Issues Involved:
1. Whether the revisional order made by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is time-barred.
2. The correct rate of tax applicable to the turnover of rice sold.
3. Inclusion of the value of gunny bags in the taxable turnover.
4. Legality and propriety of the Assistant Commissioner's order.
5. Application of additional tax under section 5-A of the A.P.G.S.T. Act.
6. Applicability of the doctrine of merger to the assessment order and appellate order.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Revisional Order Made by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is Time-barred:
The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the dealer's contention that the revisional order was time-barred, as both the date of service of the revision notice (2nd September 1969) and the date of the revisional order (12th September 1969) were beyond four years from the date of service of the final order of assessment (29th March 1965). The High Court upheld this view, stating that the Deputy Commissioner's order was beyond the four-year time limit fixed for revision under section 20(3) of the A.P.G.S.T. Act. The assessment order dated 15th March 1965 did not merge into the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner, and thus, the time commenced from the date of service of the assessment order.

2. The Correct Rate of Tax Applicable to the Turnover of Rice Sold:
The Assistant Commissioner agreed with the dealer's contention that if the rice sold was obtained from paddy that met tax under the A.P.G.S.T. Act at 3 paise per rupee, the turnover should be taxed at 1 paisa per rupee under item 66(b) of the First Schedule to the A.P.G.S.T. Act. However, the Deputy Commissioner later held that the correct rate of tax on inter-State sales of such rice should be 1 1/4 per cent, leading to a modification of the Assistant Commissioner's order. The High Court found that the Assistant Commissioner's view was correct and there was no illegality or impropriety in his order.

3. Inclusion of the Value of Gunny Bags in the Taxable Turnover:
The Assistant Commissioner upheld the inclusion of the value of gunny bags (Rs. 6,385) in the taxable turnover, following the decision of the Kerala High Court in Srinivasa Pai v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. This part of the order was not contested further and stood justified.

4. Legality and Propriety of the Assistant Commissioner's Order:
The High Court examined whether the Assistant Commissioner's order was illegal or improper, which would give jurisdiction to the Deputy Commissioner to revise it. The court found that the Assistant Commissioner correctly directed the assessment officer to tax the turnover at 1 per cent if the dealer proved the rice was obtained from paddy that met tax under the A.P.G.S.T. Act. The court held that there was no illegality or impropriety in the Assistant Commissioner's order, and hence, the primary condition for the exercise of revisional powers by the Deputy Commissioner was not satisfied.

5. Application of Additional Tax Under Section 5-A of the A.P.G.S.T. Act:
The High Court noted that the question of levy of additional tax at 1/4 per cent under section 5-A of the A.P.G.S.T. Act was neither raised before the assessing officer nor decided by the Assistant Commissioner. The court held that the Deputy Commissioner should have revised the fresh assessment order dated 12th December 1967, where the Special Commercial Tax Officer failed to levy the additional tax, instead of revising the Assistant Commissioner's order dated 17th September 1965.

6. Applicability of the Doctrine of Merger to the Assessment Order and Appellate Order:
The High Court discussed the doctrine of merger and concluded that the assessment order dated 15th March 1965 did not merge into the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Company Ltd., which stated that the doctrine of merger depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the statutory provisions. Since the question of additional tax was not the subject matter of the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner, the doctrine of merger did not apply.

Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the tax revision case, upholding the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal's order that the revisional order of the Deputy Commissioner was time-barred. The court found no illegality or impropriety in the Assistant Commissioner's order and held that the correct rate of tax on the turnover of rice was 1 per cent, with the inclusion of the value of gunny bags justified. The court also clarified that the doctrine of merger did not apply to the assessment order and appellate order in this case.

Issues Involved:
1. Breach of terms embodied in the agreement.
2. Bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice.
3. Entitlement to refund of the amount paid.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Breach of Terms Embodied in the Agreement:
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were not guilty of breach of the terms in the agreement of sale. It was determined that the defendant first party had "played false with the plaintiffs and sold the disputed property along with others to defendants second party in December 1942." The court concluded that the entire liability for the breach of the plaintiff's contract lay upon Mr. Guha and not on the plaintiffs.

2. Bona Fide Purchaser for Consideration Without Notice:
On this issue, the trial court held that the defendants second party had failed to prove that they had paid the consideration money in good faith and without notice of the contract of 1931. The defendants second party claimed to be bona fide purchasers for value, having paid full consideration in good faith and without notice of the alleged contract of sale set up by the plaintiffs. However, the court was not convinced by their defense.

3. Entitlement to Refund of the Amount Paid:
The trial court observed that it was unnecessary to consider in detail the alternative relief prayed for by the plaintiffs, which was a decree for a sum of Rs. 44,688/- with interest at 6% from the date of the suit till the date of realization against defendant first party. However, the court noted that if it had refused to decree the main relief of specific performance, there would have been no difficulty in passing a decree for the alternative claim against defendant first party. The decree for specific performance was granted, directing the defendants to execute and register a deed of sale for the consideration of Rs. 1,00,000, with the plaintiffs required to pay Rs. 77,000 to the defendants and be put in possession of the property.

Appeals and Subsequent Proceedings:
Three appeals were filed against the judgment and decree of the trial court: one by the defendant first party, one by the plaintiffs, and one by defendants second party. The appeals by the plaintiffs and defendant first party were dismissed due to non-prosecution. In the appeal filed by defendants second party, one of the appellants died, and the legal representatives were not substituted in time, leading to the appeal's abatement.

Supreme Court's Decision:
The Supreme Court had to determine whether the appeal could be heard and disposed of in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased Saroda Charan Guha. The court noted that the decree passed by the trial court was a joint decree against both the defendant first party and defendant second party. The court held that the vendor (defendant first party) was a necessary party because the plaintiffs had also sought an alternative relief against him. The appeal could not proceed in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased vendor, as it would result in inconsistent and contradictory decrees or the inability to grant proper reliefs.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the abatement of the appeal concerning the deceased vendor proved fatal to the entire appeal. The court emphasized that the vendor was a necessary party, and without his legal representatives, the appeal could not be competently heard. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.

Issues:
Interpretation of section 5(3) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 regarding tax liability on a gift made by a spouse out of gifts received earlier under section 5(1)(viii).

Analysis:
The case involved a gift made by a wife to her husband, which was originally received by her from the husband as a gift exempted from tax under section 5(1)(viii) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958. The key question was whether the subsequent gift by the wife to the husband was liable to tax under section 5(3) of the Act. Section 5(3) states that gifts made by a spouse out of gifts received under section 5(1)(viii) shall be deemed taxable gifts by that spouse, irrespective of the exemptions under other subsections. The court emphasized that the unit of assessment under the Act is a definite period, usually an year, and the wording of the statute must be interpreted in that context. The court rejected the argument that the expression "gifts received by that spouse as fall within clause (viii)" should be limited to gifts received in the relevant previous year, stating that the provision covers gifts received over longer periods as well.

The court referred to a previous Division Bench ruling to support the interpretation that taxation statutes, including gift-tax laws, operate on a specific period for assessment. The court clarified that even if the original gift by the husband to the wife was made in a previous year, the wording "as fall within clause (viii)" encompasses gifts to which clause (viii) is applicable, regardless of the timing of the original gift. The court concluded that for the gift in question, the exemption under clause (viii) of section 5(1) was not applicable, and therefore, the gift was liable to tax under section 5(3) of the Act.

In response to the question referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the court answered in the affirmative, ruling against the assessee and in favor of the department. The court directed the parties to bear their respective costs and ordered the judgment to be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by the Act.

Issues Involved:
1. Inclusion of dividend income from shares held by the assessee's wife and sons in the assessee's total income.
2. Determination of the real ownership of the shares.
3. Legal tenability of the Tribunal's exclusion of dividend income.
4. Burden of proof regarding benami transactions.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Inclusion of Dividend Income:
The primary issue was whether the Tribunal was justified in excluding from the assessable income of the assessee the sums of Rs. 56,586 and Rs. 39,542, which were the amounts of dividend received by the assessee's wife and two sons from shares acquired out of the profits of the assessee for the assessment years 1953-54 and 1954-55. The Income-tax Officer included these dividends in the total income of the assessee, asserting that the shares, although held in the names of his wife and sons, were actually owned by the assessee.

2. Determination of Real Ownership:
The High Court concluded that the shares were purchased by the assessee in the names of his wife and sons, inferring that these were benami transactions. The court held that the burden of proof was on the assessee to show that the shares were not purchased benami, which he failed to discharge. The court also held that the real owner could be assessed on the dividend income even if the shares were registered in the names of his wife and sons.

3. Legal Tenability of Tribunal's Exclusion:
The Tribunal had directed that the income assessed for the assessee should be reduced by the amounts of Rs. 56,586 and Rs. 39,542 for the respective assessment years, based on the contention that the registered holders of the shares (the wife and sons) should be assessed for the dividend income. However, this exclusion was found to be legally untenable. The Supreme Court noted that the shares were admitted by the assessee to belong to him and were his own investments. The Tribunal's reliance on the decision in Howrah Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax was misplaced, as it did not address the issue of real ownership versus registered ownership.

4. Burden of Proof Regarding Benami Transactions:
The High Court and the Supreme Court emphasized that the assessee had admitted in the past that the shares in question belonged to him. The Tribunal did not deal with the question of whether the purchase of shares was benami. The Supreme Court found ample material to justify the inference that the assessee was the real owner of the shares and they were held benami in the names of his wife and sons. The court stated that once it was found that the assessee was the real owner, it would be presumed that the ownership continued to remain vested in him unless shown otherwise by subsequent events, which was not demonstrated by the assessee.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the dividend income from the shares held by the assessee's wife and sons should be included in the assessee's total income. The court found that the Tribunal's exclusion of this income was not legally tenable, and the assessee had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the shares were not purchased benami. The appeals were dismissed with costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the President of the Board of Secondary Education's order dated February 25, 1961, reviewing the earlier order dated April 22, 1960, without a hearing.
2. The High Court's refusal to grant relief based on the argument that it would be academic.
3. Compliance with the rules governing the service conditions of teachers in non-Government High Schools.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the President's Order Dated February 25, 1961:
The appellant, a teacher at Araria Higher Secondary School, was dismissed on charges of misappropriation of school money. The President of the Board of Secondary Education set aside this dismissal on April 22, 1960, and directed reinstatement with full salary and allowances. However, upon a request for review by the Managing Committee, the President modified his order on February 25, 1961, limiting the appellant's entitlement to subsistence allowance during the suspension period. This modification was made without affording the appellant any hearing, which the appellant contended was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the modification of the earlier order without a hearing was invalid, emphasizing that "this unwritten right of hearing is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the rival contestants."

2. High Court's Refusal to Grant Relief:
The High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, reasoning that the President's initial order of April 22, 1960, was invalid based on an earlier decision in Liladhar Jha v. Board of Secondary Education, which stated that the President had no jurisdiction to order payment of arrears. The High Court deemed it academic to declare the review order invalid. The Supreme Court found this approach to be "highly unfair and unjust," stating that the appellant was entitled to relief as the review order directly affected his rights. The Court pointed out that the Managing Committee might still consider the review order operative if not expressly quashed, thus necessitating judicial intervention.

3. Compliance with Rules Governing Service Conditions:
The appellant's counsel highlighted Rule 18 of the service conditions, which mandates the Managing Committee to follow the Board's orders. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's grievance was specifically against the review order made without a hearing. The Court emphasized that if the Board chooses to reconsider the order dated April 22, 1960, the appellant must be given a fair hearing, as required by Rule 17, which embodies the principle of natural justice. The Court did not express an opinion on the competence of the review but underscored the necessity of a hearing if reconsideration occurs.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and the President's orders dated February 25, 1961, and January 18, 1964. The case was remanded to the stage prior to the February 25, 1961 order, with instructions that any reconsideration of the April 22, 1960 order must include a fair hearing for the appellant. The Court emphasized the importance of natural justice and fair procedure in administrative decisions affecting individual rights. The appellant was awarded costs from the contesting respondents.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Regulation 47 of the 1966 Articles of Association of the Yogam.
2. Applicability of the Companies Act, 1956, to the Yogam.
3. Right of shareholders to attend and vote at general meetings.
4. Compliance with Table C of Schedule I of the Companies Act, 1956.
5. Practical difficulties in convening large meetings.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Regulation 47 of the 1966 Articles of Association of the Yogam:
The appellant contended that Regulation 47 of the 1966 Articles of Association of the Yogam is illegal and void. Regulation 47 restricts the general meeting to only certain representatives of the Yogam, excluding many shareholders from participating. The learned single judge had upheld the validity of Regulation 47, but upon appeal, it was determined that Regulation 47 is violative of the provisions in Table C of Schedule I and the Companies Act, 1956, and is therefore void.

2. Applicability of the Companies Act, 1956, to the Yogam:
The Yogam was registered under the Travancore Regulation I of 1063, which corresponds to the Companies Act, 1956. The court confirmed that the Yogam is bound by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, including the provisions applicable to existing companies as per Section 58V of the Act. The Yogam was assumed to be a company limited by guarantee for the purpose of the discussion.

3. Right of Shareholders to Attend and Vote at General Meetings:
The court emphasized the inherent right of every member of a company to attend and vote at general meetings. This right is fundamental and cannot be restricted except by explicit provisions in the Companies Act. The court found no provision in the Companies Act that expressly takes away this right. Therefore, Regulation 47, which restricts this right, was deemed invalid.

4. Compliance with Table C of Schedule I of the Companies Act, 1956:
Table C, applicable to companies limited by guarantee, states that every member shall have one vote. Regulation 47 of the 1966 Articles of Association was found to be contrary to this provision. The court held that the Articles of Association must comply with Table C and cannot include provisions inconsistent with it. Therefore, Regulation 47 was declared void.

5. Practical Difficulties in Convening Large Meetings:
The learned single judge had noted the practical difficulties in convening a general meeting for the 60,000 members of the Yogam. However, the court held that practical difficulties do not justify the infringement of shareholders' inherent rights to participate in the administration of the company. The court suggested that the company could utilize Section 25(6) of the Companies Act to address such difficulties.

Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and Regulation 47 of the 1966 Articles of Association was declared void. The current Board of Directors, elected based on the invalid Regulation 47, would continue for the remaining part of their term. A fresh election must be conducted without considering Regulation 47 before the expiry of the current term. If the existing Board fails to conduct the election, the administrators appointed by the learned single judge will take control and conduct the election. The direction making the appellant liable for costs was set aside, and no order as to costs was made.

Issues:
1. Whether the trustees of the trust constitute an assessable unit under the Wealth-tax ActRs.
2. Whether the property held by the trustees under the trust is held for any public purpose of a charitable or religious nature in IndiaRs.

Analysis:

Issue 1:
The appeals involved a reference under section 27(1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, concerning the wealth-tax assessment of the appellant-assessee for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59. The High Court had ruled against the assessee, leading to the appeals before the Supreme Court. The trust in question, known as "Gordhandas Govindram Family Trust," primarily aimed to benefit the family members of Gordhandas Govindram Seksaria. The trust deed outlined specific provisions for the maintenance and marriage expenses of poor family members, indicating a clear familial focus. The Supreme Court examined the relevant provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, including sections 3, 5(1)(i), and 21, to determine the assessability of trustees. It was argued that trustees could not be taxed under the Act due to a supposed lacuna in the charging section. However, the court rejected this contention, citing precedents and interpretations of similar provisions in tax laws.

The court referred to Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Kripashankar Dayashankar Worah, emphasizing that trustees could be assessed for wealth-tax concerning trust properties. The argument that trustees did not fall within the scope of section 3 of the Act was dismissed, highlighting the broad interpretation of the term "individual" to include trustees. The court drew parallels with interpretations in income tax laws to support the inclusion of trustees as assessable units. Citing precedents like Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sodra Devi and V. Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India, the court affirmed that trustees could be considered individuals for tax assessment purposes. The judgment aligned with previous decisions that joint trustees could be assessed as individuals under the Wealth-tax Act, ultimately concluding that the trustees of the trust constituted an assessable unit under the Act.

Issue 2:
Regarding whether the trust in question served a public charitable or religious purpose, the court examined the trust's provisions and intent. The trust primarily aimed to benefit the family members of Gordhandas Govindram Seksaria, with provisions for the maintenance and marriage expenses of poor family descendants. The court noted that the trust's title and provisions indicated a clear familial focus, rather than a broader public charitable intent. Reference was made to a Bombay High Court case where a similar trust was deemed not charitable under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as its primary purpose was to benefit the settlor's family. The Supreme Court concurred with this assessment, emphasizing that the trust in question was private in nature, benefiting the family directly and the public indirectly. The court's decision aligned with previous rulings on trusts with primarily familial benefits, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the appeals.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the trustees of the trust constituted an assessable unit under the Wealth-tax Act and that the trust did not serve a public charitable or religious purpose, resulting in the dismissal of the appeals.

Issues Involved:
1. Authority to confirm and enhance the sentence.
2. Right to a hearing by the confirming authority.
3. Validity of confirmation by a different officer.
4. Requirement of a hearing before final confirmation.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Authority to Confirm and Enhance the Sentence:
The petitioner contended that the confirming authority does not have the power to enhance the sentence and cannot achieve this indirectly by directing a revision. The court examined Sections 153, 157, 158, and 160 of the Army Act, which outline the powers of the confirming authority. Section 158 allows the confirming authority to mitigate, remit, or commute the punishment. Section 160 permits the confirming authority to direct a revision of the sentence. The court concluded that the confirming authority's direction for revision, implying a need for a harsher sentence, was within legal bounds. The confirming authority provided detailed reasons for considering the original sentence inadequate, which the court found unexceptionable and in accordance with the law.

2. Right to a Hearing by the Confirming Authority:
The petitioner argued that the confirming authority should have given him a hearing before directing a revision of the sentence. The court noted that the petitioner had an opportunity to address the court martial during the revision process but chose not to. The court held that requiring a hearing before the confirming authority directed a revision was not a principle of natural justice in this context. The petitioner had the chance to present his case before the court martial, which was sufficient.

3. Validity of Confirmation by a Different Officer:
The petitioner contended that only the officer who convened the court martial could confirm or direct a revision of the sentence. The court clarified that Section 157 allows the findings and sentences of summary general courts-martial to be confirmed by the convening officer or a superior authority. The court rejected the argument that the convening officer and the confirming authority must be the same individual, noting that the confirming authority in this case was the Chief of Army Staff, a higher authority than the convening officer. The court found no merit in this contention.

4. Requirement of a Hearing Before Final Confirmation:
The petitioner argued that the confirming authority, whether Brig. Bhilla or the Chief of Army Staff, should have given him a hearing before confirming the subsequent sentence. The court held that the Army Act does not require such a hearing. The petitioner had the opportunity to present a petition to the confirming officer under Section 164 but did not do so. The court found no violation of principles of natural justice in the confirmation process.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioner. The procedures followed were in accordance with the Army Act, and the principles of natural justice were not violated. The petitioner's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution were not infringed, and the confirming authority acted within its legal powers. The petition was thus dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the assessment order for the year 1962-63 after the expiry of four years.
2. Compliance with principles of natural justice regarding the material used for assessment.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Assessment Order for the Year 1962-63 After the Expiry of Four Years:

The appellant contended that the assessment order for the year 1962-63 could not be passed after the expiry of four years from the close of the assessment year, as stipulated under section 153(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The department argued that the case fell under section 147, which deals with income escaping assessment, and thus the limitation period should be governed by section 153(2).

The court examined the relevant sections, noting that section 153(1) applies to assessments made under sections 143 or 144, which are for current assessment years. In contrast, section 153(2) applies to assessments made under section 147, which deals with income escaping assessment. The court clarified that section 153(1) does not apply to assessments under section 147 initiated by a notice under section 148. It was concluded that the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer in respect of the assessment year 1962-63 was valid and within time as per section 153(2).

The court further reasoned that if the appellant's argument were accepted, it would lead to an absurd result where any assessment made beyond four years of the end of the assessment year, even if initiated by a valid notice under section 148, would be barred by time. This would contradict the provisions allowing a notice under section 148 to be issued within eight years of the end of the relevant assessment year.

2. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice Regarding the Material Used for Assessment:

The appellant argued that the assessment order did not disclose the material on which it was based, and no opportunity was given to rebut that material, violating the principles of natural justice. The court noted that the appellant had refused to take delivery of multiple notices and failed to produce his account books despite several opportunities.

The court referred to section 142(3), which mandates that an assessee be given an opportunity to be heard regarding any material gathered during inquiries. However, this provision does not apply to assessments made under section 144, which deals with best judgment assessments when the assessee does not cooperate. Given the appellant's non-cooperative attitude, the court held that the Income-tax Officer was justified in proceeding with the assessment under section 144 without providing further opportunities to the appellant.

In conclusion, the court found no merit in either of the appellant's contentions and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Issues:
1. Whether the reallocation of shares in a partnership, resulting in a diminution of one partner's interest and an increase in the interest of others, constitutes a gift chargeable to gift-taxRs.
2. Whether the redistribution of shares in a partnership, specifically the transfer of one-sixth share in the goodwill of the firm, amounts to a taxable giftRs.

Analysis:

The judgment pertains to a Hindu undivided family, a partner in a firm, which underwent a change in profit-sharing ratio through a supplementary deed. The Gift-tax Officer contended that the reallocation of shares, without consideration, constituted a gift to the other partners. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner disagreed, stating it was a reallotment of shares and not a transfer of property. The Tribunal concurred, emphasizing that partners can alter profit-sharing ratios without it being construed as a transfer unless expressly done. The Tribunal held that no transfer or surrender occurred, thus no gift tax liability. The revenue appealed to the High Court, questioning the Tribunal's decision.

The High Court referenced a previous case and opined that redistributing profit-sharing involves a transfer of property constituting a gift. The Court differed from the Tribunal's view and held that the redistribution of shares did amount to a gift chargeable to tax. However, the Gift-tax Officer had evaluated the transaction as a gift of one-sixth share in the goodwill of the firm. The Court highlighted that goodwill is an asset of the partnership and should be considered in valuing the gift. The Court directed the revenue to re-value the gift, refraining from providing a specific valuation method.

In conclusion, the High Court answered the question in the negative, favoring the revenue. The Court directed the revenue to re-value the gift, including the one-sixth share in the entire firm's net assets, which should encompass the goodwill. The revenue was awarded costs, and the question was answered in the negative.

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
2. Consideration of records from previous assessment years (1955-56 to 1959-60) for the assessment year 1960-61.
3. Validity of the initiation of proceedings under section 33B after the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 33B:
The Commissioner of Income-tax issued a notice under section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to the assessee for the assessment year 1960-61, questioning the validity of the initial capital, sale of ornaments, income from business, and investments. The Commissioner found the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, citing lack of jurisdiction by the Income-tax Officer and insufficient enquiry into the assessee's claims. The Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the Commissioner could not rely on previous years' assessments (1955-56 to 1959-60) to conclude that the 1960-61 assessment was erroneous. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's jurisdiction under section 33B, emphasizing that the Commissioner could cancel an erroneous assessment even if the income was voluntarily returned by the assessee. The Court cited Rampyari Devi Saraogi v. Commissioner of Income-tax, supporting the view that the Commissioner has ample jurisdiction to cancel an assessment if it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue.

2. Consideration of records from previous assessment years (1955-56 to 1959-60) for the assessment year 1960-61:
The Tribunal had held that the Commissioner could not consider the records of previous assessment years (1955-56 to 1959-60) while assessing the year 1960-61. The High Court, however, did not pronounce an opinion on whether the Commissioner could consider materials from previous years, focusing instead on the jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court supported the High Court's view that the assessment order for 1960-61 was erroneous due to the Income-tax Officer's lack of jurisdiction, which was sufficient grounds for the Commissioner to set aside the assessment.

3. Validity of the initiation of proceedings under section 33B after the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922:
A third question was whether the Commissioner could lawfully initiate proceedings under section 33B on June 25, 1963, after the repeal of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, by the Income-tax Act, 1961. The High Court declined to answer this question as it was not pressed by the assessee. The Supreme Court did not address this issue further, focusing on the jurisdictional and procedural aspects of the case.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's jurisdiction under section 33B to cancel the assessment for the year 1960-61, finding the Income-tax Officer's assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the Commissioner had sufficient grounds to set aside the assessment due to jurisdictional errors and lack of proper enquiry by the Income-tax Officer. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues Involved:

1. Whether there was any evidence before the Tribunal for computing the gross profit in the manner it did.
2. Applicability of the proviso to section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
3. Validity of the assessment methods and conclusions drawn by the Income-tax authorities.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Evidence for Computing Gross Profit:

The primary issue was whether there was any evidence before the Tribunal for computing the gross profit in the manner it did. The court observed that the term "evidence" should be understood broadly as "material" rather than strictly under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Tribunal had some material before itself, including previous orders of assessment, which could form the basis of its conclusions. The court emphasized that insufficiency of material or a wrong conclusion on facts does not entitle interference unless there is no evidence at all. The Tribunal's reliance on the previous year's margin of profit (17%) was deemed appropriate, as it constituted good material or evidence for computing the gross profit for the assessment year 1957-58.

2. Applicability of the Proviso to Section 13:

The court examined whether the proviso to section 13 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was applicable. The proviso allows the Income-tax Officer to adopt any basis for computation if the assessee does not follow a regular method of accounting or if the method employed does not allow proper deduction of income, profits, and gains. The court noted that the income-tax authorities unanimously agreed that the proviso was attracted in this case. The Tribunal's application of the proviso to section 13 was justified as the assessee's method of accounting did not provide a clear picture of the income, necessitating a best judgment assessment.

3. Validity of Assessment Methods and Conclusions:

The court reviewed the assessment methods and conclusions drawn by the Income-tax authorities. The Income-tax Officer initially estimated the sales and applied a higher margin of profit due to discrepancies in the assessee's records. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner adjusted the figures and provided some relief to the assessee. The Tribunal further reduced the margin of profit from 19% to 17%, considering the previous year's margin and the increase in overhead costs. The court found that the Tribunal's approach was consistent with established principles, as previous assessments can provide a valid basis for current assessments. The court referred to authoritative texts and judicial precedents, including views from Kanga's "The Law and Practice of Income-tax" and cases like Gopinath Naik v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Commissioner of Income-tax v. Maharajadhiraja Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, to support this stance.

The court also addressed the petitioner's argument that the 2% overhead costs should reduce the margin from 17% to 15%. However, it concluded that the Tribunal's decision to maintain the 17% margin, considering larger sales and overhead costs, was not erroneous. The court underscored that the Tribunal had good material before it, including previous assessments, to justify its conclusions.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that there was not only evidence but good evidence before the Tribunal for computing the gross profits in the manner it did. The reference was answered affirmatively, and the matter was returned to the Tribunal. No order as to costs was made, acknowledging the debatable nature of the issue.

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 31 of the State-Financial Corporations Act, 1951.
2. Applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings under Section 31 and Section 32 of the Act.
3. Investigation of the petitioner's objections and circumstances by the District Judge.
4. Maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the availability of an alternative remedy.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 31 of the State-Financial Corporations Act, 1951:
The petition was filed against an order by the District Judge, Indore, directing the sale of the petitioner's property to recover the amount due to the respondent. The respondent had filed an application under Section 31 of the Act for the sale of the petitioner's mortgaged property due to default in payment. The District Judge had refused to investigate the petitioner's circumstances, leading to the confirmation of the order of attachment and directing the sale of the property.

2. Applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceedings under Section 31 and Section 32 of the Act:
The petitioner contended that the District Judge had broad jurisdiction under Section 31 and was bound to investigate the facts and circumstances, including the petitioner's defenses, in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The respondent argued that the District Judge's role was limited to investigating the Corporation's claim and that the CPC applied only to procedural aspects of the inquiry. The court noted that Section 32(6) of the Act mandates that the District Judge investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the CPC, implying a comprehensive investigation, including the petitioner's defenses.

3. Investigation of the petitioner's objections and circumstances by the District Judge:
The court emphasized that the term "claim" in Section 32(6) includes the sum-total of facts alleged by the Corporation and the relief sought, thus encompassing the petitioner's defenses. The District Judge should have investigated the petitioner's objections and circumstances under Order 20, Rule 11 of the CPC. The court cited precedents, including AIR 1972 SC 801 and AIR 1972 Pat 83, to support the applicability of the CPC in such proceedings and the need for a thorough investigation of the petitioner's defenses.

4. Maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the availability of an alternative remedy:
The respondent argued that the petition should be dismissed as the petitioner had not availed the alternative remedy of appeal. The court referred to AIR 1971 SC 33, where the Supreme Court held that the availability of an alternative remedy does not bar the maintainability of a writ petition if the High Court has entertained and heard it on merits. The court noted that the petitioner could have sought condonation for the delay in filing an appeal, but since the petition was already entertained, it would not be just to dismiss it on this ground. Moreover, the District Judge's refusal to investigate the petitioner's objections was a jurisdictional error, making the petition maintainable under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, set aside the order of the District Judge, and remanded the case for investigation of the petitioner's objections and their disposal in accordance with the law. The order of attachment was to continue until the matter was resolved by the District Judge. The parties were directed to bear their own costs, and the security deposit was to be refunded to the petitioner.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the cheque issued was supported by consideration.
2. Whether the plaintiff can establish that the actual sale consideration was Rs. 15,000 against the stated Rs. 4,500 in the sale deed.
3. Applicability of Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
4. Impact of the Stamp Act and Contract Act on the enforceability of the transaction.
5. Legal implications of issuing a cheque as a form of payment.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Whether the cheque issued was supported by consideration.
The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,000 due under a dishonoured cheque issued by the second defendant as the managing partner of the first defendant firm. The trial court concluded that the cheque was given for the sale of the plaintiff's properties to T. K. Mani and was fully supported by consideration. However, the lower appellate court held that the cheque was issued as security for the due performance of terms between the second defendant and T. K. Mani, and not as part of the sale consideration.

Issue 2: Whether the plaintiff can establish that the actual sale consideration was Rs. 15,000 against the stated Rs. 4,500 in the sale deed.
The plaintiff and witness T. K. Mani testified that the real consideration for the sale was Rs. 15,000, with Rs. 10,000 paid in cash and Rs. 5,000 via cheque. The lower appellate court rejected this evidence, citing the sale deed's recital of Rs. 4,500. The court referenced Motilal Singh v. Mt. Fulia, which held that no oral evidence could contradict the sale deed's recitals. However, the higher court found that the evidence of the plaintiff and T. K. Mani was credible and supported by circumstances, thereby establishing the real consideration as Rs. 15,000.

Issue 3: Applicability of Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
The lower appellate court relied on Section 92 of the Evidence Act, which prohibits oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a written contract. However, the higher court clarified that this section applies only between parties to the document or their representatives. In disputes involving third parties, Section 92 does not bar oral evidence. The court cited the Supreme Court's view in Hira Devi v. Official Assignee, Bombay, which allowed third parties to provide extrinsic evidence to contradict the document's terms.

Issue 4: Impact of the Stamp Act and Contract Act on the enforceability of the transaction.
The respondents argued that allowing the plaintiff to prove a different consideration would defeat the Stamp Act's provisions, particularly Sections 27 and 64, which require full and true consideration to be stated in the instrument. The court noted that even if the parties understated the value to pay lesser stamp duty, the instrument would not become void or inadmissible. The court also referenced Section 23 of the Contract Act, which deals with lawful consideration. It concluded that the sale deed was valid despite the understated consideration, and Section 23 did not preclude the plaintiff from proving the real consideration.

Issue 5: Legal implications of issuing a cheque as a form of payment.
The court emphasized that issuing a cheque is equivalent to payment in cash, citing cases like Mohideen Bi v. Khatoon Bi and Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay. It held that a cheque, unless dishonoured, operates as payment. The lower appellate court's view that the cheque was not supported by consideration was thus unsustainable. The court found no evidence to support the second defendant's claim that the cheque was issued as security, reinforcing that it was indeed part of the sale consideration.

Conclusion:
The second appeal was allowed, and the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court were set aside, restoring the trial court's decision in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that the cheque was supported by consideration and that the plaintiff could establish the real sale consideration as Rs. 15,000. There was no order as to costs, and no leave was granted.

Issues:
1. Challenge to assessment orders based on the inclusion of agricultural lands in the definition of "asset" in the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.
2. Attack on the discriminatory nature of the proviso to section 5(1)(iva) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, as amended by the Finance Act of 1969.

Analysis:
The High Court of Madras addressed the challenge to the assessment orders made against the petitioners concerning the inclusion of agricultural lands in the definition of "asset" in the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The petitioners contended that Parliament lacked legislative competence to levy a tax on agricultural lands. However, the court rejected this contention, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, which upheld the validity of the provision in the Finance Act, 1969, allowing the valuation of agricultural lands for wealth-tax purposes.

Moving on to the second issue, the petitioners argued that the proviso to section 5(1)(iva) of the Wealth-tax Act was discriminatory as it granted higher exemptions to assessees owning agricultural lands compared to those owning other assets, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The court analyzed the legislative provisions under section 5(1)(iv) and 5(1)(iva) regarding exemptions for house properties and agricultural lands, respectively. The petitioners initially claimed that the higher exemption for agricultural lands was discriminatory but later abandoned this argument during the proceedings.

The court examined the contention that the proviso to section 5(1)(iva) was discriminatory by reducing the exemption limit for individuals owning both house properties and agricultural lands. The petitioners argued that the exemption for agricultural lands should be considered independently. However, the court held that the legislature had the discretion to provide limitations for exemptions across different categories of assets. The court found that the two-fold classification in granting exemptions based on ownership of house properties and agricultural lands had a rational nexus with the legislative intent of the Act and did not amount to arbitrariness or discrimination.

Additionally, the court distinguished a Supreme Court decision cited by the petitioners, emphasizing that the taxation measure in question did not operate unequally or violate Article 14. The court upheld the validity of the combined ceiling limit for exemptions in respect of house properties and agricultural lands set by the legislature. Consequently, the writ petitions challenging the assessment orders were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Issues Involved:
1. Locus Standi of the Petitioner
2. Requirement of Inquiry under Section 36 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950
3. Allegations of Mala Fides
4. Nature of Power under Section 38 of the Act
5. Requirement of a Speaking Order
6. Delegation of Ministerial Functions
7. Approval of the Central Government
8. Competence of the Minister to Pass the Order
9. Availability of Material to Form Opinion for Supersession

Detailed Analysis:

1. Locus Standi of the Petitioner:
The petitioner, as the Chairman of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, challenged the supersession order. The court held that the petitioner had locus standi to file the petition as his right to act as Chairman was infringed, resulting in pecuniary loss. The court distinguished the case from precedents where individual members could not challenge the dissolution of statutory bodies independently.

2. Requirement of Inquiry under Section 36 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950:
The petitioner argued that an inquiry under Section 36 was mandatory before supersession under Section 38. The court held that Section 38 operates independently of Sections 36 and 37. It does not necessitate a prior inquiry, provided the State Government forms an honest opinion based on some material.

3. Allegations of Mala Fides:
The petitioner alleged that the supersession was motivated by personal animosity of the Chief Minister and his desire to appoint his cousin as Chairman. The court found no evidence to support these allegations. The Chief Minister's affidavit denying these claims was accepted, and the petitioner's failure to substantiate his allegations led to the rejection of this ground.

4. Nature of Power under Section 38 of the Act:
The petitioner contended that the power under Section 38 was quasi-judicial and required a speaking order. The court, assuming the power to be quasi-judicial, found that procedural requirements were met. A show cause notice was issued, explanations were considered, and the Minister applied his mind to the matter. The absence of detailed reasons in the notification did not invalidate the order as the grounds were provided in the show cause notice.

5. Requirement of a Speaking Order:
The court held that Section 38 did not require reasons to be recorded in the notification itself. The detailed grounds supplied with the show cause notice and the internal notings were sufficient. The court distinguished this case from others where specific statutory provisions mandated recording reasons.

6. Delegation of Ministerial Functions:
The petitioner argued that the Minister improperly delegated his functions to subordinates. The court held that the Minister could rely on notes prepared by his officials, including the Home Commissioner, as part of the administrative process. The Minister's final decision, based on these notes, did not constitute improper delegation.

7. Approval of the Central Government:
The petitioner challenged the validity of the Central Government's approval. The court accepted the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the Government of India, which stated that the matter was carefully examined before granting approval. The court presumed the legality of official acts in the absence of specific challenges to the competence of the approving authority.

8. Competence of the Minister to Pass the Order:
The petitioner questioned the competence of the Minister, arguing that the matter should have been handled by the Chief Minister or the Governor. The court found that the business rules allowed the allocation of the State Owned Motor Transport to the Minister in charge, Shri Hardeo Joshi, and the Chief Minister also signed the order. The order, expressed in the name of the Governor, was valid under Article 166 of the Constitution.

9. Availability of Material to Form Opinion for Supersession:
The court found that most grounds for supersession were not controverted by the petitioner. Issues like the failure to create a City Transport Service, idle new vehicles, and the strike by employees were acknowledged. The State Government's opinion was based on sufficient material, and the court did not find the order to be mala fide, dishonest, or based on extraneous considerations.

Conclusion:
The writ petition was dismissed as the court found no merit in the petitioner's objections. The supersession order was upheld, and no costs were awarded.

Issues:
1. Liability of producers supplying cement in gunny bags to pay sales tax on the turnover relating to the price of the gunny bags.
2. Interpretation of rule 6(f) of the Rules under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 regarding charges for packing materials.

Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether producers supplying cement in gunny bags to the State Trading Corporation were liable to pay sales tax on the price of the gunny bags. The court noted that the supply of cement itself was not considered a "sale" due to the Cement Control Order, 1958. The key question was whether the gunny bags were sold. The court referred to previous decisions and the relevant assessment years to determine if the price of the gunny bags was controlled by the government. The Central Government had indeed fixed the price of the gunny bags, and the court held that the contention that the supply of gunny bags constituted "sales" was to be rejected. The court emphasized that the Central Government's right to fix the price had not been disputed earlier.

2. Another issue involved the interpretation of rule 6(f) of the Rules under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, specifically regarding charges for packing materials. The rule underwent changes over time, and the court analyzed the evolution of the rule up to September 1963 and subsequent recastings. The court examined whether the price of packing materials was exempt under the rule. The court referred to past decisions and concluded that the charges for packing included both the price of the packing material and labor charges. The court disagreed with a previous decision that held otherwise. Additionally, a new contention was sought to be raised during the hearing regarding the exemption for packing material not applying to cases under the Central Sales Tax Act due to retrospective amendments. However, the court did not allow this new contention as it was not raised earlier, and the appeals were ultimately dismissed with costs.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court's judgment clarified the liability of producers supplying cement in gunny bags for sales tax and provided an in-depth analysis of the interpretation of rule 6(f) regarding charges for packing materials under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

Issues:
1. Whether the income from slaughter tapping received by the assessee during 1959-60 is agricultural income taxable under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950Rs.
2. Whether the assessee conducted agricultural operationsRs.
3. Whether the assessee held the property in questionRs.

Analysis:
The case involved a question regarding the taxation of income from slaughter tapping under the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 for the assessment year 1959-60. The assessee had an agreement with a company to slaughter tap rubber trees in an estate. The contention was that the income derived was not agricultural income. The Tribunal considered the activities undertaken by the assessee, such as weeding, road laying, and curing rubber, as essential for obtaining the yield, distinguishing it from a mere licensee scenario. The Tribunal rejected the argument that the income was not agricultural income, emphasizing the necessity of the acts performed by the assessee.

Regarding the definition of "person" under section 2(m) of the Act, the assessee argued that they did not own or hold the property. However, the Tribunal found that the assessee held the property by undertaking various activities on the estate, indicating possession and control over the land during the slaughter tapping process. The Tribunal held that the assessee fell under the definition of "person" and was liable for taxation on the income earned.

The High Court considered a challenge to the Tribunal's conclusions on agricultural operations and property holding. The Court acknowledged the possibility of differing views but emphasized the limitation of not revisiting factual findings unless proven arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court found that the Tribunal's findings on agricultural operations and property holding were supported by the evidence, leading to a decision in favor of the department and against the assessee. The Court directed each party to bear their respective costs, with the judgment to be forwarded to the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.

In conclusion, the High Court answered the question in the affirmative, upholding the taxation of the income from slaughter tapping as agricultural income based on the Tribunal's findings regarding the activities conducted by the assessee and their possession of the property during the process.

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income-tax to issue search and seizure warrants.
2. Possession of the seized amount and documents.
3. Legal validity of search and seizure when the location of items is known.
4. Compliance with Section 132(9) of the Income-tax Act regarding allowing the petitioners to take extracts and copies of seized documents.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income-tax to Issue Search and Seizure Warrants:
The core issue was whether the Commissioner of Income-tax had sufficient material to issue search and seizure warrants under Section 132(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court examined the note recorded by the Commissioner, which indicated that the police inspector, Balwant Singh, had informed him about the recovery of Rs. 1,61,000 from Ramesh Chander. The court held that the information provided by a credible source, such as a police inspector, was sufficient for the Commissioner to form a "reason to believe" that the money was undisclosed income. The court emphasized that the adequacy of the grounds for the belief could not be scrutinized in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, provided the information had a rational connection to the belief. Thus, the court concluded that the Commissioner had the jurisdiction to issue the search and seizure warrants.

2. Possession of the Seized Amount and Documents:
The court analyzed whether Ramesh Chander was in possession of the money and documents at the time of the search and seizure. It was found that Balwant Singh, the police inspector, had already taken possession of the amount and documents before the income-tax authorities executed the search warrants. The court noted that the police had detained Ramesh Chander and his companions, and the money and documents were in the custody of the police, not Ramesh Chander. Consequently, the search and seizure warrants issued on the presumption that Ramesh Chander was in possession of the amount and documents were deemed invalid.

3. Legal Validity of Search and Seizure When the Location of Items is Known:
The court addressed the argument that search and seizure warrants could not be issued if the location of the items was known. It disagreed with the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court in Moti Lal's case, which suggested that warrants could not be issued if the items were not concealed. The court clarified that the term "search" in Section 132 of the Income-tax Act did not imply that the items had to be hidden. The court further held that the income-tax authorities could not issue search and seizure warrants to seize items already in possession of another statutory authority, as it would create a conflict between different statutes. Therefore, the search and seizure warrants issued in this case were invalid because the items were already in the custody of the police.

4. Compliance with Section 132(9) of the Income-tax Act:
The court examined whether the petitioners were given an opportunity to take extracts and copies of the seized documents, as required by Section 132(9) of the Income-tax Act. It was found that the petitioners were not allowed to take extracts or copies of the account books and other documents, which prejudiced their defense. The court held that the violation of Section 132(9) rendered the final order under Section 132(5) of the Income-tax Act illegal. However, the court noted that if the search and seizure warrants were valid, the appropriate remedy would be to direct the Income-tax Officer to pass a fresh order after allowing the petitioners to take the necessary extracts and copies.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the search and seizure warrants were invalid because the money and documents were in the possession of the police, not Ramesh Chander, and the income-tax authorities could not seize items already in the custody of another statutory authority. The court modified the order of the learned single judge, directing the income-tax authorities to return the seized amount and documents to the police authorities, who would proceed in accordance with the law. The court also clarified that the income-tax authorities could approach the court of competent jurisdiction to get the amount adjusted for unpaid income-tax if permissible by law.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether water pumping sets are classified as agricultural implements or machinery under the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
2. The efficacy of the alternative remedy under the Act.
3. The applicability of specific notifications under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
4. The validity of section 3-AB of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Classification of Water Pumping Sets:
The petitioner argued that water pumping sets should be classified as agricultural implements and thus taxed at 2% under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Department contended that these pumping sets are machinery and taxed their turnover at 6%. Previous decisions by the court, such as Delta Engineering Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax and M/s. Chandra Metal Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, held that centrifugal pumps and pumping sets are not agricultural implements. The court, however, reconsidered these decisions and determined that pumping sets are indeed agricultural implements because they are intimately connected with agriculture and commonly used for irrigation, which is an essential agricultural process.

2. Efficacy of Alternative Remedy:
The court examined whether the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of appeal under the Act. Although the petitioner had already availed of this remedy and the appeal was pending, the court found that the alternative remedy was not efficacious and speedy. The court noted that the petitioner faced a significant tax liability due to ongoing assessment proceedings and previous court decisions that were likely to be unfavorable. Additionally, the petitioner challenged the vires of section 3-AB of the Act, which could not be decided by the authorities under the Sales Tax Act. Thus, the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition was rejected.

3. Applicability of Specific Notifications:
The court analyzed two notifications under section 3-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Notification No. ST-1365/X-9901956, dated 1st April 1960, and its modification by Notification No. ST-6552-X-900(31)-1965, dated 1st September 1965, classified agricultural implements and included pumping sets as agricultural implements. On the other hand, Notification No. ST-7098/X-1012-1965, dated 1st October 1965, related to machinery and its spare parts, taxing them at 6%. The court concluded that if pumping sets are agricultural implements, their turnover would be taxable under the notification of 1st April 1960 at 2%.

4. Validity of Section 3-AB of the U.P. Sales Tax Act:
As the petition succeeded on merits, the court found it unnecessary to address the constitutional question regarding the validity of section 3-AB of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the petition, quashed the assessment order for the year 1966-67, and directed the Sales Tax Officer to pass the assessment order for the year 1968-69 in accordance with the clarified law. The court held that water pumping sets are agricultural implements and should be taxed at 2%. The petitioner was entitled to costs, with one set of costs awarded. The connected writ petition for the assessment year 1968-69 was also directed to be decided in line with this judgment.