TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1936 (9) TMI 16
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.... has filed an application stating his objections against the application of the Liquidator. He has also filed a separate application under sections 120 and 234 of the Indian Companies Act praying for extension of the time fixed for registration under section 109 of the Companies Act, and in the alternative claiming to be treated as a preferential creditor. The facts which have led to the making of these applications are not in dispute. The house in question was purchased by the Dinshaw Bank which will hereafter be referred to as the company. On March 5, 1934, the Company executed a mortgage deed in favour of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, Cawnpore Branch, in respect of the said house. The deed was registered under the Re....
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....ision for review in the Indian Companies Act and that the District Judge had, therefore, no authority to recall his order. I am of opinion that the argument has no substance. There can be no doubt that the District Judge, when he passed the order under section 120 of the Companies Act was acting as a Court of Civil Jurisdiction. Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. I am, therefore, of opinion that the District Judge was competent to review his earlier order. Apart from this I have no doubt that he had inherent power to vacate his previous order if he conside....
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....urisdiction to pass any order under section 120 in this case, yet the defect of jurisdiction was cured by the provisions of s, 3, sub-s. (3), of the Companies Act. No question of jurisdiction or of validity of the aforesaid order arises when the order has already been vacated and does not exist any longer. Reference was also made to section 114 of the Companies Act and it was argued that the certificate given by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was conclusive evidence that the requirements of sections 109 to 112 as to registration have been complied with. The argument is fallacious in the first place because the certificate no longer exists having been cancelled by the Registrar when it was brought to his notice that the order, dated ....
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....rder extending time under section 15 ought to contain the words "but that this order be without prejudice to the rights of parties acquired prior to the time when such debentures shall be actually registered." In another case in the same volume In re Spiral Globe Co., the same principle was affirmed. The following observations made in this case may be usefully quoted: "But the principle of the cases before referred to is not limited in its application to those cases in which the ownership of or property in goods or chattels has actually changed; it extends, in my judgment to cases in which the rights of third persons have actually accrued and which would be prejudicially affected if registration were allowed without saving and protecting....
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....ferred to could not do any body any good and would be quite useless. In the second case it was held that the usual proviso added to an order for extension of time for registration namely that the order is to be without prejudice to the rights of parties acquired prior to the date of actual registration only protects creditors who have acquired security on the property the subject-matter of the charge and that the Court will not insert in the order any terms for the protection of unsecured creditors of the Company. But it was added that these observations have no application to a case in which the extension is applied for after an order for winding-up has been made. The third case also is not in point because there was no question about th....