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Showing 21 to 40 of 855 Records
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2009 (3) TMI 1085 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ny liability or prosecution for the said violations of Sections 295 and 297. 18. In the circumstances, Company Petition No.1 of 2009 is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) to (e). Company Petition No.2 of 2009 is also made absolute in terms of prayers (a) to (d). 19. The Transferee Company to lodge a copy of this order and the scheme with concerned Superintendent of Stamps for the purpose of adjudication of stamp duty payable, if any, on the same within thirty days of obtaining the authenticated and/or certified copy of the order. 20. The transferee company to pay costs of ₹ 7500/- each to the Regional Director and to the Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay. The transferor company to pay costs of ₹ 7500/- to the Regional Director. Costs to be paid within four weeks from today. 21. Filing and issuance of the drawn up order is dispensed with. . All concerned authorities to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by Company Registrar, High Court, Bombay.
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2009 (3) TMI 1084 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce, if a claim of a third party of joining him as a party to a civil suit is supported by the provisions contained under Order 1, Rule 10 and under Order 22, Rule 10 of the C.P.C., yet solely giving weightage to such technicalities, if his request is turned down and rejected, I am of the opinion that it would amount to making these provisions contained in the C.P.C. nugatory and futile. 14. In light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the trial Court dated 10-9-2007 below Exh. 29 in Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 2006 is quashed and set aside. The petitioner is permitted to be impleaded in Special Civil Suit No. 89 of 2006 at this stage as plaintiff No. 2. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. 15. At this stage, learned Advocate Ms. Trusha Patel for the respondent No. 1 requested that the operation of this order be kindly stayed for four weeks. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, said request is not granted.
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2009 (3) TMI 1083 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... extent that they confirm to being either charitable or religious in nature. We are also of the view that when the assessee seek exemption u/s.11 of the Act there are adequate provision namely section 13(1) (a)& (b) of the Act to deny exemption in the event of the income not to being spent in the manner contemplated by the Trust deed. At the time of grant of registration it was open to the respondent to only look into the objects of the Trust and to see if they are of the nature contemplated by Section 11 of the Act i.e., charitable and/or religious. 7. We are also of the view that the decisions relied upon by respondent in the impugned order are on different facts and will not be applicable to the case of the appellant for the reasons already given. For the reasons stated above, we direct the respondent to allow registration of the Assessee u/s.12AA of the Act. 8. In the result, appeal by the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 8th February, 2012.
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2009 (3) TMI 1082 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ating her. This version is unbelievable, simply because, accused No. 4 has no issues, it does not mean that she same will insist her brother or her brother's wife to give their only son in adoption to her. Even assuming that she has demanded so, it does not mean that is demand of dowry so as to attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC. 44. PWs 1, 2 and 5 i.e. father, mother and brother of the deceased do not speak of any dowry demand. The High Court's reasoning that there was nothing to show that A-1 owned a truck is contrary to the evidence on record. PW-1 has accepted the position as noticed by the trial Court. There is no analysis of the conclusions of the trial Court by the High Court. 45. Above being the position, the interference by the High Court with the order of acquittal is not correct. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail bonds executed pursuant to this Court's Court dated 22.3.2002 shall stand discharged. The appeal is allowed.
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2009 (3) TMI 1081 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... herefore following the same, we hold that provisions of section 115JB are not applicable to the assessee-bank. In these circumstances providing relief to the assessee in the order passed u/s.154 of the Act by the AO becomes academic. In other words if the assessee is not covered by MAT provisions when the original order was passed then order of the AO granting relief under the same provisions while passing rectification orders does not alter the legal position. In these circumstances order passed by the CIT u/s.263 of the Act is not in conformity of law. Secondly, as submitted by the assessee, order passed by the CIT is barred by time limit prescribed by the provisions of section 263 of the Act. Therefore, as held in earlier years, action of the CIT cannot be endorsed. Appeal filed by the assessee for the AY. under consideration is allowed. Appeals of the assessee bank for the AYs. 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2006-07 stand allowed. Order pronounced in the open court 10th April, 2013
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2009 (3) TMI 1079 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it and proper. 27. We also grant bail to appellant Izharul Haq Abdul Hamid Shaikh in Special TADA Case No. 6 of 2005 under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 123, 120B, 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25(1)AB, AA of the Arms Act, Section 9-B of the Explosive Substances Act, read with Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of TADA Act pending before the Designated (TADA) Court, Porbandar and also in connection with Case No. 1 of 2005 in respect of similar charges pending before the Designated (TADA) Court at Valsad, subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. Regarding the conditions for grant of bail, there will be similar directions, as indicated hereinabove in Jivan Raghu Varli's case, with more stringent conditions, if thought necessary by the Trial Court. 28. We make it clear that any observation made by us while disposing of these appeals at the stage of grant of bail should not influence the Trial Courts in the trials pending before them. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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2009 (3) TMI 1078 - SUPREME COURT
Imposing condition for depositing huge amount in fixed deposit for grant of anticipatory bail - Inability of the petitioner to comply with the condition - Within or outside the purview of Section 438 of the CrPC - Anticipatory bail u/s-438 CrPC - Nature and gravity of accusation - Onerous and unreasonable - receipt of ₹ 32.5 lakhs as advance towards sale consideration of the property was alleged to be on misrepresentation - HELD THAT:- It is disclosed from the records that the said property is already mortgaged during the year 2004 with the Punjab National Bank and that in fact parties have already obtained an order of attachment. Even the documents with regard to the ownership of the property are lying with another financial institution from whom the appellants have received consideration. There appears to be hypothecation in respect of the said property which was entered into with the private financer.
It is alleged that the appellants while entering into the said agreement with the complainant never brought to his notice about the mortgage of the property. The aforesaid allegations are serious but the same are required to be considered by the court in accordance with and in the light of correct position of law.
This Court in Amarjit Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi [2002 (1) TMI 1326 - SUPREME COURT], held was held that, "the imposition of condition to deposit the sum of ₹ 15 lacks in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is an unreasonable condition and, therefore, we set aside the said condition as a condition precedent for granting anticipatory bail to the accused/appellant.”
It appears that, High Court passed the impugned order with the intention of protecting the interest of the complainant in the matter. In our considered opinion, the approach of the High Court was incorrect as under the impugned order a very unreasonable and onerous condition has been laid down by the Court as a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail.
We accordingly, set aside the impugned order and remit back the matter to the High Court to consider the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellants afresh in accordance with law taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case including the gravity of the offence alleged and analysing the prayer of the appellants whether to grant or not to grant the prayer for anticipatory bail.
Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.
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2009 (3) TMI 1077 - ITAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... eet as on 31st March, 2004 was of ₹ 59,42,561.39. The order of the AO is based on certain presumptions and conjectures. He is not able to prove the nexus between the borrowed fund and invested in purchase of shares as well as diversion of borrowed fund for non-business purpose. 22. Similarly, in the case of Sri Om Prakash Chirania the AO has failed to prove that the interest-pertains to investment made in purchase of shares and diverted the same for non-business purpose. He has simply worked out a formula and disallowed the same without proving any nexus between the borrowed fund as well as the utilization of shares. In view of the various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Courts/Tribunal we uphold the orders of the learned CIT(A) on this issue and dismiss the appeals of the Revenue. 23. In the result, the appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purpose whereas the cross-objections of the assessees and the Revenue's appeals are dismissed as stated above.
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2009 (3) TMI 1076 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Adv., Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Adv. For the Respondent None ORDER Delay condoned. Dismissed.
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2009 (3) TMI 1075 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The High Court has rightly observed that the charges have to be established beyond reasonable doubt before the prosecution can succeed, but at that stage the challenge can be made. There was no scope for intereference. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the High Court. However, we make it clear that the observations made by the High Court while dismissing the petition before it shall not be considered to be conclusive and determined. It has been rightly noted that Manvinder accepted the factum of cancellation but thereafter executed the special power of attorney. Therefore, we find no infirmity in the order of the High Court to warrant interference. However, we request the trial court to explore the possibility of early disposal of the case. If any petition for exemption is filed, needless to say the same shall be considered keeping in view sub section 2 of Section 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Cr.PC.'). 12. The appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (3) TMI 1074 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e having regard to Sub-section (7) of Section 14-A thereof. Its jurisdiction extends to examining the legality, propriety or correctness of a direction/order or decision of the authority in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 as also the dispute made in an application under Sub-section (1) thereof. The approach of the learned TDSAT, being on the premise that its jurisdiction is limited or akin to the power of judicial review is, therefore, wholly unsustainable. The extent of jurisdiction of a court or a tribunal depends upon the relevant statute. TDSAT is a creature of a statute. Its jurisdiction is also conferred by a statute. The purpose of creation of TDSAT has expressly been stated by Parliament in the amending Act of 2000. TDSAT, thus, failed to take into consideration the amplitude of its jurisdiction and thus misdirected itself in law. 54. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are allowed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at ₹ 50,000/- in each case.
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2009 (3) TMI 1073 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... iversity requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix. 42. It is one thing to say that a summary proceeding cannot be resorted to when a noticee resists a bona fide dispute involving complicated questions of title and his right to remain in possession of the land but it is another thing to say that although a Special Court and/or a Tribunal which has all the powers of a civil court would not be entitled to enter into such a contention. Krishna Rao (supra), therefore, in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case. 43. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) lays down the correct law and N. Srinivasa Rao (supra) does not. The reference is answered accordingly. The merit of the matter may now be determined by an appropriate Bench.
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2009 (3) TMI 1072 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking amendment of the plaint in the Chamber Summons and appointment of Court Receiver - injunction restraining from creating 3rd party rights in respect of the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) on the suit property - utilising and loading the TDR on any property - Whether the Plaintiff's action, followed upon dissolution of the Firm, the notice of which came to be given upon the Development Rights Certificate (DRC) being issued by the MMC, but later not pressed for 2 years could be so tainted with delay as to disentitle the Plaintiff to any equitable relief? - unregistered agreement for transfer/sale of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) - TDR being an immovable property - Respondent No.3 claims to have purchased the TDR from Respondent No.1 through its sister Concern - relief sought for by the Plaintiff is two fold:- Against the Defendant and Against Respondent No.3.
an order of injunction restraining the Defendant as well as the Respondent s from creating 3rd party rights in respect of the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) on the suit property, utilising and loading the TDR on any property and acting pursua nt to the agreement s entered into by and between the Defendant s and the Respondent s in respect of TDR and for an order against the Defendant to deposit monies received under the transaction relating to the TDR by him.
HELD THAT:- In the case of Sikandar Vs. Bahadur [1905 (1) TMI 1 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] considered in the case of Chheda Housing [2007 (2) TMI 664 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] it has been held a lease of more than 1 year of a right to collect market dues upon a piece of land, being a benefit which arises out of the land would fall within the purview of Section 3 of the Registration Act, 1877 and must, therefore, be made by a registered instrument .
The consequence of the TDR being an immovable property would be the requirement of registration upon its transfer. The TDR was issued in the name of the Respondent No.2 by the MMC. Even prior to its issue, the Respondent No.2 had claimed the TDR. The Decree on Admission obtained by the Firm of the Plaintiff and the Defendant against Respondent No.2 in Suit No.6736 / 1 999 was to be satisfied partly by payment of money and partly by the agreement to sell the TDR to the Partnership Firm. The TDR is transferred to the Defendant as a partner of the Partnership Firm or to the Firm itself by Respondent No.2 under the Consent Decree for consideration. The Consent Decree is not registered.
The agreement between the Defendant and Respondent No.1 as well as between Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3 as also between Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.3 all dated 19th January 2007 have all not been registered. None of these parties including the Plaintiff, therefore, can base its claim in an action in law upon the unregistered agreement to transfer TDR which is a benefit arising from an immovable property and consequently immovable property itself.
The reliefs sought under prayers of this Chamber Summons need not be granted. The Respondents are neither necessary or proper parties to the suit which is a suit for dissolution of the suit Partnership Firm and its accounts. No reliefs can be passed against the Respondents for want of registration of the Consent Decree itself. Consequently reliefs under prayers are refused.
The express admission of the Defendant about the Partnership Firm, its dissolution and the account relating to the main, and only one, asset of the Partner ship requires Judgment on Admission itself to be passed under the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 of the C.P.C. Consequently at least the preliminary decree for dissolution of the suit Partnership Firm under the provisions of Order XX Rule 15 of the C.P.C is forthwith required to be passed. The shares of the Plaintiff as well as the Defendant s are required to be declared. They admittedly share 50% in the profits and losses of the Firm.
It is declared that the Partnership Firm stood dissolved on and from 11th January 2007, the date of the notice of dissolution and the date from which the notice in the official gazette came to be made affective. Accounts of the suit Firm shall, therefore, be taken.
The suit is referred to the Commissioner for taking account s under Order XXVI Rule 2 of the C.P.C with directions under Order XXVI Rules 11 and 12 of the C.P.C. The Defendant who has alone been in management of the suit Partnership Firm shall produce the bank accounts as well as any other accounts kept in the normal course of the conduct of the Partnership business by him before the Commissioner for taking accounts.
1) The Defendant shall show all the documents relating to the Creditors of the Firm.
2)The Defendant shall give inspection and xerox copies of these document s to the Plaintiff.
3)The Commissioner for taking account s shall ascertain the genuine and bonafide Creditors, if any, of the Firm.
4)The Commissioner shall allow the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence as required and desired by each of them.
5)The Commissioner shall make his report of the account s of the Firm to the Court upon the evidence.
6)The Defendant shall deposit the amount admittedly received by him in Court within 4 weeks from today. The Prothonotory and Senior Master of this Court to invest the said amount in any Nationalised Bank intially for a period of 37 months.
Chamber Summons is disposed of accordingly. Preliminary Decree is passed in the suit accordingly.
Suit to be placed on board for final decree upon the Commissioner making his report.
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2009 (3) TMI 1071 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... reasons for dismissing the same and ought to have passed a speaking and a reasoned order. Such being the position and without going into the merits of the writ petition, we set aside the impugned order and restore the writ petition and request the High Court to decide the writ petition afresh on merits. 4. The High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition at an early date preferably within three months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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2009 (3) TMI 1070 - SUPREME COURT
Involvement of serious acts of misconduct proved against Booking Clerk and removed from service - Challenged the Non-reasoned order of High Court - Respondent filed an application before the Labour Court and admitted that certain entries in register entered by him could not be made - Labour Court directed re-instatement with 50% backwages - writ petition was filed which was dismissed summarily after issuance of notice to the respondent who filed his reply - basic stand of the appellant is that the order is non-reasoned and the High Court had not even considered the various stands highlighted by the appellant.
HELD THAT:- It appears that the High Court had initially issued notice and reply was filed by the respondent. After that the High Court has dismissed the writ petition in a summary manner. It cannot be said that the various aspects highlighted by the appellant were without any substance. What would have the effect of it was to be enquired in the writ petition which apparently has not been done. The order reads as follows:
''Impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Consequently writ petition is dismissed.''
As the quoted portion of the order goes to show that practically no reason was indicated, the dismissal of the writ petition in such summary manner without indicating any reason is clearly indefensible.
Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court's judgment not sustainable.
The attempt to draw an analogy on the power of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the `Constitution') and the practice of rejecting appeals at the SLP stage invariably without assigning reasons with the one to be exercised while dealing with a writ petition has no meaning and is illogical. First of all, the High Court is not the final court in the hierarchy and its orders are amenable to challenge before this Court, unlike the obvious position that there is no scope for any further appeal from the order made declining to grant special leave to appeal.
It has been on more than one occasion reiterated that Article 136 of the Constitution does not confer any right of appeal in favour of any party as such and it is not that any and every error is envisaged to be corrected in exercising powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are special and extraordinary and the main object is to ensure that there has been no miscarriage of justice. That cannot be said to be the same with a writ petition. This position is highlighted in Dr. Vishnu Dev Sharma v. State of U.P. and Ors [2008 (1) TMI 979 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA].
Hence, the impugned order of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to hear the Civil Misc. Writ Petition to be disposed of by a reasoned order.
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2009 (3) TMI 1069 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hares as genuine even though the contract notes and bills of brokers found during the course of survey were found to be bogus as a result of investigation carried out by the A.O. during the course of assessment proceedings ? 2. We have heard both parties. We also considered the orders of the Tribunal which are relied on the findings of fact recorded by the another bench of the Tribunal in the case of the husband of the respondent viz. Mukesh Marolia. Revenue is unable to point out any perversity of the said findings. We are also informed that the appeal filed in the husband’s case is dismissed for non prosecution. In our opinion, the questions as framed would not arise. Consequently, appeal stands dismissed.
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2009 (3) TMI 1068 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... require registration. This seems to be the plain meaning of Clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. 14. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the exception in Clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra). 15. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra), and since we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra), the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court. 16. Let the papers be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.
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2009 (3) TMI 1067 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sonable or rational explanation for not filling up the vacancies, the explanation given is detrimental to the public interest and the interest of the Revenue. 21. We have also seen from a perusal of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal that there is no explanation whatsoever given by the Union of India for not filling up the vacancies except some proposed amendment to the Rules. Before us also there is no other explanation forthcoming. Consequently, we have no option but to dismiss the writ petitions and approve the view taken by the Tribunal. The Union of India is, therefore, directed to process the case for the appointment of the Respondents against the respective vacancies to which they may be entitled and thereafter place the matter before the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet for further directions. The needful should be done by the Union of India within a period of 8 weeks from today. 22. The writ petitions are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.
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2009 (3) TMI 1066 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... has simply replied upon one instance where the appellants have utilised the modvat credit availed input i.e. 30 HP motor, in which case the credit so availed was subsequently reversed by them. We agree with the learned advocate that this single instant is not sufficient to hold against the appellant that separate accounts were not being maintained by them. This factual position can be examined by verifying their record, which has not been done by Commissioner (Appeals) though the original adjudicating authority has verified the same and come to clear finding of maintenance of separate records. As such, the finding of original adjudicating authority does not stand factually dealt with by Commissioner (Appeals). We, accordingly, set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh decision in the light of the observations made by us as above. 5. Stay petition as also appeal get disposed off in above terms. (Dictated & Pronounced in Court)
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2009 (3) TMI 1065 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ositing a sum of ₹ 10 lakhs, which the latter never deposited. In the interregnum, the respondent approached the bank for one time settlement. The bank agreed for settlement, but the respondent failed to abide by the conditions of settlement. Consequently, bank issued notice dated 12.2.2007 for possession of the secured assets. The respondent challenged the said action in W.P. No.2322 of 2007, which has been disposed of by the High Court in the manner indicated hereinabove. In our view, the approach adopted by the High Court was clearly erroneous. When the respondent failed to abide by the terms of one time settlement, there was no justification for the High Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy was available to the respondent under Section 17 of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court is dismissed.
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