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Showing 61 to 80 of 875 Records
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2010 (2) TMI 1263 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... ned on the job workers. Learned Counsel submits that this issue covers their case. 4. We have carefully considered their submissions. There is no denial of the fact that the scarp was removed from the job workers premises. In such a circumstance the department ought to have raised demand on the job worker and not on the suppliers of the raw material as held by the above noted judgments. The ratio will clearly apply to the facts of the case. Hence following the same the impugned order is set side and appeal allowed with consequential relief." 6.1 It can be seen that the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has also held the same view following the decision in the case of M/s. Emco Ltd. Vs. CCE, Mumbai-III - 2008 (223) ELT 613 (Tribunal-Bom.). 7. The ratio as reproduced above is squarely in favour of the respondent and I find that the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) is correct and legal and does not suffer from any infirmity. Appeal filed by the Revenue is rejected.
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2010 (2) TMI 1262 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntry 5, inserted by the 1999 amendment; that the said old Special Rule was superseded by Note (3) of Rule 5 of General Rules; and therefore re-insertion of the provision in the Special Rules will not supersede the General Rule. We are afraid that the said contention has no merit. When the Rule Making Authority being aware of the existence of Note (3) in Rule 5 of the General Rules, chooses to subsequently make a contrary provision in the Special Rules, it is to be inferred that the subsequent rule is intended to prevail over the general rule. We therefore hold that Note (2) to Entry 5 of the Table under Rule 3 of Special Rules will prevail over Note (3) to Rule 5 of the General Rules. 16. It therefore follows that the ratio of 5 1 1 1 has to be applied with reference to vacancies which were notified and not with reference to the cadre strength. There is no ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court. Appeal is dismissed. Application for intervention is dismissed.
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2010 (2) TMI 1261 - SUPREME COURT
Order of the HC passed in Criminal Contempt - High Court power to initiate the contempt proceedings suo motu for ensuring the compliance of the orders passed by the Court - convicting the appellants for not complying with the directions issued by this Court in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal [1996 (12) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT] and sentencing them for six months' imprisonment and also imposing a fine - HELD THAT:- In the instant cases, the record reveals that the Habeas Corpus petition was taken by the High Court on 30.07.1997 and directed the District Judge to hold the inquiry on the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus petition. The District Judge submitted the report on 03.12.1997. The Court considered the case on 4.12.1997 and initiated contempt proceedings against appellants and others suo motu. Matter was remanded to the District Judge for further inquiry in view of the fact that Sujan Singh was not heard in the earlier inquiry. The District Judge submitted the supplementary inquiry report on 12.07.1998. After hearing the parties the judgment was reserved on 12.03.1999. Thereafter, it was listed on 14.12.2001 i.e. after 2 years and 9 months for fresh arguments. However, the counsel for the parties stated that nothing more was required to be submitted except what had been argued earlier. The judgment was pronounced on 20.12.2001. It is apparent from the order sheets itself that the matter remained pending before the Court, so far as the contempt proceedings are concerned, for more than three years which itself is in contravention of the true spirit of the purpose of initiation of the contempt proceedings.
In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that contempt proceedings had been concluded without ensuring the compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Rules 1952. The appellants had never been informed as what were the charges against them. The relevant documents on the basis of which the High Court had taken a prima facie view while initiating the contempt proceedings suo motu, had not been made available to them. The notice itself was not only defective, but inaccurate and totally mis-leading. The facts and circumstances of the case warrant reversal of the aforesaid judgment and order.
This Court, while entertaining these appeals, granted interim relief to the appellants. Thus, State could not initiate disciplinary proceedings against either of them.
The appeals stand allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Contempt is hereby set aside.
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2010 (2) TMI 1260 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 09. The Official Liquidator shall join the Secured Creditors as and when final sanction for the payment to be made to the Chartered Accountant for the aforesaid purpose is sought. 5. In the result, the Official Liquidator is permitted to distribute the amount to each of the Secured Creditors and the workmen of the sums due to each one of them as stated in paragraph No.4 reproduced hereinbefore. 6. The payment shall be made to Secured Creditors upon completion of all the formalities including furnishing of usual undertaking. Similarly the workmen shall be paid amount due to them and the option shall be exercised by each of the workman for receiving payment either by Account Payee Crossed Cheque or by Electronic Mode, subject to the workman being identified by respondent No.3 Union through its authorised representative in the event a workman opts to receive the payment by Account Payee Crossed Cheque. 7. The Application stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2010 (2) TMI 1259 - ITAT, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ” 6. It was submitted that the assessee had to undertake some trading in the nature of hedging to protect itself from undue risk taken by it and the losses so claimed were not allowed to be set off stating that Explanation to section 73 is applicable. It was submitted that the issue in assessment year 2003-04 in ITA No. 3873/Mum/2007 about quantification of loss under consideration was restored back to the file of the A.O. vide order dated 3rd April 2009 and it was submitted that the A.O. allowed the necessary relief in the consequential order. Since the issue is one of set off of brought forward losses, the A.O. is directed to allow the set off, if the earlier years loss is quantified as a business loss according to the provisions of law. The ground is infact infructuous and accordingly rejected. 7. Ground Nos. 8 & 9 are general in nature which require no adjudication. 8. In the result, appeal is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 12th February 2010.
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2010 (2) TMI 1258 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her any payments were made after 16th September, 1988, and whether any amount remained due or outstanding, cannot be inferred from the aforesaid 'C' Form. Most importantly, however, the 'C' Form cannot be construed as an acknowledgment for the reason that no intention to acknowledge a liability can be inferred therefrom. The Courts though lean in favour of a liberal construction of all documents which are sought to be relied upon as acknowledgments, it would be too far fetched to hold that a 'C' Form handed over by the appellant to the respondent can be construed as an acknowledgment of subsisting liability owed by the appellant to the respondent. The liability could well have been liquidated and wiped off even before the issuance of the 'C' Form. 26. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment and decree dated 6th December, 1996 is unsustainable and the same is accordingly set aside. 27. RFA No. 54/1997 stands disposed of accordingly
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2010 (2) TMI 1257 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es must be kept in view while deciding the cases of medical negligence. We should not be understood to have held that doctors can never be prosecuted for medical negligence. As long as the doctors have performed their duties and exercised an ordinary degree of professional skill and competence, they cannot be held guilty of medical negligence. It is imperative that the doctors must be able to perform their professional duties with free mind. 96. When we apply well settled principles enumerated in the preceding paragraphs in dealing with cases of medical negligence, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the appellants have failed to make out any case of medical negligence against the respondents. 97. The National Commission was justified in dismissing the complaint of the appellants. No interference is called for. The appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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2010 (2) TMI 1256 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... propositions have been accepted by learned Single Judges of this Court in several cases, but in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Press that false, misleading, unfair or deceptive advertising is not protected commercial speech, we are of the opinion that propositions (a) and (b) above and the first part of proposition (c) are not good law. While hyped-up advertising may be permissible, it cannot transgress the grey areas of permissible assertion, and if does so, the advertiser must have some reasonable factual basis for the assertion made. It is not possible, therefore, for anybody to make an off-the-cuff or unsubstantiated claim that his goods are the best in the world or falsely state that his goods are better than that of a rival. 24. Having considered all the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal. There is no occasion to interfere with the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. 25. The appeal is dismissed
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2010 (2) TMI 1255 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would also perhaps be useful to cull out the distinction between acquiescence and laches as stated in the Black's Law Dictionary (6f Edition at page 24). Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an existing state of things, while latches implies a neglect to do that which the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may be evidence of acquiescence. Laches imports a merely a passive assent, while acquiescence implies active assent. In re Wilbur's Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5 A.2d 325, 331. "Acquiescence" relates to inaction during performance of an act while "laches" relates to delay after act is done. Accordingly, this issue is found in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 43. In view of the discussions above, I am of the opinion that the prayers sought in the suit deserves to be rejected. The suit is dismissed. It is ordered accordingly.
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2010 (2) TMI 1254 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. 128. However, in this case the courts below proceeded on a prima facie misconstruction of documents. They adopted and applied wrong standards. We, therefore, are of the opinion that a case for interference has been made out. 56. We have not merely reassessed material and arrived at a conclusion different from that of the trial court when, the view of the trial court was also a reasonable view. We find that on the material available at this interlocutory stage, the view taken by the learned Single Judge was not at all reasonably possible on a proper application of settled principles of law and express statutory provisions. It is because of this reason that the impugned order cannot be sustained and requires to be set aside. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside
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2010 (2) TMI 1253 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lication for rectification/cancellation of a registered trade mark is pending before the statutory authority, the High Court is obliged to stay further proceedings in the suit pending before it pursuant to Section 124(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. 18. In so far as the suit out of which present appeal arises is concerned, there is an allegation against the Appellants of passing off the trade mark 'Plasto' as well as 'Non-Dust' and there is an allegation of infringement of the trade mark 'Non-Dust'. 19. In view of the express provisions of Section 124 of Trade Marks Act, we stay further proceedings in the suit in so far as the alleged infringement is concerned with regard to the trade mark 'Non-Dust' until the disposal of the matter before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board. It is, however, made clear that the passing off action may continue. 20. No further orders are required to be passed on this appeal. It is, therefore, disposed of.
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2010 (2) TMI 1252 - ITAT, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... Times", ranges from ₹ 2,400/- per sq.ft. to ₹ 3,200/- per sq.ft. for commercial area. Keeping in mind all these factors, in our considered view, it will meet the ends of justice to adopt the valuation of commercial premises ₹ 2,000/- per sq.ft. as against valuation ₹ 500/- per sq.ft. adopted by the D.V.O. and valuation ₹ 2,700/- per sq.ft. adopted by the assessee's valuer. Even according to the assessee, "Indian Valuer Directory and Reference Book", is a reliable source of information and these rates are adopted by the Government of Maharashtra for official purposes. We have adopted the rates given in this referencer. Accordingly, we direct the Assessing Officer to recomputed the capital gains in the light of our observations. To this extent, grievance of the assessee is upheld. 6. In the result, assessee's appeal is partly allowed in the terms indicated above. Pronounced in the open court today on 30th day of March 2010.
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2010 (2) TMI 1251 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under Section 14, the aggrieved person having forum to challenge the action under sub-section (4) to Section 13 of the Act, which includes the measures taken under Section 14, before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. 14. For the reasons as discussed above, and to enable the appellant and aggrieved person to raise all the questions regarding legality and propriety of action of the Bank before the Tribunal, we not only set aside the order dated 29th October, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application Nos. 4563/09 and 4564/09, but also set aside the common order dated 9.4.2009, passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad in Appeal Nos. 04/09, 06/09 and 07/09. All the aforesaid Appeals stand restored to original file of Debt Recovery Tribunal-II, Ahmedabad with a direction to the Tribunal to decide the appeals on merits, after notice and hearing the parties. Both the appeals are allowed. There should be no order as to costs.
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2010 (2) TMI 1250 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r subsection (2) to Sec.13 and deciding the objections, if any, preferred by the borrower under subsection (3A) to Sec.13 and when action is taken under subsection (4) to Sec.13. 8. So far as individual case of the appellant is concerned, we are not discussing the same on merit as action of secured creditor in taking possession which amounts to action under subsection (4) to Sec.13 can be challenged before the Debt Recovery Tribunal u/Sec.17. If in one or other case notice under subsection (2) to Sec.13 is not given or details as required under subsection (3) to Sec.13 are not supplied and the secured creditor has taken steps to take possession, a measure under subsection (4) to Sec.13 by following procedure u/Sec.14, the aggrieved person may challenge the same before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Se.17, but such action will not render Sec.14 illegal. We find no merit in this appeal. Both Letters Patent Appeal and Civil Application are accordingly dismissed, but no costs.
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2010 (2) TMI 1249 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... ts, insurance claim and interest for the purpose of computing deduction u/s 80-IB. 38. These issues were there in assessee’s appeal in I.T.A.No. 768/Ind/2006, hence, decided in identical manner. Thus, this ground of the assessee is partly allowed. 39. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee stands partly allowed. 40. Now, we shall take up the assessee’s appeal in I.T.A.No. 351/Ind/2008 41. The issue raised in ground no.1 is identical to issue raised in ground no.1 of I.T.A.No. 768/Ind/2006. Hence, this ground is accepted for the same reasons. 42. The issue raised in ground no.2 is related to disallowance made by the Assessing Officer u/s 40A(2)(b), which was not pressed, as the assessee had got the due relief subsequently. Hence, the same is dismissed as not pressed. 43. In the result, this appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. 44. To sum up, all the appeals stand partly allowed. This order has been pronounced in the open court on 26th February, 2010.
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2010 (2) TMI 1248 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to the misconduct alleged and the same would certainly shock the court’s judicial conscience. 17. In view of the above noted judgments, we feel that ends of justice will be met by substituting the punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant with the penalty of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect and directing that she shall be paid only 20 of back wages during the intervening period. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant is substituted with the penalty of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect. We also direct that instead of full back wages, the appellant shall be entitled to 20 of the salary and allowances for the period between the dates of removal from service and this order. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are directed to reinstate the appellant without delay. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2010 (2) TMI 1247 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roceedings, the same shall not be allowed. In the case on hand, it is stated that the date of marriage, the date of birth of the child and certain other details relating to the immovable properties belonging to the petitioner have been erroneously mentioned due to inadvertence. Allowing such amendment to cure the said mistakes, in my considered opinion, will not change either the nature or the character of the proceeding. After such amendment is made, the petitioner herein may file additional counter, if any. After all the respondent has to prove by cogent and convincing evidence the factum of marriage, the birth of the child out of such marriage and the income of the petitioner, etc. In such view of the matter, I am of the view that the learned Magistrate was right in allowing the petition for amendment, which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. 19. In the result, this revision fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, connected MP is closed.
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2010 (2) TMI 1246 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment had granted interest, nor merely on the basis of the proposed amendment to Section 267, but also in exercise of the powers of the Division Bench under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 51. The High Court thus has power under Article 226 to grant interest in appropriate cases. The Division Bench exercised this power in a similar case. Cases such as these are fit matters to exercise such power and I accordingly do so. 52. I note that once again the application has not sought future interest. It is not possible, therefore, for me to grant future interest from the date of the application viz. 11th August, 2003, till the date hereof. The Petitioner is at liberty to make a further application for the same. 53. In the result, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The Respondent shall pay the Petitioner the said amounts on or before 30th June, 2010. The Respondent shall also pay costs fixed at ₹ 1,500/to the Petitioner on or before 30th June, 2010.
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2010 (2) TMI 1245 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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Restoration of the name of the company - Petition filed u/s 560(6) - business of manufacture and distribution of toys - struck the petitioner company's name off the Register - defaults in statutory compliances reqd. u/s 159 and 220 - HELD THAT:- This case show that this is not merely a case where the interests of justice and requirements of the Statute would be met merely by payment of the costs of the Registrar of Companies. It is difficult to believe that although the company kept functioning for 8 long years along with a properly staffed secretarial department but the Director was so pre-occupied with his wife's illness for 8 years continuously that he was unable to spare even a minute or two to inquire from his staff as to whether the annual statutory returns were being filed.
It is also equally improbable that the continuing illness, described as "kidney problems", of the Director's wife, precluded the staff of the company from informing Mr. Neeraj Dhamija or even any of the other Directors of the fact that statutory returns mandated under the Companies Act are not being filed. The whole thing has obviously been handled in a very casual manner and must be deprecated. To my mind, such conduct does not display sound and responsible business functioning expected of companies. The non-filing of returns with the Registrar of Companies had also made it impossible for interested parties to find out the current financial health of the company over a span of 8 years.
Considering the facts, the restoration of the company's name to the Register maintained by the respondent will be subject to the payment of ₹ 50,000/- as exemplary costs, payable to the common pool fund of the Official Liquidator. In addition, further costs of ₹ 11,000/- be paid to the Registrar of companies. Costs be paid within three weeks from today, and subject to the completion of all formalities, including payment of any late fee or any other charges which are leviable by the Registrar of Companies for the late deposit of statutory documents.
The impugned order for striking off the name of the petitioner company shall then stand set aside. The name of the petitioner company, its Directors and members shall, as a consequence, stand restored to the Register of the Registrar of Companies, as if the name of the company had not been struck off, in accordance with Section 560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956.
The petition is disposed of.
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2010 (2) TMI 1244 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vely revising the rent for the premises, the revision was not, in our opinion, adequate. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that instead of ₹ 10,000/- determined by the High Court, the respondents shall pay ₹ 15,000/- per month towards rent w.e.f. 1.11.2003. The same shall stand revised to ₹ 25,000/- per month w.e.f. 1.1.2009. The differential amount thus payable shall be deposited by the respondents before the Rent Controller within six months from today whereupon the Rent Controller shall take steps to disburse the same to the appellants, the current owners of the premises. Needless to say that the revision ordered by us is also tentative and shall not prevent the parties from seeking determination of the fair rent for the premises by instituting proceedings before the competent Court/authority in accordance with law. 22. With the above modification, this appeal is disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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