Issues Involved:
1. Deletion of addition in trading results by CIT(A).
2. Direction to accept capitalisation of expenses and allow depreciation.
3. Alleged denial of opportunity to the Assessing Officer by the CIT(A).
4. Application of section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act.
5. Alleged violation of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules.
6. Determination of the date of commercial production.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Deletion of Addition in Trading Results by CIT(A):
The CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 2,10,53,195 made by the Assessing Officer, who had rejected the books of accounts under section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act. The CIT(A) considered the detailed arguments and evidence provided by the assessee, including the supervision by the Central Excise Department and the maintenance of statutory registers. The CIT(A) found no material evidence to support the Assessing Officer's claim of sales outside the books of account and concluded that the provisions of section 145(2) were not applicable.

2. Direction to Accept Capitalisation of Expenses and Allow Depreciation:
The CIT(A) directed the Assessing Officer to accept the capitalisation of expenses for the period from 1-1-1987 to 11-3-1987 and to allow depreciation thereon. This decision was based on the finding that the commercial production started in March 1987, contrary to the Assessing Officer's conclusion that it began in January 1987.

3. Alleged Denial of Opportunity to the Assessing Officer by the CIT(A):
The Judicial Member contended that the CIT(A) received additional evidence without affording the Assessing Officer an opportunity to cross-examine Shri Dubey, who was produced before and interrogated by the CIT(A). This was considered a violation of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, which mandates that the Assessing Officer be given a reasonable opportunity to examine additional evidence or cross-examine witnesses. The Judicial Member proposed quashing the CIT(A)'s order on this ground.

4. Application of Section 145(2) of the Income-tax Act:
The Assessing Officer applied section 145(2) to reject the books of account, citing discrepancies in production records, power consumption, and raw material usage. However, the CIT(A) found that the statutory registers and records maintained by the assessee were duly examined and signed by the Central Excise authorities. The CIT(A) concluded that the provisions of section 145(2) were not applicable, as the Assessing Officer did not provide concrete evidence of sales outside the books of account.

5. Alleged Violation of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules:
The Judicial Member argued that the CIT(A) violated Rule 46A by admitting additional evidence without giving the Assessing Officer an opportunity to cross-examine Shri Dubey. The Accountant Member, however, contended that the notice of hearing was given to the Assessing Officer, who did not avail of the opportunity to be present. The Third Member concluded that there was no violation of Rule 46A, as the CIT(A) did not consider the interrogation of Shri Dubey as additional evidence and did not record any reasons for admitting such evidence.

6. Determination of the Date of Commercial Production:
The Assessing Officer determined that the commercial production started in January 1987, based on various documents and statements, including those of Shri Dubey. The CIT(A), however, accepted the assessee's claim that commercial production began in March 1987, supported by statutory registers and other records. The Third Member upheld the CIT(A)'s findings, noting that the Assessing Officer's conclusions were based on surmises and conjectures without substantial evidence.

Conclusion:
The Third Member concluded that the CIT(A) provided sufficient opportunity to the Assessing Officer within the meaning of section 250 of the Income-tax Act and that there was no violation of Rule 46A. The CIT(A)'s order to delete the additions and accept the capitalisation of expenses was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Temporary injunction in a passing off action.
2. Prior user and trans-border reputation of the trademark "WHIRLPOOL."
3. Validity and effect of trademark registration by defendants.
4. Allegations of delay, acquiescence, and abandonment by plaintiffs.
5. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Temporary Injunction in a Passing Off Action:
The core issue revolves around whether a temporary injunction should be granted to restrain the defendants from using the trademark "WHIRLPOOL." The plaintiffs, a multinational corporation and its Indian subsidiary, sought to prevent the defendants from manufacturing, selling, or advertising washing machines under the "WHIRLPOOL" mark. The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court granted the temporary injunction, which was affirmed by the Division Bench, leading to the present appeal.

2. Prior User and Trans-Border Reputation:
The plaintiffs claimed prior user of the "WHIRLPOOL" mark since 1937 and a trans-border reputation that extended to India. They argued that the mark "WHIRLPOOL" was associated with their products worldwide, including in India, through advertisements in international magazines. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a reputation and goodwill in the "WHIRLPOOL" mark extending to India, despite limited actual sales within the country.

3. Validity and Effect of Trademark Registration by Defendants:
The defendants had applied for and obtained registration of the "WHIRLPOOL" trademark in India in 1992, based on proposed use. The plaintiffs opposed this registration and filed for rectification, both of which were pending. The court noted that the defendants had not provided evidence of actual use of the trademark prior to the grant of the interlocutory injunction. The registration was deemed insufficient to negate the plaintiffs' claim of passing off, as the plaintiffs' prior user and reputation were established.

4. Allegations of Delay, Acquiescence, and Abandonment:
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were guilty of delay, acquiescence, and abandonment of the "WHIRLPOOL" mark in India, as their registration had lapsed in 1977. The court rejected these arguments, noting that the plaintiffs had consistently opposed the defendants' registration and had filed for rectification and the present suit without undue delay. The court found no evidence of acquiescence or abandonment by the plaintiffs.

5. Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Injury:
The court held that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs, as the use of the "WHIRLPOOL" mark by the defendants could cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs' reputation and goodwill. The plaintiffs' washing machines were of a higher quality and engineering standard, and the defendants' use of the mark could mislead consumers. The court found that the defendants would suffer no significant injury by being restrained from using the "WHIRLPOOL" mark, as they could continue to sell their products under other names.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the temporary injunction granted by the Delhi High Court, affirming that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of passing off, supported by prior user and trans-border reputation of the "WHIRLPOOL" mark. The court found no cogent ground to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that the grant of an interlocutory injunction was in accordance with settled legal principles. The appeal was dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000.

Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 64 of 1994 under Section 370 of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 66 of 1994 under Section 211 read with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 68 of 1994 under Section 209(6) and (7) of the Companies Act, 1956.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 64 of 1994 under Section 370 of the Companies Act, 1956:

The petitioner, accused No. 5, sought quashing of the proceedings in C.C. No. 64 of 1994, alleging that the financing company had advanced loans in excess of the prescribed limits under the Central Government Notification No. G.S.R. 448(E) dated 17-4-1989. The complaint stated that the loans were granted up to 31-3-1992, while the petitioner assumed charge as managing director only from 16-9-1992. The court noted that the relevant period for the alleged offence was up to 31-3-1992, and since the petitioner was not the managing director during that period, he could not be considered an officer-in-default under Section 5 of the Companies Act. Consequently, the complaint did not disclose any offence against the petitioner, and the proceedings in C.C. No. 64 of 1994 were quashed.

2. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 66 of 1994 under Section 211 read with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, 1956:

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings in C.C. No. 66 of 1994, which alleged that the balance sheet and profit and loss account for the year ending 31-3-1992 did not show a true and fair view of the state of affairs. The complaint described accused No. 1 (ex-managing director) as the officer-in-default during the relevant period, while the petitioner assumed charge only from 16-9-1992. The court concluded that no offence was made out against the petitioner under Section 211 read with Schedule VI, as he was not the managing director during the relevant period. The respondent's counsel conceded that no prima facie case was made out against the petitioner. Thus, the proceedings in C.C. No. 66 of 1994 were quashed.

3. Quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 68 of 1994 under Section 209(6) and (7) of the Companies Act, 1956:

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings in C.C. No. 68 of 1994, which alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Section 209(1) and (3). The complaint stated that the company had not kept proper books of account for the period up to 31-3-1992. The petitioner, who assumed charge as managing director from 16-9-1992, was not described as an officer-in-default in the complaint. The court found that the irregularities pertained to a period prior to the petitioner's appointment. Consequently, the complaint did not disclose any offence against the petitioner under Section 209, and the proceedings in C.C. No. 68 of 1994 were quashed.

Conclusion:

The court allowed the criminal petitions and quashed the proceedings in C.C. No. 64 of 1994, C.C. No. 66 of 1994, and C.C. No. 68 of 1994, insofar as they pertained to the petitioner. The court emphasized that the petitioner could not be considered an officer-in-default for offences committed prior to his appointment as managing director on 16-9-1992.

The Department appealed against the Collector's order withdrawing a show cause notice regarding the inclusion of the cost of containers supplied by buyers in the assessable value. The Collector disagreed with including this cost, which was upheld by the Tribunal. The Respondent had availed the benefit of a notification, which the Collector found to be of academic interest as it was no longer in force. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to interfere.

The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi, in the case of manufacturing of printing machines, held that training charges collected are not to be included in the assessable value for the levy of central excise duty. The Tribunal set aside the orders and allowed the appeal. (Citation: 1996 (8) TMI 324 - CEGAT, New Delhi)

The appeal was allowed by way of remand as the adjudicating authority did not consider the reply submitted by the appellants, leading to the orders being set aside. The matter has been remanded back for further consideration.

The appeal was against the rejection of Modvat credit based on subsidiary gate passes issued by the Proper Officer in the name of the appellant. The appellate tribunal found the subsidiary gate passes, issued on the basis of SAIL stockyard challans recognized as equivalent to gate passes by the Board, to be valid. The appeal was allowed, directing the restoration of the credit.

The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi heard a case where the Department added profit to the cost of raw materials and job charges for assessing value under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Collector (Appeals) found the addition arbitrary and allowed the appeal. The Tribunal dismissed the Department's appeal, stating that the charges already included the profit element.

The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT in New Delhi heard a case where a private limited company was manufacturing welding electrodes and selling them through a partnership concern. The Collector (Appeals) had held that the manufacturer and the partnership concern were related persons, but the Tribunal disagreed. The Tribunal found that the two concerns were not related persons based on the limited evidence presented and set aside the Collector (Appeals) order, allowing the appeal.

The revenue appeals were filed against an order classifying inputs as scrap and granting duty exemption on finished goods. The inputs were M. S. Rod cuttings, angle cuttings, and plate cuttings, deemed as eligible materials under Notification No. 208/83. The Tribunal rejected the revenue appeals, citing a previous case where similar materials were considered rerollable, not scrap.

Issues:
1. Valuation of closing stock upon dissolution of a firm.
2. Interpretation of provisions under section 187(2) of the Income Tax Act.
3. Application of legal principles regarding valuation of stock-in-trade upon dissolution of a firm.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Valuation of Closing Stock:
The case involved a dispute regarding the valuation of closing stock upon the dissolution of a firm. The Commissioner contended that the closing stock should have been revalued at market rates upon the dissolution of the firm. The Commissioner relied on the principle that stock-in-trade must be valued at market price upon termination of business activity. This principle was supported by various legal precedents, including the decision in G.R. Ramachari & Co. v. CIT. The Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner's view, citing the legal principle that the surplus from valuing stock at market price must be reflected as profit and taxed accordingly.

2. Interpretation of Section 187(2) Proviso:
The Tribunal analyzed the proviso under section 187(2) of the Income Tax Act, which states that there is no change in the constitution of the firm if it is dissolved on the death of a partner. The Tribunal referred to judgments by the Madhya Pradesh High Court to interpret this provision. The Tribunal concluded that in the absence of a provision in the partnership deed stating otherwise, the firm was considered dissolved upon the death of a partner, leading to a succession scenario under section 188 rather than a change in constitution under section 187.

3. Legal Principles on Valuation of Stock-in-Trade:
The Tribunal extensively discussed legal principles regarding the valuation of stock-in-trade upon the dissolution of a firm. It referred to the decision in A.L.A. Firm v. CIT, where the Supreme Court upheld the principle that stock-in-trade should be valued at market price upon dissolution. The Tribunal emphasized that the successor-firm cannot claim set-off based on the valuation of closing stock of the old firm, as they are distinct entities with different constitutions. The Tribunal ultimately rejected the appeal of the assessee, upholding the Commissioner's decision to value the closing stock at market price.

In conclusion, the Tribunal's judgment focused on the correct valuation of closing stock upon the dissolution of a firm, interpreting relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and applying established legal principles regarding the valuation of stock-in-trade in such scenarios.

Issues Involved:
1. Deduction under section 80HH of the Income-tax Act.
2. Rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act.
3. Inclusion or exclusion of investment allowance in computing deductions.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Deduction under section 80HH of the Income-tax Act:
The primary issue in the case revolves around the proper computation of the deduction under section 80HH of the Income-tax Act. The original assessment allowed the deduction on a gross profit of Rs. 1,44,36,149 before allowing deductions under sections 32 and 32A. The Assessing Officer later determined this to be an excess allowance and proposed to re-determine the deduction after considering these deductions. The assessee contended that the deduction should be allowed on the profit after adjustment of current year's depreciation and investment allowance but before unabsorbed investment allowance and previous years' relief. However, the Assessing Officer held that deductions under section 80HH should be determined on the profit after giving effect to unabsorbed deficiencies of earlier years.

The CIT(A) upheld the assessee's contention, directing the Assessing Officer to compute the deduction under section 80HH before deducting investment allowance from the profits and gains of the industrial undertaking. The Tribunal, however, had previously ruled in the assessee's own case for assessment years 1987-88 and 1988-89 that the CIT(A) was not justified in such a direction, relying on the Supreme Court decision in H. H. Sir Rama Varma v. CIT and Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT, which held that items like unabsorbed depreciation and development rebate should not be excluded when computing deductions.

2. Rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act:
The Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 154 proposing to rectify the original assessment by re-determining the deduction under section 80HH. The rectification was based on the premise that the original assessment had allowed an excess deduction. The learned D.R. argued that the rectification was justified, citing various judicial precedents that supported the reduction of investment allowance before computing the deduction under section 80HH.

However, the learned Counsel for the assessee argued that at the time of the original assessment, there was a debate and doubt regarding the inclusion or exclusion of investment allowance, and thus, the rectification was not permissible under section 154. The Counsel cited the Calcutta High Court's decision in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. ITO, which held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court does not have retrospective operation in obliterating the existence of prior debate or doubt.

3. Inclusion or exclusion of investment allowance in computing deductions:
The debate centered on whether investment allowance should be deducted before computing the deduction under section 80HH. The learned D.R. referred to multiple cases, including Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. and Mettur Chemical & Industrial Corpn. Ltd., to argue that investment allowance must be reduced before computing the deduction. The learned Counsel for the assessee, however, pointed out that the Supreme Court decision in Mettur Chemical & Industrial Corpn. Ltd. was rendered much later and pertained to section 84, not section 80HH. Additionally, the Counsel highlighted that the Tribunal itself had referred the question of law regarding this issue to the High Court, indicating that the matter was still not settled.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal concluded that at the time of the rectification, there was an ongoing debate and the issue was not free from doubt. The Tribunal noted that the matter required a long drawn process of reasoning, and thus, it did not fall within the purview of section 154. The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer was not justified in passing the rectification order under section 154, reducing the claim under section 80HH. Consequently, the appeal by the revenue was dismissed, though not for the reasons mentioned by the CIT(A).

Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of additional grounds before the Tribunal.
2. Application of section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
3. Classification of expenditure on food and light refreshment as entertainment under section 37(2A).
4. Eligibility for weighted deduction under section 35B for various expenses.
5. Allowance of weighted deduction on miscellaneous expenses and commission paid to agents.
6. Deductibility of penalty paid to the Punjab State Electricity Board.
7. Treatment of extinguishment of sales-tax liability.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of Additional Grounds Before the Tribunal:
The Tribunal held that the additional grounds taken for the first time before the Tribunal, in respect of claiming the value of entitlements to import against the export as capital receipt immune from taxation, cannot be admitted. This decision was consistent across the assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77, and 1977-78.

2. Application of Section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
For the assessment year 1975-76, the Tribunal upheld the application of section 144B, introduced with effect from January 1, 1976, stating that the assessment made was not barred by limitation.

3. Classification of Expenditure on Food and Light Refreshment as Entertainment under Section 37(2A):
The Tribunal disallowed expenditures incurred on food and light refreshment served to trainees and engineers, classifying them as entertainment under section 37(2A). The disallowances were Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 6,000 for 1975-76, Rs. 12,000 for 1976-77, and Rs. 8,000 for 1977-78. The court, however, concluded that these expenditures were for business necessity and not entertainment, thus answering in favor of the assessee.

4. Eligibility for Weighted Deduction under Section 35B for Various Expenses:
For the assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77, and 1977-78, the Tribunal disallowed weighted deductions for several expenses such as freight, handling charges, interest, packing expenses, and insurance. The court, however, held that expenditures on sea freight and marine insurance qualify for weighted deduction under sub-clause (viii) of section 35B(1)(b).

5. Allowance of Weighted Deduction on Miscellaneous Expenses and Commission Paid to Agents:
The Tribunal allowed weighted deduction on miscellaneous expenses including salary and establishment expenses, proportionate to the percentage of export sales (20%). The commission paid to agents was also allowed as it was incurred for services rendered outside India. The court upheld this view, affirming the Tribunal's decision.

6. Deductibility of Penalty Paid to the Punjab State Electricity Board:
For the assessment year 1977-78, the Tribunal allowed the deduction of a penalty of Rs. 4,950 paid to the Punjab State Electricity Board for late delivery of goods, treating it as a business expenditure. The court agreed, distinguishing it from penalties for infraction of law, thus answering in favor of the assessee.

7. Treatment of Extinguishment of Sales-tax Liability:
For the assessment year 1977-78, the Tribunal held that the sum of Rs. 36,699 on account of extinguishment of sales-tax liability was not a trading receipt and not includible in the assessee's income. The court upheld this view, noting the absence of a refund or adjustment order, thus answering in favor of the assessee.

Conclusion:
The court provided a thorough analysis of each issue, often referencing previous judgments and interpretations of relevant sections of the Income-tax Act. The decisions were largely in favor of the assessee, particularly regarding the classification of expenditures and the eligibility for weighted deductions.

Issues:
Challenge to order rejecting waiver of penalties under Wealth-tax Act for delay in filing returns based on disputed status as Hindu undivided family or individual.

Analysis:
The petitioner challenged an order rejecting the waiver of penalties under the Wealth-tax Act for delay in filing returns for assessment years 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1974-75. The Commissioner rejected the application citing the dispute over the petitioner's status as a Hindu undivided family or an individual. The petitioner claimed to be an individual post-partition of a Hindu undivided family, but the Assessing Officer doubted the partition's genuineness and continued to assess the petitioner as an individual. The penalties were levied for the delayed filing of returns in this context. The court noted that the petitioner filed returns as an individual, not as a Hindu undivided family, and the Assessing Officer's doubts led to protective assessments on the individual. Therefore, the penalties were also considered protective pending a final decision on the status of the alleged Hindu undivided family. The court held that the Commissioner should have awaited the final decision on the family's status before rejecting the waiver application.

The court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order rejecting the waiver, and directed the Commissioner to reconsider the matter based on the final decision regarding the ownership of the properties in question. The court ordered a stay on the recovery of penalties for the assessment years in question until the waiver application is finally decided. The parties were directed to bear their own costs in the matter.

Issues:
1. Whether market fee is chargeable from traders by Mandi Samitis for the services rendered.
2. Interpretation of the principle of quid pro quo in relation to fees charged by public authorities.
3. Whether the High Court's decision to remit the matter back to the Mandi Samitis was appropriate.

Analysis:
1. The Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether market fee is chargeable by Mandi Samitis from traders for services rendered. The High Court had remitted the matter back to the Samitis to adjudicate on the claim of traders that no fee should be charged as no services were provided. The Court noted that the Samitis had averred to providing various services like electric light, water, amenities, tents, culverts, and future infrastructure development. The High Court's decision was criticized for creating a conflict between the Samitis and traders based on the principle of quid pro quo, emphasizing a near-balance between fee demanded and services rendered, which the Court deemed incorrect. The Court held that the High Court should not have left the matter with the Samitis, as they would be judging in their own cause, which is undesirable.

2. The Court referred to the judge-made law in M.C.D. and Ors. v. Mohd. Yasin and Anr., emphasizing that a fee need not have a direct relation to services rendered, and a casual relation may suffice. The Court highlighted that the primary motive is regulation in the public interest, and a broad co-relationship is sufficient, without the need for meticulous balancing of costs and fees. The Court reiterated that the strict quid pro quo principle is not the sole indicator of a fee, and it may not be necessary for the fee payers to receive a direct benefit.

3. The Court further discussed the evolving concept of quid pro quo in fees, citing City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadalinan and Ors. to emphasize that the traditional concept is transforming. The Court stated that the fee must have a relation to services rendered or advantages conferred, but this relation need not be direct, and a general benefit received by the fee payers satisfies the element of service required for fee collection. The Court clarified that it is not essential for the fee payers to receive a special benefit for the payment of fees.

4. Applying the principles from the above decisions to the present case, the Court found that the Mandi Samitis do provide services to traders and others, and it is not necessary to prove that the fees collected are spent directly for the benefit of fee payers. The Court criticized the High Court's decision to remit the matter back to the Samitis, stating that the High Court should have either verified the authenticity of services rendered by the Samitis or accepted their claim without opening avenues for prolonged disputes. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and dismissed the writ petition without costs.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals based on the principles settled in Union of India v. Cibatul Ltd. (1985). No costs were awarded. (1996 (8) TMI 528 - SC)

Issues:
1. Whether winding up order should be passed against the respondent-company Presto Finance Ltd. under section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Analysis:
The petitioner, a proprietary firm, invested in the respondent-company by subscribing to shares, but the company failed to issue the shares or honor the buyback agreement. The company issued a bounced cheque for the investment amount, leading the petitioner to issue a statutory notice demanding payment. The respondent admitted the liability but failed to make the payment within the stipulated time. The petitioner alleged that the company made similar assurances to other investors but failed to fulfill its obligations, indicating insolvency. The petitioner also claimed that the company defrauded creditors by issuing bounced cheques. The Stock Exchange suspended trading of the company's shares and warned investors about trading in the company's securities.

The Court found that the respondent-company failed to pay its debts, leading to multiple petitions for winding up by various creditors. Despite admitting the debt, the respondent did not make the payment, indicating an inability to pay. The Court noted that the respondent's substratum was lost, justifying the interim order to prevent asset transfers. The Court referred to relevant sections of the Companies Act, emphasizing the inability of the company to pay its debts as a ground for winding up.

The Court concluded that there was a valid ground for winding up the respondent company, appointing the Official Liquidator for the process. The petitioner was directed to deposit initial winding-up expenses, and the order was to be communicated to relevant stock exchanges and regulatory authorities. The judgment highlighted the necessity of a deeper probe into the company's affairs, in line with the statutory provisions of the Companies Act.

Issues:
1. Applicability of Textile Committee Act, 1963 to the petitioner
2. Validity of demand notices for cess payment
3. Interpretation of Rule 4 and Rule 8 of the Cess Rules
4. Alternative remedy of appeal under the Textile Committee Act, 1963
5. Constitution of Tribunal for appeal

Analysis:

1. The petitioner sought a declaration that the Textile Committee Act, 1963 does not apply to them and challenged the demand notices for cess payment. The notices calculated cess based on the petitioner's failure to submit monthly returns as per Rule 4 of the Cess Rules. The petitioner argued that the Assessing Officer wrongly used the balance sheet for calculation instead of following Rule 8. The court held that Rule 8 does not allow calculation based on the balance sheet and quashed the demand notices, allowing the Assessing Officer to proceed afresh in accordance with the law.

2. The respondents contended that the calculation was based on a return filed by the petitioner as per Rule 4, justifying reliance on the balance sheet. However, the court found that the petitioner had not complied with Rule 4, as indicated in the demand notices. Therefore, the court disagreed with the respondent's argument and upheld the quashing of the demand notices.

3. The Union of India highlighted the option of an appeal under the Textile Committee Act, 1963. The petitioner countered that no Tribunal had been constituted under the Act, rendering the appeal remedy unavailable. The court agreed with the petitioner, overruling the preliminary objection raised by the Union of India.

4. The court set aside the demand notices and allowed the Assessing Officer to proceed afresh in compliance with Rules 4 and 8 of the Cess Rules. The petitioner was instructed to provide necessary figures from the Central Excise Department for the cess assessment. If the petitioner failed to provide the figures, the Assessing Officer was directed to obtain them directly from the Central Excise Department.

5. The judgment concluded by directing all parties to act on the court's order and undertook to proceed accordingly.

Issues:
1. Challenge to Order-in-Original before CEGAT
2. Alleged contravention of Central Excise Rules
3. Dismissal of appeal by Tribunal and High Court direction
4. Dispute on excisability of parts before Tribunal
5. Application for reference under Section 35G(1) of the Act
6. Filing of Excise Reference Application No. 103/88 before High Court

Analysis:

1. The case involved a challenge to Order-in-Original No. 9/79 passed by the Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur, where M/s. Hira Cold Storage and Ice Factory, Jaipur, and M/s. Rajasthan Farms and Food Products were held to have contravened Central Excise Rules, leading to penalties and confiscation of goods. The appeal before the Tribunal was dismissed, prompting an application before the High Court of Rajasthan, which directed the Tribunal to refer the case to the Supreme Court within 90 days.

2. The dispute centered around the fabrication of bunker coils, cooling coils, and condenser at the site, with allegations of manufacturing excisable goods without the necessary license and clearance without payment of central excise duty. The Collector's decision was challenged on various grounds, including the excisability of the parts, citing conflicting judgments from different High Courts.

3. The Tribunal dismissed the application for reference under Section 35G(1) of the Act, stating that the dispute related to classification and did not warrant a reference to the High Court. However, the High Court of Rajasthan directed the Tribunal to refer the questions of law arising from the appeal dismissal to the Supreme Court due to a divergence of opinions among High Courts.

4. The key legal questions for consideration were whether the fabrication of bunker coils, cooling coils, and condenser at the site constituted "manufacture" under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and whether these articles were excisable goods. Additionally, the issue of whether such fabrication attracted the relevant sub-item of the Central Excise Tariff was also raised for determination. The High Court's direction aimed to resolve these legal ambiguities through a reference to the Supreme Court for clarification.