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Showing 141 to 160 of 868 Records
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2009 (4) TMI 924 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the deceased Mr. M.K. Govinda Singh died intestate?
Whether the suit for partition by the daughters of the deceased M.K. Govinda Singh, who died intestate, is maintainable or not?
Whether the alleged will dated 29.11.1995 said to have been executed is genuine one and, if so, who are the beneficiaries?
Whether the D-4 is entitled to have any share in the schedule property? If so what is his share?
Whether the Will of Late M.K. Govinda Singh is true, valid and genuine?
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2009 (4) TMI 923 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lay condoned. Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (4) TMI 922 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the Customs Tariff Act or it could have gone in for amendment of the Treaty between India and Sri Lanka. In our opinion, the object which is specified in the affidavit defeats both the notification issued under the Customs Tariff Act, as also the provisions of the India-Sri Lanka Treaty and, therefore, it cannot be said that the purpose of issuing the notification is legitimate and, therefore, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the notification impugned in the present petition has been issued in public interest, because what is opposed to law cannot be said to be in public interest. 8. For all the aforesaid reasons, in our opinion, therefore, the petition has to succeed. The Rule in the petition is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs. In view of the above development, this Court is of the opinion that the Writ Petition has to succeed; it is accordingly allowed, following the judgment and reasoning of the Bombay High Court dated 20.10.2008.
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2009 (4) TMI 921 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant, whose workshop is situated on the banks of river Zuari, used government riverine land?
Whether the amendments to the Goa, Daman and Diu Port Rules, 1983, by the Amendment Rules, 1992 and 1994, relating to levy of rental charges for the use of government riverine land is ultra vires the provisions of the Indian Ports Act, 1908?
Whether the Goa, Daman and Diu Ports Rules, 1983 confers authority on the Port Authorities to demand and recover rental charges for the use of government riverine land, even before the amendment by the Amendment Rules of 1992 and 1994?
Whether the Port Authorities have the power and authority to claim rental charges for the use of government riverine land, retrospectively for the period 5.4.1984 to 3.3.1994?
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2009 (4) TMI 920 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . In our opinion, reliance on the aforesaid decision is wholly misplaced. The definition of 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act is very wide as interpreted in the aforesaid decision. We cannot apply the judgment given under a different Act to a case which is covered by the ESI Act. Under various labour laws different definitions have been given to the words 'industry' or 'factory' etc. and we cannot apply the definition in one Act to that in another Act (unless the statute specifically says so). It is only where the language used in the definition is in pari materia that this may be possible. Hence, we are of the opinion that the decision of this Court in the case of Hyderabad Race Club (supra) should be reconsidered by a larger Bench. In the meantime, the respondents shall not raise any demand against the appellant-clubs. Let the papers of these cases be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench.
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2009 (4) TMI 919 - HIGH COURT MADHYA PRADESH
Exemption u/s 10(22) - engaged in printing, sale of text-books - revenue allowed the exemption in earlier years but assessee - but AY 1995-96, notice issued u/s 143(3) - Corporation stated that the Corporation is fully owned by the Government of Madhya Pradesh which published the text-books only for the students who are imparted education in all sections of Madhya Pradesh - AO did not accept the stand put forth by the Association and came to hold that the Association is only engaged in printing of books and selling of the same and hence, it cannot be said that it is engaged in the activity of education - not entitled for exemption u/s 10(22) - directed initiation of penalty proceeding under the provisions of the statute - CIT(A) concurred with the view expressed by AO - ITAT concluded that the Association was entitled to claim exemption.
HELD THAT:- In Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], Apex Court was considering the term "education" as has been used in the dictionary clause in section 2(15). Khanna, J while dealing with the said facet has stated thus :-
''"The sense in which the word ‘education’ has been used in section 2(15) is the systematic instructions, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. According to this wide and extended sense, travelling is education, because as a result of travelling you acquire fresh knowledge. Likewise, if you read newspapers and magazines, see pictures, visit art galleries, museums and zoos, you thereby add to your knowledge. All this in a way is education in the great school of life. But that is not the sense in which the word ‘education’ is used in clause (15) of section 2.''
In American Hotel & Lodging Association Educational Institute v. Central Board of Direct Taxes [2008 (5) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT] wherein their Lordships, while dealing with the scope of section 10(22), expressed as follows :-
''Under section 10(22), one had to closely analyse the activities of the institute, the objects of the institute and its source of income and its utilisation. Even if one of the objects enabled the institute to undertake commercial activity, the institute would not be entitled to approval u/s 10(22). ''
In Oxford University Press [2001 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT] this Court found that the applicant was a branch of Oxford Press which was part of the Oxford University but its activity in India was restricted to publishing books, journals, periodicals, etc. The Tribunal held that because Oxford Press is part of the University its income was exempt u/s 10(22) as it stood at the relevant time.
From a perusal of the decisions, it is lucid that for the entitlement for getting exemption for the assessment year, it is required to see the activities of the assessee. That is the acid test. If the income/profit is applied for non-educational purposes, it is decided only at the end of the financial year. It is to be seen whether the assessee is engaged in any kind of educational activities. The authorities which we have referred to above have laid down the criteria under what circumstances an assessee can claim exemption being involved in educational purposes and how the income is spent.
In view of the aforesaid analysis and regard being had to the concept of educational purpose as is understood in the context of section 10(22), we are of the considered opinion that the forums below have really not applied their mind to the relevant issue. It is worth noting, there has been no dissection of the role played by the Corporation and whether its activity has any nexus with the educational purpose as per the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Apex Court and various High Courts. We are disposed to think that there has to be detailed analysis of the facts pertaining to the activities carried out by the Association from year to year and thereafter arrive at a conclusion whether the assessee is entitled to get the benefit of exemption.
Be it noted, the exemption need not be in entirety or totality. There can be a case where there can be a partial exemption if the income of the previous year falls within the basic conceptuality of section 10(22). Bereft of the aforesaid analysis, the orders are unsustainable. Hence, it would be apposite to set aside the order passed by the forums in all the appeals and remit the matter to the AO to consider the case after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. It would be open to the assessee-Corporation to file requisite documents to bring the case within the parameters of law which we have referred to above.
Consequently, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein above.
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2009 (4) TMI 918 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ar, Adv., Mr. T.V. Ratnam, Adv., Ms. Gunwant Dara, Adv., Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj, Adv., Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. For the Respondent Dr. Manish Singhvi, Adv., Mr. P.V. Yogeswaran, Adv. ORDER Civil Appeal Nos. 5199, 6133 and 6134 of 2008 Delay condoned. The civil appeals are dismissed. Special Leave Petitions Delay condoned. On the facts of these cases, we do not see any reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.
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2009 (4) TMI 917 - SC ORDER
Respondent is recipient of consulting engineer service from abroad - liability of the service recipient - decision in the case of JCB INDIA LTD. Versus CST, DELHI [2008 (8) TMI 65 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] contested, where it was held that recipient of consulting engineer service from outside India is not liable to pay service tax prior to 01.01.2005 - Held that: - decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2009 (4) TMI 916 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Petition under Article 226 - Complaint u/s 56 of the FERA r/w sub-sections 3 and 4 of Section 49 of FEMA - failure to comply with statutorily requirements of issuance of notice u/s 61 (2)(ii) of FERA - quashing of proceedings - petitioner points out that no proof of service has been filed along with the complaint - respondents have not cared to cite any of the persons in the list of witnesses. It is contended that so far as the criminal trial is concerned, the respondent would stand precluded from examining any witness who has not been cited as a witness.
HELD THAT:- It would appear that the statutory requirement of issuance of notice under proviso of sub clause (ii) of sub-section 2 of Section 61, its date and manner in the instant case as well as the failure to consider the petitioner's reply or even place it before the court, has resulted in manifest error in the exercise of jurisdiction by learned trial judge. The order taking cognizance in the instant case and directing issuance of summons, is clearly without application of mind and cannot stand in law. In the light of the well settled principles noticed, there is no embargo from quashing the proceedings which are pending before the ld trial court.
Bare perusal of the complaint, it has been found that the complaint has been filed without compliance of the provisions of Section 61 of the FERA, 1973. No further inquiry is necessary or required to be conducted for the purposes. The compliance is mandatory and goes to the root of the matter. There is a statutory prohibition to the filing of a complaint without such statutory compliance. The objection raised by the petitioner to the filing and maintainability of the prosecution against it, is squarely covered under the guideline 6 laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. Chaudhary Bhajanlal [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT] and Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors [1976 (4) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT].
The respondents have urged at length that the petitioner must be required to undergo the trial and establish his objections as a defence to the prosecution. The present case is one where examination of a statutory prohibition is required to be undertaken. In the light of clear principles laid down by the Apex Court, such an objection has to be held to be wholly misconceived. There would be no warrant for requiring the petitioner to defend a prolonged trial, if the filing of the complaint itself is statutorily prohibited. Continuation of such proceedings against the petitioner would, therefore, be vexatious, useless, serving no purpose and defeating the ends of justice.
Therefore, this writ petition is allowed. It is directed that the proceedings arising out of complaint, entitled Enforcement Directorate v. Sanjay Malviya & Ors. pending in the court of ld Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as against the petitioner alone shall stands quashed. The order of the ld Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint against the petitioner herein and directing issuance of summons to him shall also stand quashed.
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2009 (4) TMI 915 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g an opportunity notice without any application of mind, without considering the relevant events or the several replies given by the petitioner herein and thereafter went on file a complaint, in which for reasons best known to them, the respondents have failed to disclose the stand taken by the petitioner and the reasonable steps taken by the petitioner for the recovery of the outstanding export proceeds. In light of the above discussion and having regard to the settled position of law, proceeding with the present complaint would be a futile exercise and thus to prevent the abuse of the process and to meet the ends of justice, the present petition is allowed. 31. Consequently, complaint bearing No.361/2002 pending in the court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi instituted by the respondents under Section 56 of the Foreign Exchange Act, 1973 read with Section 49 (3) and (4) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, stands quashed. No order as to costs.
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2009 (4) TMI 914 - SUPREME COURT
Whether non-compliance of one of the facet of Rule 6 of the Rules would be fatal to the application filed?
Whether the NOC issued to Dr. Madhu Tandon is in order and, therefore, was not justified in contending contrary to their own records?
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2009 (4) TMI 913 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Maintainability of appeal - penalty u/r 209A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - Held that: - the respondent was not concerned with the excisable goods, which was subject matter of dispute in the present case - penalty could be imposed only in respect of excisable goods, which would necessarily mean those goods, which are subject matter of proceedings by issuance of show cause notice. The aforesaid position is further clarified by the order of the Commissioner dated 30-9-2004 (Annexure P-2) where it has been categorically found that in the show cause notice there was absolutely no role of any of three firms in the present case, which were alleged to be managed by inter-alia the respondent-Ashish Gupta.
There is no question of law warranting the admission of the appeal would arise - appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2009 (4) TMI 912 - SC ORDER
DEPB Scrips obtained by producing forged documents were cancelled - the decision in the case of FRIENDS TRADING CO. Versus UNION OF INDIA [2008 (10) TMI 344 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that documents being forged, the appellant could not be allowed to take advantage of exemption - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - present appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2009 (4) TMI 911 - SUPREME COURT
Whether graduate Assistants should be treated equally irrespective of whether they are promotees or direct recruits for considering them for promotion as Deputy Tehsildar?
Whether the difference in the educational qualifications is sufficient to give preferential treatment to one class of candidates against another?
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2009 (4) TMI 910 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the insurance stamps must be purchased from the State of U. P. only?
Whether the stamps are fake or genuine?
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2009 (4) TMI 909 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a place of worship and that such buildings should be owned by the religious institutions which controls the place of worship. The department has no case that any of the buildings are located at any place away from the temple. The Devaswom has in Ext.P8 clearly stated that the buildings are owned by it and are within the premises of the temple. If that be so, the buildings are eligible for exemption under proviso above referred. We therefore allow the writ appeal by vacating the judgment of the learned Single Judge and quash the impugned demand notice challenged in writ petition but leaving freedom to the second respondent to conduct enquiry about the Kalyanamandapam or other place attracting tax at any place located other than the premises of the temple i.e in and around the temple. In other words if buildings are located at any station outside the place of location of the temple the second respondent is free to identify such buildings, issue notice, assess and recover tax.
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2009 (4) TMI 908 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ded in respect of finished products, there is no justification for demanding duty in respect of the shortage of the raw-materials. Accordingly, the duty demand amounting to ₹ 1,50,769/- in respect of shortages of Pig Iron & C.I. scull is set aside. However since there is no explanation in respect of the shortage of 416 back plate and clips, the duty demand in respect of the same is upheld. Keep in view the circumstances of the case, the penalty on Appellant company under Section 11AC is upheld. 6. As regards the confiscation of the finished goods and cenvated inputs found excess, since no satisfactory explanation for the same is given, the same is upheld. 7. In view of the above discussion, so far as Appeal No. E/1178-79/07 are concerned, the impugned order-in-appeal stands modified to the extent as mentioned in para 5 above and so far as Appeal No.E/659/07-SM against the Commissioner(Appeals) order No. 122-RPR-II/07 dt.12.12.06 is concerned, the same is dismissed.
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2009 (4) TMI 907 - CESTAT BANGALORE
Valuation - inclusion of performance bonus received in the assessable value - suppression of facts - extended period of limitation - Held that:- The issue is decided in the case of JALAN REFRACTORIES (P) LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., JAIPUR [2000 (9) TMI 192 - CEGAT, CHENNAI], where it was held that bonus received after clearance of goods for better performance is not includible in the assessable value - demand of duty do not sustain.
Once the duty demand is not sustainable, interest and penalty cannot be levied.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2009 (4) TMI 906 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused?
Whether the present case is not one of those extreme cases where criminal prosecution can be quashed by the court at the very threshold?
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2009 (4) TMI 905 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... by the finance company to which dues owed. However, the relevant rule does not speak of reversal of credit only if the capital goods are removed by the assessee in whose factory such goods are installed. Removal of capital goods as such by any one would require the assessee to reverse the credit taken thereof. Further, interest will be payable in view of the delay in the reversal of credit. We also find that the same issue had been agitated by M/s. Chelpark Company Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Bangalore when similar direction regarding consideration of interest was given by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court vide Final Order No. 1193/2009, dated 14-10-2008 2009 (239) E.L.T. 460 (Tri.-Bang.) . The Tribunal held that interest is payable for delayed payment of duty. 3. In the light of the discussion, we hold that the appellants are liable to pay interest as demanded by the authorities below, uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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