Issues Involved:
1. Unusual observations in the rejection of the bail application.
2. Competence of a second judge to entertain a subsequent bail application.
3. Judicial discipline and placement of successive bail applications before the same judge.
4. Determination of judicial power by the Chief Justice.
5. Principles guiding the grant of bail.
6. Consideration of co-accused being granted bail.
7. Prosecution's stance on the bail application.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Unusual Observations in the Rejection of the Bail Application:
The learned Single Judge's rejection of the bail application with the observation that "the petitioner is bound to remain in custody till the final disposal of the trial" was deemed improper. Such a statement was found to be against the accused's right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the accused retains the right to move for bail at any stage, as per section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for bail applications to be reconsidered even after initial rejection.

2. Competence of a Second Judge to Entertain a Subsequent Bail Application:
The second judge, who entertained the subsequent bail application, referred the matter to a two-Judge Bench due to the earlier judge's unusual observations. The Court clarified that the second judge was competent to hear the bail application despite the earlier application's rejection by a different judge. The Court noted that judicial power is derived from the Chief Justice's determination, and the second judge was within his rights to entertain the application.

3. Judicial Discipline and Placement of Successive Bail Applications Before the Same Judge:
The Court addressed the impression that successive bail applications should be placed before the same judge to avoid conflicting orders, as observed in Supreme Court cases Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao. However, the Court expressed doubts about this rigid practice, especially in a busy High Court. It emphasized that while placing applications before the same judge is advisable, it is not mandatory, and failure to do so does not invalidate the subsequent judge's order.

4. Determination of Judicial Power by the Chief Justice:
The Court reiterated that a judge's power to hear cases is solely derived from the Chief Justice's determination. This principle ensures that no judge can hear matters outside their allotted jurisdiction. The Court referenced the decision in Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal to support this view, emphasizing that the Chief Justice's determination is the source of judicial power.

5. Principles Guiding the Grant of Bail:
The Court highlighted the principles guiding the grant of bail, noting that the tendency is to grant bail unless there is a reasonable likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice or tampering with evidence. The Court cited Krishna Iyer, J.'s observations in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., and The State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, emphasizing that "bail, not jail" is the basic rule unless specific circumstances suggest otherwise.

6. Consideration of Co-accused Being Granted Bail:
The Court considered that the other two accused persons had already been released on bail. While not a strict rule, the Court noted that if co-accused are equally placed, there may be no good reason to deny bail to one accused when others have been granted bail. The Court referenced Chief Justice Harries' view in Kamla Pandey v. The King, supporting this approach.

7. Prosecution's Stance on the Bail Application:
Initially, the State opposed the bail application, but later, the learned Counsel for the State submitted no objection to the grant of bail. The Court noted that while it considers the prosecution's stance, it must independently assess the merits of the case when deciding on bail.

Conclusion:
The Court granted bail to the accused-applicant, emphasizing the need to balance the interest of society in prosecuting offenses with the rights and interests of the accused. The decision underscored the principles of personal liberty, judicial competence, and the proper exercise of judicial discretion in bail matters.

Issues Involved:

1. Correct description of the goods.
2. ITC (Import Trade Control) angle.
3. Classification of the imported machine.
4. Eligibility for the benefit of Notification No. 114/80-Cus.
5. Whether the import was covered by OGL (Open General Licence).
6. Liability of the goods to confiscation and the imposition of penalty.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Correct Description of the Goods:

The appellants imported a "Chambon Web-fed Offset Rotary Printing Machine having output of more than 35,000 composite impressions per hour." The machine's configuration included various components such as an automatic non-stop unwind, web offset printing appliance, infrared dryer, cutting units, DCP platen cutter/creaser, and a complete set of electronic and control equipment. The appellants declared the machine as a printing machine in the Bill of Entry and other documents. The Tribunal found that the appellants had described the goods correctly and completely in the Bill of Entry and other main documents at the time of importation.

2. ITC Angle:

The main dispute was whether the machine was eligible for import under OGL Appendix I Part B, which covers web-fed high-speed offset rotary printing machines having output of more than 35,000 composite impressions or copies per hour. The adjudicating authority alleged that the appellants misdeclared the machine to circumvent ITC regulations. However, the Tribunal concluded that the machine was covered by OGL entry 2(22) of the 1988-91 Policy, as the principal function of the machine was printing.

3. Classification:

The appellants claimed classification under Heading 84.43 as a printing machine, while the Revenue classified it under Heading 84.79 as a machine having individual functions not specified elsewhere. The Tribunal held that the principal function of the machine was printing, and thus, it should be classified under Heading 84.43. The Tribunal referred to Section Note 3 of Section XVI, which states that composite machines are to be classified according to their principal function. Since the principal function was printing, the machine was correctly classifiable under Heading 84.43.

4. Benefit of Notification No. 114/80-Cus:

The appellants claimed the benefit of Notification No. 114/80-Cus., which provides exemption for specified machines used in the printing industry. The notification covers web-fed high-speed offset rotary printing machines with an output of more than 30,000 copies per hour. The Tribunal concluded that the imported machine, being a printing machine with an output exceeding 35,000 copies per hour, was eligible for the benefit of the notification. The addition of the DCP platen cutter/creaser did not disqualify the machine from the exemption.

5. Whether the Import was Covered by OGL:

The Tribunal held that the import was covered by OGL, as the machine met the description provided in Appendix I Part B of the 1988-91 Import-Export Policy. The machine was a web-fed high-speed offset rotary printing machine with an output of more than 35,000 composite impressions per hour, which is listed under OGL.

6. Liability to Confiscation and Penalty:

The adjudicating authority had ordered the confiscation of the machine and imposed a penalty of Rs. 10,00,000/- under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962, alleging misdeclaration and intent to evade duty. However, the Tribunal found that the appellants had not misdeclared the goods and that the machine was correctly described and classified. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of confiscation and the imposition of the penalty, allowing the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Tribunal held that the imported machine was correctly described and classified under Heading 84.43, covered by OGL, and eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 114/80-Cus. The order of confiscation and penalty was set aside, and the appeal was allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (Board) is a 'Local Authority' within the meaning of Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act, and if so, whether it is exempt from the payment of bonus under the said Act to all its employees.
2. Whether the Board is an institution established not for purposes of profit within the meaning of Section 32(v)(c) of the Bonus Act and is therefore not liable to pay bonus to its employees.
3. Whether the provisions of Section 32(iv) of the Act are ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the Board is a 'Local Authority' within the meaning of Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act:
The court examined whether the Board qualifies as a 'Local Authority' under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act. The term 'Local Authority' is defined in the General Clauses Act, 1899, as an authority legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. R.C. Jain, which outlined the distinctive attributes of a local authority: separate legal existence, autonomy, governmental functions, and the power to raise funds. The court found that the Board meets these criteria as it is a body corporate, functions in a defined area, has a representative character through a Consultative Committee, and has the power to levy rates, fees, and charges. Thus, the Board is deemed a 'Local Authority' under Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act.

2. Whether the Board is an institution established not for purposes of profit within the meaning of Section 32(v)(c) of the Bonus Act:
The court considered whether the Board was established for profit. The Tribunal had found that the Board was not a profit-making body. The court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in Workmen for Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams v. The Management, which applied the 'Dominant Purpose' test to determine the primary objective of an institution. The court agreed that the dominant purpose behind the establishment of the Board was not to earn profit. However, since the Board was already deemed a 'Local Authority' under Section 32(iv), the court found it unnecessary to delve further into this issue and left the question open.

3. Whether the provisions of Section 32(iv) of the Act are ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India:
The employees challenged the constitutional validity of Section 32(iv) of the Payment of Bonus Act, arguing that it discriminates between employees of a 'Local Authority' and those of other establishments. The court reiterated the principles governing Article 14, which allows reasonable classification based on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The court found that the classification under Section 32(iv) was reasonable as it distinguished employees based on the nature of their duties, regulatory control, and employment terms. The court noted that the employees of the Board are pensionable and have their salaries fixed based on agreements comparable to government employees, thus justifying the classification. The court concluded that the classification had a rational nexus with the object of the Act, which is to exclude establishments carrying out public duties from the burden of paying bonuses. Therefore, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 32(iv) failed.

Judgment:
1. Writ Petition No. 19528/1984 filed by the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board is allowed, and the award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 27-12-1983, which held the employees of the Board working at its Pumping Stations and Treatment Plants entitled to payment of bonus, is quashed.
2. Writ Petitions Nos. 4550/85 & 16210/84, filed by the Workmen of the B.W.S.S.B., claiming a right to payment of bonus from the Board, are dismissed.
3. The Reference made to the Labour Tribunal shall stand answered in the negative, and the claims of the employees are rejected.
4. The parties shall bear their own costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Non-registration of bonds by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.
2. Applicability of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, to the Company Law Board.
3. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board vis-`a-vis the Special Court.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Non-registration of bonds by Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.:

M/s. Canara Bank, acting as the principal trustee of Can Bank Mutual Fund, filed a petition under Section 111(2) and Section 111(4) of the Companies Act, 1956, on November 27, 1992. The petition was regarding the non-registration of 9% NPC Bonds worth Rs. 50 crores, purchased on February 27, 1992. The respondents included Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd., Shri Hiten P. Dalai (a notified person under the Special Court Act, 1992), Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd., and Standard Chartered Bank. Shri Hiten P. Dalai acted as a broker in the transaction, and Standard Chartered Bank also claimed title to these bonds.

2. Applicability of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, to the Company Law Board:

During the proceedings, it was noted that the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Amendment Ordinance, 1994, had come into effect, later becoming an Act on March 28, 1994. The Ordinance's applicability was debated, particularly whether it withdrew the Company Law Board's jurisdiction over transactions involving notified persons between April 1, 1991, and June 6, 1992. The transaction in question fell within this period, necessitating a hearing on the Ordinance's applicability.

3. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board vis-`a-vis the Special Court:

Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. argued that the Ordinance applied to the Company Law Board, thereby transferring proceedings to the Special Court. This was contested by Standard Chartered Bank, which argued that the Company Law Board is not a court as defined in the Ordinance. The argument centered on whether the Company Law Board could be considered a "civil court." The definition of "court" under Section 2(11) of the Companies Act and the jurisdiction outlined in Section 10 were discussed. It was argued that Section 10E, dealing with the Company Law Board, should be considered part of Section 10, thus making the Board a court under the Companies Act.

The Company Law Board examined various legal precedents and definitions, including those from the Supreme Court, to determine whether it constituted a court. It was concluded that the Company Law Board is not a court under the Companies Act or the Civil Procedure Code. The Board exercises both judicial and non-judicial functions, unlike a strict court, which only exercises judicial functions.

The Board referred to its previous decision in Carbon Corporation of India Ltd. v. Abhudaya Properties P. Ltd., which concluded that the Company Law Board is not a court. The Ordinance aimed to expedite the disposal of cases involving notified persons by transferring them from civil courts to the Special Court. However, the Company Law Board's jurisdiction under the Companies Act remained unaffected by the Ordinance.

Conclusion:

The Company Law Board concluded that the Special Court Amendment Act, 1994, did not apply to its proceedings. The Board retained its jurisdiction and powers to deal with matters relating to securities under the Companies Act, 1956. The main petition was scheduled for further hearing on October 3, 1994.

Ordered accordingly.

The Kerala High Court allowed the tax revision cases related to assessments under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act for the years 1979-82. The Court set aside the Appellate Tribunal's order and directed a fresh disposal of the appeals on merits after condoning the delay in filing them. The petitioner, an illiterate agriculturist, claimed that a brick manufacturing unit was run by his son, who paid the taxes. The Court emphasized the need for justice in the case.

Issues Involved
1. Whether the activity of obtaining cotton from waste cotton constitutes manufacturing or mere processing.
2. Eligibility for exemption from sales tax under the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1986 and 1989.
3. Jurisdiction of sales tax authorities to reassess and deny exemptions granted by the Industries Department.

Detailed Analysis

Issue 1: Manufacturing vs. Processing
The central issue in these writ applications is whether the activity of obtaining cotton from waste cotton constitutes manufacturing or mere processing. The petitioner argued that this activity involves a process of manufacturing, thereby entitling them to sales tax exemptions under the Industrial Policy Resolution. The sales tax authorities, however, contended that no manufacturing is involved, and thus the petitioner is ineligible for the exemption.

The court examined the definition of "manufacture" and referred to precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, which held that "manufacture" implies a change resulting in a new and different article with a distinctive name, character, or use. Applying this principle, the court concluded that cotton produced from waste cotton is a distinct article, thereby involving a manufacturing process.

Issue 2: Eligibility for Sales Tax Exemption
Under the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1986, all new small industries are exempt from sales tax on the purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products for five years from the date of commercial production. The petitioner, recognized as a small-scale industrial unit, argued that they are entitled to this exemption. The court noted that the Policy Resolution does not explicitly use the terms "manufacture" or "processing," and grants exemptions to all small-scale industries.

The court found that the petitioner's commercial production started on December 14, 1989, making them eligible for the exemption for the assessment year 1989-90. The court held that the petitioner's unit, being a small-scale industrial unit, is exempt from sales tax on both raw materials and finished products.

Issue 3: Jurisdiction of Sales Tax Authorities
The sales tax authorities issued a reassessment notice under section 12(8) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, contending that the initial exemption was granted under a mistake. They argued that the issuance of a declaration form and certificates by the Industries Department is not conclusive for entitlement to the exemption.

The court disagreed, stating that the sales tax authorities do not have the jurisdiction to override the eligibility certificates granted by the competent authority of the Industries Department. The court referred to a similar decision by the Allahabad High Court in Kumar Fuels v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which held that the Commissioner of Sales Tax cannot sit in judgment over the grant of eligibility certificates.

Conclusion
The court concluded that the activity of producing cotton from waste cotton involves a manufacturing process, thereby entitling the petitioner to the sales tax exemptions under the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1986. The reassessment order by the Sales Tax Officer was quashed, and the petitioner was granted the exemption. The other writ applications were disposed of with a direction to conclude proceedings in line with this judgment.

Separate Judgment
R.K. Patra, J., concurred with the judgment.

Final Disposition
All writ applications were disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.

The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi ruled in favor of the Revenue regarding the classification of Tapes and Sleeves made from Glass Fibre Yarn. The goods were classified under Tariff Item 59 for the period from 12-7-1972 to 15-3-1976 and under Tariff Item 22F for the remaining period. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Issues:
Appeal against Order-in-Appeal regarding time-barred Show Cause Notice under Section 11A of CESA, 1944.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Time-barred Show Cause Notice
The appeal was filed by the Revenue against the Order-in-Appeal allowing the Respondents' appeal, contending that the Show Cause Notice issued for recovery of duty was time-barred under Section 11A of the Act. The dispute arose from the classification of Glass Bonded Copper Strips under T.I. 68, which was later classified under T.I. 26A by the High Court, resulting in a refund to the supplier. The Revenue sought to recover an amount from the Respondents based on this reclassification. The Collector (Appeals) held that the Show Cause Notice was time-barred as it was issued beyond the six-month period stipulated under Section 11A. The main contention was whether the Show Cause Notice could attract the provisions of Section 11A and if it was within the statutory time limit.

Issue 2: Interpretation of Rule 56A
The Ld JDR for the Revenue argued that the action sought in the Show Cause Notice was permitted under proviso 3 to sub-rule (2) of Rule 56A and did not fall under short levy or non-levy, thus not invoking Section 11A. On the other hand, the Respondents' Advocate contended that the demand for reversal of credit was beyond the six-month period and relied on a previous judgment where demands issued beyond the statutory period were considered time-barred. The Respondents argued that the law should allow for payment adjustment in cases where recovery from customers was not feasible due to pricing considerations.

Issue 3: Application of Rule 56A and Section 11A
The Tribunal analyzed the facts and found that the dispute arose from a change in classification by the High Court, leading to a refund to the supplier and subsequent recovery demand from the Respondents. The Tribunal held that the adjustment of duty credit under Rule 56A was a self-contained mechanism, distinct from Section 11A, applicable when duty payment variations occurred. It was emphasized that no time limit was prescribed for such adjustments, and the demand was not time-barred as it was issued within a reasonable period of about 15 months after the High Court's decision.

Conclusion
The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal, setting aside the Order-in-Appeal and restoring the Assistant Collector's order. It was noted that if the Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, the Department would be obligated to restore the credit under Rule 56A. The decision highlighted the distinction between Rule 56A provisions and Section 11A, emphasizing the equitable nature of duty credit adjustments in cases of classification disputes.

Issues: Interpretation of exemption Notification No. 122/86, dated 1-3-1986 and amended Notification No. 455/86, dated 21-11-1986.

In the present case, three appeals were heard by the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi. Two appeals were filed by M/s. Khandelwal Lab (P) Ltd., while the third appeal was filed by the Revenue against a specific part of the order-in-original. The main contention raised by the appellant was the denial of the benefit of exemption under Notification No. 122/86, dated 1-3-1986. The appellant, represented by Ms. P.P. Bhandari, argued that their product, Vermisole, containing Levamisole Hydrochloride, was eligible for exemption under Sl. No. 16 of the Annexure appended to the said notification. The authorities below had rejected this claim, citing the amended Notification No. 455/86, dated 21-11-1986, as not being of a clarificatory nature. The appellant relied on precedents such as Johnson & Johnson Limited and Parke Davis (India) Ltd. to support their interpretation of the notifications. On the other hand, the Respondent, represented by Shri Somesh Arora, supported the orders passed by the authorities below.

Regarding the appeal filed by the Revenue, it was argued that the question of restricting the demand to six months would only arise if the decision went against the assessee. The Tribunal examined the submissions and noted that the assessee had claimed exemption under Notification No. 122/86, dated 1-3-1986, which was denied for a specific period based on the amended Notification No. 455/86, dated 21-11-1986. Citing the decision in Johnson & Johnson Ltd., the Tribunal held that the amended notification was clarificatory in nature, and the intention was to grant exemption from the inception of the original notification. Consequently, the impugned orders denying the benefit of the exemption were set aside, and the appellant was held entitled to the exemption from the claimed date. Both appeals filed by M/s. Khandelwal Lab (P) Ltd. were allowed with consequential reliefs as per law. As a result, the issue raised in the appeal filed by the Revenue regarding the restriction of demand to six months was deemed unnecessary for consideration.

In conclusion, all three appeals were disposed of accordingly by the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi, based on the interpretation of the exemption notifications and relevant precedents cited during the proceedings.

Issues:
Assessment of commission income, additions for undisclosed income in the form of debtors, accounting system dispute - cash basis vs. mercantile basis.

Analysis:
1. Assessment of Commission Income:
The Assessing Officer assessed the income of the commission agent firm at a higher amount than declared in the return. The additions were made due to unaccounted commission income and alleged undisclosed income from debtors. The Assessing Officer believed that the firm concealed income by not reflecting dalali bills in the books. The CIT(A) upheld the addition related to commission income but deleted the addition concerning undisclosed income from debtors for earlier years.

2. Accounting System Dispute - Cash vs. Mercantile Basis:
The firm followed a cash system of accounting, where dalali income was recorded only on a cash basis. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) contended that the firm should switch to a mercantile system for a more accurate representation of income. The firm argued that it had the right to choose its accounting system and provided detailed explanations from subsidiary books to justify its cash system. The firm cited legal precedents supporting the validity of cash accounting.

3. Judgment and Decision:
The ITAT Jaipur agreed with the firm's arguments, stating that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) failed to understand the nuances of cash-based accounting. The tribunal found no evidence of unaccounted cash receipts and emphasized that maintaining a subsidiary book did not convert the system to mercantile. The ITAT ruled in favor of the firm, allowing the appeal and directing the deletion of the additions made by the lower authorities.

In conclusion, the judgment by the ITAT Jaipur favored the firm's adherence to the cash system of accounting, emphasizing the firm's right to choose its accounting method. The tribunal overturned the additions made by the Assessing Officer and CIT(A), highlighting the importance of accurately interpreting cash-based accounting practices.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Gift-tax Act, 1958 on the transfer of assets under a family settlement deed.
2. Bona fide nature of the family settlement.
3. Valuation of the transferred assets.
4. Assessment year applicable for the gift of immovable property.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Gift-tax Act, 1958:

The primary issue was whether the transfer of 1252 equity shares and a plot of land by the assessee to family members under a family settlement deed dated 11-2-1985 constituted a gift under the Gift-tax Act, 1958. The assessee contended that the transfer was part of a bona fide family settlement and hence not subject to gift tax, citing judgments from Gauhati High Court (Ziauddin Ahmed v. CGT) and Madras High Court (CGT v. Pappathi Anni). However, the GTO disagreed, holding that the transfer was without consideration and thus taxable as a gift.

2. Bona fide Nature of the Family Settlement:

The CGT(A) initially ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the family arrangement was executed on a stamp paper and was intended to prevent future disputes, thus not liable to gift tax. However, the Revenue argued that the family settlement was not bona fide, as there were no pre-existing disputes among family members, and the properties were self-acquired by the assessee. The Tribunal agreed with the Revenue, emphasizing that a bona fide family settlement must resolve existing disputes and involve an equitable division of property. The Tribunal found the distribution of assets unequitable and not a bona fide family arrangement, noting that only a few family members benefited.

3. Valuation of the Transferred Assets:

The GTO valued the 1252 equity shares at Rs. 2,17,848 and the plot of land at Rs. 10,00,800, based on the market rate of Rs. 80 per sq.ft. in Patel Colony, Jamnagar. The assessee argued that these valuations were arbitrary. However, the Tribunal upheld the GTO's valuations, stating that they were based on information provided by the assessee and the prevalent market rates.

4. Assessment Year Applicable for the Gift of Immovable Property:

The assessee contended that the actual conveyance of the immovable property took place on 22-5-1985, falling in the assessment year 1986-87, and should be taxed accordingly. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating that the family arrangement deed dated 11-2-1985 reflected the intention to transfer the assets, making the transfer effective in the assessment year 1985-86. The Tribunal further noted that the deed was acted upon, with possession handed over to family members.

Conclusion:

The Tribunal concluded that the family arrangement was not bona fide and aimed to bypass the Gift-tax Act. It reversed the CGT(A)'s findings, restoring the GTO's assessment of the transferred assets as taxable gifts. Additionally, the Tribunal noted a lapse by the GTO in not taxing the value of all 2502 transferred shares and directed verification and necessary action.

Judgment:

The appeal by the Revenue was allowed, and the findings of the CGT(A) were reversed, restoring the GTO's assessment. The Tribunal also directed the GTO to verify and tax the value of all transferred shares as per the family arrangement deed.

Issues:
Validity of revised return under section 139(5) of the IT Act filed by the assessee, Conflict of opinion among different High Courts on the treatment of revised returns, Applicability of Instruction No. 388 issued by CBDT, New Delhi on the time limit for completing assessments, Time-barred assessment order passed by the ITO.

Analysis:

The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Ahmedabad-A concerned the validity of a revised return filed by the assessee under section 139(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The issue arose as the original return was filed under section 139(4), and the revised return was filed after certain enquiries were raised by the Income-tax Officer. The assessee contended that the revised return filed on 5-3-1974 could not be considered a valid return under section 139(5) as it did not extend the limitation period for assessment completion. The assessee relied on various High Court decisions to support this argument.

The Departmental Representative (D.R.) argued that contrary views were taken by other High Courts, suggesting that an assessee could file subsequent returns even if the original return was filed under section 139(4), and the limitation period should start from the subsequent return date. The D.R. cited several cases to support this contention.

The Tribunal noted the conflicting opinions among different High Courts on this issue. It specifically highlighted the case of Dr. S.B. Bhargava, where the High Court held that a revised return under section 139(5) could not extend the limitation period for assessment completion. The Tribunal also considered Instruction No. 388 issued by the CBDT, New Delhi, which stated that the extended time limit under section 153(1)(c) would not apply to revised returns filed under section 139(5) after an original return under section 139(4).

Based on the precedents and the Instruction, the Tribunal concluded that the revised return filed by the assessee could not be treated as valid under section 139(5). As a result, the assessment order passed by the ITO was deemed time-barred as it was completed more than one year after the original return date. The Tribunal annulled the assessment order, following the reasoning of the High Court decisions favoring the assessee and the spirit of Instruction No. 388.

The Tribunal also cautioned the ITO to consider the High Court's decision in a related case regarding the refund of tax amounts paid by the assessee in case of annulment of a time-barred assessment. Ultimately, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and annulled the assessment order passed by the ITO, subject to the mentioned observations.

Issues involved: Challenge to the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal u/s 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for rewriting the judgment instead of rectifying a mistake apparent from the record.

Judgment Summary:

The High Court of Orissa addressed the challenge to the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal dated October 7, 1991, under sub-section (2) of section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The main contention was that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by rewriting the judgment instead of rectifying an apparent mistake. The power u/s 254(2) is specifically to rectify mistakes, not to review decisions or rewrite judgments. The Tribunal's substitution of paragraphs 9 and 10 with a fresh paragraph in the original order was deemed as rewriting the judgment, which is impermissible under the law.

The Tribunal's action of substituting paragraphs in the original order was found to be beyond the scope of rectification of mistakes u/s 254(2) of the Income-tax Act. The High Court clarified that the Tribunal cannot review its own decision or rewrite a fresh judgment under this provision. Consequently, the assessee's appeals for the assessment years 1985-86 to 1988-89 were dismissed, upholding the orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for those years. The Revenue was deemed to have no further grievance or prejudice in this matter.

In a related argument, it was highlighted that the entertainment of applications for rectification has been increasing, emphasizing the need to settle the law in this regard. Referring to a previous case, the court reiterated that the Tribunal's power u/s 254(2) is limited to rectifying apparent mistakes in the record and not to review decisions or rewrite judgments. The court disposed of the writ application with these observations and directions, without any order as to costs.

Issues involved: Challenge to Circular No. 681 dated March 8, 1994, of the Central Board of Direct Taxes regarding the applicability of section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to payments made to advertising agencies for professional services.

Scope and Ambit of Section 194C:
The petitioners, an association of advertising agencies, challenged the circular based on the interpretation of section 194C of the Act. The Central Board of Direct Taxes reversed its interpretation after 20 years, citing a Supreme Court decision. The High Court previously dealt with similar issues in cases involving professionals like solicitors and transport operators, where it was held that section 194C does not apply to professional fees or transport contracts. The court noted that previous circulars had clarified that section 194C applies only to works contracts and labour contracts, not service contracts.

Interpretation of Supreme Court Decision:
The High Court analyzed the Supreme Court decision in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 201 ITR 435 and concluded that it did not expand the scope of section 194C. The Supreme Court affirmed that section 194C applies to both works contracts and labour contracts, contrary to the assessee's argument that it only applied to works contracts. The High Court emphasized that the Supreme Court's decision aligned with the Central Board of Direct Taxes' historical interpretation of section 194C.

Judgment and Conclusion:
Based on its previous decisions and the interpretation of the law, the High Court held that the Circular No. 681 of 1994 was illegal and lacked jurisdiction in mandating deduction at source from payments to advertising agencies for professional services. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and no costs were awarded. The court rejected the application for a stay of the order, emphasizing the circumstances of the case.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 194C to transport contracts.
2. Interpretation of the term "any work" in Section 194C.
3. Validity of the CBDT Circular No. 681 dated March 8, 1994.

Summary:

1. Applicability of Section 194C to Transport Contracts:
The primary issue was whether a contract for the mere carriage of goods, without additional services like loading or unloading, falls within the scope of "carrying out any work" u/s 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Historically, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) had issued circulars clarifying that Section 194C was not applicable to payments made to transport contractors. This position changed with the issuance of Circular No. 681 on March 8, 1994.

2. Interpretation of the Term "Any Work":
Section 194C mandates the deduction of tax at source from payments to contractors for "carrying out any work." The term "any work" was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 201 ITR 435, which stated that "any work" should be understood in its "natural meaning" and not confined to "works contracts." The CBDT, based on this judgment, issued Circular No. 681, extending the applicability of Section 194C to various types of contracts, including transport contracts.

3. Validity of the CBDT Circular No. 681:
The petitioners argued that the CBDT misinterpreted the Supreme Court's judgment in Associated Cement Co.'s case and that the circular was beyond the scope of Section 194C. The court noted that the CBDT had consistently interpreted Section 194C to exclude transport contracts for over two decades. The court found that the Supreme Court's judgment did not justify the CBDT's revised interpretation and that the term "any work" should not include mere transport contracts.

Judgment:
The court held that the provisions of Section 194C are not applicable to contracts for the mere carriage of goods without additional services like loading or unloading. The circular issued by the CBDT (No. 681 dated March 8, 1994) was deemed illegal and without jurisdiction to the extent it required tax deduction at source for such transport contracts. The writ petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute, with no order as to costs. The court also declined the request for a stay of the operation of the order.

The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the Revenue's application seeking reference of questions of law under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal recalled its order due to lack of proper hearing opportunity for the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's miscellaneous application based on facts related to adjournment requests and counsel availability, stating it was a general practice to grant adjournments during summer vacation. The High Court found no question of law in the Tribunal's findings and dismissed the application.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the assessee can constitute a separate Hindu undivided family (HUF) consisting of himself, his wife, and minor daughters in respect of his income from dividends.
2. Whether there can be more than one HUF having the same karta.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Separate HUF for Dividends:
The court examined if the assessee, after a partial partition, could form a separate HUF with his wife and minor daughters for the purpose of assessing dividend income. The assessee had been assessed as an HUF with his wife and minor daughters for assets acquired from a partial partition with his late father. A son was born in 1970, prompting a partial partition between the assessee and his minor son, each receiving company shares worth Rs. 10,00,000. The Income-tax Officer initially rejected the claim of a smaller HUF, asserting that the income should be assessed with the original HUF. However, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal upheld the assessee's claim, stating that the ownership and enjoyment of the assets and income absolutely vested with the smaller HUF consisting of the assessee, his wife, and minor daughters.

The court noted that the partial partition had been accepted by the Department under section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The order under section 171, which had become final, indicated that the shares worth Rs. 20,00,000 were divided between the assessee and his minor son. Consequently, the income from the shares allotted to the assessee should be assessed in the hands of the smaller HUF.

2. Multiple HUFs with Same Karta:
The court also considered whether the same individual could be the karta of more than one HUF. The Department argued that it was not possible under Mitakshara law to have two separate HUFs with the same karta. However, the court referred to precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in N. V. Narendranath v. CWT and Gowli Buddanna v. CIT, which supported the notion that a coparcener could hold property as HUF property even if it consisted of himself, his wife, and minor daughters.

The court further noted that the Bombay High Court in CIT v. M. M. Khanna held that smaller joint families within a larger joint family could hold property independently. Thus, the assessee could indeed act as karta for both the bigger HUF and the smaller HUF. The smaller HUF, consisting of the assessee, his wife, and minor daughters, could legally exist and hold property distinct from the bigger HUF.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the income from the shares allotted to the assessee in the partial partition should be assessed in the hands of the smaller HUF. The assessee could legally constitute a separate HUF with his wife and minor daughters, and there was no legal impediment to him acting as karta for both the bigger and smaller HUFs. Both questions were answered in the affirmative and against the Department. The court affirmed the Tribunal's order and fixed the counsel's fee at Rs. 1,000, with no order as to costs.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the destruction of the subject matter of the lease automatically terminates the lease without considering the option exercised by the lessee under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
2. Whether the lower court correctly applied the decision in Sidharthan v. Ramadasan in light of the Supreme Court decision in Druv Dev Singh v. Harmondir Singh.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Automatic Termination of Lease upon Destruction of Subject Matter:
The primary issue was whether the destruction of the leased building automatically terminates the lease without considering the lessee's option under Section 108(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. The court highlighted that Section 108(e) of the T.P. Act states, "If by fire, tempest, or flood or violence of any army or of a mob or other irresistible force any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the lease shall, at the option of the lessee, be void." This provision codifies the law of frustration of lease, emphasizing that the lessee has the option to void the lease if the property is substantially destroyed.

The court further examined the definition of a "building" and concluded that a building includes the site upon which it stands. Therefore, the lease does not automatically terminate if the site remains intact. The court referred to past judgments, including George v. Peter, which held that the lease of a building includes the site unless specifically excluded. Thus, the lease continues until the site is also destroyed.

2. Correct Application of Sidharthan v. Ramadasan and Druv Dev Singh v. Harmondir Singh:
The court analyzed whether the lower court correctly applied the decision in Sidharthan v. Ramadasan in light of the Supreme Court decision in Druv Dev Singh v. Harmondir Singh. The court noted that in Sidharthan's case, the lease was only for the superstructure, not the land, and the superstructure was completely destroyed. Therefore, the lease was considered terminated.

However, in the current case, the court found that the lease included both the building and the site. The court observed that the definition of "building" under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, includes the site and any structures appurtenant to it. Consequently, the destruction of the superstructure alone does not terminate the lease if the site remains.

The court also referenced the Supreme Court decision in Druv Dev Singh, which held that Section 56 of the Contract Act is exhaustive and principles of English law cannot be considered. This reinforced the view that the lease does not terminate automatically upon the destruction of the superstructure if the site is intact.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that there is no automatic termination of the lease due to the destruction of the superstructure alone. The lease continues as long as the site remains part of the leased property. The relationship between the landlord and tenant persists, and the tenant cannot unilaterally put up new constructions on the site. The court granted a mandatory injunction for the removal of unauthorized structures put up by the tenant but refused the relief for recovery of the property. Both parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Issues:
1. Petition seeking winding up of Respondent Company due to unpaid debts.
2. Claim by Petitioners for outstanding amount and interest.
3. Defense by Respondent Company regarding defective material supplied.
4. Legal defense raised by Respondent Company based on Partnership Act.
5. Dispute over registration of the partnership firm of Petitioners.
6. Interpretation of legal provisions regarding recoverable debts for winding up.

Detailed Analysis:
1. The Petitioners filed a petition to wind up the Respondent Company due to unpaid debts exceeding Rs. 500, supported by a statutory notice under section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. The Petitioners claimed an outstanding amount of Rs. 1,21,640.50 along with interest, supported by bills and demand letters sent to the Respondent Company.
3. Respondent Company contended that the supplied material was defective and required replacement, alleging non-response from the Petitioners. Dispute arose regarding the receipt and acknowledgment of a letter dated 15-11-1990.
4. Respondent Company raised a legal defense citing the Petitioners' unregistered partnership firm, invoking section 69 of the Partnership Act to bar recovery of dues through a suit.
5. Petitioners argued for the registration of their firm, providing documents and communications with the Registrar of Firms, but faced challenges in proving the application date and the connection of a receipt with their firm's registration.
6. The judgment emphasized the legal requirement for a debt to be legally recoverable to support a winding-up petition. Reference was made to legal precedents highlighting the necessity for debts to be enforceable under relevant laws, such as the Partnership Act and Negotiable Instruments Act, to be considered for winding up proceedings. The court concluded that the alleged debt was not recoverable due to the bar under section 69 of the Partnership Act, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Overall, the judgment delves into the intricacies of debt recovery, legal defenses, and the importance of meeting statutory requirements for initiating winding-up proceedings against a company.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the award made u/s 16 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961.
2. Interpretation of the phrase "all persons interested agree" in Section 16(1).
3. Calculation of the four-year period in the proviso to Section 16(1).

Summary:

1. Validity of the Award Made u/s 16 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961:
The High Court found that the property under acquisition was hypothecated by equitable mortgage to Indian Bank, which as mortgagee was entitled to claim an interest in compensation payable to the mortgagor. Since the bank was not a party to the contract, no award u/s 16 of the Act could have been made. The High Court also found that by operation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 16, since four years had elapsed from the date of the agreement, the award based on the agreement became void. However, the Supreme Court held that the non-joinder of the Indian Bank as a party to the agreement does not render the agreement void nor unenforceable, nor does it render the jurisdiction of the Collector to make the award u/s 16(1) illegal or void.

2. Interpretation of the Phrase "All Persons Interested Agree" in Section 16(1):
The Supreme Court considered whether the phrase "all persons interested agree" required that each and every party having an interest in the compensation should necessarily be a party to the agreement. The Court held that the object of Section 16 is to determine market value expeditiously and award compensation in terms of the agreement to avoid needless delay. Therefore, "all persons" must be interpreted to mean not only in a plural but also singular, which would include any one, if more than one person is interested in the compensation, to mutually enter into an agreement with the Collector. The agreement will bind the contracting parties alone and the award made u/s 16(1) may not thereby bind others.

3. Calculation of the Four-Year Period in the Proviso to Section 16(1):
The crucial question was whether the period of four years envisaged in the proviso to Section 16(1) should be reckoned from the date when the agreement was executed or from the date of the publication of the notification u/s 3(1) after the agreement was executed. The Supreme Court held that "such date" referred to in the proviso must be referable to the date of the agreement. Thus, after the expiry of four years from the date of the agreement, the Collector ceased to have power to pass the award u/s 16(1). The agreement remains valid but becomes unenforceable after the period prescribed under the statute.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and directed the civil court to expeditiously determine the market value according to law. The observation of the High Court that the civil court shall not be bound by the terms of the agreement in determining the compensation cannot prevent the Land Acquisition Collector from relying upon the agreement as evidence of the market value of the acquired property. The appeals were dismissed with parties bearing their respective costs.