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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 733 Records
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2009 (9) TMI 1037 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing that one bank could label another as a willful defaulter with the attendant consequences that the master circular brings. Whether or not that would be permissible is not a germane consideration now. But it would be adventurous to hold that such a situation can be brought about by the master circular without it specifically covering the same. 129. There appears to be an error of jurisdiction committed by the bank and its committees in applying the master circular in respect of the bank's claim against the petitioner company. Consequently, the decision of April 7, 2009 is set aside and WP No. 7729 (W) of 2009 is allowed to such extent. 130. Since there does not appear to be any apparent mala fides on the bank's part except its eagerness to realise what it believes to be its just dues, there will be no order as to costs. 131. Urgent certified photostat copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.
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2009 (9) TMI 1036 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court. Rule 413 of the Telegraph Rules provides that all services relating to telephone are subject to Telegraph Rules. A telephone connection can be disconnected by the Telegraph Authority for default of payment under Rule 443 of the Rules. 7. It is well settled that the special law overrides the general law. Hence, in our opinion the High Court was not correct in its approach. 8. In Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council (1995) 2 SCC 479 it was held that the National Commission has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon claims for compensation arising out of motor vehicles accidents. We agree with the view taken in the aforesaid judgment. 9. In view of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court as well as the order of the District Consumer Forum dated 26.11.2001. 10. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1035 - SUPREME COURT
High Court jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code to interfere with the statutory power of investigation by police into a cognizable offence - Commission of offences u/s 406 and 420 of the IPC - while the investigation was in progress, for some inexplicable reasons, the respondent moved the High Court u/s 482 - seeking directions to the police to seize an amount of ₹ 2,28,00,000/- from the appellants - facilitating the registration of 64 acres of land under the MOU which amount is alleged to have been withheld by the appellants together with a sum of ₹ 1 crore which is stated to have been paid by him to the appellants - Whether it is open to the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC to interfere with the statutory power of investigation by police into a cognizable offence?
HELD THAT:- It is the statutory obligation and duty of the police to investigate into the crime and the Courts normally ought not to interfere and guide the investigating agency as to in what manner the investigation has to proceed. In M.C. Abraham & Anr. V. State of Maharashtra & Ors.[2002 (12) TMI 650 - SUPREME COURT], this Court observed:
''Since the power is discretionary, a police officer is not always bound to arrest an accused even if the allegation against him is of having committed a cognizable offence. Since an arrest is in the nature of an encroachment on the liberty of the subject and does affect the reputation and status of the citizen, the power has to be cautiously exercised. It depends inter alia upon the nature of the offence alleged and the type of persons who are accused of having committed the cognizable offence. Obviously, the power has to be exercised with caution and circumspection."
The High Court, without recording any reason whatsoever, directed the police that it is obligatory on their part to record statements from witnesses, arrest, seizure of property and filing of charge sheet. It is difficult to discern as to how such directions resulting in far reaching consequences could have been issued by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code.
The High Court interfered with the investigation of crime which is within the exclusive domain of the police by virtually directing the police to investigate the case from a particular angle and take certain steps which the police depending upon the evidence collected and host of other circumstances may or may not have attempted to take any such steps in its discretion. It is not necessary that every investigation should result in arrest, seizure of the property and ultimately in filing of the charge sheet.
The police, in exercise of its statutory power coupled with duty, upon investigation of a case, may find that a case is made out requiring it to file charge sheet or may find that no case as such is made out. It needs no reiteration that the jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code conferred on the High Court has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only where such exercise is justified by the test laid down in the provision itself.
The High Court, without realizing the consequences, issued directions in a casual and mechanical manner without hearing the appellants. The impugned order is a nullity and liable to be set aside only on that score.
Whether there was any occasion or necessity to make those "observations" even if they are to be considered to be observations and not any directions ? - It is not even remotely suggested that there was any deliberate inaction or failure in the matter of discharge of duties by the police. There was no allegation of any subversion of processes of law facilitating the accused to go scot-free nor there is any finding as such recorded by the High Court in its order
The power u/s 482 of the Code can be exercised by the High Court either suo motu or on an application (i) to secure the ends of justice; (ii) the High Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code; (iii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. There is no other ground on which the High Court may exercise its inherent power.
The High Court is not expected to make any casual observations without having any regard to the possible consequences that may ensue from such observations. Observations coming from the higher Courts may have their own effect of influencing the course of events and process of law. For that reason, no uncalled for observations are to be made while disposing of the matters and that too without hearing the persons likely to be affected. The case on hand is itself a classic illustration as to how such observations could result in drastic and consequences of far reaching in nature. We wish to say no more.
For the aforesaid reasons, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned judgment of the High Court. Leave granted. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
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2009 (9) TMI 1034 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The present award was passed in England and it became binding between the parties since its validity was not assailed by the Judgment Debtor in England. The Judgment Debtor did not assail the award under Section 48 raising grounds as given in Section 48 of the Act, or produce any evidence in respect of any of the grounds available to the Judgment Debtor to resist the execution of the award. The issues argued by the Judgment Debtor were on the basis of intrinsic material available on record. I find no force in any of the issues raised by the Judgment Debtor. The present award is held executable. The bank guarantee issued by the Judgment Debtor in favour of the petitioner/Decree Holder and being renewed from time to time under the directions of the Court is allowed to be encashed by the Decree Holder. After getting the bank guarantee encashed, if any further amount remains to be paid by the Judgment Debtor, Decree Holder would be at liberty to take steps for further execution.
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2009 (9) TMI 1033 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... lders (supra). It is also a fact that Assessing Officer had not brought on record any material to show that the loan obtained by the assessee under ECB was diverted to group companies. In the absence of such nexus, it cannot be said that amount borrowed for the purpose of business was diverted for non-business purposes. In the absence of any such material on record, in our considered opinion, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the addition on the ground that there was no nexus between the money borrowed and expenses incurred by the assessee. Secondly, the amount was spent by the assessee on behalf of the group companies for obtaining the commission from them and hence, the same was incurred as commercial expediency. Accordingly, in our considered opinion, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was justified in deleting the addition. 12. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. 13. Order pronounced in open court on 25/09/2009.
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2009 (9) TMI 1032 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 8 of CPC has to be complied with. The Apex Court in a case reported in (1990)1 SCC 266 (KALYAN SINGH V. SMT.CHHORI) has held that for a representative suit, the court's permission under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory. Admittedly, in the instant case, no such permission was sought for. So long as no permission was either applied or granted, it cannot be stated that the suit is in order. As such the suit framed is not maintainable. 24.In the result, both the original side appeals are allowed setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge and leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The first respondent/plaintiff is permitted to continue as caretaker bishop of the Madras Diocese till the new appointment is made by the competent authority, as per the observations made in this judgment. It is made clear that any of the observations made above will not stand in the way of Synod making new appointment. Consequently, connected MPs are closed.
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2009 (9) TMI 1031 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... „PPT‟. This Court is also not, therefore, able to accept the submission of learned counsel for the Plaintiffs that use of the letters „PP‟ by either PP Buildwell or PP Prime Properties is a case of injurious association with the Plaintiff and therefore, constitutes passing off. 28. For all the aforementioned reasons this Court does not find that the Plaintiffs have made out any prima facie for grant of an ad interim injunction in their favour. However, the Defendants will maintain the accounts of volume of business conducted by each of them during the pendency of the suits and file half yearly statements in this Court. 29. It is clarified that this order is based on a prima facie view formed on the basis of the materials on record at this stage. It is not intended to influence the final opinion to be formed by the court at the conclusion of the trial on an independent assessment of the evidence. 30. Accordingly, both these applications are dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 1030 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to Claim No. 6 may also be re-examined by the Additional District Judge now since petition under Section 34 is being restored to the file of that court. 28. We, accordingly, dispose of these two appeals by the following order (i) The judgment of the High Court dated June 3, 2005 and the judgment dated February 23, 2005 passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Ernakulam are set aside. (ii) The petition (O.P. Arb. 71/2004) by the State of Kerala against the award dated December 20, 2003 is restored to the file of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Ernakulam for fresh hearing and consideration of the objections in respect of claim Nos. 1, 4B, 5 and 6. (iii) However, the 2nd Additional District Judge, Ernakulam shall first remit the award to the Arbitral Tribunal for stating their reasons in support of claim Nos. 1 and 4B and after receipt of the reasons from the arbitral tribunal proceed with the hearing and disposal of objections . (iv) Parties shall bear their own costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1029 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner-society shall continue to abide by the undertaking. 11. The apprehensions of the respondent are thus taken care of by giving of the aforersaid undertaking. Further, in case such an undertaking is violated, the remedial action can always be taken by the respondent by withdrawing the exemption so granted. All these aspects are discussed in detail by the Supreme Court in American Hotel & Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT 2008 301 ITR 86 and by this Court in Digember Jain Society for Child Welfare v. Director General of Income-tax (Exemptions) 2009 183 Taxman 462 (Delhi), following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. In view of the aforesaid, we allow this writ petition. Impugned order passed by the Director is set aside and mandamus is issued to the respondent to grant exemption to the petitioner under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act for the year 2007-08 onwards. 12. No order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1028 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Court finds that, for the exceptional reasons to be recorded by it, the adjournment of the hearing beyond the following day is necessary. The Court should also observe Clauses (b) to (e) of the said proviso. 5. In our opinion, in matters relating to trademarks, copyright and patents the proviso to Order XVII Rule 1(2) C.P.C. should be strictly complied with by all the Courts, and the hearing of the suit in such matters should proceed on day to day basis and the final judgment should be given normally within four months from the date of the filing of the suit. 6. On the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. However, we request the High Court that the suit in question should be decided within three months from the date a copy of this order is produced before the Trial Court. 7. With the abovesaid observations, the special leave petition stands disposed of.
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2009 (9) TMI 1027 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y further supplementary objections, if any, in view of the fact that the said objections were filed as early as on 14.08.2006 and several subsequent events may have become relevant. If the petitioner chooses to file the said supplementary objections, if any, he shall do so within a period of two (2) weeks from today. The first respondent is directed to consider the objections filed earlier together with supplementary objections, if any, within a period of six (6) from today and communicate its reasoned decision to the petitioner. The petitioner shall be at liberty to take such appropriate steps as permissible under law thereafter. As no measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are taken by the first respondent bank, no directions in that regard are necessary to be issued till the bank passes appropriate orders on the objections of the petitioner under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1026 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s Act. In these circumstances, the Tribunal rightly held that there could not have been any assessment order passed against the company which was not in existence as on that date in the eyes of law it had already been dissolved. The Tribunal relied upon its earlier decision in Impsat Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ITO 276 ITR 136 (AT). We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal is perfectly valid and in accordance with law. No substantial question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 1025 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the descriptive sense. Mr.Mihir Joshi‘s contention for the respondent that there can be no restraint of any kind on the font for the user of the phrase “Sugar Free” by the respondent cannot thus be accepted at this interim stage particularly in view of the past correspondence between the appellant and the respondent of the possible use by the respondent of the appellant‘s product. In our view, the interim order of the learned Single Judge at the interlocutory stage is justified and does not warrant any interference. The remedy for the grievance made by the appellant regarding the use of the expression “Sugar Free” in an inappropriate font size would be in the form of contempt petition. We were informed during the course of the hearing that a contempt petition has been filed and the same is pending before the learned Single Judge. 16. Accordingly, the appeal and the cross objections are dismissed with no order as to costs. o p /o p o p /o p
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2009 (9) TMI 1024 - SUPREME COURT
Disputed Land - Claim for preferential right for allotment of the part of the vacant land for expansion of its factory - "preferential right" of the unit holder for having allotment of "neighbouring land" for the purpose of factory expansion - Right of equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution stood violated - Whether the High Court was justified in not granting the interim relief in favour of the appellant? - Government of Maharashtra had issued a Circular regarding fixation of rate of industrial area in which allotment of plot has to be made by inviting tenders. It also provides that where there are more than one application for allotment, the plot may be disposed of by adopting the tender process.
The application of the appellant had been made prior to the application made by respondent No.4. The respondent No.4 instead of making application to the Corporation started negotiations with the Government directly for allotment of land merely by writing a letter in June, 2005 and on 10th June, 2005 an understanding was arrived in between the Government of Maharashtra and respondent No.4 of commissioning of the Project at Nasik. User of land in Open Space No.9 was converted from Open Space to Industrial Area vide order/resolution dated 10th February, 2006 and it was re-numbered as Plot No.126.
Appellant has submitted that the application of the appellant has been rejected without assigning any reason whatsoever and probably the reason may be that on the date of passing the order the land was merely a designated vacant land and not meant for industrial purpose - appellant had been asking the respondent no.2 to grant the lease of plot nos.F-16 and F-17, which had earlier not been the part of the Open Space No.9, on the basis of being contiguous and adjacent to the appellant's existing factory
HELD THAT:- Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair, legitimate and above-board but should be without any affection or aversion. It should neither be suggestive of discrimination nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. The decision should be made by the application of known principle and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is, but if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law S.G. Jaisinghani Vs. Union of India & ors.[1967 (2) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT], Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther Vs. Kerala Financial Corporation,[1987 (11) TMI 372 - SUPREME COURT].
In a case like this, when the applicant approaches the Court complaining against the Statutory Authority alleging arbitrariness, bias or favouritism, the court, being custodian of law, must examine the averments made in the application to form a tentative opinion as to whether there is any substance in those allegations. Such a course is also required to be followed while deciding the application for interim relief.
Whether interim injunction should be granted by the Court ? - Interim order is passed on the basis of prima facie findings, which are tentative. Such order is passed as a temporary arrangement to preserve the status quo till the matter is decided finally, to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object of the interlocutory injunction is, to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. (vide Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. State of Assam vs. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors.[2001 (5) TMI 937 - SUPREME COURT] and Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari Sanstha [2009 (3) TMI 992 - SUPREME COURT].
Grant of temporary injunction, is governed by three basic principles, i.e. prima facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable injury, which are required to be considered in a proper perspective in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. But it may not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction (Vide S.M. Dyechem Ltd. Vs. M/s. Cadbury (India) Ltd.[2000 (5) TMI 1060 - SUPREME COURT], and Anand Prasad Agarwalla (supra).
Anything done in undue haste can also be termed as arbitrary and cannot be condoned in law. Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil Vs. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia & Ors.[2003 (12) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT].
Thus, the law on the issue emerges to the effect that interim injunction should be granted by the Court after considering all the pros and cons of the case in a given set of facts involved therein on the risk and responsibility of the party or, in case he looses the case, he cannot take any advantage of the same. The order can be passed on settled principles taking into account the three basic grounds i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The delay in approaching the Court is of course a good ground for refusal of interim relief, but in exceptional circumstances, where the case of a party is based on fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution and there is an apprehension that suit property may be developed in a manner that it acquires irretrievable situation, the Court may grant relief even at a belated stage provided the court is satisfied that the applicant has not been negligent in pursuing the case.
In the light of the settled legal propositions and admittedly the whole case of the appellant is based on violation of Article 14 of the Constitution as according to the appellant it has been a case of violation of equality clause enshrined in Article 14, the facts mentioned hereinabove clearly establish that the Corporation and the Government proceeded in haste while considering the application of respondent No.4 which tantamount to arbitrariness, thus violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Application of the appellant was required to be disposed of by a speaking and reasoned order. Admittedly, no reason was assigned for rejecting the same. There is nothing on record to show as on what date and under what circumstances, Plot nos.F-16 and F-17 stood decarved and became part of the Open Space No.9. The respondents could not furnish any explanation as in what manner and under what circumstances, the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. has been made allotment of land from plot no.F-16, (a part of Open Space No.9), without change of user of the land. The respondent no.4 had not initially asked for 17 acres of land which has been allotted to it. There is nothing on record to show as to why the land could not be disposed of by auction. All these circumstances provide for basis to form a tentative opinion that State and its instrumentalities have acted affectionately in the case of respondent no.4.
Undoubtedly, there has been a delay on the part of the appellant in approaching the court but we cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant had been approaching the authorities time and again for allotment of the land. Admittedly, the entire land had not been developed by the respondent no.4 till this Court entertained the Special Leave Petition and directed the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the land measuring 2 acres adjacent to the appellant's plot no.F-15 vide order dated 21.7.2008.
Therefore, it is not only the appellant who is to be blamed for the delay. The land had been allotted to the respondent no.4 in undue haste and no development could take place therein for more than two years of taking the possession of the land. In such a fact-situation the submission made on behalf of the respondents that interim stay cannot be granted at a belated stage in preposterous.
Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The interim order passed by this Court on 21.7.2008 shall continue in operation till the writ petition is decided by the High Court. The Hon'ble High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously. Needless to say that any observation made herein either on facts or on law shall not adversely effect the case of either of the parties, for the reason that the only question before this Court has been as to whether the appellant deserves to be granted interim protection till his writ petition is decided by the High Court.
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2009 (9) TMI 1023 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal and discussion thereon including the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal, based on appreciation of evidence, with which no fault can be found. The view taken by the tribunal is a reasonable and possible view. No substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. 3. The appeal is thus dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1022 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icle 136, are as follows “…It is necessary to remember that wide as are our powers under Article 136, their exercise is discretionary; and if it is conceded, as it was in the course of the arguments, that this, Court could have dismissed the appellant’s application for special leave summarily on the ground that the order under appeal had done substantial justice, it is difficult to appreciate the argument that because leave has been granted this Court must always and in every case deal with the merits even though it is satisfied that ends of justice do not justify its interference in a given case…” (See AIR 1960 SC 1292 at 1294) 64. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. However, we are restraining ourselves for passing any order as to costs in view of the excellent assistance rendered to this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, there is no order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1021 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provision in Rule 34 of the Army Rules, 1954 - interval between the accused being informed of charge for which he is to be tried and his arraignment shall not be less than ninety-six hours mandatory? HELD THAT:- It is well established that a contract which involves in its fulfilment the doing of an act prohibited by statute is void. The legal maxim A pactis privatorum publico juri non derogatur means that private agreements cannot alter the general law. Where a contract, express or implied, is expressly or by implication forbidden by statute, no court can lend its assistance to give it effect.
In our judgment, there has to be clear ninety-six hours interval between the accused being charged for which he is to be tried and his arraignment and interval time in Rule 34 must be read absolute. There is a purpose behind this provision: that purpose is that before the accused is called upon for trial, he must be given adequate time to give a cool thought to the charge or charges for which he is to be tried, decide about his defence and ask the authorities, if necessary, to take reasonable steps in procuring the attendance of his witnesses. He may even decide not to defend the charge(s) but before he decides his line of action, he must be given clear ninety-six hours.
A trial before General Court Martial entails grave consequences. The accused may be sentenced to suffer imprisonment. He may be dismissed from service. The consequences that may follow from non-observance of the time interval provided in Rule 34 being grave and severe, we hold, as it must be, that the said provision is absolute and mandatory. If the interval period provided in Rule 34 is held to be directory and its strict observance is not insisted upon, in a given case, an accused may be called upon for trial before General Court Martial no sooner charge/charges for which he is to be tried are served. Surely, that is not the intention; the timeframe provided in Rule 34 has definite purpose and object and must be strictly observed. Its non- observance vitiates the entire proceedings.
The key words used in Rule 34 from which the intendment is to be found are "shall not be less than ninety-six hours". As the respondent was not in active service at the relevant time, we are not concerned with the later part of that rule which provides for interval of twenty-four hours for the accused in active service.
Merely because the respondent pleaded guilty is immaterial. The mandatory provision contained in Rule 34 having been breached, the Division Bench cannot be said to have erred in affirming the order of the Single Judge setting aside the proceedings of the General Court Martial.
In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 1020 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion (baa) to section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act ? (B) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was justified in holding that receipt of insurance claim, exchange gain, other interest and sale of scrap amount is to be included in profits derived from an Industrial Undertaking within the meaning of section 80IB of the Income Tax Act ? (C) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was justified in holding that deduction u/s.80HHC will be allowable without excluding deduction u/s.80IB of the Income Tax Act ?
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2009 (9) TMI 1019 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... vered by judgment of this court in 293 ITR 353 as well as orders dated 31.7.2009 passed in I.T.A.No. 690/2009 in the case of assessee itself. Therefore, no question of law arises. Dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 1018 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... te in the prescribed manner that in respect of the amount of export turnover mentioned in the certificate, the Export House has not claimed the deduction under this Section. The appellant has obtained a certificate from the export house M/s. Clariant (India) Limited duly certified by the Auditors, M/s. A.F. Ferguson & Company. In view of the above facts, it is held that the appellant has correctly claimed deduction in respect of sales of ₹ 1,64,43,471/-. The ld. A.R. has clearly explained that the fats of IPCA Laboratories are different. This ground is allowed.” In view of the above facts and circumstances, and consideration done by the CIT(A) on the given facts, we confirm the findings of the CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee. This issue of the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. 9. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and that of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. Order pronounced in Open Court on 11/09/2009.
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