TMI Blog1975 (2) TMI 86X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... GUPTA A.C. JJ. N.D. Karkhanis, Senior Advocate (O.P. Rama, Advocate, with him), for the appellant. Nemo for the respondent. -------------------------------------------------- The judgment of the court was delivered by SARKARTA, J.- The common question of law for determination in these appeals by special leave is: Whether section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, in terms, or, in principle, can be invoked for excluding the time spent in prosecuting an application under rule 68(6) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeal in default under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (for short, the Sales Tax Act), from computation of the period of limitation for filing a revision under that Act. It arises out of these circumstances: The respondent, M/s. Parson Tools and Plants (hereinafter referred to as the assessee), carries on business at Kanpur. The Sales Tax Officer assessed tax for the assessment years 1958-59 and 1959-60 on the assessee by two separate orders. The assessee filed appeals against those orders before the appellate authority. On May 10, 1963, when the appeals came up for hearing, the assessee was absent. The appeal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on held "that the time spent in prosecuting the applications for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeals for default can be excluded from computing the period of limitation for filing the revision by the application of the principle underlying section 14(2), Limitation Act." Hari Swarup, J., was of the opinion: "The judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, while hearing the revisions under section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, does not act as a court but only as a revenue tribunal and hence the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot apply to proceedings before him. If the Limitation Act does not apply then neither section 29(2) nor section 14(2) of the Limitation Act will apply to proceedings before him." The learned judge was further of the view that the principle of section 14(2) also could not be invoked to extend the time beyond the maximum fixed by the Legislature in sub-section (3-B) of section 10 of the Sales Tax Act. Sub-section (2) of section 14, Limitation Act, runs thus: "In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first inst ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3] 14 S.T.C. 536 (S.C.); [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850., it seems, was not brought to the notice of the High Court. In view of these pronouncements of this court, there is no room for argument that the appellate authority and the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, exercising jurisdiction under the Sales Tax Act, are "courts". They are merely administrative tribunals and not "courts". Section 14, Limitation Act, therefore, does not, in terms, apply to proceedings before such tribunals. Further question that remains is: Is the general principle underlying section 14(2) applicable on grounds of justice, equity and good conscience for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the abortive applications under rule 68(6) before the appellate authority for computing limitation for the purpose of revision applications. Mr. Karkhanis maintains that the answer to this question, also, must be in the negative because definite indications are available in the scheme and language of the Sales Tax Act, which exclude the application of section 14(2), Limitation Act, even in principle or by analogy. The learned counsel further submits that the ratio of the Privy Council decision in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub- section (3-B) of section 10 of the Sales Tax Act. Delay in disposal of revenue matters adversely affects the steady inflow of revenues and the financial stability of the State. Section 10 is therefore designed to ensure speedy and final determination of fiscal matters within a reasonably certain time schedule. It cannot be said that by excluding the unrestricted application of the principles of sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the Legislature has made the provisions of section 10 unduly oppressive. In most cases, the discretion to extend limitation, on sufficient cause being shown for a further period of six months only, given by sub-section (3-B) would be enough to afford relief. Cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite sufficient cause, is unable to make an application for revision within this maximum period of 18 months. Such harsh cases would be rare. Even in such exceptional cases of extreme hardship, the revising authority may, on its own motion, entertain revision and grant relief. Be that as it may, from the scheme and language of section 10, the intention of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m. 309., In this Bombay case, the question was, whether the suit was barred by limitation. It was not disputed that article 115 of the Limitation Act governed the limitation and if no other factor was to be taken into consideration, the suit was filed beyond time. But what was relied upon by the plaintiff for the purpose of saving limitation was the fact that there were certain infructuous arbitration proceedings and if the time taken in prosecuting those proceedings was excluded under section 14, the suit would be within limitation. It was held that if section 14 were to be construed strictly, the plaintiff would not be entitled to exclude the period in question. On the authority of Ramdutt Ramkissen's case A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103., it was then contended that the time taken in arbitration proceedings should be excluded on the analogy of section 14. This contention was also negatived on the ground that since the decision of the Privy Council, the legislature had in section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, provided as to what extent the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator. Section 37(5) was as follows: "Where the court or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing to court to get the necessary order indicated in section 37(5)." What the learned Chief Justice said about the inapplicability of section 14, Limitation Act, in the context of section 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, holds good with added force with reference to section 10(3-B) of the Sales Tax Act. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only up to a specified time-limit and no further, then the tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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