Issues Involved:
1. Possession and Status under U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
2. Jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
3. Application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession.
4. Bar of suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.
5. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Summary:

Issue 1: Possession and Status under U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
The appellants, claiming to be Khudkasht holders of the Zamindars, filed a suit for possession u/s 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which resulted in a decree in their favor. They claimed to have acquired the status of Bhumidars under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The respondents argued that they acquired the status of adhivasis u/s 20 of the 1950 Act and sought to regain possession, which the Additional Commissioner granted.

Issue 2: Jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
The appellants contended that the Additional Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal on merits once the village was under consolidation under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The Board of Revenue held that the appeal should have been stayed, not decided on merits, and remitted the matter back to the Additional Commissioner.

Issue 3: Application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restitution of possession
The appellants sought restitution of possession u/s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure after the reversal of the Additional Commissioner's decision. The Sub Divisional Officer and subsequent authorities rejected their application, stating that the decision under the 1953 Act had become final and could not be reopened.

Issue 4: Bar of suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
The appellants filed a suit u/s 209 and 229(b) of the 1950 Act, which was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue on grounds of res judicata and limitation. The High Court upheld that the suit was barred u/s 49 of the 1953 Act, as the plots were finally allotted to the respondents in consolidation proceedings.

Issue 5: Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
The appellants argued for the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time spent in earlier proceedings. The High Court and statutory authorities held that Section 14 was not applicable as the earlier proceeding under Section 144 of the CPC did not relate to the same matter in issue and failed on merits, not on jurisdictional grounds.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents had a stronger legal and equitable claim to possession as adhivasis under the 1950 Act. The appellants' suit was barred by limitation and Section 49 of the 1953 Act, and they were not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The decision of the High Court and statutory authorities was upheld.

Issues:
1. Dispute regarding the dutiability of PVC Compound manufactured before 18-6-1977 but cleared on or after 18-6-1977 till 28-6-1977.
2. Claim for refund of duty paid during the period in question.
3. Interpretation of Section 5(1) of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act.

Analysis:
1. The appeal involved a dispute over the dutiability of PVC Compound cleared between 18-6-1977 and 28-6-1977. The Department asserted that duty was leviable on the product under Item 15-A of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule, while the appellants contended otherwise, based on the product's manufacturing date before 18-6-1977. The key issue was whether duty could be charged under Item 15-A CET on goods manufactured prior to the change in classification. Both parties agreed that the product fell under Item No. 15A during the relevant period, but disagreed on the levy applicability to pre-18-6-1977 stocks.

2. The appellants argued that duty should not be levied on the pre-18-6-1977 stocks of PVC Compound under Item No. 15A, CET during the period in question. However, the Tribunal rejected this contention, citing precedents where the date of removal of goods, not the manufacturing date, determined duty applicability. The Tribunal referenced cases like Union of India v. The Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Kesar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, emphasizing that duty is linked to the date of removal, not manufacture.

3. The appellants also relied on Section 5(1) of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act for a refund claim. However, the Tribunal dismissed this argument, clarifying that the exemption notification issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules did not constitute an amendment to a declared provision of a Finance Bill. The Tribunal rejected the contention that the exemption notification triggered Section 5(1) provisions, concluding that the appeal lacked merit and was therefore rejected.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the import license compliance.
2. Quality and thickness of imported goods.
3. Denial of natural justice due to lack of cross-examination.
4. Procedural adherence and expert opinion reliance.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Import License Compliance:
The appellant imported 404 pieces of M.S. plates from Bulgaria under Import Licence No. P/D/8541999/T/OR/47/D/31:32, dated December 23, 1970, for Prime M.S. plates of tested killed quality with thicknesses of 5 mm and 6 mm. The Customs Authorities observed that the imported goods did not conform to the import license due to lower silicon content, categorizing them as semi-killed rather than killed quality. Consequently, a show cause notice was issued under Section 112 and Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962, for misdeclaration.

2. Quality and Thickness of Imported Goods:
Upon testing by the Director General, Supplies & Disposals, Jamshedpur, Sample No. 1 was found to be semi-killed with a thickness of 5.05 mm, and Sample No. 2 was killed quality but with a thickness of 7.90 mm. The appellant argued that the criterion of 0.10% silicon content applied to ladle analysis, not the final product, and requested a cross-examination of the testing officer. The Customs Authorities, however, relied on the test report and imposed a penalty of Rs. 41,500.00 under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.

3. Denial of Natural Justice Due to Lack of Cross-Examination:
The appellant contended that the refusal to summon the testing officer for cross-examination constituted a denial of natural justice. The Tribunal acknowledged this argument, emphasizing the necessity of following principles under the Evidence Act, which mandates the opportunity for cross-examination of expert witnesses. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court judgment in Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull, which underscores the importance of adhering to basic canons of criminal jurisprudence and natural justice in customs proceedings.

4. Procedural Adherence and Expert Opinion Reliance:
The Tribunal noted procedural infirmities, referencing the Supreme Court's stance in M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, which highlighted the need for proper investigation and procedural compliance. The Tribunal also referenced Sections 45 and 46 of the Evidence Act, which relate to the relevance and admissibility of expert opinions. The Tribunal found that the Customs Authorities had not provided the appellant with the opportunity to cross-examine the testing officer, thus violating principles of natural justice.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal remanded the case to the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, directing that the appellant be given the opportunity to cross-examine the testing officer and that the case be decided in accordance with the law within six months. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, emphasizing the need for adherence to procedural fairness and natural justice in customs adjudications.

Issues:
1. Challenge to the levy of penalty under section 12(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
2. Interpretation of the provisions of section 12(3) and 12(5) regarding the time limit for levying penalties.
3. Jurisdiction of the succeeding officer to levy penalty in cases where the original assessing authority did not levy penalty.
4. Determination of suppression and justification for the levy of penalty.

Analysis:
1. The High Court of Madras addressed a tax revision case challenging the Tribunal's cancellation of a penalty levied on the respondent-assessee under section 12(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The assessee was assessed for a taxable turnover, and a penalty was imposed by a succeeding officer for alleged suppression. The Tribunal set aside the penalty, stating that the succeeding officer lacked the power to levy a penalty not considered by the original assessing authority.

2. The Court examined the provisions of section 12(3) and 12(5) concerning the time limit for imposing penalties. The statute allowed for penalties to be levied within five years from the assessment year. The Court emphasized that the assessing authority, whether the original or succeeding officer, could impose penalties within this timeframe. The discretion to levy penalties was not restricted to the original assessing authority only.

3. Regarding the jurisdiction of the succeeding officer to levy penalties, the Court disagreed with the Tribunal's view that only the original assessing authority could do so. The Court held that as long as the penalty was imposed within the specified five-year period and there was no evidence of the original authority refraining from levying a penalty, the succeeding officer could exercise discretion to impose penalties based on suppression found.

4. The Court ultimately agreed with the Tribunal's decision to cancel the penalty in this case. The Tribunal found that the slip used to determine suppression did not pertain to the assessee's business but to a sister concern. As the assessment was based on incorrect information, the Court upheld the cancellation of the penalty despite differing on the jurisdiction issue. The Court dismissed the tax case, emphasizing that there was no justification for the penalty due to the lack of suppression by the assessee.

The ITAT Madras-C upheld the Commissioner (A)'s decision that guarantee commission is revenue expenditure, following a Madras High Court decision. Also, the ITAT ruled that Central subsidy received by the assessee should not be deducted from the actual cost of assets for depreciation, based on a Special Bench decision. The department's appeal was dismissed.

The judgment concerns the inclusion of uninstalled machinery value in capital computation for deduction under s. 80JJ and the treatment of borrowed capital for relief under s. 80J. The Appellate Tribunal accepted the assessee's claim regarding the uninstalled machinery and directed a modification in the computation of deduction under s. 80J pending a Supreme Court judgment on the retrospective amendment. The appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues Involved:
1. Eligibility for relief under Section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Eligibility for extra depreciation for approved hotels.
3. Requirement of specific approval from the Central Government for tax reliefs.
4. Validity of the approval dates provided by the Department of Tourism.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Eligibility for relief under Section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The assessee, a company running a hotel, claimed relief under Section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The claim was initially declined due to the absence of specific approval from the Central Government. The Commissioner (Appeals) found that there was approval for two years but not for the other two years. The Tribunal noted that the Department of Tourism had issued a letter on 4-5-1974 approving the hotel project, which was intended to cover all reliefs under the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal concluded that the approval granted on 4-5-1974 and reiterated on 13-9-1983 should be considered valid for all purposes of the Act, thereby entitling the assessee to relief under Section 80J.

2. Eligibility for extra depreciation for approved hotels:
The assessee also claimed extra depreciation admissible for approved hotels. The claim was declined by the Income-tax Officer (ITO) due to the absence of specific approval for the years under consideration. The Tribunal found that the approval granted by the Department of Tourism on 4-5-1974, which continued till 13-9-1983, was sufficient to cover the extra depreciation claim. The Tribunal emphasized that section-wise approval was not necessary and that the approval from the Department of Tourism should be considered valid for all sections of the Income-tax Act, including the claim for extra depreciation.

3. Requirement of specific approval from the Central Government for tax reliefs:
The ITO insisted on specific approval for each section of the Income-tax Act for the years under consideration. The Tribunal, however, held that such section-wise approval was not necessary. The Tribunal referred to a communication from the CBDT, which clarified that the original approval by the Department of Tourism could be taken as approval for all purposes of the Act. The Tribunal concluded that the approval granted on 4-5-1974 should be considered valid for all tax reliefs, and the communication dated 6-1-1981, which mentioned specific dates, was merely a reiteration of the original approval.

4. Validity of the approval dates provided by the Department of Tourism:
The Department of Tourism's letter dated 6-1-1981 mentioned specific dates for approval under different sections of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal found that these dates were mentioned without understanding the implications and that the approval granted on 4-5-1974 continued to be valid. The Tribunal referred to the correspondence between the assessee and the Department of Tourism, which confirmed that the hotel project was approved from 4-5-1974 and continued to be on the approved list. The Tribunal concluded that the approval was valid for all years and for all purposes of the Act.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal held that the assessee was eligible for the reliefs under Sections 32(1)(v), 33(1)(b)(B), and 80J(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The ITO was directed to quantify the relief after providing a proper opportunity to the assessee to establish its eligibility on merits. The departmental appeals were dismissed, and the assessee's appeals were allowed.

Issues:
1. Interpretation of section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the exemption of compensatory allowance paid by the Royal Bhutan Government to Government of India servants deputed to Bhutan.

Analysis:
The case involved a departmental appeal against the order of the AAC regarding the exemption of compensatory allowance paid by the Royal Bhutan Government to a Government of India servant deputed to Bhutan for the assessment year 1980-81. The key question was whether such compensatory allowance is entitled to exemption under section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appellant argued that the exemption under section 10(7) is only applicable if allowances are paid by the Indian Government, not by any foreign government. The AAC, however, held in favor of the assessee, granting exemption for the compensatory allowance and directing the ITO to exclude it from the gross salary income. The Tribunal heard arguments from the departmental representative and considered the written arguments submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal analyzed the provisions of section 10(7) which exempt allowances or perquisites paid by the Government to a citizen of India for rendering services outside India. The Tribunal referred to the definition of 'Government' under the General Clauses Act, 1897, and concluded that the word 'Government' in section 10(7) should be interpreted as the Government of India. However, the Tribunal emphasized that if the allowances are allowed by the Government of India, even if paid by a foreign government, they are entitled to exemption under section 10(7). In this case, as the compensatory allowance was approved by the Government of India for deputationists to Bhutan, the exemption was deemed applicable. The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, upholding the exemption of the compensatory allowance.

This judgment clarifies the interpretation of section 10(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding the exemption of allowances paid by a foreign government to Government of India servants deputed abroad. The Tribunal emphasized that the word 'Government' in section 10(7) should be understood as the Government of India. However, the key factor for exemption is whether the allowances are allowed by the Government of India, regardless of the foreign government making the payment. The Tribunal highlighted that the disjunctive nature of 'paid or allowed' in section 10(7) indicates that the payment and allowance do not need to be from the same authority. As long as the Government of India approves the payment, the exemption applies. The Tribunal also referenced a clarificatory letter from the Commissioner to a deputationist in Bhutan, supporting the interpretation that if the payment is allowed by the Government of India, the exemption under section 10(7) is applicable. This judgment provides clarity on the eligibility of compensatory allowances paid by foreign governments to Government of India servants for exemption under section 10(7) based on the approval by the Government of India, ensuring a fair and consistent application of tax laws in such cases.

Issues:
1. Dispute over deemed gift made by deceased to relatives.
2. Ownership of properties in question at the time of sale.
3. Applicability of section 4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act.
4. Liability of legal heirs for gift-tax assessment.
5. Legal implications of Tribunal's decision on ownership.
6. Interpretation of sections 51(2) and 52(2) of the Act.
7. Market value determination for tax assessment.

Detailed Analysis:
The judgment deals with nine appeals consolidated due to a common question regarding a deemed gift made by the deceased to relatives. The deceased initially sold properties to certain individuals and later sold portions to relatives and educational institutions. The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings for capital gains and gift-tax, assessing a deemed gift amount. The AAC, relying on a Tribunal decision, concluded the deceased was not the owner of the properties, thus canceling the assessments. The revenue appealed, arguing against the AAC's decision (Para 2-3).

The Tribunal found the AAC's reliance on the Tribunal decision misconceived. While the deceased may not have been the property owner, he was considered the transferor based on his conduct and tax assessments. The Tribunal highlighted that the deceased's treatment of the properties indicated ownership, justifying gift-tax liability. The Tribunal also discussed the applicability of sections 51(2) and 52(2) of the Act in determining tax liability (Para 5-6).

Regarding tax liability, the Tribunal referenced Supreme Court decisions to affirm that a transfer below market value could result in a gift-tax liability. The Tribunal concluded that the deceased was liable for tax on the deemed gift under section 4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act. The Tribunal found the AAC's orders legally flawed and unsustainable (Para 7).

Further, the Tribunal noted discrepancies in the valuation of the properties, requiring a reassessment of the market value for tax purposes. The matter was remanded to the AAC for a fresh decision based on the correct market value determination. The appeals were treated as allowed for statistical purposes (Para 8-9).

Issues:
1. Whether the shares received by the assessee by surrendering convertible bonds give rise to capital gains.

Analysis:
The judgment dealt with the issue of whether the conversion of bonds into equity shares would result in capital gains for the assessee. The assessee held 35 bonds issued by a company, which were convertible into equity shares. The assessee exercised this option and received cash and equity shares. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) contended that the conversion gave rise to capital gains and taxed the amount accordingly. The primary dispute was whether capital gains should be levied at all. The assessee argued that there was no transfer involved in the conversion, as there was no sale or exchange, and the asset ceased to exist. The Tribunal, however, held that the conversion of bonds into equity shares constituted a transfer within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the right to convert bonds into shares was voluntary and led to the extinguishment of the assessee's rights in the bonds, satisfying the conditions of a transfer as per the Act.

The Tribunal rejected the assessee's argument that the conversion did not involve a transfer, emphasizing that the conversion transaction could not be split into separate parts. The Tribunal highlighted that the conditions for the definition of 'transfer' under the Income Tax Act were met, as the conversion resulted in the extinguishment of the assessee's rights in the bonds. The Tribunal referenced a previous decision by the Gujarat High Court, which supported the view that extinguishment of rights did not require the asset to continue to exist post-transfer. Additionally, the Tribunal distinguished the case from scenarios involving the issuance of right shares or shares in amalgamation, stating that the creation of new rights and obligations upon exercising the conversion option differentiated this case. The Tribunal ultimately upheld the levy of capital gains on the conversion of bonds into equity shares, dismissing the assessee's appeal.

In conclusion, the judgment clarified that the conversion of bonds into equity shares triggered capital gains for the assessee, as it constituted a transfer under the Income Tax Act. The voluntary nature of the conversion and the extinguishment of the assessee's rights in the bonds were key factors in determining the taxability of the transaction. The Tribunal's decision aligned with previous legal interpretations and established principles regarding the treatment of such conversions for tax purposes.

Issues Involved:
1. Allowability of secret commission under 'Sales Promotion Expenses'
2. Long-term capital gains assessment
3. Gratuity payment to employees
4. Disallowance under section 37(3) of the Income-tax Act
5. Classification of the company as an industrial company
6. Application of section 40A(5) vs. section 40(c) for Director-employees' remuneration

Detailed Analysis:

1. Allowability of Secret Commission under 'Sales Promotion Expenses':
The central issue across all appeals was the allowability of certain amounts claimed by the assessee under 'Sales Promotion Expenses,' representing secret commission incurred in connection with its business. The assessee argued that these payments were necessary to ensure the acceptance and certification of their products by technical staff at mills, which was crucial for maintaining and increasing sales. The Income Tax Officer (ITO) disallowed these claims, citing the lack of specific details, such as the names and addresses of the recipients. However, the Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claims, recognizing the practical difficulties in disclosing such details and the established practice in the industry. The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision, emphasizing that the systematic procedure followed by the assessee over decades and the negligible percentage of these expenses relative to turnover supported their genuineness. The Tribunal also noted that the absence of recipients' names alone should not lead to disallowance if the expenditure is otherwise substantiated.

2. Long-term Capital Gains Assessment (Assessment Year 1975-76):
The assessee sold a flat and a garage, reporting long-term capital gains of Rs. 1,11,500. The ITO, based on the Valuation Officer's assessment of the property's fair market value at Rs. 4,34,000, recalculated the capital gains at Rs. 3,56,500, invoking section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 3,22,500, and the Tribunal upheld this decision, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in K.P. Varghese v. ITO, which stated that section 52(2) applies only when the assessee is shown to have received amounts exceeding what was declared.

3. Gratuity Payment to Employees (Assessment Year 1975-76):
The assessee paid gratuity of Rs. 55,500 to four employees, which the ITO disallowed, arguing it was a gratuitous payment not arising from a legally enforceable obligation. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the claim, noting that the payments were made uniformly to all prematurely retiring employees. The Tribunal upheld this decision, recognizing that the payments were made to inspire confidence and loyalty among continuing employees, despite some technical non-compliance with gratuity payment rules.

4. Disallowance under Section 37(3) of the Income-tax Act (Assessment Year 1975-76):
The ITO disallowed Rs. 10,000 out of Rs. 34,484 incurred under 'Advertisement, etc., expenses,' arguing that the expenditure on dry fruits and biscuit tins distributed to customers did not qualify as advertisement expenses. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted this disallowance, and the Tribunal upheld this decision, noting that such distributions were intended to maintain good relationships rather than serve as advertisements.

5. Classification of the Company as an Industrial Company (Assessment Year 1975-76):
The ITO rejected the assessee's claim of being an industrial company, stating that its income arose mainly from non-manufacturing activities. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the claim, noting that 70% of the turnover related to processed goods. The Tribunal upheld this decision, emphasizing that the extent of industrial activity and processing of goods should be the primary criteria for classification.

6. Application of Section 40A(5) vs. Section 40(c) for Director-employees' Remuneration (Assessment Year 1976-77):
The ITO applied section 40A(5) to disallow certain amounts from the remuneration of Director-employees, while the assessee claimed that section 40(c) should apply. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the assessee's claim, and the Tribunal upheld this decision, referencing the Special Bench's ruling in Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd. v. ITO.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decisions across various issues, emphasizing the practical business considerations and established practices in the industry. The appeals by the department were dismissed, and the assessee's appeals were allowed, recognizing the genuineness and necessity of the claimed expenditures.

Issues:
1. Appeal barred by limitation under Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Applicability of the Limitation Act in proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
4. Decision on merits by the revisional authority.

Analysis:

1. The petitioner challenged an order confiscating billets and imposing a fine, contending that the appeal was wrongly held as time-barred under Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Appellate Collector found the appeal filed beyond the prescribed time limit, which the petitioner sought to justify by citing health reasons. The High Court upheld the decision, stating that the appeal was indeed filed late, thus justifying the time-barred status.

2. The petitioner sought condonation of the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, both the Appellate and Revisional Authorities rejected this plea, emphasizing that the provisions of the Limitation Act were inapplicable to proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The High Court concurred with this view, leading to the dismissal of the petitioner's request for condonation.

3. The petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of the Limitation Act in proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The High Court clarified that the special nature of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 meant that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply. This legal position was crucial in determining the fate of the petitioner's appeal and subsequent requests for condonation of delay.

4. The petitioner contended that the revisional authority should have decided the case on its merits rather than solely focusing on the issue of delay in filing the appeal. However, the High Court found no error in the decision-making process of the revisional authority, emphasizing that the petitioner did not present any additional grounds for consideration. Consequently, the High Court upheld the revisional authority's decision and dismissed the petitioner's plea for redress.

In conclusion, the High Court ruled against the petitioner, affirming the decisions of the lower authorities regarding the time-barred appeal and the inapplicability of the Limitation Act in the proceedings under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The judgment highlighted the importance of adhering to statutory timelines and the specific legal framework governing excise matters.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether Section 40(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act is a legal bar to the maintainability of the suit.
2. Whether the claim is barred by limitation prescribed by Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
3. Whether the inferences drawn by the Courts below that the action taken by the appellants was not in good faith is supportable in law.
4. Whether the award of interest by the Courts below is legally sustainable.
5. Whether the plaintiff was bound to mitigate the damages by applying for possession of the tobacco pending the proceedings and by taking delivery of the same when called upon to do so.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Legal Bar under Section 40(1)
The defendants argued that the suit is not maintainable due to the provisions of Section 40(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The court examined whether the seizure and retention of the goods by the defendants were actions taken in good faith under the Act. The court noted that the provision protects acts done in good faith under the Act but does not protect actions done in violation of the Act or beyond the jurisdiction of the officer. The court found that the seizure and retention were not justified and were in violation of natural justice principles, as previously quashed in O.P. No. 2566 of 1962. Therefore, the court concluded that Section 40(1) does not bar the suit.

Issue 2: Limitation under Section 40(2)
The defendants contended that the suit is barred by the limitation period prescribed in Section 40(2) of the Act, which is six months from the accrual of the cause of action. The court noted that the plaintiff was first informed to take back the goods on 28-10-1964, and the suit was filed on 5-11-1966. The court referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in B. Poornaish v. Union of India, which held that Section 40 applies only to suits for damages and not to suits for the return of goods or their value. Consequently, the general law of limitation applies, and the suit is not barred by Section 40(2).

Issue 3: Good Faith of Defendants' Actions
The court examined whether the actions of the Central Excise officers were in good faith. The court found that the seizure was not justified, and the goods were not returned in the same condition as seized. The plaintiff was justified in not taking delivery due to the deterioration of the goods. The court concluded that the question of good faith is not relevant in a suit for the return of goods or their value when the goods cannot be returned in the same condition. Therefore, the inference that the defendants did not act in good faith was supported by the evidence.

Issue 4: Award of Interest
The court noted that the claim for damages by way of interest at 12% was negatived by the trial court and upheld by the appellate court. Since this issue was not argued in the second appeal, the court did not address it further.

Issue 5: Mitigation of Damages
The court did not address this issue as it was not argued in the second appeal.

Conclusion:
The court overruled the contentions of the defendants and dismissed the second appeal, affirming the decisions of the lower courts. The suit was found to be maintainable, not barred by limitation, and the actions of the defendants were not in good faith. The plaintiff was entitled to the value of the goods seized, as they could not be returned in the same condition. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Status of the assessee for assessment under the Agricultural Income-tax Act.
2. Inclusion of income from lands settled on minor daughters in the assessment.
3. Applicability of section 9(2) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act.
4. Entitlement to the lands inherited from the grandmother.
5. Effect of the Commissioner's remit order and the theory of merger.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Status of the Assessee for Assessment:
The primary issue was whether the assessee should be assessed as an individual or as a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). The Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that the assessment should be made in the status of an HUF, not as an individual. This decision was based on the fact that the properties were originally ancestral and were partitioned among the assessee, his father, and his grandfather. The properties obtained by the assessee in the partition continued to have the ancestral character and were held by the assessee as the karta of the HUF consisting of himself, his wife, and his two minor daughters. The High Court upheld this view, citing precedents from the Supreme Court, which established that properties obtained in a partition by a coparcener retain their joint family nature.

2. Inclusion of Income from Lands Settled on Minor Daughters:
The Tribunal excluded the lands settled on the minor daughters from the assessment, stating that section 9(2) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, which allows clubbing of minors' income with that of the parent, does not apply when the assessment is made on the father in the status of an HUF. The High Court agreed with this interpretation, referencing a Division Bench decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Sadhanandam, which held that section 9(2) applies only when the assessment is made on the father in his individual capacity.

3. Applicability of Section 9(2) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act:
The Tribunal held that section 9(2) does not apply to the assessee's case since the assessment was to be made on the HUF and not on the individual. The High Court affirmed this view, stating that the clubbing provision under section 9(2) is inapplicable when the assessment is made in the status of an HUF.

4. Entitlement to the Lands Inherited from the Grandmother:
The Tribunal found that the assessee was entitled to only a 1/21 share of the lands inherited from his grandmother, and this share should be assessed in his individual capacity, not as part of the HUF. The High Court concurred with this finding, noting that the land inherited from the grandmother did not belong to the HUF but to the assessee individually.

5. Effect of the Commissioner's Remit Order and the Theory of Merger:
The Revenue argued that the Tribunal should not have reopened issues decided by the Commissioner in the remit order, invoking the theory of merger. However, the High Court rejected this argument, stating that the Tribunal, being an independent appellate authority, was not bound by the Commissioner's opinion. The High Court clarified that the theory of merger does not apply in this context, as the remit order and the subsequent assessment order are separate and distinct. The Tribunal, therefore, had the jurisdiction to independently assess the status of the assessee and the applicability of section 9(2).

Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the tax revision cases, affirming the Tribunal's decision that the assessee should be assessed in the status of an HUF and excluding the lands settled on the minor daughters from the assessment. The High Court also upheld the Tribunal's decision regarding the lands inherited from the grandmother and rejected the Revenue's argument on the theory of merger.

Issues Involved:
1. Addition of Rs. 58,46,535.
2. Validity and legality of the assessment.
3. Disallowance of surtax liability and expenses under section 40A(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Addition of Rs. 58,46,535:
The assessee-company, engaged in the manufacture of tungsten carbide products, adopted the Last In First Out (LIFO) method for valuing closing stock, resulting in a reduction of Rs. 58,46,535 in the closing stock valuation compared to the previous method. The IAC (assessing officer) rejected the LIFO method, considering it not bona fide, and added Rs. 58,46,535 to the income. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this addition, noting that the change was not justified by the period of production or inflation in raw material costs. The Tribunal, after visiting the factory and examining the manufacturing process, found the LIFO method more realistic due to the long production cycle and rising raw material costs. The Tribunal held that the change in method was bona fide and necessary to reflect true profits, thus deleting the addition.

2. Validity and Legality of the Assessment:
The assessee challenged the jurisdiction of the IAC to make the assessment, arguing that the IAC should have followed the draft assessment procedure under section 144B. The Commissioner (Appeals) held that the IAC had jurisdiction under sections 125, 125(2)(a)(i), 144B, and 153. The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner (Appeals), noting that the IAC had concurrent jurisdiction and the assessment was validly made. The Tribunal emphasized that section 144B has overriding power, and the IAC was justified in making the assessment.

3. Disallowance of Surtax Liability and Expenses under Section 40A(5):
The Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed the surtax liability, relying on the Special Bench decision in Amar Dye-Chem. Ltd. v. ITO, which held that surtax liability is not a business expenditure allowable under section 37 or as a loss under section 28. The Tribunal upheld this disallowance, agreeing with the Commissioner (Appeals). Regarding the superannuation fund contribution, the Tribunal allowed the entire contribution of Rs. 89,507, following the Bombay Bench decision in Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd., which held the CBDT circular ultra vires. The Tribunal also allowed a reduction of Rs. 28,750 in respect of remuneration to Mahavir Prasad, considering it a business expenditure.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal, deleting the addition of Rs. 58,46,535 and allowing the entire superannuation fund contribution. However, it upheld the disallowance of surtax liability and confirmed the validity of the assessment made by the IAC.

Issues Involved:

1. Validity and legality of reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to MBBS/BDS Course.
2. Whether the classification between students educated in urban schools and common rural schools is based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
3. Whether the reservation is sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity and legality of reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to MBBS/BDS Course:

The petitioners challenged the reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas as being violative of Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution. They argued that the classification is arbitrary, unintelligible, and unrelated to the objects sought to be achieved. The respondents contended that the classification and consequent reservation are valid under Article 14 of the Constitution, aiming to correct regional imbalances and provide opportunities to students from disadvantaged rural schools.

2. Whether the classification between students educated in urban schools and common rural schools is based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved:

The Court examined whether the classification based on candidates coming from rural areas against urban areas satisfies the twin tests of permissible classification under Article 14. The Court noted that all students seeking admission to the medical college must have studied up to the 12th standard, meaning that even candidates from common rural schools would have joined urban schools for the last four years. The Court found that the education from Class I to VIII is of a general nature and does not equip a student for admission to a medical college. Consequently, the classification based on education from Class I to VIII in common rural schools is arbitrary and irrational, failing to provide intelligible differentia and having no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

3. Whether the reservation is sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution:

The respondents did not attempt to sustain the reservation under Article 15(4), which allows special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes or scheduled castes and tribes. Instead, they argued that the reservation is valid under Article 14. The Court referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Pradeep Tandon, which struck down similar reservations for candidates from rural areas, holding that such reservations cannot be sustained on the ground that rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes. The Court concluded that the classification in the present case is similarly invalid, as it is not based on intelligible differentia and has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

Conclusion:

The Court held that the classification and reservation of 25 seats for candidates from rural areas for admission to the MBBS/BDS Course are constitutionally invalid. The classification is arbitrary and irrational, failing to satisfy the twin tests of permissible classification under Article 14. The reservation is not sustainable under Articles 14, 15(4), and 29(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court quashed the reservation and directed the respondents to admit students based on the general merit list for the year 1982.

Issues:
1. Whether certain items manufactured/fabricated in the factory are liable to payment of excise duty.
2. Whether components manufactured in premises not considered as a 'factory' under the Factories Act, 1948, are exempt from excise duty.
3. Whether certain infrastructure facilities like storage tanks should be considered as complete machinery and subjected to excise duty.

Analysis:
1. The appeal involved a dispute regarding the liability of certain items to excise duty. The Collector held that items like Steel structure, spray pond, boiler chimney, etc., were not considered as "machinery" and valued at a specific amount, while the rest were treated as complete machinery and subjected to excise duty under Notification No. 118/75-C.E. The appellants contested this, arguing that certain components should be exempted from duty as they were manufactured in premises not qualifying as a 'factory' under the Factories Act, 1948. The Tribunal examined the records and concluded that the items valued at &8377; 12,36,054 were liable to excise duty under Item 68 CET, setting aside the Collector's order partially.

2. The second issue revolved around components valued at &8377; 10,39,407, manufactured in premises not meeting the definition of a 'factory' under the Factories Act, 1948. The appellants contended that these items should be exempted from duty. The Tribunal emphasized the need for the Collector to investigate whether the concerns fabricating these goods were 'factory' under the Act. It was highlighted that evidence supporting the claim that these items were not manufactured in a 'factory' needed to be presented. The Tribunal acknowledged this aspect and directed further examination by the Collector.

3. Lastly, the question arose regarding infrastructure facilities like storage tanks, steam trap tanks, pipe fittings, etc., valued at &8377; 19,88,940. The appellants argued that these should not be considered as complete machinery and, therefore, exempt from excise duty under Notification No. 118/75. The Tribunal agreed with this argument, stating that these items did not qualify as complete machinery and were eligible for exemption. The Tribunal ordered that no excise duty was leviable on these items and set aside the Collector's decision in this regard.

In conclusion, the Tribunal partially allowed the appeal, confirming the liability of certain items to excise duty while exempting others based on the specific circumstances and legal provisions applicable to each category of goods involved in the case.

Issues:
1. Whether the appellants are entitled to a refund of the duty amount collected.
2. Interpretation of the Supreme Court orders dated Nov. 17, 1976, and Dec. 10, 1979, regarding the refund application.
3. Examination of the limitation under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, in granting the refund.

Analysis:
The judgment involves five appeals questioning the refund of duty totaling &8377; 1,70,597.44, based on the Supreme Court's orders in Civil Appeal Nos. 784-787 and 866 of 1973. The appellants imported 'Earth Moving Equipment' during 1964-1965, which were assessed for additional duty as Motor Vehicles. However, a subsequent Public Notice declared these goods not liable for Excise duty, leading to refund applications rejected due to exceeding the time limit under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. The matter escalated to the Supreme Court, which granted leave to withdraw appeals with liberty to approach the Central Government in Revision. The Government rejected the Revision Applications as time-barred, prompting the Supreme Court to remand the matter for consideration on merits, not limited by time constraints.

During the hearing, the Departmental Representative conceded that the imported goods were not chargeable to countervailing duty, raising the question of whether the refund could be granted despite the time limitation under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act. The appellants argued that the Supreme Court's orders prevented the Department from relying on the limitation defense, while the Department contended that the merits should include the limitation aspect. The dispute centered on the interpretation of the Supreme Court's directions and the scope of 'merits' in the context of the claim for refund.

The Tribunal analyzed the statements made on behalf of the Union of India before the Supreme Court, emphasizing that the Government agreed to consider the appellants' claim on merits, potentially overlooking the statutory limitations. The Tribunal referred to precedents where examination on merits did not encompass limitation issues, concluding that the Government's statement implied a waiver of limitations under Section 131 and Section 27(1) of the Act. The Tribunal rejected the argument that it lacked the authority to relax limitations, emphasizing the Government's commitment to examine the claim on merits.

Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the appellants were entitled to a refund of the duty amount collected, given the Government's agreement to waive limitations and the non-disputed fact that the goods were not liable for countervailing duty. The Tribunal ordered the refund within three months, allowing the appeals in favor of the appellants.

Issues:
1. Transfer of revision applications to the Tribunal under Section 131-B of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Request for condonation of delay in filing revision applications.
3. Opposition to the grant of condonation of delay.
4. Legal analysis of the condonation of delay request.
5. Dismissal of appeals due to delay in filing.

Transfer of Revision Applications:
The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd., Calcutta filed revision applications before the Addl. Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, aggrieved by orders passed by the Appellate Collector of Customs, Calcutta. Upon the establishment of the Tribunal, these revision applications were transferred to the Tribunal under Section 131-B of the Customs Act, 1962.

Condonation of Delay Request:
The appellant sought condonation of delay in filing the revision applications citing reasons like misplacement of papers. The appellant's representative requested leniency due to the circumstances, emphasizing that misplacing papers constituted sufficient cause for the court to exercise its discretion in condoning the delay.

Opposition to Condonation of Delay:
The Senior D.R. opposed the grant of condonation of delay, indicating a disagreement with the appellant's request for leniency in light of the delay in filing the revision applications.

Legal Analysis of Condonation Request:
The judgment highlighted the importance of the appellant's conduct in seeking condonation of delay. It referenced legal precedents to emphasize that misplacing papers without due care and attention does not constitute sufficient cause for an extension of time. The court noted that the appellant failed to file separate applications for condonation of delay with supporting affidavits, which is a requirement for such requests.

Dismissal of Appeals:
After considering arguments from both sides and examining the legal provisions, the court concluded that the appellant did not have sufficient cause for the delay in filing the revision applications. Consequently, all four appeals were dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred, without delving into the merits of the appeals due to the limitation issue.

Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal in rejecting the appeal filed by the assessee against the order of the Deputy Commissioner.

Analysis:
The case involves an assessee, a dealer in leather covers, who reported a total and taxable turnover for a specific year. The assessing authority made a best judgment assessment, determining the turnover and levying tax at different rates for different periods. The assessee did not appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, making the assessment order final. Subsequently, the assessee filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue, which was rejected on the grounds of not exhausting appeal remedies. The assessee then filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner, who also dismissed it, citing the rejection by the Board of Revenue. The Tribunal rejected the appeal by the assessee against the Deputy Commissioner's order, leading to the current case challenging the Tribunal's decision.

The main contention of the assessee was that the Tribunal should have considered the appeal on merits rather than rejecting it on procedural grounds. The argument was that the authorities did not assess the merits of the case, and the original assessment had become final without further appeals. The assessee invoked revisional powers before both the Board of Revenue and the Deputy Commissioner, seeking a revision of the tax rate for leather covers. The Deputy Commissioner rejected the revision petition based on the prior rejection by the Board of Revenue, stating that moving a superior authority first precludes approaching a subordinate authority for the same relief. This approach was supported by a Supreme Court ruling, emphasizing that when a superior authority is seized of a case, a subordinate authority should not claim jurisdiction to revise the same order. The Tribunal's rejection of the appeal was deemed justified since the Deputy Commissioner had not addressed the revision petition on merits. The Tribunal's power to grant relief is contingent on a revisional order being passed on merits, as per legal precedent.

Referring to a Supreme Court case, the judgment reinforced the principle that if a positive order in favor of the assessee is not passed by the Deputy Commissioner in revision, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to interfere. Consequently, the High Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's decision, upholding the rejection of the appeal by the assessee. The tax case was dismissed, with no order as to costs, affirming the Tribunal's decision and emphasizing the importance of following the procedural hierarchy in seeking revisions and appeals under the relevant tax laws.