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2011 (7) TMI 1323
... ... ... ... ..... d in this case is that the Bank, which in all fairness should have restrained itself from pursuing the application filed before the Tribunal which was numbered as T.A. No. 1415 of 2000 once it had agreed to accept ₹ 78,16,428.42 towards full and final settlement of the claim submitted by it before the Official Liquidator, not only pursued the application but has also filed these petitions to challenge the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Though the order passed by the Company Judge on 2nd July, 2003 has been enclosed, but the filing of the application and the affidavit by the Branch Manager has not been disclosed in the writ petition and nor these documents have been enclosed with the writ petitions. It is, therefore, clearly a case where exemplary costs should be imposed upon the Bank for unnecessarily pursuing the matter and are, accordingly, imposed. 19. The two writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed with costs of ₹ 25,000/- in each of the petition.
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2011 (7) TMI 1322
Interest on Refund u/s 244A - The AO has passed order on January 2006 under sec. 254/154/148 of the IT Act, 1961 vide which a refund amount has been determined - But refund has actually been granted on 29th May, 2006 - HELD THAT:- There was statutory liability on the Revenue to pay the interest on the refund which was retained for seeking the administrative approval. As the refund was granted to the assessee only on 29th May, 2006, therefore, the assessee was entitled for the interest upto the said date and the AO was not justified in granting the interest only upto January, 2006 - Decision in favour of Assessee.
Interest on Retained Interest u/s 244A - Assessee's contention was that interest was short allowed for four months, so interest on interest was also payable u/s 244A - AO stated that there was no delay in granting relief or refund as procedure and instructions of CBDT were followed
HELD THAT:- Following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the SANDVIK ASIA LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX AND OTHERS [2006 (1) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT], where it was held that "even assuming that there is no provision for payment of compensation, compensation for delay is required to be paid as per the act itself recognizes in principle of the liability of the Department to pay interest when excess tax was retained and the same principle should be extended to cases where interest was retained." We, therefore, direct the AO to allow the interest to the assessee also on the interest which was payable on the amount to be refunded. - Decision in favour of Assessee.
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2011 (7) TMI 1321
... ... ... ... ..... respondent has applied to the Recovery Officer for setting aside the sale on the ground of irregularity by invoking Rule 90 of Order XXI of Code of Civil Procedure. As there is no provision under the Income Tax Act seeking for setting aside the sale on the ground of irregularity, invoking the provisions of Rule 90 of Order XXI is justifiable. Accordingly, the application was considered by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which ultimately allowed the same by setting aside the sale. In the given facts and circumstances of the case and for our conclusions in this judgment, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal warranting interference, as the Recovery Officer had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of the balance 75 percent of amount in the absence of any clause in the conditions of sale notice. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2009 is also dismissed. No costs.
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2011 (7) TMI 1320
... ... ... ... ..... AO. 8. The second ground relates to addition of ₹ 80,000/- u/s.40A(3) of the Act for cash payment of land. 9. During the year under appeal assessee made the payment of ₹ 4 crore by cash to purchase land. The Assessing Officer invoking the provisions of Section 40A(3) disallowed the sum of ₹ 80,000/-. This action of Assessing Officer was confirmed by Ld. CIT(Appeals). 10. Before us it was submitted that payments were made to farmers who insisted that payments be made in cash only as they were not having any bank account in their respective names. However, no evidence in this respect was filed at any stage and therefore this issue is also restored back to the file of AO for fresh adjudication and the assessee will be free to file further evidence in support this claim that cash payments was made by him on the request of the farmers. 11. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced on this day of 22nd July, 2011
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2011 (7) TMI 1319
... ... ... ... ..... would affect the sanctity of hearing before a quasi-judicial authority and in the present case rather a statutory body. All such powers vest with the Chairman, who is the administrative head of the Company Law Board. No party or litigant can legitimately make a grievance against the same, unless a strong case of bias, that too satisfactorily demonstrated before the Chairman of the Company Law Board. 7. In view of the above, the appeal is thoroughly misconceived and hence, the same is dismissed with cost of ₹ 25,000 (rupees twenty five thousand) and the same shall be deposited by the appellant with Company Law Board within a period of 1 (one) month from today. It will be open for the Company Law Board to appropriate the amount of cost as per the final order which may be passed in the proceedings of the main Company Petition No. 90 of 2005. Order in O.J. Civil Application No. 356 of 2011 In view of the order passed in the main appeal, civil application would not survive.
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2011 (7) TMI 1318
... ... ... ... ..... case, the order of cancellation of registration was made after passing the impugned order on 25.11.2008. Therefore, the question of registration could not have been a ground for refusal of the approval. In so far as exemption u/s 11 is concerned, the finding given by the Tribunal in earlier years is that the assessee is entitled to benefit of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 11. These orders are in the nature of binding precedence. Although the ld. DR vehemently argued that renting of building to school is not an educational or charitable purpose as understood u/s 2(15), we are of the view that the only recourse open to the revenue is to challenge the findings given by the Tribunal in assessment years 1994-95 and 2002-03. In so far as this division bench is concerned, it is bound to follow those orders. Therefore, it is held that the activities of the assessee are charitable in nature and it is entitled to approval u/s 80G. 4. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1317
... ... ... ... ..... ressed by the IPAB on the issue in respect of a trade mark would at best have a persuasive effect on the High Court deciding a passing off or infringement action. In the instant case, the IPAB's impugned order cannot be held to be invalid only because it did not advert to, much less follow, the decision of the High Court at the stage of interim injunction. 31. This Court is also satisfied that the plea of UBPL of acquiescence is not convincing. There is nothing to show that despite knowing of the use by UBPL of the trade mark FORZID, OCPL took no steps to seek an injunction against UBPL. Conclusion 32. For all of the aforementioned reasons, this Court does not find sufficient grounds having been made out for interference with the impugned order dated 14th October 2008 of the IPAB. 33. The writ petition and the pending application are dismissed with costs of ₹ 5,000/- which will be paid by the UBPL to OCPL within a period of four weeks. The interim order is vacated.
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2011 (7) TMI 1316
... ... ... ... ..... cular articles/news-items on particular place in the newspaper from the particular place in the world. The Appellant has undertaken foreign travel to cover important event in the world. This is evident from the published articles cannot be said to be not incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes at least in the specific business of the Appellant. The fact should also not be ignored that the coverage of the events had helped the Appellant to maintain the circulation during the year under consideration. On consideration of the facts of the case, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A) in deleting the disallowance of ₹ 19.59,000/- made by the AO out of foreign travel expenses. Accordingly, we uphold the order of the CIT(A) and dismiss the ground raised by the revenue. 17. In the result, appeal of the revenue is dismissed. 18. To sum up, appeal of the Assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes and the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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2011 (7) TMI 1315
... ... ... ... ..... upra) and hold that even employees’ contribution towards PF/ESI and Pension Fund which are paid before the due date of filing of the return are allowable. 11. Thus, the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) on this aspect is reversed and the Ground of appeal taken by the assessee is allowed. 12. In the result, the appeal of the assessee for the assessment year 2003-04 is partly allowed. 13. In assessee’s appeal in ITA No 341/PN/10 for the assessment year 2004- 05, the only issue relates to the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) of employees’ contribution towards PF and ESI amounting to ₹ 8,04,098/-. Similar issue has been considered by us in assessee’s appeal for the assessment year 2003-04, wherein we have decided the issue in favour of the assessee. On similarly parity of reasoning, we allow this Ground of appeal. As a result, assessee’s appeal is allowed. Decision was pronounced in the open Court on 29th Day of July, 2011.
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2011 (7) TMI 1314
... ... ... ... ..... above and the stand taken by the AO himself on the similar issue in assessee’s own case for the subsequent years i.e. assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09, we hold that the expenses in question incurred by the assessee and reimbursed by his employer company cannot be added to his total income as perquisite to the extent to which fringe benefit tax thereon was paid by the employer and only the balance amount on which no fringe benefit tax has been paid by the employer company can be added to the total income of the assessee as perquisite. The impugned order of the learned CIT(Appeals) on this issue is, therefore, set aside and the matter is restored to the file of the AO for recomputing the value of perquisite, if any, to be added to the total income of the assessee after verifying the amount of fringe benefit tax paid by the employer. 7. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed as indicated above. Order pronounced on this 29th day of July, 2011.
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2011 (7) TMI 1313
Application u/s 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act - enforcement of arbitration clause - Jurisdiction of arbitrator to consider the counter claim - Under agreement, the Appellant entrusted a construction work to the Respondent. Clause 25 of the agreement provided for settlement of disputes by arbitration. As per the contract, the work had to be commenced on 16.11.1992 and completed by 5.5.1994. On the ground that the contractor did not complete the work even by the extended date of completion (31.3.1995), the contract was terminated by the Appellant. Respondent raised certain claims and gave a notice to the Appellant to appoint an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause. As the Appellant did not do so, the Respondent filed an application u/s 11, and the said application was allowed and arbitrator was appointed. The arbitrator called upon the parties to file their statement. the Respondent filed its claim statement before the arbitrator. The Appellant filed its Reply Statement with counter claim. The arbitrator considered the fourteen claims of the contractor and four counter claims of the Appellant. he rejected the other claims of Respondent and Appellant. Feeling aggrieved the Respondent filed an application to the civil court. The Appellant challenged the civil court judgment by filing an arbitration appeal before the High Court. The Bombay High Court held that the arbitrator had No jurisdiction to entertain or allow such a counter claim as the same had neither been placed before the court in the proceedings u/s 20 nor the court had referred it to the arbitrator. The said judgment of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
HELD THAT:- The arbitration clause in this case contemplates all disputes being referred to arbitration by a sole arbitrator. It refers to an Appointing Authority (Chief Engineer, CPWD), whose role is only to appoint the arbitrator. Though the arbitration clause requires the party invoking the arbitration to specify the dispute/s to be referred to arbitration, it does not require the appointing authority to specify the disputes or refer any specific disputes to arbitration nor requires the Arbitrator to decide only the referred disputes. It does not bar the arbitrator deciding any counter claims. In the absence of agreement to the contrary, it has to be held that the counter claims by the Appellant were maintainable and arbitrable having regard to Section 23 read with Section 2(9) of the Act.
In view of the above, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court affirming the judgment of the trial court, is set aside. Consequently the award of arbitrator is upheld in its entirety and the challenge thereto by the Respondent is rejected.
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2011 (7) TMI 1312
... ... ... ... ..... ion to admit a particular candidate to a course contrary to rules. In matters relating to internal working of an educational institution and more particularly, in the matter of admissions, the Court will not interfere unless the act complained of is clearly beyond jurisdiction or contrary to the statutes, rules or regulations governing the institution, or there is a statutory duty which the authority has failed to perform or the impugned act is mala fide or arbitrary. 35. It is not established that the act of the Respondent in cancelling the admission of the Petitioner is beyond or contrary to the statutes, rules or regulations or is unreasonable, nor it is demonstrated that the said action of the Respondent is arbitrary in any manner. 36. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that no relief can be granted in favour of the Petitioner. 37. As we do not find any merit in the writ petition, the same is hereby ordered to be rejected with no order as to cost.
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2011 (7) TMI 1310
... ... ... ... ..... es Act, 1956, and in terms of the Scheme, the whole or part of the undertaking, the property, rights and powers of the Transferor Companies be transferred to and vest in the Transferee Company without any further act or deed. Similarly, in terms of the Scheme, all the liabilities and duties of the Transferor Companies be transferred to the Transferee Company without any further act or deed. It is, however, clarified that this order will not be construed as an order granting exemption from payment of stamp duty or taxes or any other charges, if payable in accordance with any law; or permission/compliance with any other requirement which may be specifically required under any law. 19. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner Companies states that the Petitioner Companies would voluntarily deposit a sum of 1,00,000/- in the Common Pool fund of the Official Liquidator within three weeks from today. The statement is accepted. 20. The Petition is allowed in the above terms. Order dasti.
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2011 (7) TMI 1309
... ... ... ... ..... Respondent had raised threshold objections on the maintainability of the Appeal. Mr. T.K. Ganju, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, has raised contentions similar to those which we have already answered above. We think that in order to avoid prolixity, we should not traverse those arguments again since our conclusion remains that an appeal is not maintainable. Again, we reiterate that in referring the parties either under Section 8 or Section 45 of the A and C Act, a prima facie view is expressed by the Court. We have no reason to believe that if the Plaintiff chooses to resort to alternative dispute resolution mechanism postulated by the Arbitration Clause, so far as NTPC is concerned, the venue would be domestic. As far as Alstom is concerned, it would be international and in consonance with the international compact under the aegis of Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris. 29. This Appeal is also rejected accordingly.
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2011 (7) TMI 1308
... ... ... ... ..... d significant. It is not possible for the Court to fathom the in justice because neither there is any patent illegality nor there is any violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel. 12. In view of the above discussion we are of the considered opinion that once an agreement contains an Arbitration clause, unless an exception is carved out for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Harbans Lal Sahania case (supra) by applying the prescribed test, the parties are required to be referred to invoke arbitration proceedings. 13. Accordingly, this LPA is allowed and the judgment of the Learned Single Judge is set aside with no order as to costs. The parties are accordingly given liberty to initiate arbitration proceedings in the matter without prejudice to their respective rights. All the pending CMs in this appeal are disposed of accordingly.
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2011 (7) TMI 1307
... ... ... ... ..... such circumstances the petitioner cannot complain that it was not put to notice by the respondent for committing breach or violating the terms of the concession agreement. In the aforesaid background of facts involved in the present case and the legal position discussed above, the two judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner would not be applicable. 13. In the light of the above discussion, this court does not find any merit in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, while taking the aforesaid view since 60 days period in terms of the order of the respondent dated 3.6.2011 for terminating the contract in terms of Article 17 of the concession contract is yet to expire, therefore to subserve the ends of justice, the respondent No. 2 is directed to decide the representation of the petitioner dated 15.6.2011 before the expiry of the said 60 days period after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 14. It is ordered accordingly.
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2011 (7) TMI 1306
... ... ... ... ..... eal are covered against the Revenue by the decision of this Court in the case of Sind Co-operative Housing Society vs. Income- 2. In view of this matter, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2011 (7) TMI 1305
Suit for Mandatory injunction - recovery of mesne profits - stay u/s 10 of the CPC - claim of adverse possession - whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed - In the year 1952, the government allotted a residential house to Ram Parshad. The Lease Deed was executed in his favour on 31.10.1964. On humane considerations of shelter, Ram Parshad allowed his three younger brothers to reside with him in the house. On 16.11.1977, these three younger brothers filed a Civil Suit in the High Court of Delhi claiming that this property belonged to a joint Hindu Family and sought partition of the property on that basis.
HELD THAT:- In the instant case when the entire question of title has been determined by the High Court and the Special Leave Petition against that judgment has been dismissed by this court, thereafter the trial court ought not to have framed such an issue on a point which has been finally determined upto this Court. In any case, the same was exclusively barred by the principles of res judicata. That clearly demonstrates total non-application of mind. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that court’s otherwise scarce and valuable time is consumed or more appropriately wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases.
It is also a matter of common experience that once an ad interim injunction is granted, the plaintiff or the petitioner would make all efforts to ensure that injunction continues indefinitely. The other appropriate order can be to limit the life of the ex-parte injunction or stay order for a week or so because in such cases the usual tendency of unnecessarily prolonging the matters by the plaintiffs or the petitioners after obtaining ex-parte injunction orders or stay orders may not find encouragement. We have to dispel the common impression that a party by obtaining an injunction based on even false averments and forged documents will tire out the true owner and ultimately the true owner will have to give up to the wrongdoer his legitimate profit. It is also a matter of common experience that to achieve clandestine objects, false pleas are often taken and forged documents are filed indiscriminately in our courts because they have hardly any apprehension of being prosecuted for perjury by the courts or even pay heavy costs.
On consideration of totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any infirmity in the well reasoned impugned order/judgment. These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as ₹ 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.
The suit pending before the trial court is at the final stage of the arguments, therefore, the said suit is directed to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and in any event within three months from the date of the communication of the order.
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2011 (7) TMI 1304
... ... ... ... ..... 94, 97 and 102 of the Act. (c) it shall diligently follow and comply the Accounting Standard 14 as notified by the Central Government and shall make adjustment in their Books of Account as per the Accounting Standard 14 notified by the Central Government under Section 211 (3A) of the Act. (d) it shall, so far as applicable, in all respect and in all manner diligently and strictly comply all requirements and provisions applicable with respect to amalgamation under the laws of Mauritius and shall ensure such compliance by the transferor companies. (e) upon the scheme being sanctioned, the transferee company shall take steps for striking -off the names of both the transferor companies in accordance with the Companies Act, Mauritius 2001. 16. The petition is allowed accordingly. 17. Fees of the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, Mr. P.S. Champaneri is quantified at ₹ 7,500/-. The said fees shall be paid by the petitioner company. The petition stands disposed of.
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2011 (7) TMI 1303
... ... ... ... ..... sanction shall be clearly and in Bold Letters mentioned in the advertisement. (c) The petitioner shall forward copy of present order to the Regional Director and Registrar of Companies who may, either before the submission of the scheme or upon its submission, file objections, if any. (d) The petitioner shall file a declaration in form of Resolution of its Board of Directors and an affidavit by any Director that provision of all applicable laws are fully complied, and all permission including those under Reserve Bank of India Act and Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA Act) have been obtained and shall be obtained/complied as and when necessary. (e) The petitioner/transferee company(as stipulated, declared and undertaken by it) shall take out proceedings for the sanction of the scheme, which shall be duly intimated to the shareholders and the creditors and shall be duly advertised. 10. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, the application is hereby disposed of.
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