TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1986 (8) TMI 242
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....led along with an application for condonation of delay in filing it. On the Registry taking exception to one consolidated appeal, three Supplementary Appeals have been filed on 12th May, 1986 along with the three other applications for condonation of delay 3. The dates relevant for a consideration of the Application for condonation of delay in the original appeal itself (Appeal No. E/1044/86-A) as furnished in the Application are as follows:- (a) 14-10-85 - The order of the Collector (Appeals) was attested and put in a course of transmission to the appellant amongst others; (b) 18-10-85 - The aforesaid order was received in the office of the Applicant. I....
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....for any of these 67 days after 18-1-1986 when limitation for filing the appeal had expired. The applicant's approach to the question of filing an appeal was apparently casual and rather leisurely. 6. For the Applicant it was urged that public interest has to be taken into consideration in condoning the delay since it may be that a departmental authority may delay filing the appeal for oblique motives and the public interest should not be allowed to suffer on that account, as it would, if the appeal is thrown out merely on the ground of some delay which is also explainable. [Reliance on 1983 ECR 1556 (SC) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bahadur Singh and Ors.]. Our attention was also invited to 1985 (21) E.L.T. 529, wherein the Tribunal had,....
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.... On perusal of the papers and the submissions made it would appear to us that - (a) in terms of S.35-B(3) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter, the Act), a period of limitation of three months from the date when the order sought to be appealed against was communicated to the Collector was prescribed and the Tribunal was competent under sub-section (5) of the said Section to admit the Appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, if satisfied that "there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period"; (b) substantially identical words occur in S.5 of the Limitation Acts of 1908 and 1963 and the expression "sufficient cause" had come up for interpretation in a host of ....
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....entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right. The proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the Court under S. 5. If sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay". [AIR 1962 S.C. 361 - adverted to supra]; (v) "it is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute 'sufficient cause' under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. But those words should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or any inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to a party, i.e. the delay in filing an appeal should....
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....y had occurred on account of negligence, inaction or want of bona fides. Nor is there any case for special indulgence just because the party applying for condonation happens to be Government; (e) the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1983 ECR 1556 (SC) related, if one may say so, to an unusual dismissal of a Writ Petition on the ground that it was barred, having been filed beyond the "usual period of limitation" of 90 days, notwithstanding that no period of limitation at all was prescribed. It was in that context that the Hon'ble Court observed that (i) the only known principle - a rule of judicial circumspection - is that the Court may not examine stale causes as the Court help....