|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 709 Records
-
2010 (11) TMI 1093 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... ital and essential for the purpose of consideration of the subject matter of appeal and to arrive at a final and ultimate decision, the Tribunal is amply empowered to admit additional evidence under rule 29. Therefore, the Tribunal had to admit additional evidence produced by the assessee since that was vital and essential for rendering justice and in deciding appeals. However, it was necessary to give the department a reasonable opportunity of rebutting it according to the principle of nature justice and for that purpose the matter was restored to the file of the AO.” Following the ratio of the above said decision, we remit the issue back to the file of the AO for giving a reasonable opportunity to the assessee to produce before the AO all the evidences and thereafter the AO shall decide the issue in accordance with law. 5. In the result, the appeals filed by the assessees’ are allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced on this 10th day of November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1092 - ITAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... ritten off in respect of assessee’s transaction with M/s.ETK Soft tech Pvt. Ltd. ITAT, Mumbai, Special Bench in the case of DCIT Vs. Oman International Bank (SAOG) 2006 286 ITR (2008) 08 (AT) (SB) (Mum.) has held that if the assessee has written off bad debts as irrecoverable in the books of account, the deduction is allowable in computing the taxable income. This decision has been upheld by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in 2009 313 ITR 128 (Bom.). The SLP as filed by the Revenue, has been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 313 ITR (ST) 03. The Supreme Court has further held in the case of Southern TechnologiesLtd. Vs. DCIT in 320 ITR 577 and in the case of TRF Ltd., Vs. CIT in 323 ITR 397 that on complying the above condition, the assessee is entitled for claiming deduction towards bad debts. In view of the above, we find that this appeal filed by the Revenue is liable to be dismissed. Order pronounced on Monday the 13th of December, 2010 at Chennai.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1091 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... icate these issues afresh not only considering the decisions relied upon by the Ld. Counsel but also all the judicial pronouncements relevant to the issues discussed above. Accordingly, all the relevant grounds are set aside. 14. In the result, appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. 1425/ PN/07 - A.Y 1998-99 The grounds raised in this appeal revolve around the following issues and they are, - “1) Services rendered 2) Sale of scrap 3) discount 4) recovery of doubtful debt 5) sundry neutral revenue.” 15. All these issues have to be set aside to the files of the CIT(A) for deciding the issue afresh after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The reasons for the same are narrated while dealing with the appeal for the A.Y 1996- 97 in the preceding paragraphs. Accordingly, relevant grounds of this appeal are set aside. 16. In the result, both appeals of the assessee are partly allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 30th November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1090 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d that the aforesaid information about the nature and status of his property in Kailash Colony were furnished by the respondent under his own declaration and by certifying that the said particulars filled in the form are true and correct to the best of his knowledge. The respondent No. 1 has also appended his signature to the said declaration by signing it on 27/06/2006. These information's are relevant and material to come the conclusions that the aforesaid property in Kailash Colony was also used as a residential property and therefore the contention of the counsel for the respondent No. 1 that it is exclusively a commercial property cannot be accepted. 24. We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case, and analyzed the arguments put forth by both parties to buttress their stand. For the reasons that we have considered herein and mentioned above, we find that the arguments raised by respondent-1 are without merit, and the appeal therefore, is to be allowed.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1089 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... is reproduced as under- “3.2 Coming to ground 2 it relates to disallowance of 1/3rd of advertisement expenditure on the ground that the benefit of expenditure also accrues to the producer of the films whose audio rights were purchased by the assessee. here also like in ground No.1, both the assessing officer as well as the first appellate authority agreed that in the earlier years similar issues have come up before the Tribunal and the issue is decided in favour of the assessee. In the light of the above we respectfully follow the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss this ground of the revenue.” 8 Respectfully following the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case and in the absence of any contrary material brought on record, the ground raised by the revenue is dismissed. 9 Grounds of appeal 2 & 3, being general in nature, are dismissed. 10 In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed. Order pronounced on the 10th, day of Nov 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1088 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... 8377; 19.59 crore. In view of these facts it appears that there is some confusion regarding the figure of work in progress vis-àvis the project undertaken, which needs to be set right. In such a situation we set aside the impugned order and restore the matter to the file of A.O. for deciding as to whether the two projects referred to in the assessment order for the year under consideration were part of the work completed in assessment year 2003-2004 on which income was offered for taxation. If the work in progress for the current year at ₹ 23.32 crores was carried over to subsequent years and the projects were complete in the assessment year 2003-2004 then no addition should be made in assessment year 2000-2001 as the income has been offered for taxation in this year. In the otherwise situation the Assessing Officer is free to decide as per law. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced on this 24th day of November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1087 - SUPREME COURT
Double Jeopardy - Double prosecution and punishment for same offence - conviction of the appellants under Section 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC and other provisions including under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act - allegation against Accused No. 3 (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 782/2007) is that she obtained a second passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal from the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad by submitting false documents like residence certificate, educational certificate with the help of A-4 to A-9.
Double Jeopardy - whether the appellant's guaranteed fundamental right under Article 20 (2) has been infringed? - HELD THAT:- Article 20 (2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once - The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more than once. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle.
In MAQBOOL HUSSAIN VERSUS STATE OF BOMBAY [1953 (4) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT], this Court explained the scope of the right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) and as to what is incorporated in it as "within its scope the plea of autrefois convict as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as it known to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence." That in order for the protection of Article 20 (2) to be invoked by a person there must have been a prosecution and as well as punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of law of competent jurisdiction or a tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence.
What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20 (2) "for the same offence"? - HELD THAT:- If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable - In Leo RoyLEO ROY FREY VERSUS SUPERINTENDENT, DISTRICT JAIL, AMRITSAR AND ANOTHER [1957 (10) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], petitioners therein were found guilty under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and the goods recovered from their possession were confiscated and heavy personal penalties imposed on them by the authority. Complaints thereafter were lodged by the authorities before the Additional District Magistrate under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 and the Sea Customs Act. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court for quashing of the proceedings pending against them in the court of Magistrate inter alia contending that in view of the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution they could not be prosecuted and punished twice over for the same offence and the proceedings pending before the Magistrate violated the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. This Court rejected the contention and held that criminal conspiracy is an offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code but not so under the Sea Customs Act, and the petitioners were not and could not be charged with it before the Collector of Customs. It is an offence separate from the crime which it may have for its object and is complete even before the crime is attempted or completed, and even when attempted or completed; it forms no ingredients of such crime.
The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte [1960 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT]], this Court laid down the law stating that if the offences were distinct there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution being applicable. It was the case where the accused were sought to be punished for the offence under Section 105, Insurance Act, after their trial and conviction for the offence under Section 409, Penal Code, this Court held that they were not sought to be punished for the same offence twice but for two distinct offences constituted or made up of different ingredients and therefore the bar of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution or Section 26 of the General Clause Act, 1897, was not applicable.
It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence.
Whether the appellant can be said to have satisfied all the conditions that are necessary to enable her to claim the protection of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution? - HELD THAT:- The charges upon which the appellant has been convicted now, for the charges under the Indian Penal Code, we will presume for present purpose that the allegations upon which these charges are based, proved, resulting in conviction and punishment of the appellant are substantially the same which formed the subject matter of prosecution and conviction under the penal provisions of Portugal law. But there exists no doubt to hold that the punishment of the appellant is not for the same offence - Be that as it may, there is no factual foundation laid as such by the appellant taking this plea before the trial court. Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to any of the witnesses that she is sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence for which she has been charged and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. She did not even make any such statement in her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is true that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution is in the nature of an injunction against the State prohibiting it to prosecute and punish any person for the same offence more than ones but the initial burden is upon the accused to take the necessary plea and establish the same.
The appellant's plea of double jeopardy is wholly untenable and unsustainable.
Whether the courts below committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the charged offences? Is there no evidence against the appellant as contended by the learned senior counsel? - HELD THAT:- It is fairly settled that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the courts below on proper appreciation of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the findings for that of the courts below unless it is clearly established that the findings and the conclusions so arrived at by the courts below are perverse and based on no evidence.
It is evident from the record that the involvement of the appellants is at two stages. Stage one is where Monica Bedi (A-3) and Mohd. Yunis (A-7) are involved in the pre- passport application at the threshold and even before the preparation of application seeking the passport in the assumed name. Stage two is the involvement of Monica Bedi (A-3), Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) after the submission of passport application before the authorities.
The High Court came to the conclusion that in submitting the false verification report in respect of residence of Sana Malik Kamal he may not have been aware and knew that the certificate so obtained would be used for the purpose of securing the passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. At any rate there is no evidence on that aspect of the matter. The High Court also came to the conclusion that by the time Mohd. Yunis (A-7) submitted a false verification there is nothing on record that he was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of cheating. Be it noted that the High Court confirmed the acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section 120B IPC. The High Court, accordingly, found that the proper offence made against him would be one for making forged document simplicitor punishable under Section 465 IPC - the High Court was not justified in convicting Mohd. Yunis (A-7) at all for it had found no case against the appellant made out under Section 120B IPC and further found that there is no evidence to assume that he was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of cheating. That there is no evidence that A-7 prepared false document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud. The ingredients of Section 463 are not satisfied. In such an event the conviction of the appellant under Section 465 IPC is unsustainable.
So far as D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) is concerned there is a clear evidence which has been properly appreciated by the courts below that he who took the article (envelop contained the passport) addressed to Sana Malik Kamal from PW-11 representing that he knew the addressee and deliver the same. The said article was actually entrusted to PW-11 for its delivery but D. Gokari Saheb (A- 8) took the same from PW-11 for delivery to Sana Malik Kamal - assumed name of Monica Bedi (A-3). The courts below found that D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) was aware of the contents of the article - the conviction of D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) for the charged offences is accordingly upheld. There are no reason whatsoever to interfere with the view taken by the High Court. However, the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment under each count awarded while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court is reduced to that of 6 months rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine amount.
So far as the appellant - Monica Bedi is concerned she is involved in the conspiracy as proved at both stages i.e. pre-passport application stage and post-passport application stage. The conspiracy itself has been hatched only with a view to secure a passport for Monica Bedi in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal - there are no merit in the submission of Shri Tulsi, learned senior counsel that there is no evidence whatsoever against Monica Bedi to prove her involvement for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 419 and 420 IPC - It is for her benefit that the entire conspiracy has been hatched involving more than one individual in order to secure a passport for her benefit enabling her to travel abroad in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. There is no material based on which this Court is to differ with the findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by the courts below.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that she had undergone more than 2 = years of sentence, it is considered appropriate to reduce the sentence to that of already undergone by her while maintaining fine amount imposed by the courts below.
Appeal allowed in part.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1086 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the memo issued by the Director, Town and Country Planning - agreements mutually entered by and between the parties - whether the Director, Town and Country Planning, is empowered to pass the impugned order? - Appellants were granted licence under the provisions of Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and the Rules framed thereunder, i.e. Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Area Rules, 1976 for setting up residential colonies. The Appellants entered into required agreements with the Governor of Haryana acting through Director Town and Country Planning, Haryana. The Appellants acting under the licence so granted and the agreements commenced setting up colonies by dividing the land into plots. The plots were sold to various buyers. The plot buyers are required to make construction on such plots to be used for the purpose for which the lay out was approved. The Appellants have also allotted flats to various persons and have entered into agreements. Mutual rights and obligations between the Appellants and the plot/flat buyers is structured by the agreements voluntarily entered into by them and all terms and conditions, covenants were mutually agreed by and between the parties. In respect of certain areas even completion certificates were granted as early as in the year 1991-92. The Director all of a sudden without any notice whatsoever to any of the Appellants issued the impugned directions which were challenged on various grounds in the High Court.
Interpretation of Contract - Freedom of contract is generally regarded as a reasonable, social, ideal only to the extent that equality of bargaining power between the contracting parties can be assumed and no injury is done to the interests of the community at large." The Court assumes "that the parties to the contract are reasonable persons who seek to achieve reasonable results, fairness and efficiency.... In a contract between the joint intent of the parties and the intent of the reasonable person, joint intent trumps, and the Judge should interpret the contract accordingly. A party who claims otherwise, violates the principle of good faith.
EXTENSION FEES - Whether the Director is empowered to issue any direction, directing the Appellants not to collect the extension fee with further direction to delete the relevant clauses from the agreement? - HELD THAT:- The provision for payment of "extension fee" has been provided for in the agreement, according to the Appellants, only in the interest of speedy development of each colony, and also in order to prevent purchase of plots by speculators who may keep the plot vacant without making any construction with the only object to earn profit by selling the same at a future date and such an act may prove detrimental to other purchasers as such acts obstruct the all round development of the area which is pre-eminently/predominantly in the public interest.
It is not necessary for us to express any firm opinion with regard to the plea so taken by the Appellants in this proceeding. It may altogether be a different matter if the purchasers raise objection as regards the very covenants incorporated into the agreement entered into by and between the parties in a properly constituted proceedings on such grounds as may be available to them in law.
Whether the Director was justified in issuing directions asking the licensee/owner to virtually amend the clauses/covenants in the agreement? HELD THAT:- The Director's functions and duties are well structured by the Act and the Rules. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules empowering the Director to sit in judgment on the perceived fairness of any clauses incorporated in the agreement entered by the parties. The terms and conditions in the licence granted by the Director do not prohibit incorporation of such a clause in the agreement to be entered between the owners and the purchasers. Nor there is any clause in the agreement entered by the owner with the Governor through the Director empowering the Director to sit in appeal over the agreement entered by the owners with the purchasers of the plots.
TRANSFER FEES - Whether the owner/colonizer in law after obtaining full payments from the allottees is prohibited from transferring the plots to the nominees of the allottees? HELD THAT:- Nor there is any provision whatsoever in the Stamp Act or Registration Act imposing any restriction on the assignment or transfer of rights under a sale/purchase agreement by the purchaser to a third party, before the execution of any conveyance deed in respect of any immovable property.
The parties in the agreement had agreed for the substitution of the name of allottees at the sole discretion of the owner. The conveyance deed executed by the owner is the one which is executed either in favour of the allottee or his nominee as the case may be on which a proper stamp duty and registration fee is required to be paid. In any event the Director has no power under the Act or the Rules to issue any such direction altogether prohibiting such nomination of another person thereby substituting the allottee.
MAINTENANCE FEE/CHARGES LEVIED - Whether the Director is empowered to issue any directions, directing the Appellants to stop charging maintenance fee from the plot/flat holders and also "delete the relevant clauses from the agreement" and refund the amounts so far collected to the Government immediately - HELD THAT:- the maintenance fee/charges levied and collected are clearly not in respect of any of the internal development works defined under Clause (i) to (v) of Section 2(i) . Perhaps, the learned senior counsel conscious of the difficulty to bring it under Section 2(i) (i) to (v) urged that maintenance expenses can be considered to be covered by Section 2 (i)(vi) , which refers to "any other work that the Director may think necessary in the interest of proper development of a colony". We find no merit in the submission.
We have already noticed that providing services of the kind for which the maintenance charges/fee are collected, are in no manner in respect of a "work" of "internal development" which is required to be carried out within the licenced area. The expression "work" in Section (i) (vi) cannot be interpreted in isolation ignoring the Clauses (i) to (v) in Section 2 . Such a construction is impermissible in law.
It is, therefore, clear that Director has no authority or power under the Act to issue any directions directing the owners/colonizers to incur maintenance expenses, by deeming the same to be part of the internal development works covered by Section 2(i). It is needless to reiterate that the maintenance of services specifies in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) cannot be considered to be part of the internal development works as defined by Section 2(i) .
Whether the amount of maintenance service charges was already included in the sale price of the plots/flats? - HELD THAT:- There is no price fixation formula devised under the provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. The Statutory Authorities have no role to play in the fixation of price and costs of land and rate at which the plots/flats are to be sold. The price charged by the owner for the plot is fixed and covered by Clauses (1) and (2) of plot sale agreement entered into by and between the parties. The agreed sale price of the plot includes external development charges. The payment of maintenance charges by the plot buyer is provided for in Clause (14) of the said agreement. The sale price charged by the owner from the plot buyers includes maintenance of service charges at the most could be a bonafide contention between the owners/colonizers and the purchasers of plots/flats.
Functions and duties of the Director and the power conferred upon him under the provisions of the Act and Rules - the Director is not authorized to interfere with agreements voluntarily entered into by and between the owner/colonizer and the purchasers of plots/flats. The agreed terms and conditions by and between the parties do not require the approval or ratification by the Director nor is the Director authorized to issue any direction to amend, modify or alter any of the clauses in the agreement entered into by and between the parties. It is thus clear that there is no provision in the Act, Rules or in the licence that empowers the Director to fix the sale price of the plots or the cost of flats.
It is thus clear that there is no provision in the Act, Rules or in the licence that empowers the Director to fix the sale price of the plots or the cost of flats. The impugned directions issued by the Director are beyond the limits provided by the empowering Act. The directions so issued by the Director suffer from lack of power. It needs no restatement that any order which is ultra vires or outside jurisdiction is void in law, i.e. deprived of its legal effect. An order which is not within the powers given by the empowering Act, it has no legal leg to stand on. Order which is ultra vires is a nullity, utterly without existence or effect in law.
LIMIT OF 15% PROFIT - Whether Appellants made any profit over and above 15% would arise for consideration only after the grant of final completion certificate in respect of the entire colony/development - HELD THAT:- The application for grant of final completion certificate remained pending with the authorities since long time. The complete accounts are to be finalized to determine whether the 15% limit on the profit has been exceeded and whether the colonizers/owners made profits over and above that. Further steps may have to be taken in accordance with law only thereafter. It would be appropriate to direct the authorities to decide the application so filed by the developers/colonizers for grant of final completion certificate as expeditiously as possible preferably within six months. In case if it is found that the owners had exceeded the said 15% limit on the profit, it shall always be open to the authorities to take appropriate action in accordance with law.
We find it difficult to sustain the impugned memo of the Director and the same is set aside. But this order of ours shall not preclude owners of plots/flats to avail such remedies as may be available to them in law and raise any dispute that had arisen or may arise and for the enforcement of contractual terms and conditions in which event the matters have to be decided on its own merits uninfluenced by the observation, if any, made in the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and in this order.
Therefore, the judgment of the High court is, set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. All interlocutory applications and contempt cases are, accordingly, disposed of in terms of this order.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1085 - ITAT PUNE
... ...
... ... ..... the relevant orders and mentioned that this issue must go to the files of the A.O for applying the above referred judgement of the Tribunal after considering exact contract paid during the year or otherwise. We find that DR’s argument has a weight. Accordingly, we set aside this issue to the files of the A.O for deciding the issue afresh in the light of the said decisions after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. 8. Interest u/s. 234B & 234D This issue is relevant to ITA Nos. 1573/PN/09 and 1224/PN/09 for the A.Y 2005-06 & 2006-07. The CIT(A) dismissed this ground that the charging of interest is consequential in nature. We find no reason to interfere to same. A.O is directed to give effect to the charging of the interest as per the changes in the figures and also as per the existing law in force. Thus grounds are allowed. 9. In the result all the four appeals of the Assessee are partly allowed. Order pronounced on 30th November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1084 - ITAT KOLKATA
... ...
... ... ..... and deposited, as the case may be. The transactions are admittedly recorded in the audited books of accounts of both the assessee-company as well as aforesaid three companies, who purchased shares of the assessee-company. Therefore, no addition on account of unexplained cash credit is warranted in the case of the assessee on the given facts and circumstances as discussed above. In view of the above, in our opinion, the action of the A.O. is contrary to the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. M/s. Lovely Exports (P) Ltd. (supra). 7.4. In view of above facts and the decisions cited supra, we are of the considered view that there is no infirmity in the order of the ld. C.I.T.(A) in deleting the addition Rs. 69.30 lakhs made by the A.O. u/s. 68 of the Act. Hence, we uphold his order and reject the ground of appeal taken by the department. 8. In the result, the appeal of the department is dismissed. This order is pronounced in the open Court on 19.11.2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1083 - ITAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... present appeal for assessment year 2003-04 were subject matter of appeal for assessment year 1999-2000 as well, before the I.T.A.T., ‘B’ Bench, Chennai. The said appeal in ITA No.629/Mds/09, the Tribunal passed its order on 7th August, 2009 after considering all and the very same grounds. The revision order passed by the C.I.T. for that assessment year 1999-2000 has been set aside by the Tribunal. The said order of the Tribunal squarely applies to the present case, as far as the merits are concerned. The only difference is that earlier the Tribunal considered an order passed under sec.263 and for the impugned assessment year the matter arises out of an assessment. But the issues have already been considered by the Tribunal on merits. 4. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we follow the earlier order of the Tribunal mentioned above and hold that the appeal filed by the Revenue is liable to be dismissed. Order pronounced on Sixteenth Day of November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1082 - ITAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... not mentioned. Another parable of Jesus Christ talks about the need to love thy neighbour as one would love himself. There is no qualification for the neighbour mentioned, much less anything about his religion. Thus the spirit of Christ lies in helping others irrespective of cast, creed and religion. Assessee wanted to provide education in the spirit of Christ and this would never by itself make it a religious institution. We are of the opinion that education by itself is charitable, and if pursued in the spirit of Christ will also be philanthropic. Assessee is eligible both for registration under section 12AA and approval under section 80G of the Act. Impugned order of the DIT (Exemptions) is quashed and he is directed to accord assessee registration under section 12AA and approval under section 80G of the Act. 7. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee stands allowed. Order pronounced in the open court after conclusion of hearing on the Third Day of November, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1081 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Payment of tax at compounded rates - Section 7(1)(b) of the KGST Act - sale of M-sand and granite metals - benefit of compounding to both the 'main product' (granite metal) as well as to the 'by-product' (M-sand) - assessment year 2003-04 - Held that:- Section 7 has been incorporated in the statute book as an alternative measure for realization of the tax, instead of undergoing the ordeal with reference to the charging provision under Section 5. It is also pertinent to note that, such benefit of compounding is not open to all sectors, but the same stands confined to 'two' different situations/units, as taken care of by Sections 7(1)(a) and 7(1)(b) - While Section 7(1)(a) deals with the dealers of gold/silver ornaments or wares, Section 7(1)(b) deals with mechanised 'crushing units' producing Granite metals.
Thus, the benefits contemplated under Section 7(1)(b) is with reference to the 'unit' and not otherwise - AO has no case that, the assessee is not running a mechanized crushing unit producing granite metals and in fact has granted compounding benefit, however confining it to the 'main product' 'Granite metal' alone; while the M-sand (by-product) is sought to be reckoned under the residual entry, imposing higher rate of tax; which has been rightly interfered by the Tribunal.
The finding of the Tribunal that the benefit of compounding has to be given to the 'unit' both in respect of the 'main product' (Granite metal) and in respect of the by-product (M-sand) is perfectly right - Revision Petition is dismissed.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1080 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s at all. This Court in Sahdeo (supra) while dealing with a similar situation held as under Every statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute creates rights in favour of persons concerned. The impugned judgment suffered from non-observance of the principles of natural justice and not ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus, the trial itself suffered from material procedural defect and stood vitiated. The impugned judgment and order, so far as the conviction of the Appellants in Contempt proceedings are concerned, is liable to be set aside. (Emphasis added) 20. The ratio of the judgment in Sahdeo (supra) applies to this case in entirety. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order dated 19.12.2002 in O.A. No. 715 of 2002 passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside. No costs.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1079 - SC ORDER
Renting of immovable property - Retrospective amendment by Finance Act, 2010 - Held that:- Parties would all make efforts for getting the writ petition, pending in the High Court, disposed of on the next date and therefore, no order is required to be passed on this, for the present.
High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition itself since an interim order is passed, which according to the petitioners, is creating prejudice to their interest.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1078 - ITAT INDORE
... ...
... ... ..... dings of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), accordingly, all the grounds taken in the cross objection are also dismissed in terms of the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals). Additional ground was taken by the assessee to the effect that since no adverse material was found during the course of search u/s 132 of the Act in respect of the additions made by the Assessing Officer or otherwise, therefore, the assessment is bad in law and unjustified. As we have already confirmed the order of the learned Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals) in annulling the assessment itself framed u/s 153C of the Act, we do not see any valid reason in the technical ground raised by the assessee in the form of additional ground. The same is, therefore, dismissed in limine. 60. In the result, all the appeals of the revenue and cross objections filed by the assessee are dismissed. This order has been pronounced in the open Court on 29th December, 2010.
-
2010 (11) TMI 1077 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... as followed the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court’s judgement in the case of Indo-Nippon Chemicals Co. Ltd. Vs Union of India 2005 (185) ELT 19 (Guj.) , which has been upheld by the apex court as reported in 2005 (186) ELT A117 (SC), to come to the above conclusion. In this view of the matter, reliance placed by ld. counsel for the appellants on the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Shyam Textile Mills and another 2004 INDLAW GUJ 454 does not advance their case. 3. Following the ratio of the Larger Bench decision, we uphold the impugned order confirming duty demand and imposing penalty, and reject the appeal. (Operative part of the order pronounced in open court on 11.11.2010)
-
2010 (11) TMI 1076 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM
... ...
... ... ..... erefore, the A.O. has wrongly invoked the provisions of section 68 for making the aforesaid additions. It was also contended that before the CIT(A), assessee has produced the relevant records to demonstrate that these are the credit balance for the services rendered by these parties. 34. We have carefully examined the order of the lower authorities in the light of rival submissions and we find that before the A.O., the assessee could not file the requisite evidence but before the CIT(A) he filed the relevant evidence which were examined by the CIT(A) before accepting the claim of the assessees. Since the CIT(A) has properly adjudicated the issue and no infirmity is pointed out by the revenue during the course of hearing of the appeal, we confirm the order of CIT(A). 35. In the result, the appeal of the assessee in ITA No.235 of 2008 is partly allowed and ITA No.372 of 2009 is dismissed. Both the appeals of the revenue are dismissed. Pronounced in the open Court on 18.11.2010
-
2010 (11) TMI 1075 - CESTAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... sal of credit made by the appellant is in order and now there is no requirement to pay 10% of the value of the exempted products. Keeping in view the retrospective amendment made to the CENVAT Credit Rules by the Finance Act, 2010, we waive requirement of predeposit, and set aside the impugned order, remand the matter to the original authority to reexamine the matter in the light of the retrospective amendment. The appellants shall be given a reasonable opportunity of hearing before passing fresh orders. The appeal is allowed by way of remand. (Dictated and pronounced in open court)
-
2010 (11) TMI 1074 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... We may note here that there were some additions made by the Assessing Officer which are deleted by the ITAT and one of the additions was on account of the valuation of the property purchased by the assessee inasmuch as Assessing Officer had not accepted the value of the property as ₹ 45 lacs as shown in the sale deed and arrived at the valuation at ₹ 1.06 crores on the basis of valuation done by DVO. As far as this aspect is concerned, ITAT has rightly held that the estimated value arrived at by the DVO cannot be taken into account for making addition when A.O. had brought on record any material to suggest that any payment in excess of sale consideration has not been shown in the registered sale deed by the assessee. This issue has recently been decided by the DB-I of this Court in the case of CIT v. Bajrang Lal Bansal, ITA No. 182/2010 decided on 20.08.2010. 5. We are of the opinion that no question of law arises in this case and hence this appeal is dismissed.
........
|
