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Showing 1 to 20 of 2021 Records
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2019 (7) TMI 2022 - ITAT DELHI
Violation of principle of natural justice - lack of cross examination provided - addition made on the basis of the information received from the Investigation Wing - HELD THAT:- Issue decided in favour of assessee as relying on case of Amitabh Bansal [2019 (2) TMI 1132 - ITAT DELHI] in which exactly similar issue has been dealt by the Tribunal and decided that when revenue strongly relies on statements of certain persons to implicate an assessee, principle of cross examination has to invariably followed if truth and justice needs to be found out, which has not been done in the case of the assessee.
Thus the issue of cross examination in dispute is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the findings of the Tribunal, as reproduced above. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2021 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Application for recall of an ex-parte under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allowed - defendant's failure to lead the evidence or appear was not on account of his own default - suit for recovery of the price of goods sold to the respondent - HELD THAT:- The Trial Court has been persuaded by the defendant's argument that the defendant and his counsel were not in communication when the defendant was in judicial custody. However, the facts regarding his having applied for certified copies of the decree during this period, and having appeared for the defendant on atleast two occasions before the Supreme Court, belie the stand taken by the defendant.
It is also significant that, even during this period, an application was filed in March, 2016 for reopening the defendant's evidence, which had been closed in October, 2015. This application was filed by a pairokar of the defendant and shows that the defendant was in a position to participate in judicial proceedings even at that stage.
This is a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, against the order of the Trial Court invoking its powers under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.
The impugned order is set aside - petition allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2020 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of Regular Bail - offence punishable under Sections 132(1)(A) (B)(C)(D) of Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by Assistant Commissioner of State Tax, Unit 99, Jamnagar - HELD THAT:- Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and perusing the material placed on record and taking into consideration the facts of the case, nature of allegations, gravity of offences, role attributed to the accused, without discussing the evidence in detail, this Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the discretion and enlarge the applicant on regular bail.
The applicant is ordered to be released on regular bail on fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2019 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Validity of order passed by the Settlement Commission - Revenue submits that the Settlement Commission has wrongly allowed deductions u/s 80-IA (4) as the returns were filed after the period prescribed by law - HELD THAT:- It is observed that the issue of filing of returns after the date prescribed by law was taken up by the respondent before this Court in M/S DILIP BUILDCON LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS [2016 (7) TMI 215 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] allowed the petition setting aside the order passed by the Central Board of Direct Taxes and condoned the delay on the part of the respondent in filing returns.
Admittedly, the order passed by this Court [supra] has attained finality as the same has not been assailed or challenged by the petitioner before any higher Court. Thus the issue regarding delay in filing the return does not survive and has been finally settled in favour of the respondent.
In view of the order passed by this Court, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Settlement Commission has wrongly allowed deductions under Section 80- IA (4) of the Act, without taking into consideration the aspect of delay, has no merit and does not survive for either being raised or adjudicated.
Also contention of revenue that the respondent was only involved in construction of roads as a contractor and, therefore, as he was only a works contractor, the benefit of the provisions relating to work undertaken for infrastructural development would not have been availed by the respondent and has wrongly been allowed by the Settlement Commission, is to be rejected as Settlement Commission has discussed these aspects extensively - The aforesaid finding in favour of the respondent, is a finding of fact and does not warrant any interference by this Court in writ proceedings.
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2019 (7) TMI 2018 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD
Maintainability of appeal - monetary amount involved in the appeal - refund granted in CENVAT account - HELD THAT:- Inasmuch as the amount disputed by the Revenue is only to the extent of Rs.12.00 Lakhs, the Revenue’s appeal is covered by the Litigation Policy.
Accordingly the appeal dismissed as not maintainable.
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2019 (7) TMI 2017 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Insertion of Section 105-A into the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - inherent Arbitrariness in the State Enactments - failure of President of India to apply his mind while granting assent to Section 105A - Impugned State Enactments become repugnant once the Parliament 'made' the New Land Acquisition Act or not - provisions of Section 105A(2) and (3), mandatory in nature or not.
Are the State Enactments void because of inherent Arbitrariness? - HELD THAT:- The purpose of acquisition under all the four Acts, namely new Act and three State Acts are different. The compensation provided under all the four Acts is going to be identical, the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme too shall be identical.
A reading of Article 254 reveals that Article 254(1) gives overriding effect to the provisions of law made by the parliament, which the parliament is competent to enact or to any provision or to any existing law in respect of matters enumerated in List 3 and if a law made by a State Legislature is repugnant to the provisions of the law made by the Parliament, then the law made by the legislature of the State is treated to be void to the extent of the repugnancy - However, Article 254(2) contemplates that where a law made by the Legislature of a State contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of the earlier law made by the parliament, then the law made by the legislature of the State, shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent will prevail in the State.
The Parliament was of the view that the Old Act, 1864 Act is resulting in drastic reduction of agricultural lands, and ensuring that agriculturalists were turned into landless poor. There were was no scheme for rehabilitating persons who have lost their livelihood/land, and the Parliament thought it fit to bring out the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the New Act.
The three State enactments received the assent of the President on 21.7.1978, 25.5.1999 and 16.9.2002 respectively and therefore, prevailed in the State of Tamil Nadu even when the Old Act, 1894 covered the entire field. Contention of the petitioner is that when the new Act came into force, the three state enactments have become void. In order to save the acquisitions made under the three State enactments, the State of Tamil Nadu brought out an amendment to the Central Act by inserting Section 105-A in order to save the acquisitions made under the three State enactments from 1.1.2014 to the insertion of 105-A - Therefore, these state enactments are rendered void, the moment the New Act was "made." i.e. when it received the presidential assent, as on 27.09.2013.
In order to bring any act within the purview of Article 254(2) it must necessarily be re-enacted, and reconsidered by the President afresh. Merely inserting Section 105A in the New Act, shall not fulfil the requirements of Article 254(2), and the laws would remain repugnant.
Since the President has given the assent to the New Act on 27.9.2013, all the three State Acts had become repugnant to the Central enactment. They had therefore become void on 27.9.2013. By introducing Section 105-A and putting the three Acts which had become void, in the fifth schedule would not resurrect the Acts which had become void - The three State Enactments have already become void on the date on which the new Act become operative and therefore, even if the deeming fiction the fullest effect, it would still not revive the three State enactments, which had become void on 27.9.2013.
The impugned three state enactments were rendered repugnant as on the date the New Act, was made, i.e. the date of which the President of India gave the New Act his assent, i.e. 27.09.2013. We further hold that in order to revive these acts it is necessary to re-enact these laws, in accordance with the provisions of Article 254(2). Mere insertion of Section 105A in the new Act, would not save these acts from repugnancy.
Are the provisions of Section 105A(2) and (3) mandatory, and if so, whether non-compliance of these provisions fatal to the validity of these enactments? - HELD THAT:- Merely by inserting Section 105A in the New Act, the State could not be revived three state enactments. Submissions have however been made across the bar at great length, that even if Section 105A has the effect of reviving the three state enactments, the fact that the requirements of Section 105A(2) and (3) have not been made is fatal, to these acts - Section 105-A(2) mandates the State Government to bring out a Notification within one year from 1.1.2014 and direct that the provisions of the Central Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the first schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in 2nd and 3rd Schedule being beneficial to the affected families shall apply to the case of the land acquisition and the enactment specified the 5th Schedule. Section 105-A(2) therefore mandates that the State Government has to bring out a Notification. Admittedly, no Notification has been brought out by the State Government.
When Section 105-A has been made subject to Section 105-A(2), section 105-A(1) can work only when the conditions specified in 105-A(2) are satisfied. Section 105-A(2) mandates that a notification has to be published. The notification as stated earlier is defined in the Act itself to mean that it has to be in the official gazette and shall to come within one year from the commencement of this Act. The purpose of the notification is to inform the general public about how the compensation is to be calculated and how the rehabilitation scheme will be worked out - It is well settled and has been laid down by a number of judgments that if there is power coupled with a duty mandating that the particular act must be done by the executive in a particular way, then it shall be done in that way or not at all.
In case of conditional legislation, the legislation is complete in itself but its operation is made to depend on fulfilment of certain conditions and what is delegated to an outside authority, is the power to determine according to its own judgment whether or not those conditions are fulfilled. In case of delegated legislation proper, some portion of the legislative power of the legislature is delegated to the outside authority in that, the legislature, though competent to perform both the essential and ancillary legislative functions, performs only the former and parts with the latter, i.e., the ancillary functions of laying down details in favour of another for executing the policy of the statute enacted.
When the effect of the legislation is depends upon the determination of a condition by the executive organ of the State, it becomes a conditional legislation and as observed in ITC. BHADRACHALAM PAPERBOARDS AND ANOTHER VERSUS MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER, ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS [1996 (9) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT], a conditional legislation is mandatory. The condition that is required for Section 105-A(1) to be active is that the notification as contemplated under Section 105-A(1) must be published within one year from 1.1.2014.
The mandatory provision of Section 105-A has not been complied and therefore Section 105-A cannot be said to have come into force in the absence of the notification as stipulated in Section 105-A(2) and also non-placing the notification before the Assembly.
Petition allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2016 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Seeking restoration of petition u/s 9 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Appellant (Corporate Debtor) submitted that the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal) (NCLT), Kolkata Bench has no jurisdiction to recall its earlier order having no power of review or to recall - HELD THAT:- The Adjudicating Authority, Kolkata Bench in exercise of power conferred by Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 having restored the petition u/s 9 to its original file, there are no illegality in the impugned order.
In so far hearing of the Appellant Amrit Feeds Limited (Corporate Debtor) is concerned, the petition having restored, the Appellant Amrit Feeds Limited (Corporate Debtor) will be given notice by the Adjudicating Authority before passing any order in the application u/s 9 preferred by S.S. Enterprises(Operational Creditor).
There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2015 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Seeking a direction to the respondent authority to consider his representation dated 29.02.2016 at Annexure-D - direction to respondent Authority to give appropriate and adequate compensation amount as per the provisions of the newly promulgated Act i.e., the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- The writ petition is disposed of with a direction to respondent to consider and decide the representation submitted by the petitioner in accordance with law by a speaking order, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order passed today.
The writ petition is disposed of.
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2019 (7) TMI 2014 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appointment of a sole Arbitrator for adjudicating the disputes - Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - HELD THAT:- The Court while exercising its power under Section 11 of the Act, cannot recast the terms of the Contract and direct the parties to go for a composite arbitration contrary to the procedure prescribed under the arbitration clause provided in distinct arbitration agreements. The overlapping of the issues does not mean that the arbitration proceedings under the two respective contracts cannot commence and continue independently. Fundamental feature of an arbitration agreement is that there is an understanding between the parties to adopt alternate mechanism for the adjudication of the future disputes that arise between them. The law does not prescribe any standard form of arbitration agreement and the parties are free to agree upon a procedure and designate the private forum where the parties would like to go in case the disputes and differences arise between them. Thus, there is to be consensus ad-idem between the parties regarding the choice of the forum.
The Supreme Court in certain judgments, has held that in certain exceptional circumstances the Court has a power to make an appointment of the Arbitrator, notwithstanding the choice of the specified forum agreed between the parties.
Parties were conscious of the terms of the agreement and they willingly and consciously agreed for the arbitral procedure envisaged under the agreement without any reservation. Petitioner is now suggesting that the agreed choice of forum should be ignored and that part of the Agreements should be severed and further Respondent should tow it's line and agree to the Arbitral Tribunal contrary to what has been provided in the Contracts. This cannot be permitted and thus the relief claimed in the present petition for appointment of a common arbitrator cannot be granted.
There is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2013 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Reversal of credit availed on the common input and input services - beat pulp is being cleared by the appellant without payment of central excise duty - Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules - HELD THAT:- The matter is no longer res-integra as it has already been decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA VERSUS DSCL SUGAR LTD. [2015 (10) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT] that the by-product such as bagasse, press mud, beat pulp does not fall under the category of manufactured product of the appellant and therefore the question of reversal of the Cenvat credit equivalent to 6% of value of such clearances does not arise.
This Tribunal in its final decision in the case of KICHHA SUGAR COMPANY LTD. VERSUS CGST CC & C.E., DEHRADUN [2018 (10) TMI 1151 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] has held Since the main condition for Rule 6 is still, “obligation of a manufacturer or producer of final products”, it doesn’t extend to by- products released during the process of manufacture of main product that too without involvement of any such activity, which may be called as manufacture.
The order-in-original is without any merit and same is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2012 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dishonour of Cheque - scope and purport of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act - direction to pay interim compensation to the respondent within a stipulated time - petitioners submitted that the Court below has not given any reason as to why it has directed to accused persons to pay 20% of the cheque amount to the respondent as interim compensation - HELD THAT:- A careful reading of the order passed by the Court below shows that the Court below has focussed more on the issue of the prospective/retrospective operation of the amendment. The Court has not given any reason as to why it is directing the accused persons to pay an interim compensation of 20% to the complainant. As held by this Court, the discretionary power that is vested with the trial Court in ordering for interim compensation must be supported by reasons and unfortunately in this case, it is not supported by reasons. The attempt made by the learned counsel for the respondent to read certain reasons into the order, cannot be done by this Court, since this Court is testing the application of mind of the Court below while passing the impugned order by exercising its discretion and this Court cannot attempt to supplement it with the reasons argued by the learned counsel for the respondent.
This Court took the effort of discussing the effect and purport of Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, only to ensure that some guidelines are given to the Subordinate Courts, which deals with complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, on a regular basis to deal with such petitions effectively and in accordance with law.
The order passed by the Court is hereby set aside. In the result, the Criminal Original Petitions are allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2011 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
CENVAT Credit - appellant has not received the Cenvatable goods but only invoices were procured - HELD THAT:- The department although has obtain statement of Shri Amit Gupta and also the transporter of the goods, who have denied to have supplied the Cenvatable goods to the appellant. The Department has not adduced any evidence regarding compliance of provisions of Section 9D of the Central Excise Act before the statement were admitted evidence. It has been held in the number of cases including ANDAMAN TIMBER INDUSTRIES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, KOLKATA-II [2015 (10) TMI 442 - SUPREME COURT] and SKYRISE OVERSEAS PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (PORT) [2017 (11) TMI 1012 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] wherein it is held that without complying the Section 9D the reliance cannot be placed on such statements - reliance cannot be placed on the statement of these persons. It is on record that appellant has manufactured the excisable goods and cleared them on payment of duty which is not disputed by the Department. The department has not found the other sources of raw material/ inputs procured by the Appellant - thus, it will not be appropriate to hold that the appellant has not procured the goods from the companies belonging to Shri Amit Gupta (other Appellant No.).
The impugned order is not sustainable and is accordingly being set aside - appeal allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2010 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD
Maintainability of appeal - monetary amount involved in the appeal - HELD THAT:- Revenue was under obligation to challenge the order separately in respect of each appeal. In any case and in any view of the matter, it is noted that small amounts are involved in each appeal disposed of by Commissioner (Appeals). The highest amounts involved in one of the appeal is to the extent of Rs.4,87,881/-.
As such, Revenue’s appeal, even if considered as against the said Order-in-Appeal, is barred under litigation policy. As such, Revenue’s appeal rejected under Litigation Policy.
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2019 (7) TMI 2009 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Lack of jurisdiction and authority - proceedings initiated under Section 7-A of the Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provision Act, 1952 - period from which the demand is made extends from 1980 to 1995, while the provisions of the said Act came to be made applicable to cleaning and sweeping workers with effect from 01.04.2001 - HELD THAT:- Conjoint reading of the provisions under Sections 40(1) (b), 113 of the MRTP Act and Notification dated 01-06-1973 shows that CIDCO would be acting as special planning authority and as an agent of the State Government.
It emerges that CIDCO is new town development authority and special planning authority which has constituted provident fund and is declared to be governed by Provident Funds Act, 1952 for benefits of its members and officers and other employees under notification dated 1st June, 1973 reproduced above does show the same and veracity of the same is not disputed - It is easily discernible that CIDCO would be an authority covered by clause (b) of Section 16 of the EPF and MP Act, 1952 referred to above. Sub-section (3) of Section (1) of the EPF and MP Act, 1952 shows that applicability of the Act would be subject to provisions contained in Section 16 and further that it is not the case of the appellant that their case is covered under sub-section of 4 of Section 1 of the EPF and MP Act, 1952.
Having regard to aforesaid, it transpires that CIDCO in present matter as the special planning authority would hardly be said to be governed by the provisions of Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952. In view of the same, it is not found that the Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained on the grounds and the submissions as advanced on behalf of the appellant. Letters Patent Appeal therefore, is dismissed. No order as to costs.
In view of dismissal of the LPA and writ petition, the civil applications do not survive and are disposed of.
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2019 (7) TMI 2008 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING - KARNATAKA
Classification of goods - Applicable rate of GST - works contract or not - manufacture and supply of submersible pump sets and accessories with installation, electrification and energisation under Ganga Kalyana scheme to Social Welfare departments of Government of Karnataka meant for various beneficiaries (farmers) as notified by the departments - providing guarantee and maintenance of installed submersible pump sets till 2 years which is used for irrigational purposes.
Whether the activity is a composite supply of works contract by way of construction/ erection/ commissioning/ installation/ completion/ fitting out/ maintenance of other irrigation works? - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the Applicant's supply involves goods i.e. submersible pump sets and the installation etc, of the same as service. Therefore, the Applicant supplies goods as well as services which are taxable supplies. The contractual agreement between the applicant and the said Corporation requires the applicant to supply the pumps and also install and energise the same. The applicant is, therefore, engaged in two taxable supplies, that of goods and also the service of installation. The service of installation is possible only when the goods (submersible pump sets) are supplied and hence the pre-dominant supply is that of "Submersible Pump Sets" and hence the principal supply in this case is supply of goods i.e. Submersible Pump Sets. Therefore the instant supply squarely falls under the definition of "Composite Supply".
Whether the supply of the applicant falls under the "Works Contract" or not? - HELD THAT:- The applicant has obligation to supply, install, electrify & energise the submersible pump sets and thereby makes the pump sets functional. The obligation on the applicant is in relation to the effective installation and functioning of the goods supplied by them. The contract governing their supplies does not relate to building, construction, fabrication etc of any immovable property, as envisaged in the definition of works contract. Their supplies (the submersible pumps) are in the nature of movable property. Hence the said activity is not related to the immovable property at any point of the time and hence the said activity does not qualify to be a "Works Contract" - In the instant case though the supply is a composite one, it is not a works contract as the said supply is not related to the immovable property. This shows that the first requirement of the Notification is not satisfied. The supplies undertaken by the applicant do not qualify to be considered as works contract. As a result the provisions of the Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28-06-2017, as amended, are not applicable. Since the first condition/requirement is not fulfilled compliance with the second condition/requirement becomes infructuous.
The supplies made by the applicant qualify to be treated as a composite supply. The tax liability on a composite supply is governed by Section 8 of the CGST Act 2017. Accordingly the composite supply comprising two or more supplies, one of which is a principal supply, shall be treated as a supply of such principal supply and the applicable GST rate on the composite supply would be the rate of GST applicable to the principal supply.
The Applicant's supply does not qualify as "Works Contract". It is a composite supply wherein the principal supply is that of the supply of goods i.e submersible pumps. The applicable GST rate to the applicant's supply would be the rate applicable on the Principal supply i.e. submersible pump sets.
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2019 (7) TMI 2007 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD
Clearance of goods to institutional consumers such as builders, infrastructure companies and the goods were marked as not for retail sale - exemption under N/N. 4/2006 dated 01 March, 2006 - Ordinary and Pozzolana Portland Cement - It appeared to Revenue that since the goods were covered by notification issued under Section 4A of Central Excise Act, 1944, the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of said notification - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra and is covered by the decision of this Tribunal in M/S JAYPEE SIKANDRABAD CEMENT GRINDING UNIT VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX, NOIDA [2018 (3) TMI 1741 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD] where it was held that The builder and construction companies qualify as institutional/industrial consumers, hence the benefit of the said Notifications would be available to the assessee.
Thus, the appellants during the relevant period of present appeal i.e. from April 2011 to December 2011 were eligible for benefit of said notification - the impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2006 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
Maintainability of appeal under Section 53B of the Competition Act, 2002 - Anti-Competition - abuse of dominant position - Proposal for combination - Jurisdiction to order such proposal - Appellant failed to establish locus standi as a person aggrieved by the 'Commission' to prefer the appeal under Section 53B - HELD THAT:- For forming prima facie opinion as to whether the combination is likely to cause, or has caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India, the Commission is required only to go through the information given under sub-section (2) of Section 6 therein including the details of combination. For forming such opinion, the Commission is not required to follow the procedure as laid down under Section 29 or Section 30 of the Act.
The violation of Section 4 (i.e. Abuse of dominant position) is completely different than the violation of Section 6(1) (i.e. combination is likely to cause or has caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition), therefore, while passing order under sub-section (2) of Section 6, the Commission cannot hold abuse of dominant position, though it may hold that the combination is likely to cause, or has caused an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India and thereby void in terms of Section 6(1) - In the present case, the Appellant alleges violation of Section 4 and not challenged the order dated 17th September, 2015 passed by the Commission under Section 31 of the Act. Further, as the question of abuse of dominant position will arise only after combination comes into effect in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 6 read with Section 31, the allegation of abuse of dominant position cannot be looked at the stage of approval of combination under Section 31.
The intimation given by the 'Commission' by letter dated 3rd November, 2015 to the Appellant is also not under challenge. The Appellant has also suppressed the aforesaid fact. It is the second time when such intimation given by letter dated 16th June, 2016, the present appeal has been preferred - The intimation given to the Appellant do not fall under any provisions as stipulated under clause (a) of Section 53A, therefore, the appeal under Section 53B preferred by the Appellant is not maintainable.
This Appellate Tribunal can hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued or decision made or order passed by the 'Commission' under sub-sections (2) and (6) of Section 26, Sections 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 43, 43A, 44, 45 or Section 46 of the Act - thus, no case has been made out by the Appellant to hold that the combination has appreciable adverse effect on competition in relevant market.
In absence of any merit, the appeal is dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2005 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Money Laundering - Provisional attachment - SCN issued to the petitioner, though an order under sub-section 2 of Section 8 of the Act is yet to be passed - HELD THAT:- In a similar situation, a Division Bench of this Court in INDIAN BANK VERSUS THE REGISTRAR/ ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY (PMLA) , THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE STATE OF TAMILNADU, THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, M/S. PRP EXPORTS [2018 (3) TMI 2019 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] where it was held that since the petitioner/Bank has already preferred the Appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, it is open to them to pursue their remedy before the Appellate Tribunal.
There are no requirement to go into the issues raised on facts. Suffice it to state that four more weeks' time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order is granted to the petitioner to give a suitable reply to the show cause notice. On receipt of the same, the adjudicating authority is expected to pass a speaking order on merits and in accordance with law - petition disposed off.
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2019 (7) TMI 2004 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction - power of Chairperson, DRAT to take up suo moto proceedings.
It is contended by the respondent that since the settlement had been arrived at between the borrower and the bank without the Presiding Officer having any role to play, the proceedings initiated against him would fall under the rare case where the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would exercise its jurisdiction, which the learned Single Judge did and there is no infirmity in the same.
HELD THAT:- Perusal of Section 33 shows that the rationale of the protection given under the said Section is in line with the ratio of the judgments referred above. In case a Central Government Officer or a Presiding Officer of the Tribunal or the Chairman of the Appellate Tribunal take any action, which is in good faith, needless to say he cannot be and should not be subjected to any prosecution or legal proceedings. If to hold otherwise, then no court or tribunal would be able to function independently and without any bias or pressures. In the present case the ratio of the above judgments applies with greater vigor as this was the case where by bank had itself entered into a settlement as they were unable to get proper value of the property on auctioning. If two parties to a litigation or a inter se dispute arrive at a settlement, then de hors the fact that the amount in dispute was higher than what is actually settled, the courts have no option but to give effect to the settlement to close the case. In fact, the latest trends of courts have been to settle the matters as far as possible through mediation or otherwise. It would indeed be a travesty of justice if the respondent who only gave effect to a mutual settlement between the parties is charge sheeted for doing his bona fide duty and closing the case solely on the basis of the settlement.
The learned Single Judge has rightly quashed the charge sheet and there are no infirmity in the impugned judgment - application dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 2003 - ITAT MUMBAI
Exemption u/s 11 - assessee received corpus contribution from Govt. of India and corpus contribution from SIDBI - charitable activity u/s 2(15) - AO held receipts are liable to be taxed as income u/s 2(24)(iia) of the Act and accordingly passed assessment order u/s 143 (3) - Whether assessee performs charitable activities within the meaning of proviso to section 2(15)? - as per DR the activities of the assessee are akin to those of a mutual association and do not fall within the definition of charitable purposes - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee own case for the AY 2010-11. [2017 (1) TMI 1145 - ITAT MUMBAI] prescribed in the trust-deed that the Government of India was liable to make up the deficit, if any, incurred in the overall operation of the scheme by providing the necessary budgetary support to the Trust. It is also prescribed in the trust-deed that the entire income arising out of corpus fund shall be spent towards fulfilling the objectives of the Trust and even savings effected in any year were to be transferred to the corpus fund to be spent towards fulfilling the objectives of the Trust. The trust- deed also prescribes the manner in which the scheme is to be implemented and it also provides for a Board of Trustees, whereby the Chairman & Managing Director of SIDBI is to be its Ex- officio Chairman and other members being drawn from the officials of the Government of India. The Management and administrative affairs of the Trust are under the overall supervision and superintendence of the Board of Trustees.
Thus object and purpose of the Trust is focussed on small scale industries and micro enterprises and is not available to entrepreneurs at large. Apart there-from, it is also prescribed in the scheme operationalized by the Trust that the benefits are to be made available only to credit facilities aggregating upto Rs.10.00 lacs sanctioned and disbursed by the lending institutions.
Therefore, considering the focused area of the Trust, it could not be inferred that there is any profit motive so as to view the activities to be 'trade, commerce or business as understood for the purposes of proviso to section 2(15) of the Act. Therefore, in our considered opinion, on facts, it is not possible to infer that assessee Trust is carrying on any regular 'trade, commerce or business' and on the contrary it is an entity which is essentially existing for charitable purposes but conducting some activities for consideration or fee. In this background, the proviso to section 2(15) of the Act cannot be invoked to exclude assessee Trust from the purview of section 2(15) of the Act since the said proviso only seeks to exclude institutions which are carrying on regular business cannot be invoked to exclude assessee Trust from the purview of section 2(15) of the Act since the said proviso only seeks to exclude institutions which are carrying on regular business - Decided in favour of assessee.
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