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VAT and Sales Tax - Case Laws
Showing 41 to 58 of 58 Records
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2013 (6) TMI 199 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Exemption on the sale of "coriander powder" and "turmeric powder" in view of Notification in G.O.Ms.No.36, CT & R (B1) dated 1.4.2008 - taxability - as per assessee by virtue of G.O.(D) No.383, Commercial Taxes Department, dated 22.10.1998 and the clarification dated 9.12.2002 issued under Section 28-A of the TNGST Act, the goods continued to enjoy the exemption & would continue even under Act 32/2006 - Held that:- Intention of the legislature was to replace the Old Serial No.18 of Part-B of Fourth Schedule with New Serial No.18 to have effect for the period 1.1.2007 and 31.3.2008. The understanding of the department prior to coming into force of Act 32/2006 and from 1.4.2008, the date of coming into force of Act 32/2008, to state the obvious, is that the powder form of chilly, turmeric and coriander continues to be exempted goods for all purposes. If during the interregnum period, namely from 1.1.2007 to 31.3.2008, there appears to be an omission, that omission is sought to be corrected by way of substitution. This Court clearly holds that substitution has the effect of replacing the old Serial No.18 of Part B of Fourth Schedule of Act 32/2006 and the substitution will therefore entail goods described in Serial No.18 of Part-B of Fourth Schedule of Amending Act 32/2008 the benefit of exemption as is applicable from the inception of Act 32/2006. The new replaces the old and that is substitution and as a consequence, exemption becomes inevitable. The department's plea that the exemption will not apply to the period from 1.1.2007 to 31.3.2008 cannot be accepted, as substitution in this case will have to relate back to 1.1.2007 itself, when Act 32/2006 came into force.
It needs no further clarification to state that even in terms of the decision Namputhiris Pickle Industries v. State of Kerala and another [1998 (3) TMI 594 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] the powder form of chilly continues to be one and the same item. This statement is made only to amplify that despite substitution by way of Act 32/2008, the petitioners are entitled to exemption in respect of the powder form of chilly, turmeric and coriander on the mere entry in Serial No.18 of Part-B of Fourth Schedule to Act 32/2006.
When there is no differentiation between the two forms of the goods, the substitution is more in the nature of clarification of a pre-existing right which has accrued to the petitioners, that is to say that the powder form of chilly, turmeric and coriander are no different from chilly, turmeric and coriander.
It is evident that the intention of the legislature under the TNGST Act as well as the Act 32/2008 is to treat chilly and chilly powder, coriander and coriander powder, and turmeric and turmeric powder as one and the same goods & continue to enjoy the benefit of exemption despite their being a specific omission of the powder form 1.1.2007 to 31.3.2008. The benefit of exemption granted based on returns filed is in order.
Thus in view of the finding of this Court that the coriander and turmeric are one and the same as their powder form, the understanding of the Government in G.O.(D) No.383, Commercial Taxes Department, dated 22.10.1998 the clarification issued on 9.12.2002 under Section 28-A of the TNGST Act and the reasoning of this Court on substitution, it is clear that exemption remained even during the period in question, namely from 1.1.2007 to 31.3.2008. This Court has no hesitation to hold that the proceedings under Section 27 of Act 32/2006, which are under challenge, are without jurisdiction and contrary to law. The said proceedings deserve to be set aside. - In favour of assessee.
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2013 (6) TMI 198 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Revision u/s 11(1) - Conduction of surveys - Discrepancies were found in the books of account – AO made additions which was reduced by the first appellate authority to some extent - Held that:- In the absence of the books of accounts, the A.O. was having no option except to made the addition on estimate basis. The First Appellate Authority has also made the addition on estimate basis and reduced the Tax liability but the Tribunal again enhanced the tax liability by making a fresh estimation. Tribunal is a final fact finding authority as per the ratio laid down in the case of Kamla Ganpati vs. Controller of Estate Duty, [2001 (2) TMI 132 - Supreme Court] Thus, it is clear that no question of law is emerging from the impugned order passed by Tribunal. Hence, no interference is required in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Order is hereby sustained.
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2013 (6) TMI 197 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Tax on entry of goods into the local area from outside the local area - Assessment under U.P. Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 2000 being contested as barred by time - Held that:- The statutory requirement is the date of receipt of the order by the Assessing Authority concerned and not mere knowledge of the order. The petitioner could not refer any iota of evidence to show on what date the judgment of writ court was received by the Assessing Authority. He wants this Court to draw inference about the date of the service of judgment which is not possible. What it mean to say is that complicated and disputed question of fact with regard to the date of communication of the judgment of Writ Court is involved. This can more properly be examined and addressed by the authority having the complete record including the assessment file and the receipt register etc.
As decided in Satyawati Tandon case [2010 (7) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT] that before exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should have recorded as to whether adjudication of writ petition involves any complicated and disputed question of fact and whether they can satisfactorily be resolved. On the facts of the present case,it is not in a position to arrive at a definite conclusion or finding in terms of section 21(6) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act to uphold the submission of the petitioner.
Having regard view of the fact that the disputed questions of fact are involved and statutory forum by way of appeal is available to the petitioner, thus court declines to interfere in the present writ petition. When the question of limitation is dependent upon the adjudication of certain facts, then, it cannot be said that it is related to the jurisdiction of the authority or is a jurisdictional issue, as in the present case. The factual aspect of the case should be decided by the statutory forum first, in such matters.
Writ petition dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal.
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2013 (6) TMI 172 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
No availability of Form ST 18 A with truck - penalty - Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 - held that:- Revenue has failed to show any material to prove that before passing of the order dated 7.1.2005 any notice was served upon the respondent-firm. The respondent-firm cannot be represented through the driver of the vehicle in absence of any authority given to him by the respondent-firm. - No penalty - Decided against the revenue.
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2013 (6) TMI 171 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty u/s 54(1)(14) of the U.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2008 - seizure of goods as the weight of the consignment was more than that disclosed in the documents - Held that:- It is admitted on record that the assessee is a dealer having turnover of Rs.15 crore per annum. The total consignment was of 23.84 metric tones in 465 bags and during seizure only 33 bags weighing about 805 Kg. having the value of Rs.11,000/- alone were said to have been found in excess. In comparison to the volume of the trade carried on by the assessee and the quantity of the consignment, the goods in excess were quite negligible. The tax liability on it would have been Rs.110/- only.
It is not expected of any dealer to involve himself in penalty proceedings relating to such petty quantity of goods having tax incidence of Rs.110/-only. Therefore, there appears to be no intention of evaision of tax in transportation of such excess goods. It was not proper to levy penalty by taking the value of the entire consignment as base. The evasion of tax, if any, would have been only o33 bags of yellow peas excess bags found and, therefore, the penalty ought to have been in tune with the value of the said excess goods. In favour of assessee.
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2013 (6) TMI 139 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Hardship in following VAT Rules - filing of Forms - Authorization to re-open the assessment - amendment in U.P. Trade Tax Rules, 1948, specifically in Rules 12-A, 12-B and 12-C. - held that:- the rule is mandatory and the filing of form as per the prescribed procedure is also mandatory. - the aforesaid Rules 12-A, 12-B and 12-C cannot be read down so as to enable a dealer to file Form IIIB in respect of transaction which took place beyond two years of the assessment year in which the form was issued.
No doubt some dealer may suffer some hardship by the impugned rules, but it is well settled that equity has no place in taxing laws. It is also well settled that a statutory rule cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates harshly. - Decided against the assessee.
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2013 (6) TMI 138 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Rectification of mistake - rate of tax adopted by the respondent-authority is inconsistent with the rate specified in the First Schedule to the TNVAT Act - department grouped the entire list of commodities under the nomenclature "Petroleum Products" and accordingly assessed the turnover to tax at 30% in the assessment order which is applicable for sale of petrol and not for other petroleum products like Bitumen, Carbon Black Feed Stock (CBFS), CRMB, Hexane, Slack Wax, Wax etc - Held that:- Considering the clarifications issued by the Head of Department of the respondent in respect of the applicability of rate of tax for Bitumen, Carbon Black Feed Stock (CBFS), CRMB, Hexane, all kinds of Wax, scrap and waste, etc. and particularly, when the petitioner agreed for the assessment of CBFS-LE at 12.5% as an unclassified item under Part-C of First Schedule to the TNVAT Act, the petitioner sent a letter dated 16.4.2012 to the respondent, which was followed by various reminders, last of which is dated 1.4.2013, seeking rectification of the error under Section 84 of the TNVAT Act.
Thus as the petitioner has raised a grievance in their letter dated 1.4.2013, addressed to the Joint Commissioner (CT), Large Tax Payers Unit, Chennai, stating that there is error in the impugned order, dated 4.7.2012 passed by the respondent-Deputy Commissioner (CT)-III, Large Tax Payers Unit, Chennai, this Writ Petition is disposed of, with a direction to the respondent to consider the petitioner's grievance in their letter dated 1.4.2013, give an opportunity of hearing and pass appropriate orders on merits.
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2013 (6) TMI 121 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Suspension of licence - maintainability of appeal - Held that:- The overall circumstances under which such orders are passed and the context in which such expressions are used need to be understood in right perspective.
On the facts of the present case, not inclined to invalidate the impugned order passed by the respondent on that ground for the reasons already recorded herein before. Since the petitioner has a right of appeal against the impugned order, no reason to entertain the Writ Petition for adjudication on merits. Writ Petition dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal.
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2013 (6) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Liquor bar license - Inclusion of the name of co-licensee in a license - substitution of the name of the petitioner in place of his deceased mother in the liquor licence - Held that:- As upon the death of the mother licensee her partner being the petitioner would continue to hold the license but till the subsistence of the license the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased mother licensee have to be brought on record appears to be correct. The only condition for consideration at the time would be that if the heirs are brought on record and they become co-licensee as different from co-partners their eligibility has to be considered under the 1968 rules. In case they are eligible they shall be co-licensee with the petitioner in the place of their deceased mother and shall be governed by the 1968 Rules, in case they claim status of partner for the term of the license. Therefore, when the impugned order has actually ordered substitution/mutation of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased licensee Smt. Sumitra Devi it has not committed an error. However, a co-licensee has to be eligible and his eligibility ought to have been ascertained before passing such an order.
The name of respondent no. 2 [Rajesh Kumar Singh] has already been directed to be made in the license. The authority is therefore required to consider whether he was an eligible person to be made as co-licensee/partner under the 1968 Rules and whether he would in any manner be entitled to be considered as partner under the 1968 Rules. The eligibility has to be and should be considered by the authority concerned forthwith.
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2013 (6) TMI 111 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Case against sales tax officer (petitioner) - disciplinary proceedings for wrong decisions - allegation of undue favor of assessee - The stand of the petitioner was that 2.5 times of the tax was the maximum penalty which could be levied and thus a wrong discharge of his quasi judicial functions could not be made the subject matter of a domestic inquiry. As regards the tax levied, he stated that since the dealer told him that the end use of the wax was manufacturing candles, he levied the correct tax.
Held that:- In the instant case there is no charge of any oblique motive against the petitioner. - As we read the evidence in light of the charge and the Statement of Imputation, we concur with the view taken by the Tribunal that it is a case of gross negligence. We highlight. It is not a case where the stand of the department is that after considering the relevant material a wrong assessment was made.
Though the counsel (of the petitioner) did not expressly concede, but tacitly admitted that the petitioner gullibly accepted what fell from the mouth of the owner of the goods. - petition dismissed.
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2013 (6) TMI 110 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Tax on Steel Tubes and Pipes @ 4% under UP Act, 2008 - notification dated 29.9.2008 omitting Entry 94 meaning thereby the petitioner has to pay tax @ 12.5% - Thereafter another notification dated 15.9.2008 the Entry 94 was reinserted - Grievance of the petitioner that from 29.9.2008 to 15.1.2009, the goods is being treated as 'unclassified' and 12.5% tax is being levied on it - Held that:- It is now well recognized principle as laid down in Whirlpool Corporation Versus Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. [1998 (10) TMI 510 - SUPREME COURT] that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. Ordinarily, relief under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is not available, if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved person.
As petitioner does not dispute that there is an efficacious statutory alternative remedy by approaching the Commissioner under Section 59 of the Act, but since vires of the notification has been challenged and as such, alternative remedy is not a bar, to which respondents submits that the Appellate Authority, while exercising the appellate jurisdiction, can also look into the legality of the notification and has every power to annul it, if the same is in breach of law. He further added that the Appellate Authority performs judicial functions independently and as such, submissions so advanced by petitioner cannot be accepted.
In decided in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others [2010 (7) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT] and Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev and others v. State of Maharashtra and others [2011 (2) TMI 1277 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] that the High Court should not interfere under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person.
Thus the petitioner has been able to make out any exception to circumvent the alternative remedy, which is efficacious and speedy. Therefore writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.
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2013 (6) TMI 89 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Liquor bar license - Suspension of licence - refusal to record/substitute the name of the petitioner in place of his deceased mother in the liquor licence in absence of succession certificate - interim direction in the revision permitting the license to remain operative in the name of respondent no. 5, co-licensee during pendency of the revision - Held that:- Entitlement of the petitioner to have his name included in the license on the death of Smt. Sumitra Devi as a heir was settled by this Court vide judgment Kamlesh Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others (2013 (6) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT). The Court upholding the view taken by the revisional authority on 13.0.2010 held that on the death of mother, respondent no. 5 would continue to hold the license till it subsists and that the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased mother are to be brought on record but their eligibility as a co-licensee has to be considered under the U.P. Licensing under Surcharge Fees System Rules, 1968. It is for the consideration of the above eligibility alone the matter was remanded but as for as the right of the petitioner to be substituted in the license as a heir of Smt. Sumitra Devi was approved.
The above order of the High Court is final. It has been accepted by the parties as it was not challenged any further. Therefore, the right of the petitioner to be included/substituted as heir of Smt. Sumitra Devi in the said licence stood concluded. This leaves no scope for directing to produce the succession certificate. Only the point of eligibility of the petitioner was left open to be considered.
None of the authorities so far have held that the petitioner is not eligible under the aforesaid 1968 rules so as to be a co-licensee with respondent no. 5 there was no justification for the appellate authority to have directed for production of the succession certificate - direction to the appellate authority to forthwith consider the eligibility of the petitioner to be included as a co-licensee.
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2013 (6) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Stay - requirement of pre-deposit - whether to deposit tax with interest etc. or only the tax portion alone - Section 17D(5) of KGST Act - held that:- The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 17D categorically stipulates that the appeal will lie, if the dealer has paid the entire tax amount and the provision does not make any suggestion to the contrary, so as to have included the interest portion as well.
The 'tax amount', as per order being a sum of ₹ 2,55,111/-, which in turn has been demanded to be satisfied. The said liability has been satisfied by the petitioner and there is no case for the respondents that the tax amount has not been satisfied, but for the interest portion.
Matter restored before the tribunal to consider the same on merits, passing appropriate orders, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible. - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2013 (6) TMI 81 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Passive Infrastructure Services to mobile phone operators - Telecommunication infrastructure - whether the activity of leasing the telecommunication towers to various mobile telephone operator be deemed as a sale within the meaning of Section 2(29)(d) of the KVAT Act, 2003? - Transfer of right to use passive telecommunication infrastructure, viz. towers, DG sets, air conditioners, power management systems etc., by provider of these services to mobile operator - Held that:- It is well settled that, whether the transaction amounts to transfer of right or not cannot be determined with reference to a particular word or clause in the agreement. The agreement has to be read as a whole to determine the nature of the transfer. Thus from a close reading of all the clauses in the agreement it appears that under the terms of the contract there is no transfer of right to use the passive infrastructure conferred on the sharing operator/mobile operator.
What is permitted under the contract is, a permission in the nature of a licence to have access to the passive infrastructure and permission to keep the equipments of the mobile operator in the pre-fabricated shelter with permission to have ingress and egress only to the authorised representatives of the mobile operator. It is because an owner of a property has a bundle of rights, namely right to possess, right to use and enjoy, right to usufruct, right to consume, to destroy, to alienate or transfer, etc.. Therefore, to constitute a deemed sale under Article 366(29A)(d) having regard to the object with the 46th Constitutional Amendment was inserted, it is clear the right that is transferred under a contract should be a bundle of rights minus right to title. Therefore, in deciding whether a transaction falls within Article 366(29A)(d) so as to constitute a deemed sale, the purpose of the 46th Amendment, the mischief sought to be remedied and the object sought to be achieved by the said provision cannot be lost sight of.
Thus in the facts of this case, looking into the various terms of the agreement it is clear under the contract, the assessee has not transferred any right in the passive infrastructure to the mobile operators. The right that is conferred on the mobile operator is a permission to have access to the passive infrastructure, a permission to keep the active infrastructure in the site belonging to the assessee, a permission to mount the antennae on the tower erected by the assessee and to have the benefit of a particular temperature so as to operate the equipments belonging to the mobile operator. No sale of goods or transfer is involved in the transaction in question. Therefore, it does not fall within the mischief of Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge as well as the assessing authority cannot be sustained.
It is declared that under the contract entered into between the parties there is no sale of goods and at any rate there is no deemed sale so as to attract levy of tax under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003.
The payments made by the assessees either in terms of the order of the assessment order or in terms of any interim order passed in the Writ Petitions or in pursuance of the final order shall be refunded to the assessees within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which the said amount to be refunded would carry simple interest at 9% after the expiry of 90 days till the date of payment.
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2013 (6) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Administrative charges on occupier of a sugar factory - rate not exceeding five rupees per quintal on the molasses sold or supplied by him being enhanced to Rs.11/- per quintal - Petitioner's alleges that the State Government is already charging taxes from the petitioner under the U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964, which is the special enactment for molasses only as such, under the U.P. Trade Tax Act or VAT Act, no tax should be realised as, it amounts to double tax under two different enactments - Held that:- As decided in M/s. SAF Yeast Company Private Limited. Vs. State of U.P. and another [2008 (10) TMI 583 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] it cannot be said that the State was unaware that molasses is not taxable under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The action of the opposite parties in collecting and realising the trade tax from the petitioner on the purchase of molasses from various Sugar Mills in the State of U.P. subsequent to the dismissal of Special Leave Petition in State of U.P. and others v. D.S.M. Group of Industries & another [2003 (3) TMI 665 - SUPREME COURT] is arbitrary, illegal and unjust. Thus the petitioner is entitled for the refund.
As during the pendency of the special appeal before Hon'ble Supreme Court[2010 (3) TMI 933 - SUPREME COURT] the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, has not been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court except providing by interim measure that there will be stay on refund and in case the assessee succeeds in the appeal, it would be entitled to interest which would be imposed on the State at the final hearing of the matter.
The respondents shall not realise tax on molasses but shall keep an account of molasses purchased/sold during the pendency of appeal so that in any case, the appeal fails by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioner shall be held liable to pay tax in accordance with law.
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2013 (6) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Excise licenses for selling Indian Made Foreign Liquor in sealed bottles - whether Nagar Nigam have any power to impose a license on the petitioners when they have already obtained a license from the Excise Department under the U.P. Excise Act and direction to pay ₹ 12,000/- per annum as licence fee? - Held that:- Nagar Nigam is a body that has to perform certain obligatory duties. These duties are provided under Section 114 of the Nagar Nigam Adhiniyam. A cursory look at the section will make it abundantly clear that these duties are directly related to public welfare, health, peace and well being. Further, in order to carry out these duties there is a huge financial burden that the Nagar Nigam has to meet, this financial burden is reduced by collecting taxes and fees in lieu of these services. As Rule 5(8) enshrines that in urban areas, no new shop shall be opened without notice to the Nagar Mahapalika, Town area or notified area, as the case may be. Sending of notice is not a mere formality. Requiring of notice denotes that if any objection is made by the Nagar Nigam it will be decided by the collector. Thus the objections raised by the Nagar Nigam cannot be ignored or taken lightly.
Since for regulatory fee there is no need for any quid pro quo, though the fee cannot be excessive. The assertion of the petitioners that charging of ₹ 12,000/- per annum is highly excessive. The bye-laws have provided ₹ 6,000/- as licence fee for country-made liquor and ₹ 12,000/- for foreign liquor. Thus the fee of ₹ 6,000/- for country-made liquor and ₹ 12,000/per annum is not excessive as it works out to only about ₹ 500/- and ₹ 1,000/- per month, which is a meagre amount. Writ dismissed.
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2013 (6) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Claim for deductions in the absence of requisite declarations denied - petitioner's inability to furnish details which was lost because of failure of the computer - Revision application to grant the sufficient time to reconstruct the data dismissed - Held that:- Appellate Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore had specifically directed the Assessing Authority to look into the B-File of the cases and thereafter decide the matter on merits & if B–File is not available then appellant be directed to submit a duplicate copy of the information was not have not been complied with by the Assessing Authority in its correct perspective inasmuch as no finding has been recorded by the Assessing Authority about the availability or non-availability of B–File.
True it is the petitioner also did not submit the duplicate documents, but as it is clear from the order that it was the duty of the Assessing Authority to have directed the appellant in case of non-availability of B–File, to submit duplicate. Thereafter, before the Revisional Authority, when the petitioner had submitted an application seeking time to produce the duplicates, the prayer should have been allowed, but it was denied on the ground that no specific period is mentioned in the application within which the petitioner would submit duplicate copy of the declaration and other relevant material. This specific time limit if not asked for by the petitioner could have been fixed by the Revisional Authority itself.
Sett aside the order passed by the Revisional Authority with a liberty to the petitioner to submit duplicate declarations and supporting material within two months from the date of appearance of the petitioner before the Revisional Authority. The petitioner shall appear before the Revisional Authority on 26.06.2013.
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2013 (6) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Levy of entry tax - Manufacturer of sugar - whether not a 'dealer' within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act and not liable to entry tax - The Uttar Pradesh Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2007 - allegation on assessee selling non levy sugar from its Mawana unit to the dealers of the local area and although non levy sugar attracts entry tax @ 2% but the same has not been deducted nor deposited as per the provisions of section 12 therefore, the Company should show cause why penalty of twice the amount - Held that:- It is noticeable that though section 12 casts an obligation on the manufacturer not to hand over goods to a purchaser, unless entry tax has been paid, but it depends upon the intention of the person making the purchase. If a dealer registered under the Act within the same local area, purchases goods from the local manufacturer with intent to sell goods within the same local area, then the purchaser is neither obliged to deposit entry tax with the manufacturer nor the manufacturer is under obligation of law to refuse to sell the goods to him. All that the manufacturer is required to do is to disclose quantum of such sales to the Authorities while submitting return in Form-E. Thus it can safely be concluded that section 12 has no universal application and will not apply to sales made within the same local area where there is no intention on part of the purchaser to take goods to another local area.
As there is no infraction of law on part of the Petitioner Company in not making deductions of entry tax at source from persons/dealers for sales made within the same local area i.e. Mawana, as provisions of sec.12 will not apply to such sales. A fortiori, there is no justification for initiating penalty proceedings against the Petitioner Company. No disputed question of facts are involved and the court has proceeded to decide the controversy assuming the facts mentioned in the impugned notices to be correct. Even then, it has been found that the proceeding initiated on the basis of impugned notices are illegal and an exercise in futility and therefore impugned Notice are hereby quashed. The authorities are restrained from proceeding any further, in pursuance of such notices. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
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