Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to Letters Patent Appeals.
2. Interpretation of Rule 7 of Chapter III of the Rules of the Court.
3. The effect of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on special or local laws.
4. Whether the Rules of the Court under the Letters Patent constitute a special or local law.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to Letters Patent Appeals:
The primary issue is whether the time required for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree should be excluded when computing the period of limitation for filing a Letters Patent Appeal. The relevant rule, Rule 7 of Chapter III of the Rules of Court, states that "a duly stamped memorandum of appeal shall be presented to the Registrar within 60 days and not more from the date of the judgment, unless a Judge in his discretion, on good cause shown, shall grant further time for its presentation." The memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or decree appealed from.

The court examined the applicability of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, which provides that "in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from, shall be excluded." The judgment in 'Fazal Muhammad v. Phul Kuar' had held that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment could not be excluded for Letters Patent Appeals. However, the court found that the provisions of Section 12(2) should apply to Letters Patent Appeals, as the rules of the court under the Letters Patent constitute a special or local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

2. Interpretation of Rule 7 of Chapter III of the Rules of the Court:
The court analyzed Rule 7, which mandates that the appeal must be presented within 60 days from the date of the judgment. The rule also allows a judge to grant further time for its presentation on good cause shown. The court noted that the rule's language, particularly the phrase "and not more," emphasizes the strictness of the 60-day period. However, the court concluded that this strictness does not exclude the operation of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, which allows for the exclusion of the time required to obtain a copy of the judgment or decree.

3. The effect of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on special or local laws:
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act states that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed in that schedule. For determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply, unless expressly excluded by such special or local law.

The court interpreted this to mean that the general provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 12(2), should apply to the computation of the period of limitation for appeals under the Letters Patent, as these rules constitute a special or local law. The court emphasized that the words "any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law" indicate a broad application of Section 29(2).

4. Whether the Rules of the Court under the Letters Patent constitute a special or local law:
The court held that the rules made by the High Court under its Letters Patent are indeed a special or local law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. This conclusion was based on the fact that these rules govern the jurisdiction and procedure of the High Court, which has a restricted local application limited to the territorial extent of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act apply to the computation of the period of limitation for Letters Patent Appeals.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the appellant is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from in computing the period of limitation for filing a Letters Patent Appeal. The judgment in 'Fazal Muhammad v. Phul Kuar' was overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent with this interpretation. The court directed that the appeal be considered within time if the period for obtaining the copy of the judgment and decree is excluded as per Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act.

Issues Involved:
1. Recovery of Rs. 5000 and Rs. 34,000 with interest.
2. Authority of a partner to draw cheques in his own favor.
3. Plaintiffs' entitlement as holders in due course of the cheque.
4. Inquiry obligation of the endorsee regarding the title of the payee.

Detailed Analysis:

Recovery of Rs. 5000 and Rs. 34,000 with Interest
The Plaintiffs sought to recover two sums of Rs. 5000 and Rs. 34,000 with interest from the Defendants. The Defendants, a partnership firm, initially contested their liability for these amounts. However, they conceded their liability for the Rs. 5000 claim, leading to a decree in favor of the Plaintiffs for this amount with interest at 6% per annum from 19-6-1949 till judgment.

Authority of a Partner to Draw Cheques in His Own Favor
The Plaintiffs contended that Jamnadas, a partner with full managerial authority, had the implied authority to draw cheques on behalf of the firm. However, the court found no evidence of express or implied authority allowing Jamnadas to draw a post-dated cheque in his own favor and endorse it to a third party. The court emphasized that partnership agreements do not inherently authorize a partner to enter into contracts with himself without the consent of all partners.

Plaintiffs' Entitlement as Holders in Due Course of the Cheque
The Plaintiffs argued that they were holders in due course of the Rs. 34,000 cheque. However, the court held that the Plaintiffs were aware that the cheque was drawn by Jamnadas in his own favor, which should have prompted further inquiry. The court stated that under Section 9 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a holder in due course must obtain the instrument without sufficient cause to believe any defect existed in the title of the person from whom it was derived.

Inquiry Obligation of the Endorsee Regarding the Title of the Payee
The court ruled that the Plaintiffs failed to make reasonable inquiries into the title of Jamnadas when accepting the cheque. Despite knowing that Jamnadas had financial difficulties and that the cheque was drawn in his favor, the Plaintiffs did not verify with other partners or the firm. The court concluded that the Plaintiffs did not act diligently and could not claim to be holders in due course.

Conclusion
The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim for Rs. 34,000 against the defendant firm. The Plaintiffs were awarded Rs. 5000 with interest at 6% per annum from 19-6-1949 till judgment. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and interest on the judgment was set at 4%. The court's decision underscores the importance of due diligence and proper authorization in financial transactions within partnerships.

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the petition.
2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ.
3. Merger of orders in appellate and revisional jurisdictions.
4. Finality of orders under the Evacuee Property Act.
5. Interpretation of statutory tenancy and occupancy rights under the Evacuee Property Act.
6. Merits of the Custodian's order.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of the Petition:
The Advocate General contended that the petition was not maintainable as the final order to be challenged was that of the Custodian General, passed on April 10, 1954. The respondent argued that it was not necessary to challenge the Custodian General's order and that the order of the Custodian could be quashed by the High Court. The court held that the petition challenging the Custodian's order was maintainable since the Custodian's order was within the jurisdiction and could be quashed by the High Court.

2. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Issue a Writ:
The Advocate General argued that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Custodian General, whose office was in Delhi. The court clarified that it had jurisdiction to quash the order of the Custodian, which was within its jurisdiction, and that the order of the Custodian General did not supersede the Custodian's order in a way that would affect the High Court's jurisdiction.

3. Merger of Orders in Appellate and Revisional Jurisdictions:
The court discussed the difference between appellate and revisional jurisdictions. It emphasized that in appellate jurisdiction, the appeal constitutes a continuation of the suit, whereas in revisional jurisdiction, the revisional court exercises its supervisory powers. The court concluded that the principles of merger applicable to appellate jurisdiction do not necessarily apply to revisional jurisdiction. The order of the lower court does not merge into the order of the revisional court unless the revisional court modifies or reverses the order.

4. Finality of Orders under the Evacuee Property Act:
The court examined Section 28 of the Evacuee Property Act, which states that orders made by the Custodian-General are final and cannot be questioned in any court. However, the court clarified that this finality pertains to ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts and does not imply that the Custodian General's order supersedes the Custodian's order for the purposes of judicial review.

5. Interpretation of Statutory Tenancy and Occupancy Rights:
The court held that a statutory tenancy is a personal right that does not vest in the Custodian. It examined the facts and concluded that upon the termination of the evacuee's tenancy, the evacuee became a statutory tenant. Section 18(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which pertains to occupancy rights, does not cover statutory tenancy or personal rights to occupy premises. Therefore, the statutory tenancy of the evacuee did not vest in the Custodian.

6. Merits of the Custodian's Order:
The court found little merit in the Custodian's order. It noted that the tenancy of the evacuee terminated with the landlord's notice to quit, and the evacuee became a statutory tenant. The Custodian's order was based on an erroneous conception of law, as the tenancy rights could not vest in the Custodian. The court also accepted the petitioner's contention that he was in occupation under a color of title and could not be evicted as a trespasser by the Custodian's summary procedure.

Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court upheld the maintainability of the petition, affirmed its jurisdiction to quash the Custodian's order, clarified the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdictions, interpreted the finality of orders under the Evacuee Property Act, and found the Custodian's order to be legally erroneous.

Issues Involved:
1. Conviction under Sections 302 and 392 IPC.
2. Circumstantial evidence and its sufficiency.
3. Admissibility of evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in light of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
4. Presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
5. Conviction under a lesser offense (Section 201 IPC).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Conviction under Sections 302 and 392 IPC:
The accused was initially convicted by the Sessions Judge under Sections 302 (murder) and 392 (robbery) IPC, sentenced to life transportation for the first count and seven years of rigorous imprisonment for the second count. The prosecution alleged that the accused murdered Vengamma and Bhagyamma and stole money and silver bangles. However, the High Court found inconsistencies and lack of direct evidence to support these charges.

2. Circumstantial Evidence and Its Sufficiency:
The prosecution relied heavily on circumstantial evidence to establish the accused's guilt. The High Court noted the following:
- No direct evidence of the accused entering or leaving the crime scene.
- Witnesses (P.W. 8 and P.W. 9) saw the accused near the crime scene but not close enough to implicate him directly.
- The accused's alleged absconding was not sufficiently proven as he was arrested in his village.
- Discovery of a blood-stained knife and other materials was questionable due to inconsistencies in police testimonies.

The Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence must be verified with scrupulous accuracy, consistent only with the accused being the culprit, and not susceptible to any other rational explanation. The Court found the circumstantial evidence insufficient to convict the accused of murder and robbery.

3. Admissibility of Evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in Light of Article 20(3) of the Constitution:
The Court examined whether the information leading to the discovery of evidence was admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, considering Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination. The Court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, which extended the protection against self-incrimination to compelled testimony previously obtained from an accused. However, the Court found no evidence of compulsion in obtaining the information from the accused, thus holding the information as voluntarily given and admissible under Section 27.

4. Presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act:
The Court considered whether the presumption under Section 114 could be drawn against the accused for murder and robbery based on the discovered articles. The Court reviewed several precedents and concluded that:
- Presumption of guilt for murder and robbery requires more than mere possession of stolen property.
- There must be additional evidence connecting the accused to the crime scene or the act of murder.
- In this case, the Court found the evidence too slender to draw such a presumption, especially since the accused was seen 1-1/2 miles away from the crime scene and there was no direct evidence linking him to the murder.

5. Conviction under a Lesser Offense (Section 201 IPC):
Despite setting aside the convictions under Sections 302 and 392 IPC, the Court found sufficient evidence to convict the accused under Section 201 IPC for causing the disappearance of evidence to screen the offender. The accused's actions in hiding the wristlets and the pot of money indicated his involvement in screening the real culprits. The Court cited precedent allowing for conviction under Section 201 IPC even without a specific charge if the facts justify it.

Conclusion:
The High Court set aside the convictions and sentences under Sections 302 and 392 IPC due to insufficient evidence and inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. However, the Court convicted the accused under Section 201 IPC and sentenced him to three years of rigorous imprisonment for his role in hiding evidence and screening the actual offenders.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the period of 60 days for making an application under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act can exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order under sub-section (3) of section 10.
2. Applicability of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act to applications under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
3. Interpretation of section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act in relation to special or local laws.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Exclusion of Time for Obtaining Copy of Order:
The primary issue was whether, in computing the period of 60 days within which an application must be made under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, an assessee is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order under sub-section (3) of section 10. The court noted that the U.P. Sales Tax Act itself did not contain any provision making the Indian Limitation Act applicable in computing the period of limitation prescribed under that Act. However, section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable, which means that the period of limitation prescribed by the U.P. Sales Tax Act must be computed by applying the provisions contained in sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 of the Indian Limitation Act.

2. Applicability of Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act:
The court examined whether the benefit provided by sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act could be extended to the applicants. Sub-section (2) of section 12 states that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal, and an application for review of judgment, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, or order shall be excluded. The court determined that the application under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was not an appeal, an application for leave to appeal, or an application for review of judgment. Therefore, on the plain language of sub-section (2) of section 12, the applicants were not entitled to exclude the period requisite for obtaining the copy of the order in computing the period of 60 days.

3. Interpretation of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act:
The court discussed the argument that section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act should be interpreted to include the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order for any suit, appeal, or application under a special or local law. The court rejected this argument, stating that the words "any suit, appeal, or application" in section 29 were not meant to enlarge the scope of sub-section (2) of section 12 but merely to describe the nature of proceedings to which sections 4, 9 to 18, and 22 are to be applied. The court emphasized that section 29 was intended to make these provisions applicable when computing the period of limitation under a special or local law in the same manner as they would be applicable under the general law governed by the Indian Limitation Act.

The court also referred to various precedents and held that the interpretation urged by the applicants would lead to unintended and potentially absurd results. For instance, the court noted that if section 29 were interpreted to apply section 12(2) to all applications under special or local laws, it would lead to inconsistencies, such as applying section 12(2) to applications for execution under the U.P. Tenancy Act, which was not the intention of the legislature.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that there was no justification for holding that the provisions of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act are applicable to the computation of the period of limitation for an application under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Consequently, the question referred to the Full Bench was answered in the negative, indicating that the period of 60 days cannot exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order under sub-section (3) of section 10.

Separate Judgments:
- MOOTHAM, C.J., AGARWALA, J., UPADHYA, J., and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.: All agreed with the conclusion that the question should be answered in the negative, emphasizing that the application under sub-section (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act does not fall within the categories covered by section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act.
- Reference Answered in the Negative: The court collectively concluded that the application was time-barred and the period taken in obtaining the copy of the order could not be excluded.

Issues Involved:
1. Authorization to pay extra remuneration to managing agents.
2. Validity of the notice convening the meeting.
3. Jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
4. Internal autonomy of the company.
5. Application of Section 87C of the Indian Companies Act.
6. Validity of the appointment of the managing agent.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Authorization to Pay Extra Remuneration to Managing Agents:
The core issue was whether Defendant No. 1 company was authorized to pay extra remuneration to its managing agents beyond what was stipulated in the agreement dated 24th February 1932. The plaintiffs contended that the managing agents were entitled only to a nine annas commission in the rupee, as per the agreement, and any additional remuneration was ultra vires and illegal. The trial court agreed, ruling that there was no express provision in the company's memorandum or articles of association authorizing such an increase. However, the appellate court found that the provision related to the appointment and remuneration of the managing agent was not a condition within the meaning of Section 10 of the Indian Companies Act, and thus, the company could regulate this detail without a special resolution. The appellate court relied on precedents such as Ramkumar Potdar v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. and Ramachandra Lalbhai v. Chinubhai Lalbhai to support this view.

2. Validity of the Notice Convening the Meeting:
The plaintiffs argued that the notice dated 21st June 1949, particularly item (5) regarding extra remuneration, was vague and invalid. They cited Narayanlal v. Manekji Petit Manufacturing Co., where resolutions were invalidated due to insufficient disclosure in the notice. The appellate court, however, found that the notice was clear and specific, and the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to object before the meeting. The court concluded that the notice was valid and the resolution passed was legal.

3. Jurisdiction to Entertain the Suit:
The defendants contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it pertained to the internal management of the company. The appellate court did not explicitly address this issue in the judgment, focusing instead on the substantive issues of authorization and notice validity.

4. Internal Autonomy of the Company:
The defendants argued that decisions regarding remuneration were part of the company's internal autonomy. The appellate court supported this view, stating that the company had the right to regulate the details of its management, including remuneration, without requiring court intervention or a special resolution.

5. Application of Section 87C of the Indian Companies Act:
The plaintiffs argued that Section 87C of the Indian Companies Act, which required a special resolution for extra remuneration, applied as the managing agent was appointed after the commencement of the Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1936. The appellate court disagreed, noting that Defendant No. 5 replaced the deceased managing agent by virtue of the existing agreement and not as a new appointment post-1936. Thus, Section 87C did not apply, and no special resolution was necessary.

6. Validity of the Appointment of the Managing Agent:
In a related appeal (First Appeal No. 549 of 1951), the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the appointment of Seth Narottamdas Jethalal as the managing agent. The trial court dismissed this challenge, and the appellate court noted that the appeal had become moot due to the death of Seth Narottamdas. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as the plaintiffs' right to sue did not survive against the heirs and legal representatives.

Conclusion:
The appellate court allowed First Appeal No. 134 of 1951, set aside the trial court's decree, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs. The cross objections were also dismissed. First Appeal No. 549 of 1951 was dismissed due to the death of the original defendant, with no order as to costs.

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of the sales tax assessment on the sale of tea.
2. Constitutional validity of the newly incorporated section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act by the amending Act (Bihar Act VI of 1949).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Sales Tax Assessment on the Sale of Tea:

The assessee, an incorporated company, Debijhora Tea Co. Ltd., produced and processed tea in Bihar and sent it to their head office in Jalpaiguri for resale. The Sales Tax Authorities assessed the gross turnover and taxable turnover for the periods from 1st October 1948 to 31st March 1949 and from 1st April 1949 to 25th January 1950, resulting in sales tax assessments of Rs. 9,240 and Rs. 10,865-2-0 respectively. The assessee contended that the imposition of sales tax was illegal as no portion of the tea was sold within Bihar. However, the Board of Revenue rejected this contention, holding the imposition of sales tax legally valid.

2. Constitutional Validity of the Newly Incorporated Section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act:

The core issue was whether the newly incorporated section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, as amended by Act VI of 1949, was constitutionally valid. The amended section 2(g) includes a legal fiction that deems the sale of goods produced or manufactured in Bihar to have taken place within Bihar, regardless of where the delivery or contract of sale is made. The assessee argued that this provision authorized the imposition of sales tax on "forward contracts," which was not legally valid. They referred to the Supreme Court decision in Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash, which held that the power to impose a tax on the sale of goods did not include the power to tax forward contracts.

The court, however, found this argument fallacious, stating that section 2(g) authorizes the imposition of tax only on completed transactions of sale, not on forward contracts. The legal fiction introduced by section 2(g) was deemed to create sufficient territorial nexus, allowing the Bihar Legislature to impose sales tax on goods produced or manufactured within the State, even if the sale occurred outside Bihar. The court emphasized that the legislative power under section 100(3) of the Government of India Act, read with item 48 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, allowed the Provincial Legislature to make laws for the Province, including taxing transactions with sufficient territorial nexus.

The court also referenced the judicial Committee's decision in Wallace Brothers and Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax and the Supreme Court's decision in The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., which supported the principle of territorial nexus for legislative jurisdiction. The court concluded that the production of tea in Bihar constituted a real and pertinent connection, justifying the imposition of sales tax by the Bihar Legislature.

Conclusion:

The High Court answered all the questions referred to it in favor of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The court upheld the validity of the sales tax assessment on the sale of tea and the constitutional validity of the newly incorporated section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, as amended by Act VI of 1949. The court held that the Bihar Legislature had the jurisdiction to tax the sale of goods produced or manufactured within the State, even if the sale occurred outside Bihar, due to the sufficient territorial nexus. The State of Bihar was entitled to the costs of the reference, with a hearing fee of Rs. 250.

Issues:
1. Interpretation of the term "green vegetables" in the U.P. Sales Tax Act notification of 1948.
2. Exemption of betel leaves from sales tax under the notification.
3. Validity of the assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer.
4. Applicability of the subsequent notification of 1954 exempting betel leaves from sales tax.
5. Adequacy of legal remedies available to the petitioner.

Interpretation of "Green Vegetables":
The main issue in this case is the interpretation of the term "green vegetables" as mentioned in the U.P. Sales Tax Act notification of 1948. The petitioner argued that betel leaves should be considered as green vegetables and thus exempt from sales tax. The court analyzed various definitions of "vegetable" and concluded that betel leaves do not fall under the category of green vegetables based on their usage and definition in dictionaries. Reference was made to a similar case in the High Court at Patna where betel leaves were not considered as green vegetables. The court upheld that betel leaves do not qualify as green vegetables under the notification.

Exemption of Betel Leaves:
The petitioner contended that betel leaves should be exempt from sales tax under the 1948 notification which exempted green vegetables and fresh fruits. However, the court ruled that betel leaves do not fall under the category of green vegetables as per the notification. The subsequent notification of 1954 specifically exempted betel leaves from sales tax, except for prepared pans, further clarifying the tax status of betel leaves.

Validity of Assessment Order:
The petitioner challenged the assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, arguing that betel leaves should be exempt from sales tax. The court noted that the petitioner's argument was based on the interpretation of the term "green vegetables," which was ultimately rejected. The court upheld the assessment order and dismissed the petitioner's claim.

Legal Remedies Available:
The respondents argued that the petitioner should have pursued other legal remedies, such as filing an appeal against the assessment order. However, the court deemed such remedies as dilatory and not an adequate solution, especially considering the potential delay in resolving the matter. The court overruled the objection raised by the respondents regarding the maintainability of the petition.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, the court dismissed the petitioner's claim, stating that betel leaves do not qualify as green vegetables under the U.P. Sales Tax Act notification of 1948. The subsequent notification of 1954 exempted betel leaves from sales tax, except for prepared pans. The court upheld the assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer and rejected the petitioner's argument for exemption based on the interpretation of the term "green vegetables." The petition was dismissed with costs.

This detailed analysis of the judgment highlights the key issues involved in the case and provides a comprehensive overview of the court's decision on each issue.

Issues:
1. Determination of whether a receipt is a trading receipt taxable as income or a capital receipt immune from tax.

Analysis:
The judgment in this case revolves around the issue of whether a particular receipt should be considered a trading receipt taxable as income or a capital receipt exempt from tax. The judge, Harman J., emphasized the importance of analyzing the real nature of the payment to determine its classification. He quoted previous judgments to highlight the difficulty in drawing a clear line between income and capital receipts, stressing that each case must be considered based on its unique facts. The judge rejected the notion that the distinction between a payment under a contract and a payment for a contract acquisition was relevant in this case, as it did not align with the specific circumstances presented.

Furthermore, the judge discussed various cases that demonstrated conflicting decisions regarding the taxation of payments based on their impact on the company's profit-making capacity. He expressed skepticism towards the distinction based on the importance of assets or the duration of contracts, indicating that such criteria were not definitive in determining the tax treatment of receipts. The judge also addressed the argument that the company's characterization of the payment as compensation for loss of office should dictate its tax treatment, emphasizing that merely labeling the payment was insufficient to determine its tax status.

Moreover, the judge delved into the company's business activities, highlighting its role as a mining finance company involved in buying and selling shares and providing secretarial services to other companies. The judge examined the circumstances surrounding the payment in question, emphasizing that the payment was intricately linked to the company's unique position and its ability to influence the terms of a share sale. The judge concluded that the payment, although not part of the share purchase price, was earned in the course of the company's trade and constituted a trading receipt subject to taxation.

In the final analysis, the judge upheld the commissioner's decision that the payment in question should be treated as a trading receipt taxable as income. The judge dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the payment was earned by the company as part of its trade activities and was directly linked to its shareholding position, making it subject to taxation as income.

Overall, the judgment provides a detailed examination of the factors influencing the tax treatment of receipts, emphasizing the need to consider the specific circumstances of each case to determine whether a receipt should be classified as a trading receipt or a capital receipt for tax purposes.

Issues Involved:
1. Qualification of the appellant to stand for election.
2. Validity of the declaration made by the appellant.
3. Jurisdiction of the returning officer.
4. Appealability of the order passed by the returning officer.
5. Whether the returning officer acts as a court.
6. Jurisdiction of the Magistrate in filing a complaint.
7. Whether the order of the Magistrate was without jurisdiction.
8. Misapprehension in the statement of the appellant's caste.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Qualification of the appellant to stand for election:
The appellant was a candidate for election to the House of the People from the Karnal Reserved Constituency. According to the proviso to section 33(3) of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951), a candidate must provide a verified declaration that they are a member of the Scheduled Castes for which the seat is reserved. The appellant declared himself a member of the Balmiki Caste, a recognized Scheduled Caste under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.

2. Validity of the declaration made by the appellant:
The appellant's declaration was challenged by another candidate, who claimed that the appellant was not a Balmiki by caste but was born a Muslim and converted to Hinduism. The District Magistrate held an inquiry and found prima facie evidence supporting the claim that the appellant was born a Muslim and later converted to Hinduism. Consequently, a complaint was filed against the appellant under sections 181, 182, and 193 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. Jurisdiction of the returning officer:
The Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the returning officer was not a court, and thus the proceedings did not fall under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, however, held that the returning officer was a court and that his order was appealable, but dismissed the revision on the merits.

4. Appealability of the order passed by the returning officer:
The Supreme Court examined whether the order of the District Magistrate, acting as the returning officer, was open to appeal. Sections 195, 476, and 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure were scrutinized. The Court concluded that the order was not appealable as the returning officer was not acting as a court under section 195(1)(b).

5. Whether the returning officer acts as a court:
The Court analyzed the functions and powers of the returning officer under section 36 of the Representation of the People Act. It was determined that while the returning officer performs judicial functions, he does not act as a court. The proceedings before the returning officer are quasi-judicial and do not possess all the attributes of a court.

6. Jurisdiction of the Magistrate in filing a complaint:
The Court noted that the application for initiating prosecution under section 193 was made under section 476 on the assumption that the returning officer was a court. However, the application was also presented under section 195, which was necessary for offences under sections 181 and 182. The Court held that there was no legal impediment to the returning officer filing a complaint under sections 181 and 182 and also charging the accused with an offence under section 193.

7. Whether the order of the Magistrate was without jurisdiction:
The Court found that the order dated 17-9-1952 was not without jurisdiction. The appellant's objection that the returning officer was not a court was overruled by the Magistrate, and the complaint was validly filed under section 195(1)(a).

8. Misapprehension in the statement of the appellant's caste:
The appellant contended that the Magistrate misapprehended his declaration, stating that he was born a Balmiki, whereas he only declared that he was a Balmiki by caste. The Court found no substance in this contention, noting that the appellant himself pleaded in his counter-affidavit that he was born in a Balmiki Hindu family. The charge in the complaint was that the appellant's declaration of being a Balmiki by caste was false.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the order of the Magistrate dated 17-9-1952 was final and that there were no exceptional grounds for interference in a special appeal. The Court upheld the discretion of the lower courts in deciding whether to take action under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to set-off of excess advance tax payments made in Lahore for assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48 against tax liabilities in India for subsequent years.
2. Applicability of Indian Independence (Rights, Property, and Liabilities) Order, 1947, to refund claims.
3. Limitation period for claiming refunds under the Income-tax Act.
4. Adequacy of alternative remedies (appeal) before filing a writ petition.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Entitlement to Set-off of Excess Advance Tax Payments:
The petitioner, a partner of a firm, made advance tax payments under section 18A of the Income-tax Act in Lahore for the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48. Post-partition, the petitioner sought to adjust these excess payments against tax liabilities assessed in Lucknow for the years 1948-49 and 1949-50. The Income-tax Officer, Lucknow, initially referred the matter to higher authorities but later refused the adjustment, stating jurisdictional limitations due to the records being in Pakistan.

The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a refund under section 48 of the Income-tax Act, as the payments were made under the Act when it was applicable in Lahore. Section 49E allows the Income-tax Officer to set off the excess payments against future tax liabilities. The court emphasized that if a statute confers a beneficial power on a public officer, it should be construed as a duty to exercise that power. Thus, the Income-tax Officer had a duty to allow the set-off requested by the petitioner.

2. Applicability of Indian Independence (Rights, Property, and Liabilities) Order, 1947:
The petitioner argued that under article 9 of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property, and Liabilities) Order, 1947, the liability for refund of excess tax payments devolved on the Dominion of India and subsequently on the Union of India under article 294 of the Constitution. The court agreed, interpreting the term "financial obligations" to include such tax payments, thereby making the Union Government liable for the refund.

The court rejected the respondent's reliance on the Indian Independence (Income-tax Proceedings) Order, 1947, and the Expert Committee's report, as there was no evidence that the corresponding deposits were transferred to Pakistan or that an agreement binding on the two Dominions was reached.

3. Limitation Period for Claiming Refunds:
The respondent contended that the claim for a refund was barred by time under section 50 of the Income-tax Act, which imposes a four-year limitation period. The court found that the petitioner's claim was made within the allowable period, as evidenced by the Income-tax Officer's letter dated 5th February 1952, indicating that the claim was pending consideration by higher authorities.

4. Adequacy of Alternative Remedies:
The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the petitioner should have filed an appeal against the Income-tax Officer's order. The court noted that section 30 of the Income-tax Act does not provide for an appeal against an order under section 49E. Moreover, the court observed that the Income-tax Officer's refusal was based on instructions from higher authorities, making an appeal futile. Thus, the writ petition was deemed appropriate and maintainable.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, issuing a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent to determine the excess payments made under section 18A of the Income-tax Act for the years 1946-47 and 1947-48 and to allow a set-off of those amounts against the tax liabilities for the years 1948-49 and 1949-50. The petitioner was awarded costs.

The Orissa High Court allowed the petition regarding items 1 and 2 of the final bill for earth work, exempting them from sales tax assessment. The rest of the claim was rejected. Another petition lacking evidence to prove no sale element was rejected. No costs were awarded in both cases.

Issues:
1. Claim for deduction of excise duty in income tax return.
2. Disallowance of deduction by Income-tax Officer.
3. Direction by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for adjustment of excise duty.
4. Failure to carry out the direction by the Commissioner of Income-tax.
5. Petition seeking enforcement of the Tribunal's order.
6. Applicability of sections 35(2) and 33(4) of the Income-tax Act.
7. Jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to pass orders on proceedings of an earlier year.
8. Availability of alternative remedies such as appeal or stating a case under section 66 of the Act.
9. Validity of issuing a writ of mandamus to enforce an order passed without jurisdiction.

Analysis:
The judgment involves a petition under article 226 of the Constitution concerning the deduction of excise duty in an income tax return by a firm operating a sugar mill. The firm claimed a deduction of &8377; 76,836 under section 10(2) of the Income-tax Act for the relevant accounting year. However, the Income-tax Officer disallowed the deduction, stating it related to sales from the preceding year. The firm appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which directed the adjustment of the excise duty as an expenditure for the earlier assessment year of 1941-42. Despite the Tribunal's order, the Commissioner of Income-tax failed to carry out the adjustment, leading to the firm filing a petition seeking a writ of mandamus to enforce the Tribunal's order.

The legal issue addressed in the judgment pertains to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to pass orders on proceedings of an earlier year. The court highlighted that the powers of the Tribunal under section 33(4) of the Income-tax Act are limited to passing orders in the proceedings before it on appeal. The judgment emphasized that the Tribunal lacks the authority under this section to issue directions regarding concluded proceedings of an earlier year. It was noted that if the firm was dissatisfied with the assessment order for the earlier year, its recourse should have been to request the Tribunal to state a case under section 66 of the Act, rather than seeking enforcement through a writ of mandamus.

Furthermore, the judgment discussed the applicability of sections 35(2) and 33(4) of the Income-tax Act. The court pointed out that while section 35(2) empowers the Tribunal to rectify mistakes apparent on the record within a specified time limit, the four-year limitation period rendered it inapplicable in this case. The judgment clarified that the direction given by the Tribunal, which the firm sought to enforce, was beyond the scope of section 33(4) as it related to proceedings of an earlier year.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish a legal right to the relief sought through the petition. As a result, the petition was dismissed with costs. The judgment underscored the importance of adhering to the proper legal procedures, such as appealing or requesting a case statement, rather than seeking enforcement through writs in cases where the Tribunal's jurisdiction is in question.

Issues Involved:
1. Personal liability of the second defendant for the suit debt.
2. Plaintiff's entitlement to sue based on the terms of the agreement.
3. Validity of the settlement of accounts in light of alleged pressure, coercion, undue influence, and fraud.
4. Reopening of the settlement of accounts.
5. Validity of the borrowing as contested by the first defendant.
6. Omission of credit for payments towards the suit debt.
7. Nature of the interest agreed upon and whether it is penal and excessive.
8. Correct amount due to the plaintiff and from which defendant.
9. Plaintiff's entitlement to sue given the agreement in favor of Vengu Lakshmi Ammal.
10. Validity of the negotiation of the instrument.
11. Binding nature of the suit debt on the first defendant company.
12. Limitation of the plaintiff's remedy to motor vehicles and exclusion of personal liability of the second defendant.
13. Binding nature of the acknowledgments signed by the second defendant on the first defendant company.
14. Usurious and excessive nature of the stipulated interest rate.
15. Reliefs entitled to the plaintiff.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Personal Liability of the Second Defendant:
The court found that the second defendant was personally liable for the suit debt. He had expressly included his personal liability in addition to the company's liability when signing the passbooks and executing the agreement (Ex. A.8). He acknowledged that the agreement was executed in respect of debts due to Subbiah Aiyar's estate and not in favor of Vengu Ammal, his widow.

2. Plaintiff's Entitlement to Sue:
The court ruled that the plaintiff, Parameswara Aiyar, was entitled to sue to enforce the terms of Ex. A.8. This agreement was executed in favor of Subbiah Aiyar's estate, of which Parameswara Aiyar was the validly appointed sole administrator by the court.

3. Validity of the Settlement of Accounts:
The court found that the settlement of accounts relied on by the plaintiff was not brought about by pressure, coercion, undue influence, or fraud, as contended by the defendants.

4. Reopening of the Settlement of Accounts:
The court held that the settlement of accounts could be reopened only regarding proved mistakes.

5. Validity of the Borrowing:
The court found that the borrowing was not void or non-binding on the company, except for a sum of Rs. 5,465 advanced for the Kalakad toddy shop dues and Rs. 7,547-15-0 advanced for the second defendant's life assurance payment. These payments were not for company purposes and were ultra vires of the company.

6. Omission of Credit for Payments:
The court found that Subbiah Aiyar had not omitted to give credit for any payments made towards the advances to the company.

7. Nature of the Interest:
The court found that the agreed interest of 12% compound interest was not penal and excessive. Compound interest was accepted by the brothers on behalf of the company in the vaddi chittais sent by Subbiah Aiyar, and they had signed for the balance found on the basis of compound interest at several settlements of accounts.

8. Correct Amount Due:
The court granted the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 1,94,407-5-11 with interest at six percent per annum from the date of the plaint, 19th December 1950, against the second defendant. The first defendant company was ordered to pay Rs. 1,76,708-5-11 out of this sum with similar interest and costs.

9. Plaintiff's Entitlement to Sue:
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to sue both under the settlement of accounts (Ex. A.7) and the agreement in favor of Vengu Ammal (Ex. A.8).

10. Validity of the Negotiation of the Instrument:
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants on this issue.

11. Binding Nature of the Suit Debt:
The court found that the suit debt was binding on the first defendant company except for the two sums related to the toddy shop and insurance payments.

12. Limitation of Plaintiff's Remedy:
The court answered this issue in the negative, indicating that the plaintiff's remedy was not limited to the motor vehicles, and the second defendant was personally liable.

13. Binding Nature of Acknowledgments:
The court found that the acknowledgments signed by the second defendant were binding on the first defendant company.

14. Usurious and Excessive Interest Rate:
The court found that the interest rate was not usurious or excessive and upheld the agreed 12% compound interest.

15. Reliefs Entitled to Plaintiff:
The court granted the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 1,94,407-5-11 with interest and costs as detailed above.

Appeals and Final Judgment:
The first defendant company and the second defendant filed appeals contesting the decree. The court dismissed the appeals, upholding the lower court's judgment. The court found that the debts were contracted for company purposes and utilized for such purposes, and the amounts decreed were correct. The court also dismissed the company's suit for accounts, affirming that the company had no right to call upon Subbiah Aiyar to render accounts. The court dismissed A.S. No. 341 of 1952 with costs and A.S. No. 357 of 1952 with the costs of the first respondent, Parameswara Aiyar.

The Punjab High Court decided that "murghi dana" is not exempt from sales tax under the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. The Court held that "murghi dana" cannot be considered as wheat or wheat flour, and therefore, it is liable to tax. The appeal was allowed, and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.

Issues:
1. Application under article 226 for writ of certiorari and mandamus against Income-tax Officer's order.
2. Assessment of income-tax for multiple years and subsequent demand notices.
3. Petitioner's contention on default, penalty imposition, and coercive measures.
4. Interpretation of section 45 of the Income-tax Act regarding default and appeal filing.
5. Discretion of Income-tax Officer in treating assessee as defaulter.
6. Comparison with previous case law on automatic stay of tax realization.
7. Petitioner's argument on arbitrary exercise of discretion by Income-tax authorities.
8. Allegation of inadequate steps in realizing amount from third party.
9. Court's analysis and rejection of all petitioner's contentions.

The judgment involves a petition under article 226 seeking a writ of certiorari and mandamus against an Income-tax Officer's order dated May 27, 1955, assessing the petitioner for income-tax for multiple years. The petitioner filed appeals against the assessment orders, leading to a demand notice and subsequent coercive measures for tax payment. The petitioner argued that filing appeals prevented default and coercive measures. The court analyzed section 45 of the Income-tax Act, noting that appeal filing does not automatically stay tax payment, and discretion lies with the Income-tax Officer. The court cited case law to support discretionary power of the Officer. The petitioner's claim of arbitrary discretion was rejected as the Officer acted within bounds by giving time for payment and considering instalment options. The petitioner also alleged inadequate steps in realizing funds from a third party, which the court dismissed, emphasizing the petitioner's responsibility to facilitate payment. Ultimately, the court rejected the petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's contentions and dismissed the case without costs.

Issues:
1. Interpretation of the powers of a Custodian of Evacuee Property to cancel a lease granted by him under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act.
2. Jurisdiction of the Custodian to issue directions under section 10 of the Act regarding movables in the possession of the appellants.
3. Effect of subsequent legislation on the powers of the Custodian to cancel leases and agreements.

Analysis:
1. The case involved a question regarding the authority of a Custodian of Evacuee Property to cancel a lease granted by him under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Initially, Tendolkar, J. held that section 12 of the Act only applied to leases granted by the evacuee and not by the Custodian. However, Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J. later interpreted that section 12 applied whenever there was a lease concerning property belonging to the evacuee, regardless of whether it was granted by the evacuee or the Custodian. Subsequent legislation, the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954, clarified that the term 'lease' includes a lease granted by the Custodian, thus affirming the Custodian's power to cancel leases, including those granted by himself.

2. The jurisdiction of the Custodian to issue directions under section 10 of the Act regarding movables in possession of the appellants was also disputed. Tendolkar, J. held that section 10 applied only to properties of the evacuee, and since the movables had become the property of the appellants through a sale, the Custodian had no authority to issue directions concerning them. This aspect was upheld by Chagla, C.J. and Dixit, J. The judgment clarified that the Custodian lacked authority under section 10 to issue directions regarding movables that were no longer evacuee property.

3. The subsequent legislation, the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954, introduced an Explanation to section 12 of the Act, explicitly stating that a 'lease' includes a lease granted by the Custodian. This retrospective amendment settled the issue regarding the Custodian's power to cancel leases, irrespective of whether they were granted by the evacuee or the Custodian. The judgment emphasized that the Custodian had the authority to cancel leases and agreements, including those granted by himself, as clarified by the amended section 12.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed as the subsequent legislation confirmed the Custodian's power to cancel leases, and the Custodian lacked authority under section 10 to issue directions regarding movables that were no longer evacuee property. The judgment highlighted the impact of legislative amendments on the interpretation of statutory provisions and upheld the Custodian's authority to cancel leases and agreements under the Act.

Issues Involved:
1. Liability of the Indian Coffee Board as a dealer under the Madras General Sales Tax Act.
2. Inclusion of amounts collected by way of tax and contingency deposits in the taxable turnover.
3. Exemption claims under Article 286 of the Constitution for export and inter-State sales.
4. Validity of Act XVII of 1954.
5. Excess collections under Section 8-B(2) of the Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Liability of the Indian Coffee Board as a dealer under the Madras General Sales Tax Act:
The petitioner, the Indian Coffee Board, is a statutory body constituted under the Coffee Market Expansion Act, VII of 1942. Despite the statutory composition, the Board was held to be a dealer as defined by section 2(b) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, as affirmed in Indian Coffee Board v. State of Madras. The petitioner obtained registration as a dealer under the provisions of the Act, which was a basis for the assessment.

2. Inclusion of amounts collected by way of tax and contingency deposits in the taxable turnover:
Three items were contested by the petitioner:
- Rs. 6,14,510-13-0 collected as tax under section 8-B of the Act.
- Rs. 9,598-3-3 collected to cover potential tax claims.
- Rs. 1,63,259-12-3 collected as "contingency deposit" to cover tax on transactions believed to be non-taxable.
The Appellate Tribunal and the Court upheld the inclusion of these amounts in the taxable turnover under section 8-B of the Act, as they were considered collections by way of tax.

3. Exemption claims under Article 286 of the Constitution for export and inter-State sales:
- Export Sales: The petitioner claimed Rs. 85,03,048-11-0 as turnover of sales in the course of export, which was denied exemption by the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the sale to registered exporters was completed within the State of Madras and was not a sale in the course of export. The Court affirmed this, distinguishing between a sale for export and a sale in the course of export, referencing The State of Travancore-Cochin v. S.V.C. Factory.
- Inter-State Sales: The petitioner claimed Rs. 14,52,297-1-0 as turnover of inter-State sales. The Tribunal noted that delivery was made to agents within the State, and thus, the sales did not qualify as inter-State trade under Article 286(2). The Court upheld this, stating that the sale and delivery were completed within the State, and subsequent transport by the purchaser did not make it an inter-State sale.

4. Validity of Act XVII of 1954:
The petitioner challenged the validity of the Madras General Sales Tax (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act, XVII of 1954. The Tribunal declined to investigate this question, but the Court upheld the validity of the Act, referencing its judgment in T.R.C. No. 58 of 1955 (Sri Sundararajan and Co., Ltd. v. The State of Madras).

5. Excess collections under Section 8-B(2) of the Act:
The last item considered was Rs. 4,681-7-3, which was the excess collection made by the petitioner Board. The Tribunal's decision to include this in the taxable turnover was upheld, as the petitioner did not press the claim before the Tribunal.

Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed with costs, affirming the Tribunal's decisions on all contested issues, including the inclusion of collected amounts in the taxable turnover, denial of exemption claims under Article 286, and the validity of Act XVII of 1954.

Issues Involved:
1. Inclusion of tax collected under section 8-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act in the assessable turnover.
2. Legislative competence to enact the Madras General Sales Tax (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act, 1954.
3. Validity of retrospective application of the impugned Act.
4. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Inclusion of Tax Collected Under Section 8-B in Assessable Turnover:
The assessee, a registered dealer, collected a sum of Rs. 46,456-12-6 by way of tax under section 8-B of the Madras General Sales Tax Act during the assessment year 1952-53. This amount was included in the assessable turnover by the taxing authorities and upheld by the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee contended that this sum should not be subject to sales tax. The court referenced a previous decision in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Krishnaswami Mudaliar, which held that amounts collected by a dealer as sales tax and paid to the government should not be included in the dealer's turnover. However, the Madras Legislature subsequently passed the Madras General Sales Tax (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act, 1954, which deemed such amounts as part of the turnover for sales made before April 1, 1954.

2. Legislative Competence to Enact the Impugned Act:
The petitioner argued that the impugned Act was ultra vires the legislature's competence. The court clarified that the legislative competence under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution includes the power to levy taxes on the sale or purchase of goods. The court emphasized that the legislative competence is not limited by section 8-B of the Act. The court held that the legislature had the power to enact laws that include amounts collected by way of tax in the dealer's turnover and that the impugned Act was within this competence.

3. Validity of Retrospective Application of the Impugned Act:
The court noted that section 2 of the impugned Act deemed amounts collected by way of tax to be part of the turnover for a limited period before April 1, 1954. The court held that the legislature's use of the term "deemed" created a legal fiction for this period, which was within its competence. The court also upheld the validity of section 3 of the impugned Act, which validated assessments made under the principal Act as explained in Krishnaswami Mudaliar's case. The court referenced several cases, including United Provinces v. Atiqua Begum and Werrin v. The Commonwealth, to support the principle that the power to validate illegal assessments is incidental to the power to levy the tax.

4. Alleged Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution:
The petitioner contended that the impugned Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution by discriminating between assessments for periods before and after April 1, 1954. The court rejected this contention, stating that changes in the basis of taxation from time to time do not fall within the mischief of Article 14. The court held that the legislature's power to alter the basis of taxation does not result in discrimination or denial of equal protection of laws.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Madras General Sales Tax (Definition of Turnover and Validation of Assessments) Act, 1954, was intra vires and valid. The petition challenging the validity of the Act was dismissed with costs, and the court affirmed the inclusion of the disputed amount in the assessee's turnover.

Issues:
1. Validity of notice under section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Proper publication of transfer of jurisdiction and its effect on notice under section 22(4).
3. Competency of the officer issuing the notice under section 22(4).
4. Necessity of another notice under section 22(2) upon transfer of the case.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: The validity of the notice under section 22(2) of the Income-tax Act was challenged by the applicant, contending that the transfer of the case was not properly notified and published in the official Gazette, thus making the notice invalid. However, the court held that the transfer was valid under sub-section (7A) of section 5 by the Commissioner of Income-tax, and publication in the Gazette was not required. The notice served by the Income-tax Officer, Chhindwara, was deemed valid for the assessment by the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Nagpur.

Issue 2: The question of proper publication of the transfer of jurisdiction and its effect on the notice under section 22(4) was raised. The court ruled that the transfer under sub-section (7A) did not necessitate re-issuance of notices by the succeeding officer. Therefore, the notice under section 22(4) issued by the officer in Nagpur was deemed valid and in compliance with the law.

Issue 3: The competency of the officer, Shri R.S. Gahlot, who signed the notice under section 22(4) was challenged. The court found that the officer had the authority to sign the notice, and the subsequent assessment made by another officer was considered valid based on the notice issued.

Issue 4: The necessity of another notice under section 22(2) upon transfer of the case was debated. The court held that since the assessee failed to comply with the initial notice under section 22(2) by not filing the return, the assessment made under section 23(4) was deemed valid, and the issuance of another notice was not required.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the application, upholding the validity of the notices issued and the assessment made under section 23(4) of the Income-tax Act. The court emphasized the importance of complying with notice requirements for assessments and affirmed the decision of the lower authorities in dismissing the appeals.