account. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of. However, there is no order as to costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 680 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Liability for payment of tax created in terms of the charging section - Validity Of section 3 of the Karnataka Special Tax on Entry of Certain Goods Act, 2004 ("the Act") - Contravention of sub-articles (a) and (b) of article 304 of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The test for determining as to whether the provision is discriminatory or not and the combined effect on the present law and the KST Act cannot be called in aid as a defence to show that they achieve parity in the matter of levy of tax by the State Legislature on similar goods and therefore the further question as to whether it is actually achieved or not recedes to the background. The attack of discrimination, which is sought to be dispelled by operation of the provisions of the very enactment, as noticed earlier on the first contention, remains and therefore it will have to be held that the provision is inevitably one in violation of the requirement of article 304(a) of the Constitution of India and has to be declared as unconstitutional.
Insofar as the argument of the learned Advocate-General placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shaktikumar M. Sancheti's case [1994 (11) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT]is concerned, the argument of the provisions of the Maharashtra Act being in violation of the provisions of article 304(a) of the Constitution of India was not even canvassed by the appellant before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court did not examine this question. While it is a fact that the High Court had dispelled the argument of the Act being violative of article 304(a) at the best, the law as laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court can be accepted as a persuasive precedent. So also the position in respect of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Eagle Corporation's case[2006 (10) TMI 395 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT]. But, in the light of the discussion above with reference to the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Avinyl Polymers' case [1998] 109 STC 26, I cannot agree with the view expressed by either the Gujarat High Court or the Bombay High Court, but only follow the view of the Division Bench of our court and therefore I reject the contention urged on behalf of the State. This question being covered by the ratio in Avinyl Polymers' case [1997 (8) TMI 471 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], it is not possible to examine the argument of liberal construction to be employed in testing the validity of taxing statute when challenged on the ground of discrimination.
In this view of the development, I am not inclined to examine the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners by Sri Navroz H. Seervai, learned Senior Counsel, that the defence of valid classification available for defending the allegation of discrimination under article 14 cannot be called in aid to test the existence or otherwise of the discrimination under the provisions of article 304(a) of the Constitution of India, as it has become unnecessary to answer this question.
Though the examination could have been stopped at this stage, as very serious arguments have been addressed on the question as to whether the provisions of article 304(b) are still attracted even after answering the question in the light of the provisions of article 304(a) and lengthy submissions have been made at the bar on this question and for the sake of completion of examination, I take up this contention next.
While one argument is that the very fact that if such a levy is not discriminatory, then that by itself takes care of the requirements of article 304 of the Constitution of India, as contended by the learned AdvocateGeneral, I am unable to accept this proposition, for the reason that the taxing statute which has the effect of impeding movement but still found to be a non-discriminatory tax, at the best can be passing the test of article 304(a) and not as one answering the requirements of article 304(b) also.
In the present case, while no independent argument is advanced to contend that the restriction is a reasonable restriction imposed in public interest, it is not even in dispute that the Bill had not received the previous sanction of the President nor the defect cured by the Act having been reserved for the assent of the President and the assent having been given in terms of the provisions of article 255 of the Constitution of India. For this reason also, the Act becomes unconstitutional, being violative of sub-article (b) of article 304 of the Constitution of India.
In the result, these petitions are allowed, the provisions of the Act, particularly section 3 of the Act are declared to be in contravention of subarticles (a) and (b) of article 304 of the Constitution of India and therefore violates article 301 and accordingly declared to be unconstitutional. The impugned assessment orders, demand notices, etc., issued for giving effect to the provisions of the Act and the charging section and all proceedings initiated under the Act stand quashed, by issue of writs of certiorari in all these petitions. As a consequence, the taxes collected by the State under the impugned provisions of the Act are required to be refunded to the persons who have paid them.
Rule made absolute. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 679 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to agitate the matter before the Deputy Commissioner by directing the Deputy Commissioner, second respondent, to re-consider the issue afresh. The reasoning given by the Deputy Commissioner that he cannot re-hear the matter as he has already passed an order dated March 28, 2002 cannot be legally sustainable. Every order passed by the authority, who is himself regarded as a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction while disposing of the quasi-judicial matter, is having inherent powers and any order passed by him can be reviewed if the situation so required. Useful reference can be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh reported in 2000 3 SCC 581. Hence, the second respondent, Deputy Commissioner, is hereby directed to re-hear the matter which he has closed by his order of April 23, 2002, if the certified copy of the compounding order was available with the file. With this observation, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs.
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2007 (3) TMI 678 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pportunity to the parties with regard to the quantum of penalty, the authorities have imposed the maximum penalty provided by law. The counsel for the appellant contends that it is not that in all the cases the maximum penalty is attracted and the authority is required to give cogent and convincing reasons as to why the maximum penalty is being imposed in a particular case. We have gone through the order dated January 23, 2006 (annexure P-8) of the Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Ujjain. Though he has given detailed reason why the penalty is attracted, he has not given any reason why the maximum penalty is imposable. Under these circumstances, while dismissing the appeals on all other grounds, we direct the revisional authority to give an opportunity to the appellant and thereafter to decide the quantum of penalty. Meanwhile, status quo will be maintained and coercive steps to recover the amount shall remain in abeyance. With the above direction, the appeals are disposed of.
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2007 (3) TMI 677 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es where D3 proposals have been deviated by the assessing officer after applying their mind. Hence, this court is of the view that the assessment orders are passed without considering the objections and by taking note of the D3 proposal of the enforcement officers. Therefore, the orders of assessment have to be set aside and the same are set aside. The assessing officer is directed to consider each one of the objections raised by the petitioners and give reason, except the reason that they have admitted before the Enforcement Officer and given statement before them with reference to the material made available and with reference to their accounts. Hence, in both the writ petitions, the impugned orders are set aside and the matters are remitted back to the assessing authority to re-frame the assessment in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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2007 (3) TMI 676 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Court even in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v.Corromandal Pharmaceuticals 1997 105 STC 327. That apart, the abovesaid provision cannot be made applicable for non-payment of the statutory obligation for maintaining of the appeal at the instance of the petitioner. This court does not want to multiply the decisions to the abovesaid effect and there are umpteen number of decisions of the Supreme Court available on this issue. Hence, for the foregoing reasons and in the light of the decisions stated above and of the further fact that all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are not applicable to the statutory provision which is under consideration, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. The learned Senior Counsel requests that the court may observe that the petitioner can make a representation to the Government to remove the embargo for filing the appeal. I am of the view that the taxpayer is having such a right to put forth his grievance.
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2007 (3) TMI 675 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 03, dated December 12, 2003, which was in Notification No.KA.NI-2-530/XI-7(159)/91-U.P. Act-15-48Order, dated February 17, 2000 the benefit of concessional rate of tax is available to a dealers not holding recognition certificate under section 4B(2) of the Act on their sale to the dealer holding recognition certificate on furnishing of form IIIB as required under sub-rule (5) of rule 25B of the Rules. For the reasons stated above, view taken by the Tribunal is erroneous and cannot be upheld. It is held that the dealer, who was not holding recognition certificate is entitled for the benefit of concessional rate of tax under Notification No.KA.NI-2-5107/XI-7(159)/91-U.P. Act-15-48-Order (34)-2003, dated December 12, 2003 on its sale of notified goods to a dealer holding recognition certificate under section 4B(2) of the Act. In the result, the revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside. Tribunal is directed to pass appropriate order under section 11(8) of the Act.
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