|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 380 Records
-
2012 (1) TMI 368
... ...
... ... ..... Delay condoned. Dismissed on facts only.
-
2012 (1) TMI 367
... ...
... ... ..... ld. A.R. that on similar facts in other years penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) has not been initiated. The ld. D.R. on the other hand, relied upon the order of AO. 5. We have heard the learned representatives of the parties, record perused. We find that the CIT(A) has followed the judgment of the Apex Court and others. The Kerala High Court in the case of CIT vs. K. Moideen Kutty Haji (supra) has clearly held that in such cases, penalty u/s. 271(1) (c) is not leviable when the AO during the assessment proceeding accepted the additional income of the assessee. Because assessment was completed on the basis of agreed addition and not on the basis of concealed income found by the AO on the basis of examination by him. Following the above judgment of Kerala High Court and in n the light of the above facts, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A). The order of CIT(A) is confirmed. 6. In the result, appeal of revenue is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 20-01-2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 366
... ...
... ... ..... aa). 3. These amendments were made by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1998. 4. In view of the aforesaid amendment, we feel that the matter should be considered and decided by the tribunal afresh as it requires factual examination and details. Accordingly, we answer the question of law mentioned above by directing the tribunal to decide the aspect/issue afresh in view of the retrospective amendment. The order passed by the tribunal deciding the question/issue will be treated as set aside. In the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 5. Parties will appear before the Assistant Registrar, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on 12th March, 2012, when a date of hearing will be fixed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 365
... ...
... ... ..... ned, the order of detention can be set aside. (f) Same is the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the decision reported in 2004 (2) KLT 1094 (Lekha Nandakumar v. Government of India). 12. Applying the above cited decisions to the facts of this case, we are of the view that the detention order passed against the detenu cannot be allowed to stand as there are unreasonable and unexplained delay in execution of the detention order dated 4.11.2010 till 22.8.2011 and on the ground of not placing the relevant documents before the State Advisory Board/Confirming Authority. 13. As we are setting aside the detention order on the above two grounds, we are of the view that the other grounds raised by the petitioner need not be gone into. 14. In the result, the habeas corpus petition is allowed. The detention order dated 4.11.2010 is set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if his detention is not required in any other case. Connected M.P.No.1 of 2011 is closed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 364
... ...
... ... ..... ty to both the parties to suggest as to which substantial questions of law would arise. Therefore, in the instant case, present Appellants i.e. Respondents in the Second Appeal are entitled to argue under Sub-Section 5 of Section 100 of the Code, to contend that those questions of law do not arise. 32. With the aforesaid directions, this appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent. 33. Since the matter is old, we deem it fit and proper that the learned Single Judge would endeavour to dispose of the appeal at an early date on merit and in accordance with law, preferably within a period of one year from me date of framing of the substantial questions of law. The parties would appear before the High Court on 14.3.2012 and matter be listed on the said date before learned Single Judge as per Roster. The record, together with copy of this order, be sent to the Registrar General of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by this office at an early date. Parties to bear their own costs.
-
2012 (1) TMI 363
... ...
... ... ..... ing all the parties including the applicant. (iii) Since, the learned senior counsel for the applicant has been heard in support of the I.A. No.3 and 4 of 2010 no separate order is necessary thereon. The same are disposed of accordingly. 23. Hence, we pass the following order - (a) The impugned judgment and order dated 13.2.2002 rendered by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Najibabad, U.P. in the Suit No. 121/1994, and those arising in the appeals therefrom rendered by the Additional District Judge, Bijnaur and the High Court of Allahabad are held to be bad in law and are hereby set aside. (b) There shall be a declaration in favour of the appellant that the respondent No. 1 had no right to sell the disputed parcel of land. Suit No. 121/1994 filed by the appellant in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Najibabad, U.P. shall stand decreed to that extent. 24. The Civil Appeal and I.A. Nos. 3 and 4 of 2010 stand disposed of as above. The parties will bear their own costs.
-
2012 (1) TMI 361
... ...
... ... ..... sed income determined which is in excess of the amount of undisclosed income shown in the return.” The Commissioner of Income-tax(A) disposed off the appeal without referring to Second Proviso to section 158BFA(2). This Tribunal is of the opinion that the Second Proviso to section 158BFA(2) needs to be taken into consideration while disposing of the appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax(A). Accordingly the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax(A) is set aside and the issue is remitted back to the file of the Commissioner of Income-tax(A). The Commissioner of Income-tax(A) shall reconsider the issue afresh in the light of Second Proviso to section 158BFA(2) and thereafter decide the same in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing. 15. In the result, appeal in IT(SS)A No.214/Coch/2005 is dismissed and appeal in IT(SS)A No.02/Coch/2006 is allowed, for statistical purpose. Order pronounced in the open court on this 08th day of January, 2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 360
... ...
... ... ..... his power mentioned in section 250 (4) of the Act, which provides that the CIT(A) may remand the case to the A.O. and call for the remand report on the assessment on certain points. Hence, there is no violation of Rule 46-A. Needless to mention that the power of the Appellate Commissioner is co-terminus with the power of the Assessee Officer. Appellate authority has all the powers, which the original authority has subject to condition/restriction, if any, prescribed by law as per the ratio laid down in the following cases 1. Jute Corp. of India Ltd. vs. CIT, 187 ITR 688,693 SC; and 2. CIT vs. Nirbheram Daluram, (1997) 224 ITR 610 (SC). In view of above, we are of the view that no substantial question of law is emerging from the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is hereby sustained along with the reasons mentioned therein. The appeal filed by the department has no merit and the same is dismissed at the admission stage.
-
2012 (1) TMI 359
... ...
... ... ..... 271(1)(c) there is a duty placed on the assessee to reply to the penalty notice and to give the plausible explanation. Once this is done, the duty shifts to the Assessing Officer to show that the explanation given by the assessee is false. Explanation 1 to section 271(1)(c) of the Act is clear on this issue insofar as it specifically uses the term “fails to offer an explanation” and the term “offers an explanation which is found to be false” as also the term “explanation which he is not able to substantiate”. Here the assessee has given an explanation. The explanation is substantiated by evidences. The explanation has not been shown to be false. In the circumstances, penalty is not leviable. In the circumstances, the order of the learned CIT(A) confirmed the levy of penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act stands reversed. In the circumstances the appeal of the assessee is allowed. 6. The order was pronounced in the court on 31/01/2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 358
... ...
... ... ..... y allegation whether the activities were carried under any contract. Show cause notice was issued on the basis of information obtained without any enquiry. The appellant was not brought to charge by any specific term. It may be stated that adjudication may give rise to civil and evil consequences for which show cause notice should bring the charge against noticee for reply lead defence. When show cause notice in clear term did not bring the appellant to charge, there is no scope to agree with Revenue. Accordingly, appeal is allowed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 357
... ...
... ... ..... , relying on the decision in assessee's own case for assessment year 200304 which is not accepted by the revenue ?” 2. Counsel for the parties state that similar question raised in the assessee’s own case being Income Tax Appeal (L) No.87 of 2011 in the case of CIT Vs. A.F. Ferguson & Co. has been rejected by this Court on 21.7.2011. For the reasons stated therein, the present appeal is dismissed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 356
... ...
... ... ..... r three years from the date of completion of the assessment in respect of the person against whom search was carried out is barred by limitation. A similar view was taken by Hyderabad Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Dy.CIT, Cir. Vs Shri P Venkata Ramana in ITSSA No.08/HYD/2010 order dated 11-02-2011. A similar view was also taken by the Gujarat High Court also in the case of Khandubhai Vasanji Desai & Ors vs DCIT (1999) 236 ITR 73 (Guj). The co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has also taken a similar view in Assist.Commissioner of Incometax vs Smt. Cicy P Thomas in ITSS No.32/Coch/2007 and CO No.37/coch/2007 order dated 22-12-2011. 7. In view of the above, in our opinion, the block assessment order passed against the assessee u/s 158BD is barred by limitation. Accordingly, the same is quashed. 8. In the result, the revenue appeals are dismissed and the cross objections of the assessee are allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on this 06th day of January, 2012.
-
2012 (1) TMI 355
... ...
... ... ..... endered by this Court in Aurobindo Pharma Ltd. (supra), the Revenue had preferred a petition for special leave to appeal. That petition has since been dismissed and is mentioned in 2011 (269) E.L.T. A147. The Supreme Court also observed that similar matter have already been dismissed by the Supreme Court on an earlier occasion. 3. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.
-
2012 (1) TMI 354
... ...
... ... ..... this issue, and direct the assessing officer to recompute the capital gains. 9. As for the disallowance of expenditure of ₹ 1,38,112, in view of the pleading of the assessee before us that it should have been allowed under the head ‘business income itself, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities on this aspect, and restore the matter to lthe file fo the assessing officer, with a direction to verify the details of the expenditure of ₹ 1,38,112, and allow the same against business income of the assessee, if the assessee is able to substantiate its claim that the expenditure in question is relatable to the business income itself, by producing evidence to the satisfaction of the assessing officer. The assessing officer is accordingly directed to redecide this issue in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. 10. In the result, appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. Order pronounced in the court on 25.1.2012
-
2012 (1) TMI 353
... ...
... ... ..... iled before the High Court by the petitioner and the petitioner ought to have gone by the normal statutory remedy. Be that as it may, liberty is given to the petitioner to argue the points raised in this petition before CIT (A). We are informed that appeal has been filed before CIT(A) and the same is pending. CIT (A) will decide the matter uninfluenced by observations made by the High Court in the impugned judgement. Accordingly, the special leave petition stands disposed of. All contentions on both sides are expressly kept open.
-
2012 (1) TMI 352
Maintainability of petition - Misappropriation of Sales Tax Forms - Offence punishable u/s 406 IPC - Period of limitation for u/s 468(2)(c) CrPC for taking cognizance - whether the petitioners having availed of the remedy of revision should be allowed to take recourse to section 482 CrPC as a substitute for virtually initiating a second revisional challenge or scrutiny which is clearly barred U/s 397(3) CrPC? - HELD THAT:- The issue regarding filing of petition before the High Court after having availed first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) CrPC laid statutory bar of second revision petition, the courts have held that High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 482 CrPC as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But, that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly, when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved of the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before Sessions Court. It was all to depend not only on the facts and circumstances of each case
For the purpose of computing limitation, it is the date of the complaint that is material and not the date on which the cognizance come to be taken by the Magistrate and the process was issued against the petitioner. The subsequent stages such as examination of complainant and the witnesses, the consideration of the case, the preliminary inquiry etc. take considerable time and it would therefore, be unreasonable and irrational to compute the period of limitation from the date when the cognizance was taken or the process was issued. Furthermore, these processes are dependent on various factors including the time available to the court which is something over which the complainant has no control.
It would, thus, be wholly untenable to hold that a complaint if presented within the period of limitation would be barred merely because a certain amount of time elapsed until the cognizance could be taken or the order of process could be passed. Since the complainant continued requesting the petitioner to return the file and it was not returned for two years, the complainant was compelled to file a complaint with the police on 30th October 1998. I do not find any merit in the submission that the complaint was time barred.
In view of the discussion and having seen that the present case was at the stage of framing of charges and that both the courts below have appreciated the allegations against the petitioner and have formed a prima facie view of the framing of charges u/s 406 IPC. In view of entrustment and refusal to return the file, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. Not only that, the case does not fall within the parameters of invoking inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, even otherwise it does not call for any interference by this court on merits. Hence, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Nothing in this order shall amount to expression of opinion on the merits of case.
-
2012 (1) TMI 351
... ...
... ... ..... 798 to 19992000 is to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 32(2) as applicable for A.Y. 199798 to 19992000 or the same has to be dealt with in accordance with the said provisions as applicable to A.Y. 200304 and 200405 ?”
-
2012 (1) TMI 350
Insider trading - Selling the shares during the unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) period - Violation of the PIT Regulations 1992 - according to the Board, the appellant was deemed to be a connected person with the company and its directors who had access to US PI and hence an insider. The appellant is alleged to have traded in the scrip of the company based on the (UP SI) relating to financial results. Hence, it was alleged that the appellant had violated regulation 3(i), (ii) and 4 of the regulations. After considering the reply of the appellant and granting personal hearing, the adjudicating officer found the appellant guilty and, by the impugned order, imposed penalty as stated above. Hence, this appeal.
HELD THAT:- the appellant in the present case has placed sufficient material on record to show that she has not traded on the basis of US PI. It is also a matter of record that the appellant used to trade regularly in the shares of the company and her trades were genuine transactions carried out by her in the normal course of business. the appellant that where an entity is privy to USPI, it will tend to purchase shares and not sell the shares prior to the US PI becoming public if the information is positive. In this case declaration of financial results, dividend and bonus were positive information but the appellant not only bought but also sold the shares not only during the period when the price sensitive information was unpublished but also prior to and after the information becoming public. A person who is in possession of US PI which, on becoming public is likely to cause a positive impact on the price of the scrip, would only buy shares and would not sell the shares before the US PI becomes public and would immediately offload the shares post the information becoming public. This is not so in the case under consideration. The trading pattern of the appellant, as shown in the chart above, does not lead to the conclusion that the appellant’s trades were induced by the US PI. Further, appellants in that appeal only purchased the shares while in possession of US PI and there was no trading by them prior to or after the information becoming public. In the case in hand the charge of trading on the basis of US PI has not only been denied by the appellant, it has also been able to demonstrate through her trading pattern that the trading was not based on the US PI.
the appeal is allowed and impugned order set aside with no order as to costs.
-
2012 (1) TMI 349
... ...
... ... ..... nds assailed on the point of limitation in as much as the demand for the period 1.11.04 to 31.03.07 was raised by the issuance of SCN dtd. 31.03.08. Ld. Advocate submits that though they have advanced submission on the point of limitation, the Commissioner in his impugned order has not taken the same into consideration and has not given any finding on their plea of limitation. As such he prays for setting aside the impugned order and remanding the matter to adjudicating authority for deciding the plea of limitation. 3. Ld. DR appearing for the Revenue agrees on the above course of action suggested by the ld. Advocate. 4. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to Commissioner for deciding the issue of limitation and consequent penalty. Needless to say that the appellant would be given an opportunity of putting their defence and principles of natural justice. 5. All the appeals stands allowed by way of remand. (Pronounced in the Open Court)
-
2012 (1) TMI 348
... ...
... ... ..... sment, after expiry of four years is invalid in law. In this case also admittedly, the assessment was reopened after expiry of four years. In view of the above, in our opinion, the was no negligence on the part of the assessee in disclosing full material which is relevant for completing the assessment. Therefore, in view of Proviso to section 147, the reopening of assessment after four years is invalid in law. Accordingly we hold that the reopening of assessment is invalid. Consequently the reassessment proceedings has no leg to stand. Accordingly we uphold the order of Commissioner of Income-tax(A) for the reasons stated above. 6. In view o the above, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to go into the merit of the appeal filed by the department. Accordingly, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed. 7. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed and the cross objection of the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on this 20th day of January, 2012.
........
|
