Issues Involved:
1. Compliance with Section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Liability under Section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. Reasonable excuse for default under Section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 1956.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Compliance with Section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956:
The Official Liquidator of Bharat Electric Company Ltd. filed a complaint under sub-section (5) of section 454 of the Companies Act, 1956, alleging that the accused failed to submit and verify the statement of affairs of the company as required by sub-section (2) of section 454. Despite being notified on March 16, 1970, and an order from the court on October 23, 1970, granting one month's time, the accused did not comply. The first accused argued that he and his wife ceased to be directors more than one year before the winding-up date of February 19, 1970, and thus were not obligated under section 454(2).

2. Liability under Section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956:
The court examined whether the accused were liable under section 454(2), which mandates submission and verification of the statement of affairs by directors, managers, secretaries, or other chief officers at the relevant date, and by persons who have been officers of the company. The accused argued they ceased to be directors by November 28, 1964, as per an affidavit (exhibit D-1) from the Registrar of Companies. However, the court noted that section 454(2) also includes "persons who are or have been officers of the company" without a one-year limitation, unlike clauses (b), (c), and (d), which specify a one-year period before the relevant date. Since the official liquidator had obtained an order on October 23, 1970, directing the accused to submit the statement, the requirements of clause (a) were satisfied. Thus, the accused could not escape liability based on their cessation as directors over a year before the winding-up.

3. Reasonable Excuse for Default under Section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 1956:
The first accused claimed a reasonable excuse for default, stating that the company's office was raided, and all records were removed by the Kerala Government on July 3, 1962. He supported this with a judgment (exhibit D-4) from a Magistrate acquitting him in a related case due to the non-availability of records. However, the court found this story "too good to be believed" and rejected it as "absolutely fantastic." The court noted that the company's last general meeting was on August 19, 1961, and it had ceased operations, with its office and movables attached by revenue authorities for arrears of rent. Despite rejecting the raid story, the court acknowledged the practical impossibility of submitting a statement of affairs after nearly a decade of the company's cessation. Thus, the court held that the default was not without reasonable excuse and acquitted the accused of the offence.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that although the accused were liable under section 454(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, they had a reasonable excuse for not submitting the statement of affairs due to the practical impossibility of doing so after the company's cessation. Therefore, the accused were acquitted of the charges.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of assessments made without passing an order under section 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Deductibility of Rs. 42,009 as a trading loss in the assessment for the year 1958-59.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Validity of Assessments Without Section 25A Order

Facts:
The assessments in question pertain to the years 1955-56 and 1957-58 to 1961-62. The assessee, a Hindu undivided family (HUF), claimed that a partition of its properties occurred on July 10, 1960. This claim was communicated to the Income-tax Officer (ITO) through letters dated October 10, 1960, January 16, 1961, and March 11, 1962, requesting an order under section 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The ITO acknowledged these letters but did not dispose of the application before completing the assessments. Eventually, the ITO refused to record the partition, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAC) later accepted the partition with effect from July 10, 1960.

Legal Provisions:
Section 25A mandates that if a claim of partition is made during the assessment, the ITO must make an inquiry and, if satisfied, record an order recognizing the partition. If no such order is passed, the family continues to be assessed as undivided.

Arguments:
The department argued that the assessments were valid as no partition order was passed before the assessments, deeming the HUF to continue under section 25A(3). They contended that the failure to pass an order was a procedural irregularity that did not invalidate the assessments. Conversely, the assessee argued that the assessments were invalid as they were made on a non-existent entity post-partition, which was recognized by the AAC with retrospective effect from July 10, 1960.

Court's Analysis:
The court noted that section 25A is procedural and not a charging section. It emphasized that the ITO's failure to pass an order under section 25A before completing the assessments was an irregularity, not affecting the jurisdiction to make assessments. The court referenced several precedents, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Additional Income-tax Officer v. A. Thimmayya, which held that such procedural errors could be rectified by appellate authorities.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the assessments made without an order under section 25A were valid but required modification. The ITO should follow the procedure under section 25A(2) to apportion the tax liability among the family members based on their respective shares. The Tribunal was directed to instruct the ITO to modify the assessments accordingly.

Issue 2: Deductibility of Rs. 42,009 as a Trading Loss

Facts:
For the assessment year 1958-59, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 42,009 as a bad debt from Lalgirji Vinodgirji. The amount was advanced in the course of business, and a suit for recovery was mutually settled with both parties withdrawing their claims.

Arguments:
The ITO rejected the claim, but the AAC allowed it, and the Tribunal upheld the AAC's decision, recognizing the amount as a trading loss.

Court's Analysis:
The court examined the Tribunal's findings that the money was advanced during business operations and that the settlement was made wholly and exclusively for business purposes. These findings were based on evidence and were binding on the court.

Conclusion:
The court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the sum of Rs. 42,009 was a trading loss deductible in the assessment for the year 1958-59.

Final Judgment:
1. The assessments made by the ITO without an order under section 25A are valid but require modification as per section 25A(2).
2. The sum of Rs. 42,009 was a trading loss deductible in the assessment for the year 1958-59.

Each party was directed to bear its costs, with an advocate's fee of Rs. 250.

Issues Involved:
1. Legitimacy of the hundi loans amounting to Rs. 95,000.
2. Credibility of the solicitor's testimony and account books.
3. Discrepancies in the account books of the assessee and the solicitor.
4. Role and credibility of Nichani & Co. in arranging the loans.
5. Burden of proof regarding the source of the alleged loans.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legitimacy of the hundi loans amounting to Rs. 95,000:
The Income-tax Officer found entries of Rs. 95,000 in the assessee's books, allegedly borrowed through hundi loans. The assessee initially failed to disclose that these transactions were managed by her solicitor, Shantikumar Gandhi. Upon investigation, the Income-tax Officer summoned the alleged financiers, but most summonses were returned as "Not claimed," and the solicitor failed to produce these financiers. The Tribunal ultimately disbelieved the solicitor's evidence, finding that the alleged loans were not genuine.

2. Credibility of the solicitor's testimony and account books:
The solicitor, Shantikumar, claimed to have arranged the loans through Nichani & Co., but his account books did not fully support this claim. He admitted to handling finances for the assessee and her mother but failed to provide documentary evidence for significant transactions, particularly the Rs. 50,000 loan. The Tribunal found discrepancies between his oral testimony and account books, leading to a conclusion that his testimony was unreliable.

3. Discrepancies in the account books of the assessee and the solicitor:
The Tribunal noted several inconsistencies between the account books of the assessee and the solicitor. For instance, the repayment dates for the Rs. 45,000 loan differed in their respective accounts. The solicitor's account indicated repayment on 13th October 1960, while the assessee's books showed repayment on 19th October 1960. Such discrepancies led the Tribunal to question the authenticity of the transactions.

4. Role and credibility of Nichani & Co. in arranging the loans:
The solicitor claimed that the loans were arranged through Nichani & Co., but the proprietor, Kanayalal Hiranand, denied any involvement in these transactions. Kanayalal admitted to being a name-lender and dealing in smuggled gold but denied arranging loans for the solicitor or the assessee. The Tribunal believed Kanayalal's testimony over the solicitor's, further discrediting the alleged loans.

5. Burden of proof regarding the source of the alleged loans:
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to prove the source of the Rs. 95,000. The solicitor's testimony and account books did not provide credible evidence of the loans' origin. The Tribunal found that merely stating that a solicitor arranged the loans was insufficient; the actual source of the funds had to be established, which was not done in this case.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal's findings were based on a thorough evaluation of evidence and circumstances. The discrepancies in the account books, the unreliable testimony of the solicitor, and the denial by Nichani & Co. led to the conclusion that the alleged loans were not genuine. The Tribunal's decision to disbelieve the solicitor and treat the amount as income from undisclosed sources was upheld, and the rule was discharged with costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Registration of the Indenture of Contributory First Legal Mortgage.
2. Requirement of tax clearance certificates from confirming parties.
3. Scope of inquiry by the Sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, Wealth-tax Act, and Income-tax Act.
4. Possibility of partial registration of a document.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Registration of the Indenture of Contributory First Legal Mortgage:
The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Sub-Registrar to register the Indenture of Contributory First Legal Mortgage dated August 10, 1964. The Sub-Registrar refused to register the document due to the absence of tax clearance certificates from the confirming parties, Ramabai Tricumji and Chandrakant Tricumji, despite the mortgagor, Tricumji Mirani, having produced his certificate.

2. Requirement of Tax Clearance Certificates from Confirming Parties:
The petitioners argued that the confirming parties' lack of tax clearance certificates should not prevent the registration of the mortgage deed. They contended that the confirming parties' rights were already postponed by a separate deed of modification and postponement of security, which was duly registered. Therefore, the Indenture did not transfer, assign, limit, or extinguish their rights, and the Sub-Registrar erroneously insisted on tax clearance certificates from them.

3. Scope of Inquiry by the Sub-Registrar:
The court examined the provisions of the Registration Act, Wealth-tax Act, and Income-tax Act to determine the Sub-Registrar's scope of inquiry. Under sections 34 and 35 of the Registration Act, the Sub-Registrar's inquiry is limited to verifying the identity and execution of the document by the parties. However, sections 34 of the Wealth-tax Act and 230A of the Income-tax Act impose additional restrictions, requiring tax clearance certificates for documents that transfer, assign, limit, or extinguish rights in property valued over a certain amount.

The court noted that the Sub-Registrar must consider surrounding circumstances and not just the document's face value. This broader inquiry is necessary to determine if the document falls under the restrictions of the Wealth-tax Act or Income-tax Act.

4. Possibility of Partial Registration:
The court addressed whether partial registration of a document is permissible if some parties produce tax clearance certificates while others do not. The court concluded that both sections 34 and 230A allow for partial registration. The Sub-Registrar can register the document concerning parties who have provided the necessary tax clearance certificates and keep the registration pending for those who have not.

Judgment:
The court issued a writ of mandamus directing the Sub-Registrar to register the Indenture of Contributory First Legal Mortgage concerning the mortgagor, Tricumji Mirani, and to endorse the registration certificate accordingly. The Sub-Registrar was also directed to keep the registration pending for the confirming parties until they produce the required tax clearance certificates under section 230A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioners did not press for costs, and no order as to costs was made.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the purposes set out in sub-clauses (4) and (5) of clause 3 and sub-clause (4) of clause 8 of the assessee's constitution are "charitable purposes" under the Indian Income-tax Act.
2. Whether the beneficiaries of the assessee's purposes constitute a section of the public.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Charitable Purposes:
The primary issue was whether the purposes outlined in sub-clauses (4) and (5) of clause 3 and sub-clause (4) of clause 8 of the assessee's constitution qualify as "charitable purposes" under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and section 11(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Sub-clause (4) of Clause 3:
- This sub-clause speaks of "acts useful to the community," which falls within the definition of "charitable purpose" as it embodies an object of general public utility.

Sub-clause (5) of Clause 3:
- This sub-clause consists of two parts. The first part promotes "unity and brotherhood amongst the members of the community," which is beneficial to the community and thus qualifies as a charitable purpose.
- The second part aims at the "complete development of all aspects of life of each male and female member of the community." This is interpreted to mean economic, physical, intellectual, and spiritual well-being, which are beneficial to the public and thus qualify as charitable purposes.

Sub-clause (4) of Clause 8:
- This sub-clause involves the management of community events like Havan, Bhandaro, and processions. While the revenue contended that Bhandaro (community dinner) was not charitable, the court held that it could be a religious purpose. The performance of Havan and other religious activities were deemed to be religious, if not charitable, purposes.

2. Beneficiaries Constituting a Section of the Public:
The second issue was whether the beneficiaries of the assessee's purposes, i.e., the members of the Rana community in Ahmedabad, constitute a section of the public.

- Initially, the revenue and the High Court held that the beneficiaries did not constitute a section of the public. However, this view was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the beneficiaries did constitute a section of the public, thereby fulfilling the necessary element of public benefit.

Conclusion:
The High Court concluded that the properties belonging to the assessee were held under legal obligation wholly for charitable or religious purposes. Therefore, the income derived from those properties was exempt from tax under section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62, and under section 11(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1962-63. The question referred to the court was answered in the affirmative, and the Commissioner was ordered to pay the costs of the reference to the assessee.

Issues:
1. Refusal of registration to the assessee-firm based on document date discrepancy.

Analysis:
The case involved a dispute regarding the registration of an assessee-firm under section 184 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The firm claimed to have been formed on October 1, 1961, and submitted a partnership document. However, a discrepancy arose as the document was dated October 1, 1961, but the stamp papers used were dated October 20, 1961. Subsequently, a rectification deed was executed to correct the date in the partnership document to October 20, 1961, while affirming that the partnership came into force on October 1, 1961. The Income-tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and Appellate Tribunal all concluded that the inconsistency in dates rendered the partnership document invalid ab initio, leading to the refusal of registration.

The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision to reject registration solely based on the date inconsistency was legally sound. The court highlighted that while date inconsistencies could raise suspicions about the genuineness of the partnership, if the partnership itself was valid, a mere date error would not invalidate the document. The court emphasized that the Tribunal erred in not delving into the genuineness of the partnership and focusing solely on the date discrepancy. The court noted that the rectification deed correcting the date should have been considered to rectify the initial error in the document.

The court opined that the Tribunal should have assessed the genuineness of the partnership and the validity of the partnership deed in light of that assessment. By solely deeming the partnership document invalid due to date inconsistencies, the Tribunal failed to address the core issue of whether a genuine partnership existed. Consequently, the court ruled in favor of the assessee, directing the Tribunal to reevaluate the matter considering the genuineness of the partnership and the corrected date in the partnership document. The judgment emphasized the importance of looking beyond technical errors to assess the substantive validity of legal documents in registration matters.

The High Court of Madras confirmed the Tribunal's decision that an assessee-firm was entitled to registration for the assessment year 1963-64 under section 185 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the substitution of a page in the original partnership deed did not disqualify the firm from registration, as there was no evidence of tampering with the accounts. The court ruled against the revenue, with no costs awarded.

Issues:
1. Entitlement to claim depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) of the Income-tax Act for partnership assets.
2. Interpretation of partnership deed regarding ownership of assets and entitlement to depreciation.

Analysis:
The High Court of Madras addressed two questions referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The first question was whether Smt. Rajeswari Vedachalam could claim depreciation for assets used in the partnership business for the assessment year 1960-61. The second question was whether the assessee-firm was entitled to claim depreciation for the assessment years 1960-63 to 1961-64 on partnership assets. The partnership deed indicated that Smt. Rajeswari Vedachalam owned all assets and capital, while working partners had no right to claim partnership assets. The Tribunal held that since the assets were not owned by the partnership, it couldn't claim depreciation. However, the High Court disagreed, stating that the partnership deed clearly made all assets partnership assets, even though working partners had no claim over them. Therefore, the partnership was entitled to depreciation under the Income-tax Act.

The Court analyzed the partnership deed clauses and concluded that the assets were intended to be partnership assets, as specified in clause (4) of the deed. Despite working partners having no claim over the assets, the deed clearly indicated that all existing assets were to be considered partnership assets. The Court rejected the Tribunal's interpretation that the assets remained the property of an individual partner due to the working partners' lack of rights. The Court held that if the assets were considered partnership properties and were used for business purposes, depreciation under the Income-tax Act would apply. Consequently, the Court answered the second question in favor of the assessee, allowing the partnership to claim depreciation for the assets used in the business. As a result, the first question was answered in favor of the revenue, requiring the depreciation allowed to Smt. Rajeswari Vedachalam to be added back and brought to assessment. The Court made no order as to costs in this matter.

Issues:
Whether the amount paid by the assessee to growers of sugarcane as harvesting and transportation charges forms part of the purchase turnover liable to tax under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957.

Analysis:
The case involved three revision petitions by a common assessee challenging the inclusion of payments made to sugarcane growers for harvesting and transportation charges in the taxable turnover. The assessee purchased sugarcane at a minimum price fixed by the Central Government and additionally paid harvesting and transportation charges to incentivize growers. The assessing authority included these additional payments in the taxable turnover, leading to the dispute. The key contention was whether these extra payments formed part of the purchase turnover liable to tax under the Act.

The assessee argued that the additional payments were ex gratia and not part of the purchase price, citing a Supreme Court decision in a similar context. However, the court distinguished the present case from the precedent, highlighting that the Central Government had only fixed the minimum price for sugarcane, not the maximum. The court observed that the original agreements between the assessee and growers were modified to include the extra payment of four paise per quintal, directly linked to the quantity of sugarcane supplied. Bills issued by the assessee to growers also reflected the inclusion of transport charges in the price, indicating a variation in the original contract.

The court interpreted the term "turnover" under the Act to encompass all amounts paid by the dealer for goods, including additional charges. Therefore, the court concluded that the aggregate of all amounts, including harvesting and transportation charges, constituted the assessee's turnover. Consequently, the court upheld the decision of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the revision petitions. The court ruled in favor of including the additional payments in the taxable turnover, emphasizing the direct relationship between the extra charges and the quantity of sugarcane supplied.

In summary, the judgment clarified that the additional payments made by the assessee to sugarcane growers for harvesting and transportation charges were deemed part of the purchase turnover subject to tax under the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957. The court's analysis focused on the contractual modifications between the parties, the nature of the extra payments, and the interpretation of turnover under the Act, ultimately upholding the inclusion of these charges in the taxable turnover.

Issues:
1. Reopening of original assessments under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Correctness of assessment of income from house property and business for assessment years 1957-58 to 1960-61 in the status of an individual.

Analysis:
The judgment addressed two main issues referred under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Firstly, it discussed the correctness of reopening the original assessments for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60 under section 34(1)(b) of the Act. The assessee, originally a member of a Hindu undivided family, underwent partitions resulting in the ownership of certain businesses and properties. The Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings under section 34 for reassessment, challenging the original assessments made in the status of a Hindu undivided family. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and the Tribunal concluded that the income should have been assessed only in the status of an individual, not as a Hindu undivided family.

Secondly, the judgment delved into the correctness of the assessment of income from the house property and business for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1960-61 in the status of an individual. The court referred to the decision in N. V. Narendranath v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, where it was held that property received by a coparcener on partition belongs to the Hindu undivided family and cannot be assessed as individual property. The court applied this legal principle to the present case, ruling in favor of the assessee and answering the second question negatively, supporting the assessee's position.

In conclusion, the court held that the original assessments for the assessment years 1957-58 to 1959-60 will stand, and the reassessment was set aside. The original assessment for the year 1960-1961 would be modified accordingly. The judgment did not award costs to any party.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appellate proceedings under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act can be considered a court.
4. The impact of previous Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of the Limitation Act to tribunals.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appellate proceedings under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act:
The primary contention raised by the respondent was that the appellate authority is not a court (civil or criminal), and hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay, does not apply to appeals filed under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The judgment delves deeply into the principles of the Limitation Act, noting that Section 5 provides the court the power to condone delays in filing appeals and applications. The judgment emphasizes that these principles are generally applicable to proceedings in courts, but special or local laws also prescribe their own periods of limitation. The decision hinges on whether the special law explicitly excludes the application of Section 5.

2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The judgment explains that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, fundamentally changed the application of the Limitation Act to special laws. The new provision states that all sections from 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to special laws unless expressly excluded. This change means that it is not necessary for special laws to explicitly state that Section 5 applies; rather, an express exclusion is required for it not to apply. The judgment cites the omission of Section 31 from the 1965 Rent Control Act as evidence that the legislature intended for Section 5 to apply automatically due to Section 29(2).

3. Whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act can be considered a court:
The judgment discusses whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act qualifies as a court. It notes that tribunals often have powers similar to courts, such as those under the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment asserts that the provision of Section 5 extends to these tribunals when the special law does not expressly exclude it. The judgment concludes that the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act, while not a court in the ordinary sense, is vested with the power to condone delays as per Section 5 of the Limitation Act due to Section 29(2).

4. The impact of previous Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of the Limitation Act to tribunals:
The judgment references two Supreme Court decisions, Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli, and Nityanand v. L.I.C. of India, which held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies only to applications before courts and not to tribunals. However, the judgment distinguishes these cases from the present one, noting that the Supreme Court decisions dealt with the applicability of Article 137, not the broader principles of the Limitation Act, to special laws. The judgment concludes that these decisions do not apply to the current case because the issue here is about the applicability of Section 5 to periods prescribed by special laws, not about Article 137.

Conclusion:
The judgment ultimately concludes that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeal proceedings before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, 1965, by the force of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the revision petitions are allowed, and the cases are remanded to the appellate authority to consider whether there was sufficient cause to excuse the delay in not filing the appeal within the prescribed time.

Separate Opinion:
One judge disagreed with the majority opinion, asserting that the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act is not a court and that the Limitation Act applies only to courts. This judge emphasized that the Rent Control Act's specific provision for excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy indicates that it is a self-contained code regarding limitation periods and exemptions. Therefore, the revision petitions should be dismissed.

Final Decision:
In accordance with the majority opinion, the revision petitions are dismissed with costs.

Issues:
1. Interpretation of Section 39(6) of the Insurance Act, 1938 regarding nominee's rights.
2. Entitlement of heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to the insurance policy amount.
3. Consideration of interim injunction against the nominee.
4. Safeguarding plaintiffs' interest in the insurance policy amount.
5. Direction for the trial court to dispose of the suit within a specified timeframe.

Analysis:

The judgment by the High Court of Orissa dealt with various crucial issues arising from a dispute over an insurance policy amount following the death of an individual. The primary contention revolved around the interpretation of Section 39(6) of the Insurance Act, 1938. The court held that a nominee under an insurance policy does not acquire exclusive title to the amount but is a trustee on behalf of all heirs, including themselves. This interpretation was supported by a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, emphasizing that the nominee's role is to receive the amount, not to claim sole ownership.

Furthermore, the court considered the entitlement of heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was established that the mother, widow, and sons of the deceased were simultaneous heirs in class I, entitling them to a share of the insurance policy amount. The plaintiffs were deemed entitled to a 2/5ths share of the sum, acknowledging the rights of all eligible heirs.

Regarding the request for an interim injunction against the nominee, the court upheld the decisions of the lower courts in denying the injunction. Granting such relief would have contradicted the provisions of Section 39 of the Act, as the amount was rightfully payable to the nominee. The court emphasized that injunctions should not impede statutory provisions and deemed the initial injunction request as misconceived.

In ensuring the protection of the plaintiffs' interest in their entitled share of the insurance policy amount, the court directed the trial court to require the defendant to provide security equal to 2/5ths of the sum. This measure aimed to safeguard the plaintiffs' rights without prolonging the litigation unnecessarily. Additionally, the trial court was instructed to expedite the suit's resolution within three months, with a mandate to inform the High Court of the outcome.

Ultimately, the Civil Revision was dismissed, subject to the directive for the defendant to furnish security as specified, after which she could receive the amount. No costs were awarded in this matter. The judgment underscored the importance of upholding legal provisions, protecting heirs' entitlements, and ensuring a swift resolution of the dispute.

Issues:
Recovery of unpaid bills for construction of a brick kiln, dispute over defects in construction, determination of whether defendant's plea in the written statement constitutes a set-off requiring payment of Court-fee.

Analysis:
The suit involves the recovery of unpaid bills amounting to Rs. 86,000 for constructing a brick kiln by the plaintiff, an Engineering Contractor, from the defendant partnership firm. The defendant's defense is based on alleging defects in the construction not meeting the agreement's specifications, resulting in a loss exceeding Rs. 1,60,000 to the defendant's factory. The dispute centers on whether the defendant's plea in the written statement constitutes a set-off necessitating payment of Court-fee.

The plaintiff argued that Court-fee is payable on the written statement, citing various precedents emphasizing the requirement for Court-fee even for equitable set-offs. However, the defendant contended that the plea was a defense to the suit claim and not a set-off, thus exempt from Court-fee payment. The court examined the nature of the plea to determine its classification.

The court emphasized that to ascertain if the plea in the written statement is a set-off or a defense, the entire plea must be considered. Despite a sentence indicating the defendant's loss exceeding the plaintiff's claim, the court concluded that the defendant's detailed defects in construction aimed to show the plaintiff's disentitlement due to defective work, constituting a defense rather than a set-off. The court clarified that a plea would amount to a set-off only if the plaintiff could recover the suit claim alongside the claim in the written statement.

Drawing from a prior case, the court highlighted that the defendant need not pay Court-fee on the written statement if it serves as a defense to the plaint claim rather than a set-off. Consequently, the court ordered to repost the suit for further trial, determining that the defendant's plea did not require payment of Court-fee.

In conclusion, the judgment delves into the distinction between a defense and a set-off in the context of a construction dispute, ultimately deciding that the defendant's plea in the written statement constitutes a defense, not a set-off, exempting it from Court-fee payment.

Issues:
Interpretation of Section 630 of the Companies Act regarding wrongful withholding of property by an officer or employee of a company.

Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a petition filed seeking to quash proceedings in a case where the petitioner was accused of wrongfully obtaining and withholding possession of the company's property. The court examined the allegations in the complaint and the relevant provisions of the Companies Act. It was noted that the petitioner had been re-elected as a director and subsequently appointed as a managing director through resolutions passed at annual general meetings. The central issue revolved around whether the actions of the petitioner constituted wrongful withholding of company property as per Section 630 of the Companies Act.

The court analyzed the provisions of Section 630 of the Companies Act, which outline penalties for wrongful withholding of company property by an officer or employee. The key contention raised by the petitioner's counsel was that the ingredient of "wrongfully" was not satisfied based on the resolutions passed at the general body meetings appointing the petitioner as managing director. The court considered the circumstances under which the petitioner continued to serve as managing director despite not being re-elected as a director, emphasizing that his services were accepted and endorsed by the company.

The respondent's counsel argued that the petitioner's failure to get re-elected as a director invalidated his position as managing director under the Companies Act. However, the court found that the petitioner had operated openly as managing director based on resolutions passed at general body meetings, and there was no evidence of wrongful possession or withholding of company property. The court highlighted the positive feedback on the petitioner's services in the company's audit report, indicating a lack of wrongful intent or misconduct on his part.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint against the petitioner was misconceived and ill-conceived, as it did not meet the requirements of Section 630(1)(a) or (b) regarding wrongful withholding of company property. Consequently, the court quashed the proceedings in the case, C.C. No. 1178 of 1971, on the grounds that the complaint lacked merit and failed to establish any wrongdoing on the part of the petitioner.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the assessee, a member of a Hindu undivided family (HUF), can throw her separate property into the common hotchpot of the HUF.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the assessee, a member of a Hindu undivided family (HUF), can throw her separate property into the common hotchpot of the HUF:

The key question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court was whether the assessee, as a member of the Hindu undivided family, was entitled to throw her separate property into the common hotchpot of the HUF.

The facts of the case reveal that the assessee, governed by Mitakshara law, and her husband jointly purchased a property and later declared it as belonging to the HUF. The Income-tax Officer included the assessee's share of income from the property up to February 27, 1964, in her taxable income. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld this, stating there was no effective transfer of the property to the HUF during the year 1963-64. However, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that the property had become HUF property from February 27, 1964.

The High Court outlined the characteristics and legal principles governing Hindu undivided families and coparcenary under Mitakshara law. It emphasized that a coparcener, who is a male member of a coparcenary, can throw his separate property into the joint family hotchpot, thereby transforming it into coparcenary property. This act does not constitute a transfer or gift but a change in the mode of ownership and devolution of the property.

The Court distinguished the legal consequences for female members, noting that a female member cannot manage joint family property, her creditors cannot sell it, and she cannot seek partition (except when permitted by statute). Thus, a female member loses control over the property, except for a potential maintenance charge.

The Court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Mallesappa Bandappa Desai v. Desai Mallappa, which held that the blending of self-acquired property with joint family property applies only to coparceners and not to female members. The rationale is that blending requires the owner to be a coparcener with an interest in the coparcenary property, which a female member lacks.

The Court rejected the argument that modern principles of justice, equity, and good conscience should extend the right to female members. It emphasized that the principle of blending is an exception to the general law requiring formal transfer instruments, and cannot be extended beyond coparceners.

The Court also noted that Hindu law allows limited owners, like widows, to surrender their estate to the nearest reversioner, but this principle does not apply to female members blending their separate property with joint family property.

The Tribunal's reliance on certain cases to support the assessee's position was found misplaced. The High Court of Delhi's decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Pushpa Devi was cited, which held that only a coparcener could throw self-acquired property into the family hotchpot, not a female member.

The High Court concluded that the right to throw separate property into the joint family hotchpot is available only to coparceners. Since the assessee in this case was not a coparcener, she could not convert her separate property into joint family property by mere declaration.

Conclusion:

The High Court answered the question in the negative, holding that the assessee, being not a coparcener, could not treat her separate property as joint family property from the date of her declaration. The assessee was directed to pay costs to the Commissioner of Income-tax.

Issues Involved:
1. Deduction admissible in respect of tax payable.
2. Exclusion of one-third share of deceased coparcener in coparcenary property from the net wealth of the assessee.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Deduction Admissible in Respect of Tax Payable
The first question of law referred by the Tribunal is whether the deduction admissible is in respect of tax payable pursuant to the relevant return filed by the assessee or the tax as finally determined on assessment. The court concluded this issue based on a prior decision in Wealth-tax Reference No. 3 of 1970. It was held that the tax liability admissible as a deduction in computing the net wealth of the assessee must be taken as the amount of tax finally determined on assessment, not the amount computed based on the return filed by the assessee.

Issue 2: Exclusion of One-Third Share of Deceased Coparcener in Coparcenary Property
The second question arose from the assessment of a Hindu undivided family (HUF) for the assessment years 1960-61, 1961-62, and 1962-63. The issue was whether the one-third share of Dinesh in the coparcenary property, inherited by Usha and Pushpavati under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, should be excluded in determining the net wealth of the assessee.

The court noted that upon Dinesh's death, his interest in the coparcenary property devolved on his wife, Usha, and his mother, Pushpavati, by virtue of section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This devolution was confirmed by a settlement where Usha received Rs. 10,70,000 in full satisfaction of her claim. The Tribunal held that the one-third share of Dinesh ceased to belong to the HUF and thus the HUF was entitled only to the remaining two-thirds share.

The court explained that under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, when a male Hindu dies, his interest in the coparcenary property devolves by testamentary or intestate succession if he leaves behind certain relatives, including a wife or mother. This interest is deemed to be the share he would have received if a partition had occurred immediately before his death. Therefore, the heirs receive a definite share in the property, and the HUF continues with the remaining share.

The court further clarified that the HUF and the heirs hold the properties as tenants-in-common, not as joint tenants. This means each has an undivided share in every item of the property. Specifically, for the jewellery valued at Rs. 29,270, the Tribunal correctly observed that only two-thirds belonged to the HUF, making it exempt from wealth-tax under section 5(1)(xiv) since its value was less than Rs. 25,000.

The court supported this conclusion by referencing section 19 of the Hindu Succession Act, which states that heirs who succeed together to the property of an intestate take the property as tenants-in-common. This principle was further reinforced by decisions from various High Courts, including Calcutta, Bombay, Mysore, and Kerala, which supported the view that the heirs and the HUF hold the properties as tenants-in-common.

In conclusion, the court affirmed that only the two-thirds share of the jewellery belonging to the HUF should be included in the net wealth computation, and since its value was below the threshold, it was exempt from tax. The second question was answered in the affirmative, and the Commissioner was directed to pay the costs of each reference to the assessee.

Issues:
Challenge to the validity of provisions of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939 and Rules framed thereunder. Jurisdictional issue regarding the service of notice under section 19(2) of the Act. Validity of the assessment order and applicability of section 30 of the Act.

Analysis:
The petitioner, the managing director of a tea estate, challenged the validity of the assessment order by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Shillong, for the assessment year 1957-58. The petitioner claimed that no notice under section 19(2) of the Assam Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1939, was served on him prior to the assessment order, rendering the assessment illegal and without jurisdiction. The key contention raised was the absence of the statutory notice, which is crucial for a valid assessment under the Act.

The respondent, in response, provided evidence of the notice served under section 19(2) through an order dated July 16, 1957, and an entry in the issue register. However, the court found that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the actual service of the notice on the petitioner. The court highlighted the importance of proper service of notice under section 19(2) for a valid assessment and concluded that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer lacked jurisdiction to make the assessment under section 20(4) due to the absence of proper notice.

The court further examined the applicability of section 30 of the Act, which allows for the reassessment of escaped income within a specified period. It was noted that the three-year limitation period under section 30 had expired, and the jurisdiction of the officer to assess the income was therefore barred. The court referred to relevant legal provisions and previous Supreme Court decisions to support its conclusion that the assessment order was invalid due to jurisdictional issues and being time-barred under section 30.

Based on the analysis, the court allowed the petitioner's application, making the rule nisi absolute and directing the respondents to refrain from taking any action based on the impugned assessment order. The court did not award costs in this matter. The judgment was agreed upon by both judges, emphasizing the importance of proper statutory procedures and jurisdictional requirements in tax assessments.

Issues Involved:
1. Legality and correctness of the computation of capital gains.
2. Interpretation and application of sections 45, 46, and 48 of the Income-tax Act.
3. Constitutionality of section 46 of the Income-tax Act under article 14 of the Constitution.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 when a departmental appeal is pending.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality and Correctness of the Computation of Capital Gains:

The petitioner-company challenged the order dated March 30, 1967, by the Income-tax Officer, which computed the capital gains for the assessment year 1962-63 at Rs. 47,97,735. The petitioner received three payments from an Indian company in liquidation, aggregating to Rs. 81,32,335, which were distributed over several years. The Income-tax Officer held that the taxable event for these capital gains arose in the assessment year 1962-63, due to the final distribution of Rs. 2,39,934 in the previous year on September 18, 1961. The officer aggregated all distributions and assessed them as capital gains for the assessment year 1962-63, rejecting the petitioner's contention that only the final distribution should be considered.

2. Interpretation and Application of Sections 45, 46, and 48 of the Income-tax Act:

The court analyzed sections 45, 46, and 48 of the Income-tax Act. Section 45 states that profits or gains from the transfer of a capital asset are chargeable to income-tax in the year of transfer. Section 46(1) clarifies that the distribution of assets on liquidation is not regarded as a transfer by the company. Section 46(2) states that a shareholder receiving money or assets on liquidation is chargeable to income-tax under "Capital gains," reduced by any amount assessed as dividend. Section 48 outlines the computation of income chargeable under "Capital gains."

The court noted that the phrase "previous year" in section 45 indicates that taxable gains arise in the year of transfer. The distribution of assets by a liquidator does not involve any transfer by the shareholder, and the shareholder's shareholding is never transferred. The court emphasized that the year in which ownership of the capital assets or money is transferred to the shareholder is the "previous year" for assessing capital gains. The court rejected the respondent's argument that the full value of the consideration could only be determined upon the final distribution in liquidation.

3. Constitutionality of Section 46 of the Income-tax Act:

The petitioner argued that if section 46 was interpreted as per the Income-tax Officer's findings, it would be unconstitutional and violate article 14 of the Constitution. The court, however, did not find it necessary to decide on the constitutionality of section 46, as it ruled in favor of the petitioner on the main issue of the correct interpretation and application of the section.

4. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 When a Departmental Appeal is Pending:

The respondent contended that the petitioner was not entitled to file the petition as it had already instituted a departmental appeal. The court acknowledged this but noted that it was not appropriate to coerce the petitioner to withdraw its departmental appeal. The court highlighted the importance of the issue and the fact that the petition was admitted in 1967 and had reached hearing in 1972. Therefore, the court decided to entertain the petition despite the pending departmental appeal.

Conclusion:

The court made the rule absolute, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated March 30, 1967. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the petition to the petitioner. The petitioner-company's undertaking given on June 19, 1967, was to continue for a further period of four months.

Issues Involved:
1. Computation of tax liabilities for income-tax, wealth-tax, and gift-tax in wealth-tax assessments.
2. Determination of deductible tax amounts when assessments are rectified or reopened.
3. Applicability of section 2(m)(iii)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act regarding outstanding tax liabilities.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Computation of Tax Liabilities in Wealth-Tax Assessments:
The core issue addressed is how to compute the liability for income-tax, wealth-tax, or gift-tax when determining the net wealth of an assessee. The court examined whether the liability should be based on the figure computed from the return submitted by the assessee or the figure determined on assessment, especially when the assessment occurs after the relevant valuation date but before the wealth-tax assessment is finalized.

The judgment emphasized that the liability for these taxes is a "present liability" on the last day of the accounting year, even if not quantified by assessment and payable at a future date. This principle was backed by the Supreme Court's decision in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, which defined a "debt" as a present obligation to pay an ascertainable sum of money, even if the exact amount is determined later through assessment.

The court concluded that if the tax liability is assessed before the wealth-tax assessment is completed, the actual amount determined by the assessment should be used rather than the estimate provided by the assessee. This ensures that the liability is quantified accurately as per the statutory provisions.

2. Determination of Deductible Tax Amounts When Assessments are Rectified or Reopened:
The court also addressed scenarios where the tax liability is rectified under section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, before the wealth-tax assessment is finalized. The judgment clarified that the rectified amount, which corrects any errors in the initial quantification, should be considered for deduction in computing the net wealth.

Similarly, when the assessment is reopened and a fresh assessment is made under section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, or section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the reassessed tax amount should be used. The court reasoned that reassessment corrects the quantification of the same liability that existed on the relevant valuation date, ensuring that the correct amount is deducted.

3. Applicability of Section 2(m)(iii)(a) of the Wealth-Tax Act:
A specific issue arose regarding the applicability of section 2(m)(iii)(a) of the Wealth-tax Act in Wealth-tax Reference No. 20 of 1970. This section deals with the exclusion of certain tax liabilities from deductions if they are outstanding on the valuation date and are claimed by the assessee in appeal as not being payable.

The court examined whether the wealth-tax liabilities for the assessment years 1960-61 and 1961-62, which were assessed but not demanded by notice until after the relevant valuation dates, could be considered outstanding. The court held that a tax amount becomes payable only when a notice of demand is issued, and since the notices were issued after the relevant valuation dates, the liabilities were not outstanding on those dates. Consequently, these liabilities were deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the deduction admissible in computing the net wealth of the assessee should be based on the tax as finally determined on assessment, not on the tax computed according to the return filed by the assessee. The court affirmed that rectified or reassessed tax amounts should be considered for deduction if finalized before the wealth-tax assessment. Additionally, the court clarified that tax liabilities are not outstanding on the valuation date until a notice of demand is issued, impacting the applicability of section 2(m)(iii)(a). The Commissioner was ordered to pay the costs of each reference to the assessee.

Issues:
1. Whether sales of empty containers and miscellaneous goods by a pharmaceutical company attract sales tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act.
2. Whether the definition of "business" under the Act includes transactions ancillary or incidental to the main trade or manufacture.

Analysis:
The judgment by the Calcutta High Court addresses the issue of sales tax liability on the petitioner, a pharmaceutical company, for sales of empty containers and miscellaneous goods. The petitioner contended that such sales were not part of their primary business and hence not taxable. However, the Assistant Commissioner found these sales to be ancillary or incidental to the petitioner's trade or commerce. The court noted that the definition of "business" under the Act includes any transaction connected with or ancillary to trade, commerce, or manufacture. As per the retrospective amendment, if such sales are related to the petitioner's main activities, they are deemed to be part of the business and taxable. The court distinguished a railway case where sales were incidental to operations, unlike the petitioner's case where sales were connected to their manufacturing activities. The judgment emphasized that profit motive is now immaterial under the Act's definition of business, aligning with a Supreme Court decision regarding the inclusive nature of business transactions.

The court also referred to a Supreme Court case involving a textile company's sales of old items, highlighting the concept of "business" as an occupation or profession with a profit motive. However, the judgment clarified that the statutory definition of business under the Act supersedes the commercial understanding, emphasizing that profit need not be the sole motive. The court concluded that the petitioner's sales of empty containers and miscellaneous goods were ancillary to their pharmaceutical manufacturing business, falling within the Act's definition of business. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the rule discharged, affirming the tax liability on the petitioner for such sales.