|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 1569 Records
-
2015 (8) TMI 1579 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Eligibility of the 1st respondent, for 1st and 2nd time bound upgradation under EPP of BSNL - direction to place the case of the 1st respondent for consideration by the Screening Committee - HELD THAT:- The 1st respondent was acquitted on merits and that the Court, after considering all the facts, held that there is no cogent and reliable evidence and that the complainant himself was not clear. The Court has further held that averments made by the prosecution cannot be accepted and resultantly, when there was no evidence, the 1st respondent herein is entitled to be acquitted.
While that be the clear finding recorded in the judgment, acquitting the respondent, under the premise of appeal, being filed and pending, against the order of acquittal, the 1st respondent cannot be deprived of the time bound IDS scale upgradation, endlessly. Disposal of the appeal may take a long time. The 1st respondent is stated to have retired from service. There is no certainty that the State would be satisfied, even if the appeal in the High Court fails. If the State chooses to prefer a further appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Department may again contend that the appeal is pending before the Apex Court - if the arguments of the petitioner have to be accepted, then there is no finality to the judgment of acquittal. In the light of the discussion and decisions considered, the further contention of the learned counsel that Vigilance has not given a clearance, cannot be countenanced.
Though by placing reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Garikapti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [1957 (2) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT], learned counsel for the petitioner contended that appeal is a continuation of the proceedings and that Vigilance has not given a clearance to the case of the 1st respondent to the Screening Committee, this Court is not inclined to accept the same.
The Writ Petition is dismissed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1578 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Applicability of provisions of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the acquisitions under the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 - determination of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court - HELD THAT:- The question whether the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act i.e., Section 23(2) and Section 23(1)(A) that relate to the payment of solatium and interest would apply to the acquisitions under the MID Act fell for consideration before this Court in the case of Resident Deputy Collector, Pune v. G.N. Landge & Anr., [1996 (11) TMI 491 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], and this Court observed by referring to a couple of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that it had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act are adopted by reference in the MID Act in the year 1967 in view of Section 33(5) of the MID Act.
After so observing, the Court held that the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation was liable to pay interest in terms of the provisions of Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisitions under the MID Act. It is not in dispute that after the said decision, the Corporation started paying interest and solatium to the claimants in terms of the provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.
There is another set of judgments in the cases of Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Vithal Rao & Ors., [1972 (12) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT], NIT v. Vasantrao & Ors., [2002 (9) TMI 798 - SUPREME COURT] and MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION. VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. [2003 (3) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by applying the test of Article 14of the Constitution of India held that different principles of compensation cannot be formulated if land is acquired for public purposes, as discrimination cannot be made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land.
In the case of GIRNAR TRADERS & DIGAMBAR MOTIRAM JHADHAV VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. & THE COMMISSIONER & ORS. [2011 (1) TMI 1343 - SUPREME COURT], Hon'ble Supreme Court was mindful of the purpose of legislation by reference and legislation by incorporation, viz. that in a legislation by reference all amendments to the former law, though made subsequent to the enactment of the later law, would ipso facto apply to the later law and in a case of legislation by incorporation the subsequent amendments in the former law could not be treated as a part of the incorporating Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though there is a reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act by Section 126(3) of the MRTP Act by incorporation, the amending provisions of the Land Acquisition Act to the extent of acquisition of land, payment of compensation and recourse to legal remedies could be read into the acquisitions under the MRTP Act.
The object of the provisions of Section 28-A is to provide similar compensation to the land holders that are affected by the same Section 4 notification. It cannot be said that Section 28-A was enacted only with a view to help the inarticulate and poor people. Section 28-A appears to have been enacted, as reflected from the statements of objects and reasons to remove inequality and discrimination in the payment of compensation. If the object of enacting the provisions of Section 28A is as such, it cannot be said that the said provisions cannot be read in the provisions of the MID Act so as to make the same applicable to the acquisitions under the MID Act.
It is hereby held that the provisions of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act would apply to the acquisitions under the MID Act. The respondent No. 2 is directed to consider the applications of the petitioners for determination of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
The petition are allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1577 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reason to believe - share premium amount received over and above the intrinsic value of shares, is income which has escaped assessment - HELD THAT:- It is not the case in the reasons to believe that what has been received as share premium is in fact not share premium. In fact the reasons do proceed on the basis that what has been received is indeed share premium. Prima facie, we are of the view that the basis of the impugned notice stands concluded in Vodafone India Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union of India and others [2014 (10) TMI 278 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and also Central Board Circular No.2 dated 29 January 2015 that receipt of share premium being on a capital account and cannot be subjected to tax as income.
We were inclined to dispose of the petition at the stage of admission itself after hearing the parties. Additional Solicitor General expressed his inability to waive service at this stage. In view of the above, adinterim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (d).
Petition is placed for final hearing in the week commencing from 19 October 2015.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1576 - SUPREME COURT
Illegal gratification - Acceptance of Bribe or not - offence punishable Under Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 - HELD THAT:- It is apparent that the High Court has failed in its duty to come to the close quarter of the reasoning employed by the trial court while reversing the judgment of acquittal. Appreciation of evidence to hold it to be credible was required which has not been done by the High Court at all. In a cursory manner without reappraisal of the evidence and probabilities, the judgment of acquittal has been reversed. Though the High Court has the power to re-appraise the evidence in appeal against acquittal but that has not been done. It is incumbent upon the High Court while reviewing the evidence and to reverse the order of acquittal to consider all matters on record including the reasons given by the trial court in respect of the order of acquittal and should consider all the circumstances in favour of the accused which has not been done.
In the absence of the complainant, the onus lay upon the prosecution to adduce credible evidence and to prove the guilt beyond the periphery of doubt. K.M. Eregowda, PW-2, had stated that 10 to 12 other officials were sitting in the same room in which bribe was paid. Taking of bribe in the presence of 10 to 12 other officials of the Treasury Office is quite improbable. It assumes significance in the circumstances from which place the money was recovered; whether it was from the possession of the accused. PW-1 has stated that he found currency notes on the table, and the accused was standing behind the table. Whereas K.N. Eregowda, PW-2, has stated that the currency notes were kept by the accused beneath the book on the table - Since the complainant was not available for cross-examination, the view taken by the trial court could not be said to be the one which was not possible in the prevailing scenario. Even if two views are possible on the facts, one taken by the trial court did not call for interference, especially in appeal against acquittal.
In A. Subair v. State of Kerala [2009 (5) TMI 912 - SUPREME COURT], this Court has laid down that illegal gratification has to be proved like any criminal offence and when the evidence produced by the prosecution has neither quality nor credibility, it would be unsafe to rest the conviction on such evidence.
Thus, acceptance of the bribe has not been established by adducing cogent evidence. In view of the circumstances discussed above, the view taken by the trial court was a plausible one and could not have been interfered with by the High Court, that too without coming to the close quarters of the reasoning and re-appraisal of the evidence. The judgment of the High Court is not only cryptic but also no attempt has been made to look into the evidence-both oral and documentary.
There are no hesitation in setting aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court - appeal allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1575 - ITAT PUNE
Determination of suppressed production - estimation of production and the consequent profits thereon on the basis of consumption of electricity vis-à-vis production of TMT bars - addition was worked out in the hands of the assessee on the basis of US standards - CIT(A) in applying gross profit rate of 4% and consequently allowing manufacturing and administrative expenses on the unaccounted production - HELD THAT:- The issue arising in the present appeal is identical to the issue before the Tribunal in Shree Om Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. [2015 (10) TMI 2316 - ITAT PUNE] and following the same reasoning, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the addition made on account of excess production following the consumption of electricity as per US standards as not merited. However, addition of additional income in the hands of assessee on account of admission made by the assessee of clandestine removal of goods without payment of Excise duty is to be made in the hands of the assessee as per our directions in the above said appeals. Appeals of the assessee are allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1574 - SUPREME COURT
Remand in police custody - arrest after filing charge sheet - whether no remand in police custody can be given to the investigating agency in respect of the absconding accused who is arrested only after filing of the charge sheet? - Allegation of killing of nine persons and injuring large number of villagers of Village Netai of District Paschim Medinipore in West Bengal.
HELD THAT:- In STATE THROUGH C.B.I. VERSUS DAWOOD IBRAHIM KASKAR AND ORS. [1997 (5) TMI 453 - SUPREME COURT] a three judge bench of this Court has laid down the law on the issue relating to grant of police custody of a person arrested during further investigation, and it was held that So far as the accused in the first category is concerned he can be remanded to judicial custody only in view of Section 309(2), but he who comes under the second category will be governed by Section 167 so long as further investigation continues. That necessarily means that in respect of the latter the Court which had taken cognizance of the offence may exercise its power to detain him in police custody, subject to the fulfilment of the requirements and the limitation of Section 167.
The case of DINESH DALMIA VERSUS C.B.I. [2007 (9) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT] which is relied upon by the High Court, relates to granting of bail Under Section 167(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. In said case, the accused/absconder (Dinesh Dalmia) after his arrest was produced before the Magistrate, and on the request of CBI police custody was granted on 14.2.2006 till 24.2.2006, whereafter on another application further police custody was granted till 8.3.2006. Said accused was remanded to judicial custody, and the accused sought statutory bail Under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 Code of Criminal Procedure as no charge sheet was filed against him by CBI within sixty days of his arrest - the High Court is not justified on the basis of Dinesh Dalmia in upholding refusal of remand in police custody by the Magistrate, on the ground that accused stood in custody after his arrest Under Section 309 Code of Criminal Procedure.
The refusal of police remand in the present case is against the settled principle of law laid down by this Court. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the High Court, affirming the orders of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhargram, are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the High Court and the orders passed by the Magistrate, declining the police remand, are set aside.
Appeal allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1573 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Condonation of delay in filing his income-tax return late by 30 months - rejection of refund claim - Order passed u/s 119 - petitioner submitted that the delay in filing the income-tax return beyond the specified period, was on account of “genuine hardship” and during the relevant period, he was a distributor of ‘Cable Master’ for the entire State of Haryana and thus, due to his field duty his family life remained disturbed. More so, the TDS certificates were also misplaced - HELD THAT:- Genuine hardship explained by assessee is completely devoid of any merit, because, the petitioner has not been able to refute the stand of the respondent that he never remained distributor of ‘Cable Master’ after 31.03.2009, as per his own certificate dated 16.04.2008 (Annexure P-2) issued by M/s Innetwork Entertainment Limited and thus, it is evident that the petitioner had no field duty after 31.03.2009. Resultantly, the question of disturbance of his family life does not arise at all. Accordingly he cannot be permitted to allege that he could not file his income-tax return in the prescribed time on account of above reason.
So far as the second grouse raised by the petitioner regarding misplacement of his TDS certificates is concerned, the same has also no legs to stand, because he has not produced copy of any FIR or DDR in support of his above assertion. In the absence of any such corroborative evidence, his above plea is not liable to be accepted.
Thus as whether there existed genuine hardship or sufficient cause for condonation of delay or not, it depends upon evaluation of totality of facts and circumstances in a given case. As noticed above, the petitioner has miserably failed to convince that he had any “genuine hardship” in filing his income-tax return late by 30 months, therefore, no benefit whatsoever of the aforesaid authorities can be given to him.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1572 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Inaction of the Officer-in-Charge, Jorasanko Police Station (hereafter the said O.C.) in taking steps for registration of an FIR - complaints in relation to a perceived hate speech delivered by a Member of Parliament (hereafter the said member) owing allegiance to the political party in power in this State, while addressing a public rally - HELD THAT:- To err is human, but it has to be remembered that this is not a writ petition at the instance of a stranger or a busybody attempting to gain cheap popularity by espousing a pretended public cause; it is inter alia at the instance of a political party which, in the parliamentary elections last conducted in the country, was successful in emerging as the party having the maximum number of representatives in the Lok Sabha and is also part of the ruling dispensation at the Centre. Invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction of a high Court by a political party of the stature of the first petitioner, not being unmindful of the influence that it wields on the common people, pertaining to a sensitive issue in such a disorganized manner and with such a casual approach not only merits to be deprecated but the time is now ripe, when the Courts in India are faced with a deluge of litigation from aggrieved persons seeking justice and the Courts are hard pressed in listening to the grievance of each one of them, to send a strong signal that the Courts are not the place for settling political scores and that wastage of judicial time, though nominal in measure, would not be tolerated.
This bench has no hesitation to hold that not only should this writ petition be not entertained in view of the developments post the decision in Biplab Kumar Chowdhury but the petitioners ought to suffer exemplary costs so as to remind the first petitioner that howsoever strong and mighty it is in the political scene, it must respect the laws of the country while seeking to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the Court and not suppress facts or produce a tampered document to suit its end.
Petition dismissed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1571 - ITAT BANGALORE
Exemption u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) - AO noticed that the nature of the activity of the assessee, though registered as a credit co-operative society, is that of a banking institution notwithstanding the fact that receipt of and lending money is limited to its members - assessee submitted that the AO erred in treating the assessee as a commercial banking institution and in denying the deduction available to it u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in respect of income arising from the transactions only with its members - Whether assessee is a co-operative society and not a cooperative bank and therefore the provisions of section 80P(4) of the Act are not applicable? - CIT(A) allowed exemption - HELD THAT:- As the issue under consideration has already been considered and decided by this Tribunal in the case of M/s. Bangalore Commercial Transport Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. [2011 (4) TMI 1222 - ITAT BANGALORE] wherein this Tribunal held that section 80P(4) is applicable only to cooperative banks and not to credit cooperative societies. The intention of the legislature of bringing in cooperative banks into the taxation structure was mainly to bring in par with commercial banks. Since the assessee is a cooperative society and not a cooperative bank, the provisions of section 80P(4) will not have application in the assessee’s case and therefore, it is entitled to deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i)
We are of the view that the assessee society is entitled to deduction u/s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act. We uphold the order of the ld CIT(Appeals). Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1570 - SC ORDER
Acquittal of petitioner in the prosecution launched by the respondents - involvement in Gambling or not - HELD THAT:- The petitioner confirms that the trial court passed an order on 11th October, 2014 acquitting the petitioner in the prosecution launched by the respondents. The prosecution case was that the members of the petitioner were indulging in Mangatha “ulle, velliye” by betting money for profit. There is no allegation whatsoever that the members of the petitioner or other persons were playing rummy (13 cards) in the premises of the petitioner.
Under the circumstances, petitioner says that since the prosecution was not based on the petitioner or any of its members playing rummy (13 cards), he would like to withdraw the writ petition that was filed before the Madras High Court being WP No.21620 of 2011. We permit him to withdraw the writ petition.
Since the writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn, the observations made by the High Court in the writ petition or in the writ appeal filed by the State do not survive - SLP dismissed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1569 - SC ORDER
Gambling or not - online rummy - HELD THAT:- The judgment in THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE STATE OF TAMIL NADU CHENNAI AND ORS. VERSUS MAHALAKSHMI CULTURAL ASSOCIATION [2012 (3) TMI 710 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, has not at all dealt with online rummy. In fact, learned counsel for the respondents states that they have not yet taken any decision whether online rummy falls foul of the law or not.
Under these circumstances, since there is no discussion at all in regard to online rummy in the impugned judgment and order, it is not necessary to entertain these petitions, the issue being res integra - it is made clear that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras has not dealt with online rummy and, therefore, any observations made in the impugned judgment and order may not necessarily relate to online rummy.
Petition disposed off.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1568 - ITAT MUMBAI
Applicability of Tonnage Tax Provisions to Sundry credit balance written back u/s. 41(1) - CIT(A) has deleted the impugned addition/disallowances following the earlier years order of the Tribunal - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee own case [2011 (7) TMI 588 - ITAT, MUMBAI] legislature in its wisdom provided the manner of computation of income under the tonnage tax scheme. In section 115VA, it is clearly provided that sections 28 to 43C would not over ride the computation of profits and gains under section 115VA. As section 41(1) falls within sections 28 to 43C, no separate addition under that section can be made. As section 41(1) seeks to bring to tax certain specified items of receipts under the head “profits and gains of business” the scheme should not be invoked while computing profits and gains of business under Chapter-XII-G. Hence, we are of the opinion that the argument of the assessee should succeed.
As no distinguishing decision has been brought to our notice by the Revenue, respectfully following the orders of the Co-ordinate Bench, we uphold the findings of the Ld. CIT(A). Ground No. 1 to 4 of the Revenue is accordingly dismissed.
Sundry receipts from core shipping and reimbursement of managed vessels - As decided in own case [2015 (3) TMI 751 - ITAT MUMBAI] submitted that neither the A.O. nor the ld. CIT(A) has examined the relevant details placed at 157 of the paper book and urged that the matter may be sent back to the A.O. for deciding the same afresh after verifying the said detail. As the ld. D.R. has no objection in this regard, the issue relating to inclusion or exclusion of item No. 3 & 6 is restored to the file of the A.O. for deciding the same afresh.
Receipts relateable to core activity of operation of qualified ship and part of incidental activity - applicability of provisions of Chapter XII-G relating to tonnage income are applicable - HELD THAT:- We find that commission on disbursements (receipts) and Sundries have not been properly explained by supporting demonstrative evidences. We, therefore, restore these issues to the file of the AO. The assessee is directed to demonstrate its claim of receipts being directly related to the core activity/incidental activity by bringing cogent material evidences on record in respect of these 2 receipts and the AO is directed to examine the same and decide afresh whether these receipts can be clubbed under core activity/incidental activity of the assessee.
In so far as rent on furniture and Application money-right to info Act are concerned, these receipts can be treated as taxable as business income under normal provisions of the Income –tax. The assessee gets part relief in respect of impugned receipts.
Adjustment of the calculation of turnover - Since we have restored the issues relating to 2 receipts to the file of the AO to be decided afresh, the second grievance of the assessee also goes back to the file of the AO which can be decided only after deciding the taxability of receipts or otherwise qua ground No. 1 of this appeal. The AO is directed to decide this issue after deciding the taxability of receipts. Ground No. 2 is allowed for statistical purpose.
Disallowance of administrative expenses and in alternative allowance of proportionate expenditure incurred by the assessee - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case [2011 (7) TMI 588 - ITAT, MUMBAI] Assessing Officer has rightly held that the assessee would not have incurred the expenditure claimed for earning income.
We restore this issue to the file of the AO. The AO is directed to decide this issue as per the directions of the Tribunal given in earlier years and as per the decision taken by him pursuant to the directions given by the Tribunal in earlier years. Ground No. 3 is allowed for statistical purpose.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1567 - ITAT HYDERABAD
Rectification of mistake - Depreciation on goodwill - as per assessee Tribunal adjudicated on various issues facts relating to depreciation on goodwill, even though was on record and placed on record in the course of hearing, the said facts were not considered - HELD THAT:- As can be seen from the above, the ITAT has consciously not considered the ground as the facts were not on record. Just because an amount was shown in the balance sheet and claimed depreciation on the basis of entries in Books of Accounts, it cannot be considered that all facts are on record.
Doubt has been expressed ‘how the goodwill arose, what is the amount, why assessee has not claimed depreciation and other issues require examination in AY. 2007-08’. The claim of depreciation has to be examined in the year in which such asset becomes part of Block of assets. Then in later years only consequential depreciation on WDV has to be allowed.
Admittedly the Goodwill came into assessee books in AY 2007-08. Since, we were adjudicating the issues in AY. 2009-10, Bench also gave a clear finding that consequential depreciation can be allowed in AY. 2009-10. Assessee also admits that issue and the claim for AY. 2007-08 is still pending before the CIT(A). In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that there is no mistake apparent from record and accordingly, the contentions raised by assessee are rejected.
Levy of interest U/s. 234C - As contended that interest can be levied only on the returned income and not on the assessed income as was done by the AO - HELD THAT:- Even though Ground with reference to levy of interest U/s. 234C were listed in para 3 of the order in page 3, adjudication on the issue was not made subsequently. Therefore, this contention of assessee is correct. With reference to the interest U/s. 234C, AO can examine levy as per provisions of Act in the consequential order as many issues were restored to AO in the order. Assessee should be given due opportunity and the calculation of interest should also be incorporated so as to examine the correctness of the calculations.
Miscellaneous Application is partly allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1566 - ITAT DELHI
Income from factory premises - income from business OR income from other sources - assessee has submitted that the assessee could not restart its business till date after its discontinuance in the year as back as 1988 and chairman of the assessee company is 88 years of age - HELD THAT:- The assessee is a corporate assessee and the litigation and the amount involved in the litigation could not be said to be of that magnitude that the assessee could not restart its business during the past 27 years. The facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the assessee is no more interested in restarting its business and has let out its factory premises along with its machinery, furniture and fixtures for a fixed amount of rent and, therefore, the action of learned CIT(A) in directing to treat the income under the head ‘income from house property’ was justified and no interference in the same is called for. In this view of the matter, the order of learned CIT(A) is confirmed and the ground of appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1565 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - assessment order was made u/s 153C/143(3) considering the revised return - assessee filed its revised return of income without claiming exemption under section 12AA of the Act and furnishing the computation of income as income from business and profession - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the assessments were made under section 153(c) of the Act. The petitioner after filing the returns had filed the revised returns and had participated in the proceedings. The assessment proceedings under section 153C were not challenged. Ultimately orders of assessment were passed. Accepting the assessments taxes were paid. Thereafter, penalty proceedings have been initiated under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of particulars of income. We find that the Tribunal while dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee has dealt in its order, in detail every aspect, including the factual aspect of the matter. Thus, we find that no substantial question of law arises. Hence, the applications for admission of appeal are dismissed. Consequently appeals are not admitted.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1564 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
Whether on a correct interpretation of the provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with the Explanation 1 appearing thereunder, the Tribunal misdirected itself in law and adopted a wholly erroneous approach in upholding the levy of penalty in the instant case, on the alleged ground that the Appellant Foundation had concealed its income and/or furnished inaccurate particulars of its income in respect of the assessment year 2011-12 ?
Whether the Order passed by the Tribunal upholding the levy of penalty in the instant case of the Appellant Foundation in respect of the assessment year 2011-12 is wholly erroneous in law, against the facts and evidences on record, wholly baseless, unreasonable and/or otherwise perverse?
The application disposed of. Let informal Paper Books be prepared and filed in the department and also be served on the respondent/revenue within 8 weeks from date along with the gist of this order.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1563 - SUPREME COURT
Direction to Appellant-tenant to vacate and handover physical possession of the suit premises to the Respondent-landlord - Respondent-landlord alleges that Under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the lease, he sent a legal notice through speed post on 26.12.2011 - the Appellant-tenant denied having received any such notice - HELD THAT:- The words in Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure "may" and "make such order..."show that the power Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the Court. Where the Defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the Court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim.
In the suit for eviction filed by the Respondent-landlord, Appellant-tenant has admitted the relationship of tenancy and the period of lease agreement; but resisted Respondent-Plaintiffs claim by setting up a defence plea of agreement to sale and that he paid an advance of Rs. 82.50 lakhs, which of course is stoutly denied by the Respondent-landlord. The Appellant-Defendant also filed the Suit for Specific Performance, which of course is contested by the Respondent-landlord. When such issues arising between the parties ought to be decided, mere admission of relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be said to be an unequivocal admission to decree the suit Under Order XII Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure.
An opportunity has to be afforded to the Appellant to put forth his defence and contest the suit and therefore, the matter is to be remitted to the trial court for a fresh hearing, however, subject to the condition that the Appellant should pay the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 44,000/- per month within a period of eight weeks - Having regard to the said order passed by the trial court, payment of sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month would also be subject to the final outcome of the eviction suit as well as the suit for specific performance.
The matter is remitted back to the Rent Controller for consideration of the matter afresh and the appeals are allowed.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1562 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Illegal Construction or not - sanction was granted to the petitioner by the Municipal Corporation or not - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the petitioner has not been summoned by the Lokayukt Organization in regard to any criminal case. The Organization has registered an Inquiry Case No.134/2013 and conducting the inquiry against the officers of the Municipal Corporation and it is necessary to find out that whether permission for construction of a house was granted illegally or not.
The Organization has a right to conduct the inquiry against the officers or employees of the Municipal Corporation.
The Corporation has issued notice to the petitioner in regard to illegal construction. It is an independent issue. If any illegal construction has been made by the petitioner the Corporation has its right to take action in accordance with law and if the petitioner has made the construction in accordance with proper sanction, she can very well place the fact before the Corporation. Corporation is at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
Petition disposed off.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1561 - SC ORDER
Club and Association service - Charitable service - Service provided to members - HELD THAT:- The delay is condoned - application admitted.
The matter to be heard along with Civil Appeal No. 7497 of 2012.
-
2015 (8) TMI 1560 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Levy of Entry tax - procurement of 66393.87 mts of boulder from the petitioners own leased quarry and the purchase of boulder by the petitioner of 250977.78 mts from one M/s. Start Trading Pvt. Ltd. - whether boulder was not a schedule goods under the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999? - HELD THAT:- The second proceeding under Section 10 of the O.E.T. Act under Anenxure-3 to the writ application was merely based upon the audit conducted by the Auditor General which once again raised the issue as to whether boulder was a mineral or not. This turn- over and the period was covered by the earlier order dated 26.02.2011 passed under Section 10 of the O.E.T. Act under Anenxure-1 and consequently having attained finality and no challenge having been made to the same, remains final and binding on all parties.
The opposite party had no jurisdiction in this matter to initiate a fresh proceeding under Section 10 of the O.E.T Act, resulting in passing of the order dated 31.07.2012 under Annexure-3 - there are no hesitation in directing quashing of Anenxure-3 - application disposed off.
........
|
