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Showing 21 to 40 of 1047 Records
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2011 (4) TMI 1532 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... the scrip thereafter had fallen. He contends that it is wrong to say that the price of the scrip went up only because of the declaration of bonus. There is no merit in this contention as well. The learned counsel is not right in contending that the announcement regarding bonus was made for the first time on February 24, 2005. As a matter of fact, the matter regarding issue of bonus shares was first made known to the public on February 17, 2005 when BSE was informed that a meeting of the Board of Directors of the company would be held on February 24, 2005 to consider the issue of bonus shares to the existing shareholders. This announcement to the public was enough to raise the price of the scrip which did actually go up. The price and volume data of the scrip and the record clearly supports this view. 9. No other point has been raised. For the reasons recorded above, we allow the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. Parties shall bear their own costs in both the appeals.
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2011 (4) TMI 1531 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ission, as all these claims were made almost contemporaneously. Therefore, a just and proper order would be that 50% of this ₹ 53,78,472/- is to be paid by the Official Liquidator to Adityapur within four weeks from the date of service on him of a copy of this order. The purchaser/assignee will make a similar payment to Adityapur within four weeks from such date of service of this order. Upon receipt of such payment, Adityapur will accord or be deemed to have accorded their ex-post facto permission in terms of Clause 6(1) of the lease. The payment made by the Official Liquidator is to be treated as if that payment was not received by the Official Liquidator beneficially, but, was set apart to clear his title and should be treated as expenses of winding up. This order is executable as a decree. Both applications are disposed of. No order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, to be provided upon complying with all formalities.
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2011 (4) TMI 1530 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... radip Sharma, Adv., Ms. Neera Gupta, Adv., Mr. Som Prakash ,Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Adv. For the Respondent Mr. Ajay Vohra, Adv., Ms. Kavita Jha, Adv. ORDER Delay condoned. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
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2011 (4) TMI 1529 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e absence of any complaint on this score, we must assume that the appellant had suffered no prejudice on account of a defective 313 statement. The cases cited by Mr. Sushil Kumar, undoubtedly Crl. Appeal No.2081/2009 talk about the importance of a 313 statement and the implications for the prosecution, should there be some defect. It is, however, equally well-settled that an objection as to prejudice must be taken at the earliest see Shobit Chamar & Anr. Versus State of Bihar (1998 (3) SCC 455) and prejudice must be shown before a trial could be said to be invalidated see in this connection Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade Versus State of Maharashtra (AIR 1973 SC 2622) and Santosh Kumar Singh Versus State through CBI (2010 (9) SCC 747) . No prejudice to the accused has been pointed out even this belated stage. It must therefore be presumed that no prejudice has in fact occurred. 11. We are therefore of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
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2011 (4) TMI 1528 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an transaction. Was the respondent taking six different loans on the same day? The petitioner has miserably failed to come forward with satisfactory explanation on this unusual story set up by him. The story advanced by the petitioner that the respondent, after signing and issuing the cheques, requested him not to encash the same immediately but to wait for arranging the fund is also another incredible story, which defies explanation. For all these reasons, I have no alternative to hold that the respondent, on the materials brought on record by the petitioner, has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption against her by preponderance of probability and the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the impugned judgment of acquittal does not call for my interference but on different grounds. 9. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this revision, which is hereby dismissed. Let the parties bear their respective costs. Transmit the L.C. record.
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2011 (4) TMI 1527 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... upported the prayer of the accused-petitioner for allowing the revision and setting aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against him. 5. On consideration and sentence passed hereinabove, and exercise of power of this Court to compound the offences arising out of the N.I. Act by virtue of Section 147 thereof, I am of the considered view that, this is a fit case where the prayer of the petitioner to compound the offence as provided under Section 147 of the N.I. Act ought to be allowed and that the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I. Act ought to be set aside. Accordingly, the revision is allowed and consequently the order of conviction and sentence dated 24.2.2007 passed by the learned SDJM, Bhubaneswar in I.C.C. Case No. 4318 of 2004 and confirmation of the same in Crl. Appeal No. 10/ 10/2-08/07 vide judgment dated 21.5.2008 by the learned ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge. F.T.C-3, Bhubaneswar are set aside.
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2011 (4) TMI 1526 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
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... ... ..... ous that the activities which were earlier undertaken by PUDA at Ludhiana had not been taken over by the assessee. Therefore, there is similarities in the facts and circumstances between the case of the assessee and the case of PUDA. In this view of the matter, the aforesaid order passed by this Tribunal in PUDA v CIT, Chandigarh in ITA No. 764/Chandi/2003 exclusively covers the issue agaisnt the assessee. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee was fair enough to concede the aforesaid position. Following the order of this Tribunal in Punjab Urban Development Authority v CIT in ITA No. 764/Chandi/2003 and for the reasons given by the Tribunal in the aforesaid order, we dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee. For the sake of ready reference the Registry is directed to enclose a copy of order dated 1.6.2006 in the case of Punjab Urban Development Authority v. CIT in ITA No. 764/Chandi/2003 with this order. 6. Appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. Order pronounced on April, 2011
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2011 (4) TMI 1525 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Recruitment Rules 2005 as well as the letters - Promotion to the post of Raj Bhasha Adhikari AD(OL) - HELD THAT:- It was pointed out by learned Counsel for the Appellants that the impugned Raj Bhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules 2005 were quashed by the High Court without service of any notice of the writ petition on the Appellants (Respondents 3 to 6 in the writ petition) and that too at the preliminary stage of admission on the basis of an alleged submission of a counsel who did not have any authority and Vaklatnama in his favour by the Appellants and who had not been given any instruction to appear on their behalf. We agree with this submission.
When rules are challenged it is necessary to have the matter gone into in depth by inviting a counter affidavit and examining the matter in detail. A summary disposal of a writ petition by allowing it without even calling for a counter affidavit and quashing the rules, in our opinion, is totally against any established procedure of law.
This is evident from the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah [1997 (7) TMI 662 - SUPREME COURT]. It was held therein that pension is no longer treated as a bounty but was a valuable Constitutional right under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution, which were available on 1.1.1973 and 1.4.1974 (that is before the 44th Constitution Amendment). Since this was a Constitutional right it could not be taken away by amendment of the rules. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and hence a Constitutional right can only be taken away by amending the Constitution, not by amending the rules or even by amending the statute.
We are of the opinion that the above observations are not sustainable. When Rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, no undertaking need be given to anybody and the Rules can be changed at any time. For instance, if the retirement age is fixed by rules framed under Article 309, that can be changed subsequently by an amendment even in respect of employees appointed before the amendment. Hence, we cannot accept the view taken by the High Court. There is no question of equity in this case because it is well settled that law prevails over equity if there is a conflict. Equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it. As the Latin maxim states "Dura lex sed lex"' which means "The law is hard, but it is the law".
The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.
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2011 (4) TMI 1524 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ubmits that, many a hurdle is there, with regard to the finalisation of the assessment and that steps are being taken to challenge Ext.P9 as well. A minimum time of 'four months' is necessary to have the proceedings finalised in accordance with the relevant provisions of law, submits the learned Standing Counsel. 4. Having heard both the sides, this Court finds that the proceedings have to be taken to logical conclusion. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to finalize Exts.P10 and P12 in the light of the relevant provisions of law and on the basis of the relevant materials. Petitioner is at liberty to rely on Ext.P9 before the respondents and it is for the respondents to consider the applicability of the same to the given set of facts and circumstances. Final assessment order as above shall be passed as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within 'three months' from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Writ petition is disposed of as above.
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2011 (4) TMI 1523 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... money to Mr. Ashok Bhai who is expired. His son has made settlement and paid my amount. I have given amount to Mulchand Ravji Chheda of ₹ 14,00,000/- that amount was given in cash. I have given amount to Mr. Ishwar Ravji. I have given amount to Narendra Savla who is owner of Krti Store. I have given amount of ₹ 4,50,000/- to him. I have filed criminal case against him.... I am not income tax payer. I voluntarily say that I am agriculturist and it is not necessary to pay income tax. 5. It is pertinent to note that the transactions of such huge amounts were in cash and promissory notes stipulating interest were got executed. No money lending licence has been produced before the trial Court. In light of the above facts, the trial Court is justified in holding the view that the debt in question is not legally enforceable debt as per the provisions of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946. Leave is, therefore, refused. Criminal Application No. 5397 of 2010 stands disposed of.
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2011 (4) TMI 1522 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... h Vs. State of Punjab,(1995)1SCC 760(SC) . 10.1 In view of the foregoing, especially when the ld. CIT(A) have not passed a speaking order ,we consider it fair and appropriate to set aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) and restore the issue raised in ground no. 3 of these appeals to his file for deciding the matter afresh in accordance with law in the light of our aforesaid observations, after allowing sufficient opportunity to both the parties. Needless to say that while redeciding the appeal, the learned CIT(A) shall pass a speaking order, keeping in mind, inter alia, the mandate of provisions of sec. 250(6) of the Act. With these observations, ground no. 3 in these two appeals is disposed of. 11. Ground nos. 4 & 5 in these appeals being prayer and general in nature ,do not require any separate adjudication and are, therefore, dismissed. 12. In the result, both these appeals are partly allowed, but for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the court today on 8 -04-2011
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2011 (4) TMI 1521 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... ition on substantive basis in the other case, could not make protective appellate order in the case of the assessee. The Assessing Officer may not be sure as to in whose hands the income should be brought to charge of tax or for which assessment year such income is assessable. In such a situation, the Assessing Officer is legally justified in making two assessments out of which one is substantive assessment and the other is protective assessment. But in appeal, it is not open to the CIT(A) in confirming the addition on protective basis in the case of an assessee, even though substantive addition was deleted in the hands of the same assessee. In view of the above, we hold that the CIT(A) was not justified in directing the Assessing Officer to sustain the addition mentioned above on protective basis and thus, his direction is hereby vacated. 15. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are partly allowed, as above. Decision pronounced in the open court on 13th April 2011.
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2011 (4) TMI 1520 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment years, namely, ITA Nos. 900- 905/2008, which were dismissed by this Court on 24th January, 2011 following the judgment in the case of Director of Income Tax v. Galileo International Inc. 224 CTR 251. Accordingly, this appeal is also dismissed.
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2011 (4) TMI 1519 - ITAT MUMBAI
Validity of order passed by the Assessing officer u/s 154 r.w.s. 143(1)(a) - time barred mistake - limitation of four years laid down in section 154(7) - HELD THAT:-We are of the considered view that the ratio laid down in the case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd v. CIT [1995 (1) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] remains confined to a case where subject matter of second rectification is the same as the first rectification and it was only in such a situation that the time limit of second rectification proceedings gets extended by the fact of first rectification proceedings. In a situation in which the subject matter of second rectification proceedings is wholly unrelated to the subject matter of first rectification proceedings as is the situation in the present case, the time limit for second rectification proceedings remains unaffected by the first rectification proceedings. In view of the these discussion, as also bearing in mind entirety of the case, we are of the considered view that the impugned rectification order, having been passed well after the end of four years from the end of financial year, in which, intimation u/s 143(1)(a) passed, is time barred. In any event, by no stretch of logic, a rectification of mistake almost after eight years of processing an intimation u/s 143(1)(a) can be said to have been made within a reasonable time limit. We, accordingly, quash the impugned rectification order.
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2011 (4) TMI 1518 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ments are permissible but employee would be deemed to be appointed to the service only when he discharges duties of the post on the cadre post of such service or commenced probation on induction for training prescribed for members thereto. Therefore, in order to claim seniority prerequisite is that the post held by an employee should be a cadre post permanent or temporary. 87. G.O.Ms. No. 1 dated 4.1.1980 further shows that temporary posts, would form part of cadre only w.e.f. 4.1.2010, as it is prospective in nature. 88. For the reasons stated above, no ground is made out to interfere with the impugned order. 89. Consequently, all the writ petitions are ordered to be dismissed, but no order as to costs. 90. Miscellaneous applications praying to dispense with the production of original documents are ordered. 91. Miscellaneous applications praying to vacate interim injunction are rendered infructuous and disposed of accordingly. All other miscellaneous applications are closed.
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2011 (4) TMI 1517 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... w this point is sufficient to hold that the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court is not sustainable in law. 27. Apart from this, this Court finds that the appellants had been in peaceful possession of the disputed property from July 1963 and their predecessor-in-interest was in possession of the same property from 1950 till the property was transferred by her to Lateef Hassan Burney, predecessor-in-title of the appellant. After such transfer the construction started on the property and the appellants have been residing there since 1964 and the suit came to be filed only in 1975. Even in that suit after impleading the original defendant no.2 no relief has been claimed against him. 28. In view of the aforesaid admitted factual position and the legal questions discussed above, this Court cannot affirm the views taken by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court is affirmed. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2011 (4) TMI 1516 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... of an individual. The test to determine whether two different ventures can be considered to constitute the same business are not is to see whether there was any interconnection, inter-lacing, inter-dependence, embracing the ventures and whether different ventures were so inter-laced and so dovetailed into each other as to make them into the same business. 19. In our view, the test is fulfilled in this case and, hence, the claim of the assessee of bad debts from brokering business is to be allowed. Coming to the second limb of disallowance, admittedly, the issue whether the conditions under section 36(2) are fulfilled or not, is decided in favour of the assessee by the decision of Mumbai Special Bench in assessee’s own case for earlier assessment year. Respectfully following the same, we set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and allow this ground of appeal. 20. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 27.5.2011
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2011 (4) TMI 1515 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... n the effect of the provisions of the Income-tax Act. In the absence of any provision in the Act to assess the assessee that had been dissolved and thus ceased to exist, no assessment order could be made against it by the Assessing Officer. Thus, the assessment order passed on the assesseecompany was a nullity. “ 5. But, the facts relating to this issue are not clearly culled out and the Assessing Officer is required to verify the same. Therefore, both these appeals are restored to the file of the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer shall investigate and state the clear facts. In case he finds that the company was not in existence at the relevant time, the assessment order cannot stand and the matter will end up then and there. Otherwise, he can proceed further. Having decided as above, there is no need to decide the other issues taken on merit. 6. In the result, both the appeals are allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open court on 18.4.2011.
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2011 (4) TMI 1514 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sence of any such finding, the genuine expenditure incurred by the assessee for value addition job work paid by A/c. Payee cheque cannot be disallowed. This issue is clearly covered by the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in above case law.” From the above discussion, it can be clearly seen that the entire issue has been decided by the Tribunal on the basis of evidence on record. The assessee had made payments for job work done through account payee cheques. There were other corroborative evidences to prove such evidence. The Assessing Officer has committed error in disallowing such claim. In addition to having made payments through A/c. Payee cheques, the assessee had also produced TDS Certificate in support of its claim. The Assessing Officer observing that such cheque payments could have been withdrawn and reverted back to the assessee were not based on evidence. We find no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly, Tax Appeal stands dismissed.
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2011 (4) TMI 1513 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s cannot be intermingled with the subsequent allottees in areas which may be wholly undeveloped. Such action is clearly violation of Article 14. We are also of the opinion that the Board can not be permitted to exercise its powers of fixing the final price under Clause 7(b) at any indefinite time in the future after the allotment is made. This would render the word "as soon as" in Clause 7(b) wholly redundant. As noticed earlier, in the present case, the Board has sought to fix the final price after a gap of 13 years. Such a course is not permissible in view of the expression "as soon as" contained in Clause 7(b). 20. In our opinion, the High Court correctly concluded that the fixation of final price by the Board is without authority of law. It violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India being arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretionary powers. 21. In view of the above, we find no merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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