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Showing 1 to 20 of 1460 Records
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2017 (7) TMI 1465 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM
Addition u/s 40A - payments for purchase of the land in cash to related company of the assessee - HELD THAT:- The intention of the legislature for inserting section 40A(3) of the Act is to pluck the loophole of tax evasion by making the payments in cash. Once it is established that the payment is genuine and the recipient has admitted the payment in their income return, the purpose of 40A(3) of the Act is complied with. Therefore, the courts have held in such circumstances the rigor of the provisions needs to be interpreted liberally when the payment is genuine and the payee is identifiable. In this case, there is no doubt regarding the payee and payer and the CIT(A) also has given a finding that the payee in the case of Siri Constructions has admitted the amount in their returns.
As in the case of Sri Lakshmi Satyanarayana Oil Mill [2014 (8) TMI 486 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT] held that the provision must be interpreted liberally and the assessees cannot be subjected to undue rigor. Therefore, in the instant case, the payments are said to be genuine and the payees are identifiable and the recipients have admitted the receipts in the income. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and the same is upheld and the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
Correct head of income - Gain on sale of land - capital gain or business income - intention behind the transaction - HELD THAT:- It is evident that the assessee has meticulously planned the entire transaction as business transaction. It is evident from the fact that before registration of the land with the help of GPA and she had entered into an agreement for development of the land with M/s. Siri Constructions and immediately after the development she has sold the land to Reliance Industries. The entire transaction appears to be with an intention to do the business but not for the investment. Therefore, the CIT(A) rightly held the transaction as the venture in the nature of trade and not capital gains. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the Ld. CIT(A), therefore order of the CIT(A) is upheld.
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2017 (7) TMI 1464 - CESTAT DELHI
Rectification of mistake - mistake apparent on record or not - HELD THAT:- The Final Order M/S. KAJARIA CERAMICS LTD. & ORS. VERSUS C.C.E. JAIPUR-I [2016 (11) TMI 1752 - CESTAT DELHI] passed by the Tribunal is modified and in the title of the order, ‘Arising out of Order-in-Appeal No. 433 (DKV)ST/JPRI/2010’, the words ‘434’ is also added.
ROM application allowed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1463 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Addition on account of transaction on sale and purchase of shares - capital gain or business income - aspect pertaining to the volume of transactions, the frequency of transactions and the continuity and regularity of the purchase and sale of the shares - whether the said shares were bought and sold as a part of trading activity or as a part of investments? - addition on account of legal expenses - HELD THAT:- The tribunal while examining the issue has referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vinay Mittal [2012 (5) TMI 89 - DELHI HIGH COURT] referring to case of Rewashanker A. Kothari [2006 (1) TMI 80 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] held that one of the most important tests outlined in that decision was as to whether the transactions in the shares were of a large volume and were frequent and whether there was continuity and regularity in such transactions of purchase and sale. It was noted that if there was repetition and continuity coupled with the magnitude of the transactions bearing a reasonable proportion to the holding then it would be an important circumstance in considering such activity to be in the nature of trade and business.
All the circumstances outlined in the decision of the Delhi High Court and that of the Gujarat High Court as also the guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes referred to in the impugned order needed to be considered and then a view was required to be taken on the totality of circumstances.
Unfortunately, that has not been done. It is for this reason that we feel that the present appeal ought to be disposed of by setting aside the impugned order and by remitting the matter to the tribunal for a fresh consideration in the manner indicated above. It is ordered accordingly. Since we are in any event remitting the matter with regard to the nature of the transaction concerning the sale and purchase of shares, we also set-aside the finding with regard to legal expenses and that also ought to be considered afresh. Parties shall be entitled to raise all contentions available to them in law.
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2017 (7) TMI 1462 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Transfer Pricing Adjustment - ALP determination - - international transaction of receipt of intra-group services with its Associated Enterprises ("AEs") - services received by the assessee should be considered to be arm’s length under TNMM - HELD THAT:- ITAT in the impugned order [2016 (9) TMI 1334 - ITAT DELHI] followed its earlier order in the Assessee’s own case for AY 2007 – 2008 and 2008 – 2009 [2015 (12) TMI 1620 - ITAT DELHI]. The Revenue’s appeal against that order of the ITAT was dismissed by this Court vide order [2016 (9) TMI 244 - DELHI HIGH COURT] - no substantial question of law arises for consideration.
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2017 (7) TMI 1461 - SUPREME COURT
Meaning to be given to the definition of "light motor vehicle" as defined in Section 2(21) of the MV Act - transport vehicles are excluded from it or not - 'transport vehicle' and 'omnibus' the "gross vehicle weight" of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a "light motor vehicle" and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, "unladen weight" of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a licence to drive the class of "light motor vehicle" as provided in Section 10(2)(d) or not - effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act No. 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 - effect of Amendment of Form 4 as to the operation of the provisions contained in Section 10 as amended in the year 1994 - procedure to obtain the driving licence for transport vehicle of the class of "Light Motor Vehicle" has been changed.
HELD THAT:- The questions are answered as below:
(i) 'Light motor vehicle' as defined in Section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Section 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act No. 54/1994.
(ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a road roller, 'unladen weight' of which does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class of "light motor vehicle" as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the "unladen weight" of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued Under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form.
(iii) The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act No. 54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting Clauses (e) to (h) of Section 10(2) which contained "medium goods vehicle" in Section 10(2)(e), medium passenger motor vehicle in Section 10(2)(f), heavy goods vehicle in Section 10(2)(g) and "heavy passenger motor vehicle" in Section 10(2)(h) with expression 'transport vehicle' as substituted in Section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid substituted classes only. It does not exclude transport vehicle, from the purview of Section 10(2)(d) and Section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle.
(iv) The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of "transport vehicle" is related only to the categories which were substituted in the year 1994 and the procedure to obtain driving licence for transport vehicle of class of "light motor vehicle" continues to be the same as it was and has not been changed and there is no requirement to obtain separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle, he can drive transport vehicle of such class without any endorsement to that effect.
Let matters be placed for hearing on merits before the appropriate Bench.
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2017 (7) TMI 1460 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional power to review its judgment as granted by Article 137 of the Constitution - Rule 1 of Order 40 - Error apparent on the face of record or not - HELD THAT:- Under Order 40 Rule 1 no application for review can be entertained except on the ground of an error apparent on the fact of the record. Although, the power of review given to this Court in wider as has been held by the Constitution Bench in P.N. Eshwara [1980 (2) TMI 258 - SUPREME COURT], Justice Krishna Iyer has given an illustration where the Court will not hesitate in exercising its power to review in a case where deceased himself walks in the Court on whose murder Accused were convicted. Justice Krishna Iyer rightly observed that Court is not powerless to do justice in such case. Thus, although the power of review granted to this Court is wider but normally and ordinarily the review in a criminal case has to be on the grounds as enumerated in Rule 1 of Order 40.
What is "an error apparent on the face of the record" has also been a subject matter of consideration by this Court in a large number of cases. What are the grounds on which this Court shall exercise its jurisdiction and what is the error apparent on the face of the record came to be considered by this Court in KAMLESH VERMA VERSUS MAYAWATI & ORS. [2013 (8) TMI 912 - SUPREME COURT]. This Court held that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning is not an error apparent on the face of the record.
By review application an applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue the appeal on the grounds which were urged at the time of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even if the applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible on the conviction or sentence of the Accused that is not a sufficient ground for review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision due to judicial fallibility. There has to be error apparent on the face of the record leading miscarriage of justice to exercise the review jurisdiction Under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to be a material error manifest on the face of the record with results in the miscarriage of the justice.
The submissions raised in the review petitions do not raise any ground for review of judgment of this Court dated 25.01.2010 - the review applications are rejected.
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2017 (7) TMI 1459 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Rule of interpretation - principle of harmonious construction - Locus standi - whether individual parents have locus to approach the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee (DFRC) under the provisions of the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act? - HELD THAT:- Sub-Section 1 of Section 10 provide that powers and functions of DFRC shall be to adjudicate the dispute between the school management and the PTA regarding fee to be charged by the school management from the students. However, a particular sections of statute cannot be read in isolation. While considering the provisions of law, the Court will have to take into consideration various provisions of the statute and apply the principle of harmonious construction.
The other principal that require consideration is the first principal of interpretation. That is of plain and literal construction. Only when the effect cannot be given to the legislative intent, a recourse to the other principals of statutory interpretation would be permissible. It is more than well settled that a right to appeal is a creature of a statute. There cannot be an inherent right to an appeal, until the statute specifically provides for the same. If the legislature in its wisdom has not provided for right to appeal by individual parents before DFRC, if we arrive at the interpretation urged by Respondent Parents by resorting to the pragmatic principle of interpretation, we are of the view that we will be totally encroaching upon the legislative functions of the legislature. The learned counsel for the Respondents may be justified in contending that the legislative enactment which provides a right to appeal only to the management and not to the parents is discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 - while entertaining the Petition of the Petitioners raising basic issue as to the tenability of the appeal at the instance of individual parents, it will not be permissible to consider challenge of the Respondents - the Respondent No. 1 has erred in entertaining the grievance on behalf of the individual parents.
The dispute with regard to constitution of PTA or the Executive Committee is beyond the purview of the said enactment. If any of the parties are aggrieved with the constitution of PTA, the same being an association, such party would either have to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, if the association is not registered or if it is registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, then the competent authority under the said Act. We find that the direction issued in that regard by the Respondent No. 1, is also without jurisdiction.
There are no hesitation in accepting the arguments of the Respondents - Parents that the said enactment has been enacted with the avowed object of prohibiting exploitation of the parents. However, though it is held that the contention of the Respondents Parents is correct in that regard. In the exercise of powers under Article 226, the provisions of the statute cannot be surpassed.
Petition allowed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1458 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Refund claim and CENVAT Credit - denial on the ground that the services used in unregistered premises - HELD THAT:- This Court held that the aforesaid question has come up for consideration in Commissioner, Service Tax Commissionerate Vs. M/s Atrenta India Private, [2017 (4) TMI 563 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT], wherein this Court was of the view that the refund could not be denied to the assessee merely on the basis of non-registration of the premises - It was held that even otherwise, Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 does not contain a condition precedent that input services have to be received at a registered premises of the output service provider only.
The aforesaid question was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department - Appeal of Revenue dismissed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1457 - CESTAT CHENNAI
Levy of service tax - business auxiliary service or not - distribution for recharge vouchers, electronic coupons and starter packs of M/s. VCL - Department was of the opinion that the income earned on resale of recharge vouchers and electronic coupons, starter packs is a discount or commission provided by M/s. VCL - HELD THAT:- The issue whether the sale and purchase of SIM cards, recharge coupons, starter packs would amount to business auxiliary service has been settled by the judgment in the case of THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE VERSUS M/S. BHARAT CELL [2015 (10) TMI 1111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] wherein the ratio of the decision laid down in GR. MOVERS AND MARTEND FOOD AND DEHYDRATES PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, LUCKNOW [2013 (6) TMI 339 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] was referred. The other decisions of the honourable High Courts of Allahabad as well as Kerala have taken similar view. The demand also includes the amount reflected in the credit notes issued by M/s. VCL to appellant.
The demand is also made on the margin earned by the appellant for outright purchase and sale of pepsico products. It is not disputed that the appellants in these appeals have discharged VAT on the products sold by them. Therefore, the Department cannot demand service tax basing upon the distribution agreement entered into with M/s. Pepsico Holdings (India) Pvt. Ltd. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD AND HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX [2014 (7) TMI 159 - CESTAT MUMBAI] is squarely applicable to the said issue.
The demand is unsustainable - The impugned orders are set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1456 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interpretation and application of Statute - Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with its Seventh Schedule - eligibility to be appointed as arbitrator.
According to the arbitration clause the contractor had to choose two out of which the railways would appoint one as the arbitrator - this panel is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is against the permitted relationship of the arbitrator with the parties, mentioned in the fifth and seventh schedules.
HELD THAT:- The general conditions of contract provide that the railways are to provide a list of more than three persons. But this condition is not followed as the highest Court desires it to be followed. The railways have forwarded only three names. They ought to prepare and furnish to a contractor a much longer and wider list. They should be given a wide choice amongst persons with different backgrounds and professional attainments -
Therefore, the railways are required to furnish a longer list to the petitioner containing at least 30 names. Secondly, the arbitration clause provides that the railways can appoint any person from within or outside that panel. This stipulation is bad. The railways do not disclose the personnel from whom they would appoint their arbitrator. The Contractor does not know whether the appointed arbitrator of the railways would be disqualified under Schedules V and VII. Therefore, it is also imperative that the railways appoint an arbitrator from the panel sent to the petitioner or from a disclosed panel.
This application is disposed of by setting aside the letter dated 24th February, 2017 (Annexure-m page 68 of the petition) by directing the respondent railways to forward a panel of at least 30 names, of persons of different backgrounds and professional avocations and attainments to the petitioner. It may include serving or retired officers of other organisations. From this panel the petitioner will be required to choose two. Thereafter, the railways can select one to be the contractor's nominee arbitrator.
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2017 (7) TMI 1455 - SC ORDER
Prosecution under FERA - Acquirng foreign exchange without previous general or special permission from RBI from persons not being authorised dealers in foreign exchange and deposited the amounts in a bank account outside India - As decided by HC [ 2017 (2) TMI 518 - MADRAS HIGH COURT]contention of the respondent that he is not the citizen of India and he will not come under the purview of FERA is not at all acceptable - Also there are so many incriminating materials available to presume that the respondent would have committed the offences and he is liable to be charged under Sections 8(1) and 9(1)(a) of FERA, 1973
HELD THAT:- No ground to interfere with the impugned order. The special leave petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1454 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Enforcement of a foreign award - Sections 47 to 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Order XXXVI Rule 9 of Madras High Court Original Side Rules read with Clause 15 of Letters Patent.
HELD THAT:- The inescapable and indisputable conclusion is that a foreign award cannot become opposed to public policy in India merely because a larger/longer period of limitation has been applied to test the claim in a money suit. More so, when the contracting parties have unambiguously covenanted that the proper law for the contract would be Singaporean Law.
There are no hesitation whatsoever in holding that a Foreign Award, merely because limitation aspect has been decided on the basis of foreign law, where the period of limitation is more, does not per se become opposed to public policy rendering it unenforceable in India.
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal qua Teleport Services and Occasional services - HELD THAT:- The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that this objection had not been raised by Raj TV till such time closing submissions were propounded before the Arbitral Tribunal. This is clear from the defence statement filed before the Arbitral Tribunal, as extracted by the Tribunal, wherein and whereby it becomes clear that the only objection which the respondent had raised is vis-a-viz. jurisdiction and that was pivoted on the applicability of law of limitation i.e., whether Indian Law of limitation or Singaporean Law of limitation would apply in the given circumstances. With regard to Teleport Services and Occasional Services, it was simply stated by Raj TV, particularly in paragraph 5 of the defence statement that all payments have been made and therefore, nothing more was due and outstanding. There was, absolutely, no due whatsoever was the plea - challenge to jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal also fails as flawed.
There are no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that the order of the learned Single Judge is correct and does not call for any interference - appeal dismissed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1453 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Seeking issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus - release from the custody by setting aside impugned remand order - violation of fundamental right of petitioner as guaranteed under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - acquiring huge amount illegally out of the said proceeds of crime and investigation was initiated - HELD THAT:- It appears from the impugned order of special judge that there was ample material in possession of the arresting authority, on the basis of which there was reason to believe that the Petitioner had been guilty of an offence punishable under Section 4 read with Section 3 of the PML Act.
Thus, none of the contentions raised by the Petitioner to challenge his arrest as illegal holds merit. As a result, the Petitioner has failed to show that his arrest is wholly illegal, null and void and that the Special Court had passed the Remand Order mechanically without application of mind. His petition for Habeas Corpus cannot be maintainable. Hence, this is not a fit case either to admit, much less, to grant the relief.
Order passed separately, signed and dated.
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2017 (7) TMI 1452 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , NEW DELHI
Application admitted u/s 9 of IBC admitted and moratorium declared - Negotiation with the settlement of dispute - HELD THAT:- The appellant submits that the appellant is negotiating with the respondent to settle the dispute. However, that cannot be a ground to interfere with the impugned order in absence of any illegality. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Operational Creditor next contended that the parties have, in fact, settled the dispute and payment has been made. However, it is not in dispute that the settlement has been made after admission of the application under Section 9 of the I&B Code, 2016.
In view of Rule 8 of Insolvency & Bankruptcy (Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016, it was open to the Operational Creditor to withdraw the application under Section 9 before its admission but once it was admitted, it cannot be withdrawn even by the Operational Creditor, as other creditors are entitled to raise claim pursuant to public announcement under Section 15 read with Section 18 of the I&B Code, 2016.
The appeal cannot be allowed. The prayer as made is accordingly rejected.
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2017 (7) TMI 1451 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
Sanction of Scheme of Arrangement for Amalgamation - Sections 230 and 232 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- From the material on record, the Scheme appears to be fair and reasonable and is not violative of any provisions of law and is not contrary to public policy - Since all the requisite statutory compliances have been fulfilled, Company Scheme Petitions filed by the Petitioner Companies are made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) of the respective Petitions.
Petition allowed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1450 - SC ORDER
Refund u/s 27 of the Customs Act - payment under protest - denial of refund on the ground that the petitioner could not establish its entitlement to CENVAT credit - It was held by Delhi High Court that when the credit under the CENVAT Rules is not admissible to the appellant, question of fulfilling the aforesaid condition does not arise.
HELD THAT:- The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1449 - ITAT MUMBAI
Validity of re-opening of assessment - non-issue of notice u/s 143(3) - HELD THAT:- Notice u/s 143(2) of the Act is mandatory and in absence of such service, AO cannot proceed to make an inquiry on return filed in compliance with the notice issued u/s 148 - See ACIT vs. Geno Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [2013 (10) TMI 218 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
In the present case admittedly no notice u/s 143(2) was issued in the present case despite the fact that the assessee filed a letter in response to notice u/s 148 of the Act that the return originally filed u/s 139(1) can be treated as return filed u/s 148 - Decided against revenue.
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2017 (7) TMI 1448 - SC ORDER
Concessional rate of entry tax - Section 9C of the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999 - petitioner is engaged in business of generation of electricity and distribution thereof in the State of Odisha - whether generation of electricity is a manufacturing activity - It was held by Orissa High Court that petitioner is entitled to avail concessional rate of entry tax on coal in terms of Rule 3(4) of the OET Rules - HELD THAT:- There are no legal and valid ground for interference. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2017 (7) TMI 1447 - ITAT DELHI
Assessee non-representation on the date of hearing - TDS u/s 194A - non-compliance of TDS provisions - default as per Sec 201(1)/ 201(1A) - HELD THAT:- As it can be safely presumed that the assessee is not serious in pursuing the present appeal and hence the appeal is dismissed in limine. Support is drawn from the orde in the case of Multiplan India (P) Ltd[1991 (5) TMI 120 - ITAT DELHI-D] and case of Estate of Late Tukojirao Holkar vs. CWT [1996 (3) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT]
In case the assessee is able to show that there was a reasonable cause for non-representation on the date of hearing, it would be at liberty if so deemed fit to pray for a recall of this order. The said order was pronounced on the date of hearing itself in the open Court.
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2017 (7) TMI 1446 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of petition - application not entertained on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction - Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - doctrine of ratio decidendi (reason/rational for the decision) - HELD THAT:- The two-Judge Bench has opined that a precedent is a judicial decision containing a principle which forms an authoritative element termed as ratio decidendi and any reasons assigned in support of such interim order containing prima facie findings are only tentative. There cannot be any quarrel over the aforesaid proposition of law. However, the controversy involved in this case has its distinctive characteristics. The Commercial Court in London, interpreting the same agreement adverted to earlier judgments (may be in anti-suit injunction) and held that in such a situation the Courts in London will have jurisdiction. The analysis made therein, as has been stated earlier, has been appreciated in BALCO and Enercon (India) Ltd. [[2014 (2) TMI 1170 - SUPREME COURT]] and this Court has approved the principle set forth in the said case. Once this Court has accepted the principle, the principle governs as it holds the field and it becomes a binding precedent.
It will be an anathema to law to conceive a situation where this Court is obligated to accept that the decisions in BALCO and Enercon (India) Ltd. [[2014 (2) TMI 1170 - SUPREME COURT]] which approve Shashoua principle are binding precedents, yet with some innate sense of creativity will dwell upon and pronounce, as canvassed by the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent, that inter-party dispute arose in the context of an anti-suit injunction and, therefore, the same having not attained finality, would not bind the parties. This will give rise to a total incompatible situation and certainly lead to violation of judicial discipline - such submission is rejected.
There cannot be any trace of doubt that any filing of an application by the Appellant in the courts in India can clothe such courts with jurisdiction unless the law vests the same in them.
The agreement in question having been interpreted in a particular manner by the English courts and the said interpretation having gained acceptation by this Court, the inescapable conclusion is that the courts in India have no jurisdiction - Appeal allowed.
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