Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the arbitral award made before publishing the arbitration agreement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Procedural irregularities in the arbitration process.
3. Consequences of non-publication of the arbitration agreement within the stipulated time.
4. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal and the effect of simultaneous references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Arbitral Award:
The appeal concerns the validity of an arbitral award made before the publication of the arbitration agreement under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The principal question is whether non-publication of the arbitration agreement as required under Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A renders the arbitral award invalid and unenforceable. The Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions, particularly Section 10-A, which mandates the publication of the arbitration agreement in the Official Gazette within one month from the date of receipt by the appropriate government. The Court concluded that the publication of the arbitration agreement is obligatory and non-compliance with this requirement would be fatal to the arbitral award.

2. Procedural Irregularities:
The management challenged the arbitral award on the grounds of procedural irregularities, including the absence of the Deputy Commissioner during the arbitration proceedings and the lack of opportunity to produce evidence. However, the High Court did not examine all the contentions urged by the management and quashed the award solely on the basis of non-publication of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court did not delve into these procedural irregularities in detail but focused on the primary issue of publication.

3. Consequences of Non-Publication:
The Court analyzed whether the requirement of publication within the time prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 10-A is mandatory or directory. It referred to various authorities and judicial precedents to conclude that while publication of the arbitration agreement is necessary, the time limit of one month is directory and not imperative. However, the Court emphasized that the agreement must be published before the arbitrator considers the merits of the dispute, and failure to do so would invalidate the arbitral award.

4. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal:
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of simultaneous references under Sections 10 and 10-A of the Act. It noted that once the parties have chosen to refer their dispute to arbitration under Section 10-A, the government cannot subsequently refer the same dispute for adjudication under Section 10. The reference made by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) was quashed. The Court directed the State Government to publish the arbitration agreement and referred the matter to the Industrial Tribunal for passing an arbitration award in accordance with the law.

Relief and Directions:
The Supreme Court issued the following directions:
1. The State Government shall publish the arbitration agreement in the Government Gazette within four weeks.
2. The agreement stands referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Haryana at Ambala for passing an arbitration award.
3. The reference made under Section 10(1) of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal is quashed.
4. The management shall withdraw the Letters Patent Appeal and the Writ Petition pending in the High Court within three weeks, failing which the High Court shall dispose of them as infructuous.

The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously, within six months from the date of first appearance of the parties. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 (A.R. Act) to nationalized banks.
2. Constitutional validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act.
3. Applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1946, to agricultural loans.
4. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to debts owed to banks.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 (A.R. Act) to Nationalized Banks:
The plaintiff, a nationalized bank, filed a suit for the recovery of dues on an agricultural loan. The trial and appellate courts dismissed the suit, upholding the respondent's defense that Section 13 of the A.R. Act prohibited the charging of compound interest. The bank argued that Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act excluded its application to banks constituted under a statute. However, both courts rejected this argument, relying on an earlier decision in Indian Bank, Alamuru v. Muddana Krishna Murthy, which held that banks constituted under the Banking Companies Act were not exempt from the A.R. Act.

2. Constitutional Validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act:
In the second appeal, the High Court examined the constitutional validity of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act, despite it not being raised by the respondent. The High Court found that the provision violated Article 14 of the Constitution, as it created an impermissible classification of debtors based on the identity of the creditor, which had no rational nexus with the object of the A.R. Act. The High Court held that Section 4(e) brought about an impermissible classification of debtors and was therefore unconstitutional.

3. Applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1946, to Agricultural Loans:
The High Court also held that Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act, introduced by the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1984, did not override the provisions of the A.R. Act. The High Court concluded that the appellant-bank, like any other creditor, was forbidden under Section 13 of the A.R. Act from charging compound interest on agricultural loans. The court further noted that Section 21-A was prospective in operation and did not affect debts incurred prior to its enactment.

4. Applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to Debts Owed to Banks:
The High Court did not directly examine the applicability of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, to debts owed to banks, as it primarily relied on the A.R. Act. However, the court noted that other decisions had held that the Usurious Loans Act was no longer applicable to any debt due to a banking company following the introduction of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act. The High Court's observations suggested that the Usurious Loans Act could still apply to loans advanced by banks, but this was not fully explored in the judgment.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding on the unconstitutionality of Section 4(e) of the A.R. Act, holding that it was not appropriate for the High Court to have taken up this question in the absence of any plea raised by the respondent. The Supreme Court remitted the second appeal to the High Court for consideration of the applicability of Section 21-A of the Banking Regulation Act to the Usurious Loans Act and whether the appellant-bank could rebut the presumption of excessive interest. The second appeal was directed to be placed before a Division Bench of the High Court for further hearing. The appeal was disposed of without an order as to costs.

Issues:
Challenge to imposition of turnover tax under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 on grounds of constitutionality, violation of fundamental rights, and incompetence of State Legislature.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Imposition of Turnover Tax Challenge:
The applicant challenged the imposition of turnover tax under section 6B of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, alleging it to be void, ultra vires the Constitution, and beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The challenge was based on violations of fundamental rights under articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, along with contentions of infringement of articles 31, 45, 265, 286, 300A, 301, and 304. The case was transferred to the Tribunal from a writ application filed under article 226 of the Constitution.

2. High Court Decision and Arguments:
A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had previously disposed of similar cases, holding that turnover tax is a tax on sales, within the competence of the State Legislature, and not violative of the alleged constitutional articles. The present applicant's case was not part of the cases disposed of by the High Court. The applicant's arguments, including contentions on the tax being an imposition on income and violating article 301 read with article 304(b), were considered and rejected by the High Court.

3. Supreme Court Decision and Conclusion:
The applicant relied on a recent Supreme Court decision regarding a different Act, arguing that the tax imposed constituted a restriction on trade and commerce. However, the Tribunal found that the Supreme Court decision was not directly relevant to the present case. The Tribunal concurred with the High Court's findings and dismissed the writ petition challenging the turnover tax imposition, emphasizing that all relevant issues had been previously considered and addressed.

4. Interest on Turnover Tax Cases:
Additionally, the Tribunal mentioned disposing of cases related to interest on turnover tax under section 10B of the BFST Act, 1941, by directing payment of interest from a specific date. The Tribunal found no merit in the present writ petition challenging the turnover tax imposition and dismissed the case without costs.

In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the imposition of turnover tax under the BFST Act, 1941, rejecting the challenges raised by the applicant and affirming the legality and constitutionality of the tax.

Issues:
Relief from criminal proceedings under section 633(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 for default in complying with sections 210 and 220 of the Companies Act.

Analysis:
The petitioners, two directors of a company, sought relief from potential criminal proceedings and liability arising from non-compliance with sections 210 and 220 of the Companies Act, 1956. The company, a joint venture between Sony Corporation and Chhabria, faced issues leading to the directors' resignation. Sony Corporation's holding in the Indian company, Orson Electronics Limited, was significant, with the petitioners being nominated as directors due to their association with Sony Corporation. The joint venture ended in 1986, following which discrepancies in the company's accounts were noticed, prompting the directors' resignation. The directors, being foreign residents and not involved in the company's day-to-day operations, took steps to address the situation by advising an investigation by Price Waterhouse. The directors argued that they should not be held accountable for the defaults of the Indian directors and had not acted dishonestly or unreasonably.

The court acknowledged the petitioners' foreign residency, limited involvement in the company's affairs, and their proactive steps to address the financial discrepancies by suggesting an independent investigation. The court accepted the argument that the petitioners should not be held liable for the company's defaults, emphasizing that they had not acted dishonestly or unreasonably. Consequently, the court granted the petitioners relief from potential prosecution under sections 210 and 220 of the Companies Act. It was clarified that the relief granted to the foreign directors would not impact the case of the Indian directors seeking similar relief under section 633(2) of the Companies Act. The court allowed the petition, absolving the petitioners from intended prosecution without imposing any costs.

In conclusion, the judgment granted relief to the foreign directors of the company from potential criminal proceedings arising from non-compliance with sections 210 and 220 of the Companies Act. The court considered the petitioners' limited involvement in the company's operations, their proactive measures to address the financial discrepancies, and the absence of any dishonest or unreasonable conduct on their part. The court's decision highlighted the importance of individual examination of liability in cases of corporate non-compliance, irrespective of the actions of other directors, and emphasized the need to relieve foreign directors from undue prosecution in such circumstances.

Issues:
- Interpretation of Notification No. 55/75 as amended by Notification No. 221/79 regarding exemption for di-calcium phosphate.

Analysis:
1. The case involved the consideration of whether di-calcium phosphate manufactured and cleared by the appellants was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 55/75 as amended by Notification No. 221/79, dated 30-6-1979.

2. The appellants, M/s. Kerala Chemicals and Proteins Ltd., were licensed to manufacture Ossein and Di-calcium Phosphate. The process of manufacture involved treating crushed animal bones with acid to produce Di-calcium Phosphate. The goods were initially classified under T.I. 68 and duty was paid accordingly.

3. Subsequently, a notification exempting "Crushed bones and bone products" was issued, leading the appellants to claim exemption for their products. Following examinations and revised classification lists, the appellants stopped paying duty and obtained refunds based on the exemption.

4. However, a show cause notice was later issued, challenging the eligibility of di-calcium phosphate for the exemption. The Assistant Collector confirmed duty demand for a specific period, which was upheld by the Collector (Appeals) based on previous orders.

5. The appellants contended that di-calcium phosphate should be considered a bone product and thus eligible for exemption under Notification No. 221/79. They cited a Tribunal's order in a similar case to support their argument.

6. The Respondent argued that a previous adjudication order had classified di-calcium phosphate under T.I. 68 without exemption, which was binding on the appellants.

7. The Tribunal considered the arguments and observed that the di-calcium phosphate was not used in fertilizer mixture, supporting the appellants' claim for exemption. They referenced previous Tribunal judgments confirming exemption for bone products and upheld the appellants' position, allowing the appeal with consequential relief.

In conclusion, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellants, affirming that di-calcium phosphate manufactured by them was entitled to the benefit of the exemption under Notification No. 55/75 as amended by Notification No. 221/79.

Issues:
1. Validity of reopening assessment and computation of deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the IT Act.
2. Computation of capital gains on the sale of a gold necklace.

Analysis:

Issue 1:
The appeal challenged the assessment of a sum as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of the IT Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1979-80. The assessment was reopened under section 147(a) due to the assessee's substantial shareholding in a company from which loans were taken. The CIT(A) upheld the reopening citing failure to disclose relevant particulars initially. The dispute centered on whether the company had accumulated profits to support the loan as deemed dividend. The appellant argued against the reopening and the inclusion of the loan amount as deemed dividend. The departmental representative supported the reopening and the quantum of deemed dividend. The Tribunal found the reopening valid due to non-disclosure of material particulars. However, after detailed analysis of the company's financials, it concluded that the loan could not be deemed as a dividend due to lack of accumulated profits, annulling the treatment of the loan as deemed dividend.

Issue 2:
The second issue concerned the computation of capital gains on the sale of a gold necklace. The appellant sold the necklace to repay a bank loan and disputed the capital gains computation. The I.T.O. and CIT(A) determined the capital gains based on the full value of consideration received. The appellant argued that the loan amount should be deducted in computing capital gains, citing tribunal decisions. However, the Tribunal held that under the IT Act, capital gains are computed based on specific provisions. It emphasized that the full consideration received must be considered without deductions apart from specified expenditures. The Tribunal rejected the argument that the loan amount should reduce the capital gains, citing relevant court rulings. Therefore, the computation of capital gains by the I.T.O. was upheld, and the appeal was partly allowed.

In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the validity of reopening the assessment but annulled the treatment of the loan as deemed dividend due to lack of accumulated profits. It also confirmed the computation of capital gains without deducting the loan amount. The appeal was partly allowed based on these findings.

Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in filing an appeal against penalty imposed under s. 18(1)(a) of the WT Act, 1957.
2. Calculation of penalty based on wealth assessment and taxable limit for the assessment year.
3. Tribunal's consideration of reasonable cause for late filing of return.
4. High Court's direction to Tribunal to reexamine the existence of a reasonable cause.

Condonation of Delay:
The appeal was filed by the assessee against a penalty imposed under s. 18(1)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, for the assessment year 1960-61, after a significant delay of 13 years, 4 months, and 11 days. The delay was attributed to various legal proceedings and discrepancies in wealth assessment.

Calculation of Penalty:
The Wealth Tax Officer (WTO) estimated the assessee's wealth at Rs. 7 lakhs, leading to a penalty of Rs. 1,00,130. However, the Tribunal later determined the value of the right to receive compensation at Rs. 1,37,720, which fell below the minimum taxable limit of Rs. 2 lakhs for the assessment year. The Tribunal confirmed the penalty calculation based on the wealth assessment, leading to an appeal by the assessee.

Tribunal's Consideration of Reasonable Cause:
The Tribunal initially overlooked the High Court's direction to consider the existence of a reasonable cause for the late filing of the return. The assessee contended that there were grounds constituting a reasonable cause for the delay, and the Tribunal was mandated to assess this aspect afresh.

High Court's Direction:
The High Court upheld the Revenue's contention regarding penalty computation but allowed the assessee to raise the argument of a reasonable cause for late filing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, upon receiving the High Court's directions, confirmed the penalty without considering the reasonable cause. However, upon a miscellaneous petition from the assessee, the Tribunal recalled its order for further consideration.

In conclusion, the delay in filing the appeal was condoned, and the Tribunal allowed the appeal as the assessee's wealth fell below the minimum taxable limit, absolving her of any liability to pay the penalty for late filing of the return. The Tribunal dismissed the earlier appeal related to penalty calculation based on the wealth assessment.

Issues:
- Entitlement to interest under section 244(1A) on refunded amounts paid as interest under sections 215, 217(1A), and 220(2).

Detailed Analysis:
1. The appeals consolidated and heard together were against the orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT) under section 263 regarding the entitlement of interest under section 244(1A) on refunded amounts paid as interest under sections 215, 217(1A), and 220(2).
2. The question revolved around whether the assessee was entitled to interest under section 244(1A) on amounts refunded after paying interest under sections 215, 217(1A), and 220(2) due to subsequent reductions in assessed income.
3. The provisions of section 244 allow interest on refunds due to the assessee, with sub-section (1A) specifying interest on amounts paid in excess of tax or penalty found to be refundable, effective from 1-10-1975.
4. The Tribunal considered precedents but emphasized that interest under section 244(1A) applies only to refunds of tax or penalty paid in excess, not to interest amounts paid by the assessee.
5. The Tribunal differentiated between sub-sections (1) and (1A) of section 244, highlighting that interest under (1A) is limited to tax or penalty refunds, not interest payments.
6. Citing the decision of the Kerala High Court, the Tribunal reiterated that interest under (1A) is specific to tax or penalty refunds, not applicable to interest refunds like those paid under sections 215, 217(1A), and 220(2).
7. The Tribunal concluded that interest under section 244(1A) is not applicable to interest refunds, leading to the dismissal of the assessee's appeals challenging the CIT's orders under section 263.
8. The Tribunal upheld the CIT's decision to withdraw the interest allowed by the Income Tax Officer (ITO) under section 244(1A) on the refunded interest amounts paid under sections 215, 217(1A), and 220(2) due to being prejudicial to the revenue's interests.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the payment of Rs. 99 lakhs to GEC was a revenue expenditure or a capital expenditure.
2. Whether the protocol dated 28-1-1972 was superseded by clause 13 of the agreement dated 10-2-1972.
3. Whether the decision to pay Rs. 99 lakhs was commercially expedient and in the best interest of the business.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Revenue vs. Capital Expenditure
The main contention was whether the payment of Rs. 99 lakhs to GEC should be treated as a revenue expenditure or a capital expenditure. The assessing officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that the payment was either voluntary and not motivated by business considerations or was capital in nature. However, the tribunal found that the payment was made to facilitate the carrying on of MICO's business throughout the Northern region, which was a revenue expenditure. The tribunal cited several cases, including CIT v. Ashok Leyland Ltd. [1972] 86 ITR 549 (SC) and J.K. Cotton Mfrs. Ltd. v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 221 (SC), where similar payments were considered revenue expenditures. The tribunal concluded that MICO did not acquire any advantage in the capital field but merely changed its method of business, making the payment a revenue expenditure.

2. Supersession of Protocol by Clause 13
The tribunal examined whether clause 13 of the agreement dated 10-2-1972 had the effect of superseding the protocol dated 28-1-1972. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the protocol was rendered ineffective by clause 13, which superseded all prior agreements. However, the tribunal found that the protocol was a policy measure for the phased takeover of the Northern region and was not entirely superseded by clause 13. The tribunal emphasized the importance of the intention of the parties and cited Abdulla Ahmed v. Animendra Kissen Mitter AIR 1950 SC 15 and Union of India v. D.N. Revri & Co. AIR 1976 SC 2257, which allow extrinsic evidence to ascertain the real effect of a clause. The tribunal concluded that the protocol was still in effect and was respected by both parties.

3. Commercial Expediency and Business Interest
The tribunal analyzed whether the decision to pay Rs. 99 lakhs to GEC was in the best interests of MICO's business. The tribunal noted that MICO had long-standing business relations with GEC and wanted to ensure a smooth takeover without litigation. The need to take over the entire Northern region in 1977, instead of in phases, was driven by sales-tax advantages in Delhi and the practical difficulties of an instantaneous takeover. The tribunal found that the decision was commercially expedient and beneficial, citing Eastern Investments Ltd. v. CIT [1951] 20 ITR 1 and F.E. Dinshaw Ltd. v. CIT [1959] 36 ITR 114, which state that payments made on the grounds of commercial expediency should be treated as revenue expenditures. The tribunal also found that the compensation paid was reasonable and the decision was bona fide, with no extraneous considerations involved.

Conclusion
The tribunal held that the payment of Rs. 99 lakhs to GEC was a revenue expenditure, the protocol dated 28-1-1972 was not superseded by clause 13 of the agreement dated 10-2-1972, and the decision to pay the amount was commercially expedient and in the best interest of MICO's business. The appeal was allowed in part, and the claim for the deduction of Rs. 99 lakhs was accepted.

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of Petition under Article 226
2. Jurisdiction of Excise Authorities under Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
3. Classification of Goods under Tariff Items 67 and 68
4. Allegations of Fraud, Collusion, or Willful Misstatement
5. Provisional vs. Final Assessment
6. Review of Classification Lists
7. Liability of Graphite Fines to Excise Duty

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of Petition under Article 226
The court examined whether the petitioners were entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court referred to previous judgments, notably Universal Cables Ltd. v. Union of India, which established that if a notice is issued by an authority in excess of jurisdiction, the court can intervene under Article 226 to prevent unnecessary harassment. The court agreed with these observations and held that the petition was maintainable.

2. Jurisdiction of Excise Authorities under Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
The court examined whether the notice issued by the excise authorities was within the jurisdiction conferred by Section 11A of the Act. Section 11A allows recovery of duties not levied or short-levied within six months, extendable to five years in cases of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement. The court found that the notice was issued beyond the six-month period and that there was no evidence of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement to justify the extended period.

3. Classification of Goods under Tariff Items 67 and 68
The petitioner company classified its products under Tariff Item No. 68, while the excise authorities contended that they should be classified under Tariff Item No. 67. The court noted that the interpretation of these tariff items was a matter of legal interpretation and that the petitioners' interpretation was plausible. The excise authorities had approved the classification lists without modification, indicating acceptance of the petitioners' classification.

4. Allegations of Fraud, Collusion, or Willful Misstatement
The court found no evidence to support allegations of fraud, collusion, or willful misstatement by the petitioners. The court emphasized that mere misclassification does not constitute fraud or willful misstatement. The petitioners had provided full descriptions of the goods, and the excise authorities had approved the classifications accordingly.

5. Provisional vs. Final Assessment
The court examined whether the assessments were provisional or final. The excise authorities argued that the classifications were provisionally approved. However, the court found no evidence that the procedures for provisional assessment under Rule 9B were followed. The endorsements on the classification lists indicated final approval, not provisional.

6. Review of Classification Lists
The court noted that there was no evidence that the excise authorities had reviewed or modified the approved classification lists. The approval given to the classification lists was not subject to any subsequent review or modification. Therefore, any demand for short levy was unjustified without a proper review of the classification lists.

7. Liability of Graphite Fines to Excise Duty
The petitioners sought a declaration that graphite fines were not subject to excise duty. The court refrained from expressing an opinion on this issue, noting that the petitioners had themselves classified graphite fines under Item No. 68. The court suggested that the petitioners could pursue appropriate proceedings if they believed the classification was made under a mistake.

Conclusion
The court partly allowed the petition, quashing the notice and its corrigendum issued by the excise authorities, and restrained the respondents from enforcing the demand. The court did not grant relief regarding the excisability of graphite fines, leaving it open for the petitioners to pursue appropriate proceedings. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and any security amount was to be refunded to the petitioners.

Issues:
Interpretation of sections 187(2) and 188 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding succession or change in the constitution of a firm for assessment purposes.

Analysis:
The case involved a reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where the Tribunal questioned whether there was a succession or a change in the constitution of the firm under sections 187(2) and 188. The assessee, a registered firm, filed two returns for the assessment year 1978-79, claiming that the firm was dissolved on March 18, 1977, and a new firm was constituted on March 19, 1977. The Income-tax Officer considered it a change in the constitution due to some partners continuing in the new firm, leading to a single assessment. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld this decision, citing the judgment in Jalam Chand Mangilal (No. 1) v. CIT [1982] 138 ITR 343.

In Jalam Chand Mangilal's case, it was held that a dissolution followed by the constitution of a new firm constituted a succession under section 188. However, this decision was overruled by a Full Bench in Girdharilal Nannelal v. CIT [1984] 147 ITR 529, which was approved by the Supreme Court in Wazid Ali Abid Ali v. CIT [1988] 169 ITR 761. The Supreme Court clarified that a change in the constitution of a firm required a single assessment for the entire accounting period, clubbing income before and after the change.

Considering the Supreme Court's approval of the decision in Ganesh Dal Mills v. CIT [1982] 136 ITR 762, the court concluded that the reference had to be answered in the affirmative against the Revenue. Therefore, the court held that in this case, there was a change in the constitution of the firm, not a succession, and a single assessment was appropriate. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the circumstances of the case.

Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of additional grounds of appeal.
2. Eligibility for concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 40/78.
3. Applicability of the date of duty payment for determining the rate of duty.
4. Eligibility for special discount in valuation.
5. Levy of Countervailing Duty (C.V. Duty).

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of Additional Grounds of Appeal:
The appellants raised additional grounds of appeal, arguing that the duty was paid on 3-10-1980, and thus the amended Notification No. 111/80-Cus., dated 19-6-1980, should apply. The Tribunal admitted additional ground No. 16, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Sarjoo PrasadRam Kumar, which allows raising jurisdictional objections at any stage. However, additional ground No. 17, regarding the levy of C.V. Duty, was rejected as it was not raised before any authority and no separate refund claim was filed under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.

2. Eligibility for Concessional Rate of Duty under Notification No. 40/78:
The appellants claimed the benefit of Notification No. 40/78, which provides a concessional rate of 25% ad valorem for "Tool Room Precision Optical Co-ordinate Jig Boring Machine including Numerical (Control)." The adjudication authority found that the imported machine lacked a built-in optical coordinate system and had a digital readout added at an additional price. The Tribunal agreed, stating that the notification clearly covers only jig boring machines with a built-in optical coordinate system and inclusive of numerical control. Therefore, the benefit of the notification could not be extended to the goods in dispute.

3. Applicability of the Date of Duty Payment for Determining the Rate of Duty:
The appellants argued that the rate of duty should be determined based on the date of duty payment (3-10-1980) rather than the date of the Bill of Entry (19-1-1979). The Tribunal rejected this argument, citing the Bombay High Court's judgment in Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which held that the relevant date for duty is the date when the Bill of Entry is presented. The Tribunal also referenced the Tribunal's decision in The Tuticorin Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Cochin, which supports this view.

4. Eligibility for Special Discount in Valuation:
The appellants sought a special discount of 10% on the assessable value, claiming it was given due to the exhibition purposes. The Tribunal rejected this claim, stating that the goods were invoiced at full value at the time of the original import, and a special discount cannot be deducted from the assessable value under Section 14(1)(a) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Tribunal cited judgments in Automotive Enterprises v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, and Union of India v. Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd., which support this position.

5. Levy of Countervailing Duty (C.V. Duty):
The appellants argued that no C.V. Duty was leviable if the date of the Bill of Entry (19-1-1979) is considered, as per Notification No. 364/76. However, the Tribunal did not entertain this argument, as the additional ground of appeal regarding C.V. Duty was rejected earlier. The Tribunal emphasized that new pleas at the appellate stage are not permissible if they were not raised in the initial proceedings, as supported by the judgment in Unique Beautycare Product Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal confirmed the findings of the lower authorities and dismissed the appeal, upholding the view that the goods did not qualify for the concessional rate under Notification No. 40/78, the relevant date for duty determination is the date of the Bill of Entry, and the special discount cannot be deducted from the assessable value. The additional ground regarding C.V. Duty was not considered.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether street trading is a fundamental right u/s Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
2. The extent and nature of restrictions that can be imposed on street trading u/s Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
3. The necessity for regulatory measures for street trading in Delhi/New Delhi.
4. The role of the State in designating areas for street trading and the implications of inaction.

Summary:

1. Fundamental Right to Street Trading:
The judgment affirms that street trading, whether as an itinerant vendor/hawker or from a stationary position, is a fundamental right guaranteed u/s Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. This right is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State u/s Article 19(6). The judgment elaborates that the terms 'profession', 'occupation', 'trade', and 'business' in Article 19(1)(g) are intended to cover all legitimate means of earning a livelihood, including street trading.

2. Restrictions on Street Trading:
The judgment acknowledges that while public streets are primarily for public use, they can also be used for street trading, subject to reasonable restrictions. It references the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1982 in England, which regulates street trading through designations such as 'prohibited street', 'licence street', and 'consent street'. The judgment emphasizes that similar regulatory measures are necessary in India to balance the right to trade with public convenience and order.

3. Regulatory Measures in Delhi/New Delhi:
The judgment notes the lack of comprehensive regulatory measures for street trading in Delhi/New Delhi, with only skeletal provisions in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, and the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. It references previous judgments suggesting the creation of hawking and non-hawking zones to manage street trading effectively. The judgment stresses the need for a structured approach to regulate street trading, considering the significant number of people engaged in this business and the essential services they provide.

4. Role of the State and Implications of Inaction:
The judgment underscores the State's responsibility to enact laws imposing reasonable restrictions on street trading in the interest of the general public. It highlights that the State must designate specific streets and areas for street trading to ensure the fundamental right is not negated. The judgment warns that continued inaction by the State would compel the courts to intervene to protect citizens' rights.

In conclusion, the judgment calls for immediate legislative action to regulate street trading, ensuring that the fundamental right u/s Article 19(1)(g) is upheld while maintaining public order and convenience.

Issues Involved:
Jurisdiction of civil court under section 10 of the Companies Act to entertain a dispute regarding the removal of a director under section 283.

Summary:
The applicant, a director of a public limited company, filed a suit challenging his removal by the managing director without a resolution of the board of directors. The plaintiff contended that the removal was illegal u/s 284 of the Companies Act as he was not given a show-cause notice. An ad interim injunction was granted by the trial court allowing the plaintiff to attend a meeting. The defendants argued that the civil court lacked jurisdiction u/s 10 of the Companies Act due to the plaintiff's actions violating section 295. The trial court upheld its jurisdiction and granted the injunction, which was later vacated by the appellate court finding lack of jurisdiction.

The High Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as per section 10 of the Companies Act, which specifies the jurisdiction of the High Court or empowered district courts. The plaintiff's challenge to his removal fell under section 283, and the district court did not have jurisdiction over such matters. The court emphasized that the High Court typically handles disputes concerning company affairs unless specific powers are granted to district courts by the Central Government. The decision was influenced by a precedent from the Calcutta High Court, supporting the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court in this case. Other cases cited by the plaintiff were deemed irrelevant to the current dispute.

In conclusion, the Civil Revision Application filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, and the one filed by the defendants was allowed, quashing the trial court's order. The status quo was to be maintained until a specified date.

Issues Involved:
1. Demand of Duty and Confiscation
2. Assumption of TDI Consumption
3. Clandestine Removal of Goods
4. Product Gradation and Classification
5. Valuation of Scrap and Under Valuation
6. Confiscation of Seized Goods and Penalty

Summary:

1. Demand of Duty and Confiscation:
The Collector demanded duty of Rs. 12.58 lakhs, confiscated four bundles of sheets with an option for redemption, imposed a penalty of Rs. one lakh, and confiscated the land, building, and machinery with an option for redemption on payment of a fine of Rs. 20,000/-.

2. Assumption of TDI Consumption:
The show cause notice alleged that the appellants consumed 42,500 Kgs of TDI, leading to the production of 93,369.23 Kgs of polyurethene foam. The appellants contested this, claiming consumption of only 38,750 Kgs. The Tribunal found the Collector wrong in assuming 42,500 Kgs and held that the actual consumption was 38,750 Kgs.

3. Clandestine Removal of Goods:
Based on the corrected TDI consumption, the Tribunal concluded that the total clearances of polyurethene foam should be 84,165 Kgs, not 93,369.23 Kgs. The Tribunal held that there was no clandestine removal of goods without payment of excise duty.

4. Product Gradation and Classification:
The show cause notice assumed 90% of production as deluxe commercial grade and 10% as waste. The Tribunal, however, accepted the appellants' claim that 36.5% of production was 3rd grade quality. It also held that the gradation of commercial and deluxe commercial grades by the appellants was correct, rejecting the Collector's assumption of all foam being deluxe commercial grade.

5. Valuation of Scrap and Under Valuation:
The Tribunal upheld the Collector's decision to increase the value of shreddings from Rs. 6/- per kg to Rs. 9.50 per kg and the value of side skin, bottom skin, and top skin to Rs. 16.50 per kg. However, it found no case for increasing the assessable value for sales to three dealers who had given advances, as the prices to all dealers were uniform.

6. Confiscation of Seized Goods and Penalty:
The Tribunal upheld the confiscation of 4 bundles of 3rd grade sheets and one bundle of top skin, with a redemption fine of Rs. 500/-. It set aside the confiscation of land, building, plant, and machinery, and reduced the penalty from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 500/-. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Issues: Classification of Polycarbonate Tubes (Bottle Guards) under Customs Tariff Act, 1975

Analysis:
The central issue in the present appeal was the correct classification of Polycarbonate Tubes (Bottle Guards) imported by the appellants. The dispute revolved around whether these goods should be classified under heading No. 84.19 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, as claimed by the appellants, or under Heading 39.01/06 as ordered by the Collector (Appeals) in the impugned order.

The goods in question were described as Transparent Polycarbonate extruded pipes supplied under specific dimensions and designated as Bottle Guards Part No. 18306 Drawing No. SR 30. These goods were intended for use as a component part of a soda making machine, as evidenced by the invoice, Bill of Entry, and supporting literature on the home soda-maker manufactured by the appellants.

The appellants argued that the precise specifications of the bottle guards, their intended use as component parts of machinery for aerating beverages, and the provisions of Section Note 2(b) of Section XVI of the Schedule supported their classification under Heading 84.19. On the other hand, the respondent contended that the goods were merely plastic tubes without exclusive use for soda making machines, thus falling under Chapter 39 of the Schedule.

Upon examination of the evidence, it was observed that the goods were designed to specific dimensions for use with soda making machines, providing added safety features for aeration processes. The length of the tubes, 210 MM, indicated a specialized purpose rather than general use for conveying gases and liquids. Additionally, Chapter Note 1(ij) to Chapter 39 excluded articles falling within Section XVI, which covers machines and mechanical appliances.

Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the Polycarbonate Tubes (Bottle Guards) were correctly classified under heading 84.19 of the Tariff Schedule. The impugned order was modified accordingly, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants, granting them consequential relief.

This detailed analysis highlights the key arguments presented by both parties, the specific characteristics of the goods in question, and the legal provisions governing their classification under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough evaluation of the evidence and relevant statutory provisions, resulting in a favorable outcome for the appellants.

Issues:
Classification of "White Lead" under the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis:
The judgment deals with the classification of "White Lead" under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The Assistant Collector initially classified the product under Heading No. 2805.90, while the Collector (Appeals) reclassified it under Heading 2804.60. The issue revolved around whether "White Lead" should be classified under salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids and metals or under inorganic bases and oxides, hydroxides, and peroxides of metals.

The tribunal examined the chemical composition of "White Lead" as a lead carbonate, basic, and referred to various sources like the Condensed Chemical Dictionary and the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System. It was established that "White Lead" is a basic lead carbonate used in the manufacture of oil paints and as a drying pigment. The tribunal concluded that since "White Lead" is an inorganic salt of a metal and not specifically described elsewhere, it should fall under Heading No. 28.05 of the Schedule, specifically sub-heading 2805.90.

The tribunal rejected the argument that "White Lead" should be classified under the heading appropriate to paints and varnishes based on the repealed Central Excise Tariff Schedule. It emphasized that the repealed schedule and the current Tariff Act of 1985 are distinct. Therefore, "White Lead" is more suitably classified under Heading No. 28.05, sub-heading 2805.90 of the new schedule.

Furthermore, the tribunal noted that after a specific date, the classification of "White Lead" would change to Heading 28.36, sub-heading 2836.90 due to its carbonate nature. The judgment highlighted the erroneous classification by the Collector (Appeals) under Heading 2804.60, as lead carbonate is distinct from lead oxide, red lead, or orange lead, as per chemical definitions.

In conclusion, the tribunal found the Collector (Appeals) classification of "White Lead" under Heading 2804.60 to be incorrect and unsustainable. The impugned order was modified, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellant-Collector.

Issues:
1. Dispute over whether a lottery prize of Rs. 2 lakh won by minor sons was their actual winnings or undisclosed income of the assessee.
2. Assessment of Rs. 1,90,000 as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources by IAC (Asst).
3. Appeal against the IAC (Asst) order by the assessee.
4. Decision of the CIT(A) to delete the entire amount assessed in the hands of the assessee.
5. Arguments presented in the appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal by both the Department and the assessee.
6. Tribunal's analysis of the facts, arguments, and evidence presented by both sides.
7. Dismissal of the Department's appeal and allowance of the Cross-objections of the assessee.

Analysis:
1. The main issue in dispute was whether the lottery prize of Rs. 2 lakh won by the minor sons of the assessee was genuinely their winnings or undisclosed income of the assessee. The IAC (Asst) alleged that the prize was actually the assessee's undisclosed income, attempting to "white-wash" black money. The IAC assessed Rs. 1,90,000 as the assessee's income from undisclosed sources based on this premise.

2. The CIT(A) reviewed all facts and arguments and concluded that there was no justification for the IAC's assessment. The CIT(A) highlighted a slight delay in tax deduction application and discrepancies in statements as factors against the assessee. However, after considering all aspects, the CIT(A) found no evidence to support the assessee's individual investment claim and deleted the entire assessed amount.

3. In the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, the Department challenged the CIT(A)'s decision, alleging that the IAC's facts were accurate and that the assessee influenced Shri Mangaram to change his statement. The assessee's counsel defended the CIT(A)'s decision, pointing out discrepancies in the IAC's conduct and statements.

4. The Tribunal carefully examined all arguments and evidence. While acknowledging the suspicion raised by the Department, the Tribunal emphasized that suspicion alone cannot replace proof. The Tribunal found ample evidence to reject the Department's allegations, concluding that the assessee did not invest Rs. 1,90,000 for the lottery ticket purchase.

5. Even if the Department's arguments were accepted, the Tribunal noted that there was no basis to charge tax from the assessee in his individual capacity. The Tribunal highlighted the lack of concrete evidence to support the Department's claims of fraud by the assessee, ultimately upholding the CIT(A)'s decision to allow the assessee's appeal.

6. The Tribunal dismissed the Department's appeal and allowed the Cross-objections of the assessee since the entire addition of Rs. 1,90,000 was deleted. The Tribunal found no merit in the objections raised by the assessee regarding the CIT(A)'s observations, as they did not impact the assessee's income or tax liability.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Executors of the estate should be assessed under Section 19A(5) or Section 21 of the Wealth-tax Act.
2. The status of the Executors as either Executors or Trustees.
3. The implications of the Urban Land Ceiling Act on the property valuation.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Assessment under Section 19A(5) or Section 21 of the Wealth-tax Act:
The primary issue in these appeals is whether the assessments should be made on the Executors under Section 19A(5) of the Wealth-tax Act or on the Trustees under Section 21. The Wealth-tax Officer (WTO) held that the assessments should be made under Section 19A(5) because a valuable piece of land remained undistributed. The assessee argued that the Executors had completed the administration of the estate and should be assessed as Trustees under Section 21. The Tribunal concluded that the Executors had effectively become Trustees since the estate had been fully administered, liabilities paid, and the shares of the beneficiaries were known and determinate. Therefore, the assessments should be made under Section 21.

2. Status of Executors as Executors or Trustees:
The Tribunal examined whether the Executors continued to function as Executors or had assumed the role of Trustees. Legal precedents indicate that Executors can shed their character as Executors and assume the role of Trustees once the estate is fully administered. The Tribunal referred to several cases, including CIT v. Estate of Late Shri T.P. Ramaswamy Pillai and Suhasini Karuri v. WTO, which support the view that Executors can become Trustees even before all debts are discharged. The Tribunal also considered the Bombay High Court's observations, which indicated that the administration of the estate was complete, and the Executors should be treated as Trustees. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the Executors were functioning as Trustees and should be assessed under Section 21.

3. Implications of the Urban Land Ceiling Act on Property Valuation:
The property in question was subject to the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which affected its valuation and distribution. The Tribunal noted that the property was initially considered waste land and faced difficulties in physical distribution. Subsequent legal developments, including the application for exemption under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Bombay High Court's orders, indicated that the land was treated as belonging to the beneficiaries. The Tribunal emphasized that the Executors did not have unfettered rights over the property and were functioning as Trustees for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the property should be assessed in the hands of the Trustees under Section 21.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal allowed the appeals, holding that the assessments should be made on the Trustees under Section 21 of the Wealth-tax Act. The Tribunal did not address the valuation of the land, as the primary legal issue was decided in favor of the assessee. The appeals were treated as allowed.

Issues involved: Promotion policy interpretation, application of bye-law 71(b)(ii), categorization of staff, tribunal's jurisdiction, exercise of power under Article 136.

Promotion Policy Interpretation:
The respondent, a civil engineer, was not considered for promotion for nearly two decades, leading him to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking relief. The Tribunal allowed his claim based on bye-law 71(b)(ii) which the appellant challenged in the Supreme Court.

Application of Bye-law 71(b)(ii):
Bye-law 71(b)(ii) pertains to the promotion of scientific and technical staff, assessing their merit for promotion after specific periods. The Tribunal extended the benefit of this bye-law to the respondent, a civil engineer, despite not being engaged in scientific work. The Court noted that the bye-law only applies to staff engaged in scientific work, excluding those in administrative roles like the respondent.

Categorization of Staff:
The reclassification of staff categories by the appellant led to civil engineers being placed under the 'administrative' category, causing discontent and protests. Despite attempts to reclassify them as 'technical,' no promotional benefits were extended until a new scheme was introduced. The Court highlighted the importance of providing opportunities for career advancement to employees, emphasizing the need for a fair promotion system.

Tribunal's Jurisdiction:
The Administrative Tribunals Act established service Tribunals as final arbiters of service-related disputes, emphasizing the importance of tribunalization of justice in service matters. The Court acknowledged the Tribunal's role in resolving such disputes without strict adherence to procedural rules, with finality given to their decisions.

Exercise of Power under Article 136:
While the Court retains the power to intervene under Article 136, it generally refrains from interfering in individual disputes unless there is manifest injustice or a substantial public interest. In this case, despite disagreeing with the interpretation of bye-law 71(b)(ii), the Court declined to overturn the relief granted to the respondent after years of stagnation in the same position.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision to grant relief to the respondent without awarding costs, considering the prolonged lack of promotion opportunities and the principles of substantial justice in service matters.