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Showing 1 to 20 of 2053 Records
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2017 (11) TMI 2056 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD
Reversal of CENVAT Credit - Availment of suo moto credit - not providing proper opportunity to the appellant to defend themselves inasmuch as they were not allowed to cross examine the jurisdictional Superintendent - HELD THAT:- It is seen that the issue on merits does not stand discussed by the Lower Authorities, i.e. as to whether the appellants was liable to pay the Cenvat credit or not. If such debit entry was not in fact, required to be made, the facts taking suo-moto credit under intimation to the Revenue would be a correction of the accounts. There are many decisions of the Tribunal lying down that such accounting correction will not require filing of refund claims. In as much the credit entry was made under intimation to the Revenue, the same will have the effect of seeking, Revenues permission.
It is deemed fit to set aside the impugned order and remand the same to the Original Adjudicating Authority for examining the issue afresh, first on merits and then on the issue of Suo-moto taking of credit.
Appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2017 (11) TMI 2055 - SUPREME COURT
Second appeal - Illegal possession of suit shop - possession of the suit shop without any right, title and interest of any nature - whether the Trial Court and First appellate Court decided the case contrary to the pleadings and evidence and especially contrary to the recitals of EX-P. 15? - HELD THAT:- The approach of the High Court in deciding the second appeal, which resulted in allowing the Respondent's appeal, is wholly perverse and against the well settled principle of law applicable to second appeals.
In the absence of any question of law framed on any of the adverse findings recorded by the two Courts below against the Respondent, those findings attained finality. In other words, since no error was noticed in any of the findings of the two Courts below, the High Court did not frame any substantial question in relation to such findings, which became final for want of any challenge.
The High Court, however, framed one general question of law as to whether the findings of the two Courts below were contrary to the pleadings and evidence and especially to Ex-P-15 and held, by placing reliance on Ex. P-15, that the Respondent was occupying the suit shop as tenant and, therefore, the remedy of the Appellant was in filing a tenancy suit against the Respondent and to claim his eviction from the suit shop under the State tenancy laws or/and Transfer of Property Act in such suit but not in the present suit which is based on the strength of his title. The High Court, with this finding, accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the Appellant's suit as being misconceived.
The defense of the Respondent was that he had denied the Appellant's title over the suit shop and then set up a plea of adverse possession contending that he has become the owner of the suit shop by virtue of adverse possession, which according to him, was from time immemorial - It was clear that the Respondent never claimed that he was in possession of the suit shop as tenant of the Appellant's predecessor-in-title. On the other hand, the Respondent had asserted his ownership right over the suit shop on the strength of his long adverse possession.
The High Court was not right in holding that the Respondent was in occupation of the suit shop as tenant and that the remedy of the Appellant was to file a civil suit to claim eviction under the Rent Laws. This finding is contrary to the pleadings and evidence. It is also otherwise not legally sustainable for want of any evidence adduced by the Respondent in support thereof.
The Trial Court and First Appellate Court were justified in holding the Appellant to be the owner of the suit shop, having purchased the same vide registered sale deed dated 20.09.1997 from its previous owner. It was also rightly held that the Respondent was in possession of the suit shop as an encroacher and failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit shop - Appeal allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2054 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment u/s 153A - Validity of Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(b) - The following questions of law arise for consideration:-
(i) Did the ITAT fell into error in setting aside the sums brought to tax by the AO under Section 153A in the circumstances of the case?
(ii) Was the Tribunal correct in holding that penalty could not have been levied under Section 271(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act in the circumstances of the case?
List on 28.02.2018 for hearing
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2017 (11) TMI 2053 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Enhancement of compensation - seeking refund of the decretal amount by the private respondents - appellant submits that the decretal amount has been deposited by respondent No. 2 before the Reference Court and the same has been released to the private respondents - HELD THAT:- The learned Reference Court shall not permit the private respondents to lead additional evidence till the undertaking and the security in terms of this order is furnished by the private respondents before the Reference Court. In the event of the failure of the private respondents to file an undertaking and the security within six months, the appellant would be at liberty to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of the decretal amount from the private respondents in accordance with law. The parties shall appear before the Reference Court on 14th December, 2017. Learned counsels for the parties submit that they have noted down the next date of hearing and no fresh notice for their appearance would be required for appearance before the Reference Court.
Application disposed off.
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2017 (11) TMI 2052 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Release of sanctioned capital subsidy/Investment Incentive - Petitioner(s) has submitted that the petitioner(s) in all writ petitions are closed units but they are eligible for grant of subsidy - HELD THAT:- The capital subsidy/Investment Incentive of Rs.50 lacs was sanctioned to the petitioner as far as back on 31.3.1997 on 18.3.1999. Since then the petitioner is waiting for the release of the capital subsidy/Investment Incentive.
During this interregnum due to financial sickness, the petitioner Company was closed in the year 2006 but the subsidy is still not released and the only reason assigned is that since there are so many similar closed units, which are claiming subsidy, therefore the Guidelines are in pipelines on the basis of which the seniority will be determined and amount would be released.
This argument is not at all impressive because earlier the petitioner, who was at Seniority No.640 has now reduced to Sr.No.230 and therefore the petitioner(s) are entitled and eligible to get the subsidy. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances the present petitions are allowed and a direction is issued to the respondents to release/grant the capital subsidy/Investment Incentive, as claimed by the petitioner(s), within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
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2017 (11) TMI 2051 - ITAT MUMBAI
Reopening of assessment - Estimation of income - bogus purchases - CIT(A) confirmed addition being 17.5% of the total bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- We find that the reopening has been done on the basis of information from the Sales Tax Department, GOM that the assessee has availed hawala entries for purchase of goods from the hawala operators - In our opinion, the said information was not available before the AO at the time of framing of the assessment and therefore was constituted valid reason for reopening the assessment u/s 148 of the Act. We are in agreement with the conclusion drawn by the CIT(A) on the issue of reopening of the assessment and accordingly the cross objection raised against re-opening is dismissed.
Addition at the rate of 17.5% of bogus purchases - We find that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of purchases by producing the relevant documentary and circumstances evidences before the lower authorities as desired by them whereas the consumption of the materials is not disputed. Therefore, reasonable addition should be made to cover the various types of savings which the assessee might have made by purchasing the goods from the gray market. Accordingly, we feel reasonable if the addition is sustained to the tune of 5% of the amount of bogus purchases. Accordingly, the CO of the assessee is partly allowed and appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
As the addition made by the ld. CIT(A) at the rate of 17.5% of the bogus purchase is on higher side, it should be made on reasonable account which brings the tax and savings which the assessee might have made. Resultantly, the appeal of the revenue stands dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2050 - ITAT MUMBAI
Rectification u/s 154 - period of limitation - validity of action of the CIT(A) in holding that order passed by the AO u/s. 154 was time barred - HELD THAT:- While framing the assessment order, AO has not computed income of assessee u/s. 115JB. This omission was identified at a subsequent date accordingly AO has passed the order to rectify the same. The impugned order so passed by the AO was dated 21/01/2014, which is much beyond the limitation period to be reckoned from the end of the Financial Year 2007-08.
Even though AO has mentioned in his order that the order is passed to give the effect to the order of CIT(A)’s order. However, in fact the rectification has been made in respect of mistake committed by him in the order passed u/s. 143(3) dated 28/15/2007. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the order of CIT(A) for holding that the order passed u/s. 154 was time barred under the provisions of Section 154(7) of the Act.
The issue under consideration is also squarely covered by the decision Sakseria Cotton Mills Limited [1979 (2) TMI 17 - BOMBAY High Court] wherein it was held that rectification of mistake- period of limitation u/s. 154(7) will apply from the date of original order of the ITO and not from the date of ITO’s order giving effect to the AAC’s order in respect of points not the subject matter of the order u/s. 154. No infirmity in the order of CIT(A).
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2017 (11) TMI 2049 - ITAT RAJKOT
Correct head on income - income from share transactions - under the head short term capital gain or business income - dual portfolio - HELD THAT:- It emerges out from the record that the assessee maintained two separate accounts i.e. one for investment, and other for trading in shares. This fact has not been disputed by the CIT(A). In the assessment year 2006-07, assessment was framed u/s 143(3).
AO has accepted the status of the assessee as an investor. Similarly, in the AY 2007-08 and 2009-10, the Revenue did not disturb the status declared by the assessee and accepted returns u/s 143(1) of the Act. In the earlier year and in subsequent year, the status of the assessee as investor was not disputed. The assessee has not used borrowed funds. All these shares were purchased by the assessee were on delivery basis. He has transacted in 16 scrips, though the transactions are large in number, but mere volume of transactions is not a criteria to doubt the treatment given by an assessee about its investment in the books.
Therefore, considering we allow the appeal of the assessee, and direct the AO to treat the investment made by the assessee as an investor and the assess the income resulted to the assessee on sale of such investment as short term capital gain. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2048 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability of independent non-executive nominee director - petitioner resigned from the company in the year 2015 - Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - HELD THAT:- This case arise from the Criminal Complaint Case No.153/1/16 wherein petitioner has been impleaded on the allegations that he was a Director of the concerned company and have been participating in day-today affairs of the company. He has taken a plea that he was a nominee independent Director and was not responsible.
Petition disposed off.
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2017 (11) TMI 2047 - ITAT PUNE
Validity of order passed u/s 271E by the Addl.CIT - as per AO entries in the inventory seized during the course of Search and seized proceedings did not pertain to Current Account held by the assessee but that of repaid in cash which is a violation of Section 269T and liable for penalty u/s. 271E - CIT(A) deleted penalty - whether the assessee in an appeal filed by the Revenue against the issue which has been decided in favour of assessee, can argue against the jurisdictional ground which was decided by the CIT(A), against the assessee? - HELD THAT:- We find that the Rule permits the assessee to support the order of CIT(A) on any grounds, that have been decided against him even though he had not appealed against it. Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules provides that the assessee without having filed any cross appeal or Cross Objections can support the impugned order on any grounds decided against him.
As relying on Jindal Polyster Ltd case [2017 (6) TMI 87 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] we find merit in the plea of assessee and proceed to decide the issue raised by the assessee by way of his arguments under Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules.
Period of limitation for initiating penalty proceedings - Initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271E wherein penalty proceedings were initiated by the Addl.CIT after completion of assessment order - The issue raised in the present appeal is squarely covered by the decision of Hissaria Bros [2001 (8) TMI 295 - ITAT JODHPUR]
Even the CBDT Circular issued on 26.04.2016 has clarified the position that regarding any violation of provisions of sections 269SS and 269T of the Act, as the case may be, the Assessing Officers below the rank of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax were advised to make a reference to the Range Head, in the course of assessment proceedings. It was also clarified that the Range Head will issue penalty notice and shall dispose / complete the proceedings within limitation prescribed under section 275(1)(c) of the Act. The said Circular issued by the CBDT is advisory and has only clarified the position and cannot be said to be prospective in application.
Before parting, we may also refer to certain factual aspects. The assessment under section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act was completed on 30.11.2007. The notice for initiation of penalty proceedings was issued on 11.03.2010 and order levying penalty was passed on 24.09.2010. There is inordinate delay in initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271E of the Act, which otherwise also cannot be condoned - Thus initiation of penalty proceedings is beyond the limitation provided in the Act and the penalty order on this account merits to be dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2046 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
LTCG - deduction claim u/s.54EC - claim denied on the ground that the relevant capital gains had been reinvested to the tune of Rs.50lacs each in a time span of two separate assessment years, in proceedings u/s. 143(3) - assessee had disclosed long term capital gains to be arising from surrender of tenancy right as well as sale of shares in a Private Limited Company, received through gift - AO denied impugned deduction provision could not be spread over to the maximum amount limit of Rs.50 lacs each spread over in two assessment years - whether crucial expression “any financial year” meant only one financial year of reinvestment and not more than that? - HELD THAT:- It has come on record that the CIT(A) has followed the above co-ordinate bench order in concluding that assessee’s reinvestment of capital gains to the tune of Rs.50 lacs each spread over in two financial years falling within 6 months is very much allowable as deduction claim u/s.54 EC of the Act.
Hon’ble Madras high court’s judgment in CIT vs. C. Jaichander [2014 (11) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] also adopts a similar reasoning that there is no bar as propagated at Revenue’s behest in allowing such a deduction claim. Their lordships further take into account amendment in Section 54EC (1) by insertion of second proviso w.e.f. 01.04.2015 alongwith relevant explanatory memorandum to conclude that the amendment effect restricting the deduction amount to Rs.50 lacs only in any case would apply w.e.f. 01.04.2015 in relation to assessment year 2015-16. We reiterate that we are in assessment year 2011-12 only. The Revenue fails to dispute all these developments on judicial side. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the learned CIT(A)’s order accepting assessee’s deduction claim u/s.54EC of the Act. Revenue’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2045 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking remedial intervention - application for premature release from the jail - Scope of expression "proved", "disproved" and "not proved" - allegation of murder - HELD THAT:- The quintessence of the enunciation is that the expression "proved", "disproved" and "not proved", lays down the standard of proof, namely, about the existence or non-existence of the circumstances from the point of view of a prudent man, so much so that while adopting the said requirement, as an appropriate concrete standard to measure "proof", full effect has to be given to the circumstances or conditions of probability or improbability. It has been expounded that it is this degree of certainty, existence of which should be arrived at from the attendant circumstances, before a fact can be said to be proved.
It is on the touchstone of this legal exposition that the evidence in the case in hand, has to be appreciated. Admittedly, PW1 is the solitary eye witness to the incident. He is related both to the deceased and the Accused-Appellant. Whereas the deceased is his uncle, the Appellant is his cousin brother. He claims to have accompanied the Appellant from the video show till the place of occurrence. At the relevant time, he was admittedly intoxicated.
The testimony of PW1 with regard to the illicit relationship between the Accused persons, his revelation to the mother of the deceased that he and the co-accused were seen in a compromising position in their house with the door open and the reprimand of the mother (PW3) for the "secret talks" between them (Accused persons) lack in persuasion to conclude that the prosecution had been able to prove such relationship and therefore, the motive for the murder by them - Dehors testimony of PW1, and the motive as alleged by the prosecution, there is no other tangible and clinching material on record in support of the charge against the Appellant and the co-accused. The inference of motive by the High Court drawn from the evidence of PW1 and PW3, in the overall perspective as discussed hereinabove, is apparently flawed.
The unhesitant opinion is that the evidence of PW1, as a witness of incident of murder, as projected by him is wholly unacceptable being fraught with improbabilities, doubts and oddities inconceivable with normal human conduct or behaviour and, thus cannot be acted upon as the basis of conviction - Appellant and the co-accused are thus entitled to the benefit of doubt in the singular facts and circumstances of the case.
The Appellant is acquitted and is ordered to be set at liberty if not required in connection with any other case - Appeal allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2044 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Seeking withdrawal of the LOC notice issued against the petitioner - HELD THAT:- In view of the fact that the petitioner has been secured pursuant to the issuance of the LOC, it would amount to the LOC having abated. Consequently, the petitioner would be free to travel in and out of the country and the respondents shall not prevent him from moving in and out of the country by referring to the earlier LOC DATED 19.07.2016.
The Writ Petition is allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2043 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Company mobilized resources by issuing RPS to the public - Number of investors exceeded for RPS [Redeemable Preference Shares] issue - accountability of a Director to the actions of the Company - demanding refund the money collected by the Company through the issuance 'RPS' with interest at the rate of 15% from the date when the repayment became due till the date of actual payment - liability of Directors not in-charge of day-to-day management of a Company - HELD THAT:- The appellant was a Director of the Company during the entire period 01.04.2009 to 11.08.2011 during which the RPS was issued and monies collected from the investors. As such he was present during the entire period and therefore no benefit of apportioning the time period is available to him as in the case of Mr. Nandi.
The accountability of a Director to the actions of the Company is now well settled in law as particularly set out in the judgment passed in the matter of N. Narayanan vs Adjudicating Officer, Securities and Exchange Board of India [2013 (4) TMI 652 - SUPREME COURT]
Reliance placed by Counsel for the appellant in K.K. Ahuja [2009 (7) TMI 758 - SUPREME COURT] and Rahul H. Shah [2004 (9) TMI 702 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI] are not relevant as those decisions are in the context of the role of the Director as an officer in default under the Negotiable Instruments Act.
In the present context the role of the Director is to be seen as under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, SEBI Act, 1992 and SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000 / SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009. When the appellant was a Director of the Company, the Company mobilized resources by issuing RPS to the public, which is not in dispute. As such, the impugned order holding the appellant jointly and severally liable for the action of the Company cannot be faulted.
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2017 (11) TMI 2042 - ITAT JAIPUR
Disallowance u/s 40A - payment of packing expenses and advertising expenses - as submitted assessee has made payment to two companies for manufacture of purses and bags and manufacturing activities are done on a very small basis from his own house and the activities are in the nature of cottage industries - HELD THAT:- As correctly decided by CIT(A) expenditures of more than ₹ 20,000/- have been incurred in cash and the same was disallowed by the AO under section 40A(3). In the present proceedings, it was stated that parties to whom payment made are manufacturer of purses and bags on small basis and are in the nature of cottage industries. However, no evidence to that effect was produced by the Authorized Representative, further it was also not stated as to how they are covered under the exception to the provisions and hence, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer is confirmed. The ground of appeal is dismissed.
Unexplained cash - HELD THAT:- As correctly decided by CIT(A) Authorized Representative claimed that the cash bill of sale of articles dated 20.01.2012 had been produced but since the sale was in cash the address was not available with the assessee and neither any confirmation was produced nor the party could be produced for the verification. It is seen that the books of accounts are audited and hence the mistake would have been detected. Secondly, no advance has been found recorded in the name of Jai Singh Kumawat on 13.03.2012, further no evidence in the form of confirmation or producing the party was undertaken and in fact the authorized Representative submitted that his address was also not available. In view of the above facts, the explanation of the appellant cannot be accepted and the addition made is confirmed.
Disallowance of various expenses - expenses are not properly vouched, some of payment in cash, personal use etc. - HELD THAT:- Assessee placed reliance on the Coordinate Bench decision [2016 (4) TMI 658 - ITAT JAIPUR] in the case of Shri Anil Kumar Agarwal vs. ITO wherein similar additions on identical facts have been deleted. In the present case the AO has not rejected the books of accounts of the assessee. The additions made merely on adhoc basis is not sustainable. We, therefore, delete the addition.
Valuation of surrendered stock during survey - income from other sources or income from business - HELD THAT:- At the time of hearing, Assessee drew our attention to various details of gold and diamonds ornaments and valuation thereof are mentioned. After considering these details, we find that the details mentioned in the annexure require verification whether the stock surrendered was restricted to gold or diamond as claimed by the assessee. We, therefore, set aside the order of the ld. CIT (A) and restore the file to the AO for decision afresh after making verification of the stocks surrendered. The grounds of the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.
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2017 (11) TMI 2041 - ITAT KOLKATA
Deduction u/s 80IA - profit from infrastructure development in respect of 18 construction projects - AO observed that assessee has only carried out the entire projects only in the capacity of works contractor and hence as per the Explanation to Section 80IA by the Finance Act 2007 with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000 , it is not entitled for deduction u/s 80IA(4) - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case for the Asst Year 2011-12 segregation of projects carried out by the assessee in Table A and Table B as was done in the earlier years , as rightly pointed out by the ld DR before us, were neither done by the ld AO nor by the assessee during the year under appeal. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the assessee had indeed carried out some projects which were carried forward from earlier years. Hence in the interest of justice and fair play, we deem it fit and appropriate to remand this issue to the file of the ld AO to find out the list of projects that are eligible for deduction u/s 80IA of the Act in the light of the decisions of this tribunal for the earlier years and decide the same afresh in accordance with law.
Accrual of income - retention money as income of the year - assessee is following mercantile system of accounting - assessee’s contention is that in respect of retention money, the income arise to the assessee only when the said amount of retention money is received by the assessee and not at the time of raising of the bills - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee own case for Asst Year 2011-12 retention money in works contract with Government is taxable only on receipt basis as held by the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) [1988 (12) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT]
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2017 (11) TMI 2040 - ITAT JAIPUR
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - additions u/s 2(22)(e) towards deemed dividend, unexplained jewellery, interest disallowance u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- As in the quantum proceedings, the Coordinate Bench has deleted the additions towards unexplained jewellery and interest income, we find the same to be correct as apparent from the following findings of the Coordinate Bench in [2017 (9) TMI 473 - ITAT JAIPUR].
Thus where the additions which were the subject matter for levy of penalty has been deleted, there is no basis for levy of penalty and hence, the same is hereby deleted.
Penalty on deemed dividend - Following the consistent position taken by the Coordinate Benches in assessee’s group cases [2016 (4) TMI 71 - ITAT JAIPUR] and [2016 (6) TMI 1475 - ITAT JAIPUR] where the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) has been deleted business transaction is not covered under section 2(22)(e) the penalty levied in the instant case is hereby deleted as there are no changes in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2017 (11) TMI 2039 - SUPREME COURT
Selection of District & Sessions Judges in the Kerala Higher Judicial Service in the year 2015 - minimum cut-of marks for the interview introduced - main contention is that the Rules of the game could not have been changed after the game is played and the result of the game is known to the selectors - HELD THAT:- The decision in K MANJUSREE VERSUS STATE OF AP & ANR. [2008 (2) TMI 820 - SUPREME COURT], squarely applies to the facts of this case. In Manjusree, 75 marks were allotted for the written examination and 25 marks for the interview. The aggregate governed the merit. However, the written examination was conducted for 100 marks. When the Full Court noticed this, a sub-committee was appointed to make the arithmetical correction to scale down the marks in the written examination to 75 instead of 100. The sub-committee did two things - (1) it made the arithmetical correction (2) it introduced the same cut-of percentage for the interview as in the written examination and thus revised the merit list, which was approved by the Full Court. In the process, a few candidates were removed from the original merit list including Manjusree - A Bench of three Judges of this Court held that "introduction of the requirement of the minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process (consisting of written examination and interview) was completed, would amount to changing the Rules of the game after the game was played which is clearly impermissible". The Bench specifically noted that the Resolution of the Full Court to not specifically stipulate minimum marks for viva-voce was still in force. Yet, when the sub-committee introduced the change, the same was approved by the Full Court.
In Tej Prakash Pathak and Ors. v. Rajasthan High Court and Ors. [2013 (3) TMI 768 - SUPREME COURT] has, however, specifically doubted the correctness of Manjusree (supra) on the point whether "changing the Rules of the game after the game was played is clearly impermissible" and has made a Reference to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.
It is only appropriate to refer this matter also to the larger bench to be heard along with Tej Prakash.
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2017 (11) TMI 2038 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT
Deduction u/s 10A - whether required to be allowed before adjusting the brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation? - HELD THAT:- It is clear from the ratio laid down in CIT VS. YOKOGAWA INDIA LIMITED [2016 (12) TMI 881 - SUPREME COURT] that the unit that is contemplated for grant of benefit of deduction is the eligible undertaking (unit), that the stage of deduction of the profits and gains of the business of an eligible undertaking has to be made independently, that at that stage, the aggregate of the incomes under other heads and the provisions for set off and carry forward under Sections 70, 72 and 74 of the Act, would be premature for application of Section 10A.
It can be further culled out from the said judgment that, deductions under Section 10A of the Act would be prior to the commencement of the exercise to be undertaken under Chapter VI of the Act, for arriving at the total income of the assessee from the gross total income. The Supreme Court also termed the use of words, “total income of the assessee” under Section 10A as somewhat discordant and held that the said expression has to be construed as a total income of the undertaking. Decided in favour of assessee.
Income u/s 10A is an exemption or deduction - The Supreme Court in CIT VS. YOKOGAWA INDIA LIMITED [2016 (12) TMI 881 - SUPREME COURT] held that Section 10A as amended, is a provision for deduction. This question is answered accordingly.
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2017 (11) TMI 2037 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of Supplementary Report filed Under Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure. dated 26.04.2007 by the Investigating Officer - It is stated in the Report itself that the charges are added at the instance of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes - HELD THAT:- No detailed discussion is warranted on the well-settled proposition that no external agency can dictate the course of investigation in a criminal case. It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the police.
The Court also cannot supervise the investigation. However, in exceptional situations, Superior Courts may monitor an investigation. But that is not the same as supervision - No doubt, superior officers of police may exercise their powers Under Section 36 Code of Criminal Procedure in supervising the investigation. In the instant case, it appears that the direction was issued on the basis of a complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 before the Commission. It is not clear as to whether the Commission had conducted any inquiry before issuing direction to the Police. At any rate, it is submitted that the Appellants have not been involved in any such inquiry. Equally, it is not clear whether the second Respondent had made out a case for the intervention of the Commission under the Rules of Procedure of National Commission for Scheduled Castes.
From a perusal of contents of the NCR bearing No. 96/04 dated 25.07.2004, it is clear that the ingredients Under Section 3(1)(x) have not been made out. There was not even a whisper of allegation of harassment based on caste. That is why the first chargesheet was only Under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. It is over two years later that the Respondent No. 2 appears to have complained to the Commission. Under Rule 7.5.2(vi), the Commission is empowered to conduct an inquiry to "whether proper charge sheet has been filed mentioning the relevant Sections of Indian Penal Code together with the PCR Act, 1955 and SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 in Court". This is not a power to dictate the course of the investigation. The Commission is competent to point out any lapses or laches in the investigation. The Commission could only have brought to notice of the Police the need for a proper or further investigation and it was for the Police to take a call.
The High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to secure the ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a chargesheet in part. A person maybe Accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case - A chargesheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers Under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse. There is no requirement that the chargesheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.
This appeal is allowed. The Supplementary Report filed by the Police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.
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