TMI Blog1975 (1) TMI 62X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r electric supply lines had been laid. In order to hold that space from the Corporation, it was essential, according to the learned counsel that there should have been some agreement between the petitioner company and the Corporation or that the Corporation should have given its consent for that purpose. We are unable to accede to the above submission. Clause (a) of section 139(1) of the Corporations Act fastens the liability for payment of property tax on the actual occupier of the premises held immediately from the Government or from the Corporation. In order to attract the liability under the above clause, it is not essential that there should have been an agreement between the actual occupier and the Government or the Corporation for the holding of the premises or that the holding must be with the consent of the Government or the Corporation. The liability would accrue even if the premises vesting in the Government or the Corporation are occupied in pursuance of a statutory provision. The words "held immediately from the Government or from the Corporation signify only the party in whom the premises vest which are held by the actual occupier thereof. Contention has also been adv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this Court challenging the validity of the assessments for, the years 1964-65 and 1965- 66 as well as the initial entries for the year 1966-67. Those writ petitions were disposed of by this Court by a judgment delivered on February 21, 1967 and reported as New Manek Chok Spinning Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad Ors. [1967]2 S.C.R. 679 This Court allowed the writ petitions and held the relevant entries in the assessment books to be invalid. It was held in that case that the State Legislature had no competence under entry 49 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to make a law for taxing plant and machinery. Rule 7 (2) was held to be beyond the legislative competence of the State. Rules 7 (2) and (3) were also held to- be invalid on account of excessive delegation of powers by the- legislature. Under those rules. the specification (A. the classes of machinery for the, purpose of taxation was to be made, by the Commissioner with the approval of the Corporation irrespective of the question as to where they were to be found. This Court found that it depended upon the arbitrary will of the Commissioner as to what ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs filed petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of those notices. Those petitions were allowed by the High Court as per judgment dated July 3, 1969 on the ground that the demand for certain particulars contained in the notices was beyond the scope of rule 8(1). The contention of the petitioners in those petitions that no assessment could be made after the expiry of the official year was repelled and it was held that the Corporation had the power under section 152A to reassess lands and buildings of the petitioners to property tax for the official years 1964-65. 1965-66 and 1966-67 notwithstanding the expiration of those years. The High Court also held that the new section did not stand in the way of the petitioners getting refund of the property tax already paid. Appeal was filed in this Court against the above judgment by the Corporation. The Ahmedabad Corporation, it may be stated, used to pass a resolution under section 99 of the Corporations Act determining the rate at which property tax would be levied for the particular official year. So far as conservancy tax was concerned, the rate determined by the Corporation was 3 per cent. A special rate of conservancy tax ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... year 1968-69 as the entries for the official year 1969-70. Complaints were then filed by the petitioners against the amount of rateable value entered in the assessment books. During the pendency of those complaints, the Governor of Gujrat promulgated Ordinance No. 6 of 1969 on December 23, 1969. The ordinance was replaced by Gujarat Act No. 5 of 1970 which came into force with effect from March 31, 1970. The ordinance amended the definition of rateable value as well as section 49 with retrospective effect. It also contained ,tam validating provisions. Gujarat Act 5 of 1970 was on the line Ordinance No-. 6 of 1969, except in the matter of definition of rateable value. A number of petitions in the meantime were filed to challenge the validity of the provisions of Ordinance No. 6 of 1969 and :)se of Act 5 of 1970. For the official year 1970-71, the valuation was made in accordance with Gujarat Act 5 of 1970. A number of writ petitions were A before the Gujarat High Court challenging the provisions of Gujarat Act 5 of 1970 as well as the valuation for the year 1970-71. In the meantime, on April 17, 1970 appeal filed by the Corporation against judgment dated July 3, 1969 of Gujarat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the amount of such tax to be levied in respect of any hotel, club or other large premises may be specially fixed under section 137; (c) a general tax of not less than twelve per cent. of their rateable value, which may be levied,- if the Corporation so determines, on a graduated scale Provided............. According to section 99 the Corporation shall, on or before the twentieth day of February,, after considering the Standing Committee's proposals in this behalf,, determine inter alia subject to limitations an( conditions prescribed in Chapter XI, the rates at which municipal taxes referred to in sub-section (1) of section 127 shall be levied in the next ensuing official year. "Official year" has been defined in section 2(44) to mean the year commencing on the first day of April. Section 137 reads as under :- "(1) The Commissioner may, whenever he thinks fit, fix the conservancy tax to be paid in respect of any hotel, club, stable or other large premises at such special rate as shall be generally approved by the Standing Committee in this behalf, whether the service in respect of which such tax is leviable be performed by human labour or by substituted means or appliances ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y be expected to let from year to year a sum equal to ten per cent of the said annual rent, and the said deduction shall be in lieu of all allowance for repairs or on any other account whatever. Clauses (2) and (3) of that rule need not be set out as they were struck down by this Court in the case of New Manak Chowk Mills (supra). Rule 9 relates to the keeping of an assessment book in which shall be entered inter alia every year the rateable value of buildings and lands in the city of Ahmedabad determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules as also the names of persons primarily liable for the payment of property taxes, if any, leviable on each such building or land' Clause (i) of rule 42 reads as under. (1) If the person on whom a notice of demand has been served under rule 41 does not within fifteen days from such service pay the sum demanded or shows sufficient cause, for non- payment of the same to the satisfaction of the Commissioner and if no appeal is preferred against the said tax, a,, hereinafter provided, such sum, with all costs of the recovery, may be levied under a warrant in Form H or to the like effect, to be issued by the Commissioner, by di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) in the case of any building of a class not ordinarily let, or in the case of any industrial or other premises of a class not ordinarily let, or in the case of a class of such premises the building or buildings in which are not ordinarily let, if the annual rent thereof cannot in the opinion of the Commissioner be easily estimated, the annual rent shall be deemed to be six per cent of the total of the estimated market value, at the time of the assessment, of the land on which such building or buildings stand or, as the case may be. of the land which is- comprised in such premises, and the estimated cost, at the time of the assessment, of erecting the building, or as the case may be, the building or buildings comprised in such premises;' (2)for clause (54), the following shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been, substituted, namely (54)'rateable value' means the value of any building or land fixed, whether with reference to any given premises or otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of Act and the rules for the purpose of assessment to property taxes; 4. In section 49 of the principal Act, in sub-section (1),- (1)for the words 'such of the duties of the Commis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... -rule (3) of rule 7, for the words annual rent for which such building, land or premises might reasonably be expected to let from year to year a sum equal to ten per cent of the said annual rent' the words 'annual letting value of such building, land or premises a sum equal to ten per cent of such annual letting value' shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been substituted; and (ii)in sub rule (1) of rule 42, for the words is preferred' the words 'is preferred or entertained' shall be substituted. 13.Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal or any other authority,- (1)................ (2)no determination of any special or different rate, of conservancy tax by a Municipal Corporation constituted by or under the principal Act in respect of any hotel, club, stable, industrial premises or other large premises in exercise or purported exercise of its powers under any of the provisions of the principal Act, at any time before the commencement of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been invalidly made by reason of the Corporation having no power to determine such rate at the time when such determination was made; and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e rate of conservancy tax at 9 per cent inter alia in respect of textile, mills and factories belonging to the petitioners are ultra vires the proviso to section 129(b) and the rate of conservancy tax applicable in respect of these textile mills and factories must, therefore be taken to be the general rate of 3 per cent." Civil appeals Nos. 489 to 513 and 752 to 755 of 1973 have been filed in this Court by the petitioners before the High Court against the judgment of that court in so far as the court has upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions. Civil appeals Nos. 643 to 684 of 1973 have been filed by the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and others against the above judgment in so far as the High Court has struck down the impugned provisions and the Resolutions. Civil appeals No. 389 to 430 of 1974 have been filed by the State of Gujarat against the judgment in so far as the High Court has struck down the impugned provisions. Writ petitions Nos. 51, 60 to 73, 87 to 91, 157, 492 to 503, 533, 534 and 583 of 1972 as also writ petitions Nos. 1866 to 1877 and 2046 of 1973 which have been filed by the Aryodaya Spg. Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. and other part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The High Court rejected the first three contentions urged can behalf of the Corporation but accepted the fourt contention. Accordingly, it held that clause (i) of section 2(1A) was valid in so far a,,, it was applicable to the official year 1969-70, but was null and void in so far as it applied to the previous years on account of the infraction of article 14. Regarding clause (c) of the proviso to sub-clause (2) of clause (1A) of section 2 of the Act, the High Court held that it is only if the annual rent having regard to the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act cannot be easily estimated that the Commissioner can adopt the basis of the valuation set out in proviso to clause (c). Mr. Tar under learned counsel for the petitioners has not pressed the attack on the constitutional validity of clause (c) because, according to him, it is not known as to which property would be covered by that clauses as construed by the High Court. Likewise, so far as the constitutional validity of section 49 of the Act is concerned, the attack has not been pressed on behalf of the petitioner-appellants. Mr. Tarkunde has also pointed out that despite the decision of this Court in Manek Chowk Spg. Wvg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se of Gulam Ahmed Rogay v. Bombay Municipality That in arriving at the rateable value for purposes of section 154(1) ,of the City of Bombay 'Municipal Act, 18 8 8 of property to which the Bombay Rents, 'Hotel 'Lodging house Rates Control Act, 1947 applies the maximum value to be assigned to the property is not to'be limited,to the maximum standard rent of the property together with additions thereto permitted by the latter Act. Similar question there-after arose in the case of The Corporation of Calcutta v. Sm. Padma Debi ors [1962] 3 S C R 49. . This Court in that case was concerned with the provisions of section 127(a) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, according to which the annual rental value of land and the annual value of any building erected for letting purposes or ordinarily act, shall be deemed to be the gross annual rent at which the land or building might at the time of assessment reasonably be expected to let from year to year, less, in the case of a building, an allowance of ten per cent for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross rent. I was held by this Court that on a fair reading of the abo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ur opinion, extremely hazardous to decide the question of the constitutional validity of a provision on the basis of the supposed existence of certain facts by raising a presumption. The facts about the supposed existence of which presumption was raised by the High Court were of such a nature that a definite averment could have been made in respect of them and concrete material could have been produced in support of their existence or non-existence. Presumptions are resorted to when the matter does not admit of direct proof or when there is some practical difficulty to produce evidence to prove a particular fact. When, however, the fact to be established is of such a nature that direct evidence about its existence or nonexistence would be available, the proper course is to have the direct evidence rather than to decide the matter by resort to presumption. A pronouncement about the constitutional validity of a statutory provision affects not only the parties before the Court, but all other parties who may be affected by the impugned provision. There would, therefore, be inherent risk in striking down an impugned provision without having the complete factual data and full material be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to pay property taxes were not conscious of any impact of rent restriction for the purposes of property taxes. The Collector has denied that in determining the rateable value the Municipal Commissioner had been taking into account the standard rent of the building or land of was following the principle that the rent restricted by law was the measure of the true rent of the building. There is no material before us to show that the factual position is in any way different from that brought out in the affidavit of the Assessor and Collector of the Corporation. Mr. Tarkunde has referred to three orders dated March 22, 1969 of the Deputy Municipal Commissioner whereby the rateable value as initially fixed was reduced on complaint filed by the ratepayers It would appear from the orders that in reducing the rateable value the Deputy Municipal Commissioner took into account the rental value. The above three orders, in our opinion, can hardly be of any help to the petitioners because there is nothing to show that the Deputy Municipal Commissioner while making those orders took into account the standard rent and the restrictions placed on the increase in rent by the Bombay Rent Act. Mr. T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch group, the law will not be condemned as discriminative, bought due to some fortuitous circumstances arising out of a peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantage over others, so long as they are not singled out for special treatment. Taxation law is not an exception to this doctrine. But, in the application of the principle the courts, in view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, permit a larger discretion to the legislature in the matter of classification, so long as it adheres to the fundamental principles underlying the said doctrine. The power of the legislature to classify is of wide range and flexibility so that it can adjust its system of taxation in all proper and reason-able ways (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar [1959] S.C.R. 279 and Khandige Shah Bhat v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Kasaragod [1963] 3 S.C.R. 809.. Keeping the above principles in view, we find no violation of article 14 in treating pending cases ;as a class different from decided cases. It cannot be disputed that so far as the pending cases covered by clause (i) are concerned, they have been all treated alike. In the case of Rao ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sment was completed on or after that date. While upholding the validity of the above provision, this Court observed "Now the Act of 1961 came into force on first April 1962. It repealed the prior Act of 1922. Whenever a prior enactment is repealed and new provisions are enacted the legislature invariably lays down under which enactment pending proceedings shall be continued and concluded. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 deals with the effect of repeal of an enactment and its provisions apply unless a different intention appears in the statute. It is for the legislature to decide from which date a particular law should come into operation. It is not disputed that no reason has been suggested why pending proceedings cannot be treated by the legislature as a class for the purpose of Art. 14. The date first April 1962 which has been selected by the legislature for the purpose of cls. (f) and (g) of s. 297 (2) cannot be characterised as arbitrary or fanciful." We would, therefore, hold that clause (i) of section 2(1A) is constitutionally valid and not violative of article 14 in respect of all the years to which it has been made applicable. Leamed Additional Solicitor-Ge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of the Corporation Act in the matter of levy of conservancy tax. Clause (b) of section 129 states that the rate of conservancy tax shall be such percentage of rateable value as will in the opinion of the Corporation suffice to provide the collection, removal and disposal, by municipal agency, of all excrementitious and polluted matter from privies, urinals and cesspools and for efficiently maintaining and repairing the municipal drains constructed or used for the reception or conveyance of such matter. It is further provided that the minimum amount of such tax to be levied in respect of any one separate holding of land or of any one building or of any one portion of a building which is let as a separate holding shall be eight annas per mensem and that the amount of such tax to be levied in respect of any hotel, club or other large premises may be specially fixed under section 137. Sub-section (1) of section 137 provides that the Commissioner may, whenever he thinks fit, fix the conservancy tax to be paid in respect of any hotel, club, stable or other large premises at such special rate as shall be generally approved by the Standing Committee in this behalf, whether the service in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rnment, the rate of conservancy tax should be lower compared to the rate of general conservancy tax. Sub-section (1) deals with large premises like hotels, clubs and stables which in the very nature of things require greater conservancy service, and it hardly stands to reason that the Legislature would contemplate the fixing of lower concessional rate of conservancy tax in the case of such premises. The opening words of sub-section (3) of section 137, viz. "In any such case" make it clear that its concessional provisions apply only to the immediately preceding clause, namely, section 137(2). Act 5 of 1970 added a proviso to clause (b) of section 129. According to that proviso, when determining under section 99 or section 150 the rate at which conservancy tax shall be levied for any official year or part of an official year, the Corporation may determine different rates for different classes of properties. A proviso was also added to section 137(1) by the said Act that if the Corporation shall have determined for any official year any different rate of conservancy tax for any class of properties to which any of the properties referred to in this subsection belongs, the Commissione ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cal accuracy and broad compliance in matters of this type is sufficient for compliance with law. I submit that according to the estimate of the Municipal Corporation, to meet the total expenditure of conservancy services, if a unit rate of conservancy tax was to be provided, it was necessary to determine the rate of conservancy tax at 41 per cent of the rateable value. The Corporation has, however, sought to distribute the incidence of conservancy tax equitably among all the lands and buildings, determine the general rate of conservancy tax at 3 per cent and determine a higher rate of conservancy tax at 9 per cent in respect of industrial premises and other properties as provided in the said resolution. I submit that the use of the premises has a material relation to the cost of providing conservancy services and to the maintenance and repairs thereof I submit that the hotels, clubs, industrial premises and: other large premises referred to in section 129(b) as well as in section 137 are premises which need relatively larger conser- vancy services." The question with which we are concerned in the present cases is whether it is sufficient, as has been argued on behalf of the Corpo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section 129 of the Corporations Act by Act 5 of 1970, when determining under section 99 or section 150 the rate at which conservancy tax shall be levied for any official year or part of an official year, the Corporation may determine different rates for different classes of properties. There is nothing in the above proviso which makes it obligatoryfor the Corporation to take into account separately the cost of conservancy service for each class of property for which conservancy tax is fixed. Apart from the fact that there is no statutory obligation for the Corporation to have separate estimates of the costs of conservancy service for various classes of properties referred to in the above proviso with a view to allocate the cost amongst different classes of properties, it would not even be feasible to do so for there would not be separate municipal drains for different classes of properties. As already mentioned clause (b), of section 129 also takes into account the expense required for efficiently maintaining and repairing the municipal drains for finding, out the total expenditure for conservancy service. The High Court, in our-opinion, was in error in striking down the resolution ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... considering the budget estimates the Corporation is entitled to refer them back to the Standing Committee for further consideration or to adopt them us they stand or subject to alterations. The entire procedure provides built-in safeguards and lays down adequate guidelines in the matter of taxation. It therefore cannot be said that the legislature has not prescribed any guiding principle for the Corporation for determining the rates of conservancy tax. We agree with the High Court that the proviso to clause (b) of section 129 does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power. Mr. Bhandare on behalf of the State of Gujarat has assailed the finding of the High Court that section 406 (2) (e) and section 411 (bb) are violative of article 14 and that rule 42 of the Taxation Rules is void in so far as it has provided that if an appeal is preferred or entertained against the tax, warrant shall not be issued for the recovery of the amount of tax. The High Court in striking down section 406(2)(e) and section 411(bb) relied upon its earlier judgment dated October 27, 1969 which had been given before the addition of the proviso to section 406(2) (e) of by Act 5 of 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t claimed from an appellant in case he, seeks to file an appeal against a tax or against a rateable value after a bill for any property tax assessed upon such value has been presented to him. power at the same time is given to the appellate judge to relieve the appellant from the rigour on the above provision in case the judge is of the opinion that it would cause undue hardship to the appellant. The requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which. seeks to engage the imposition or the quantum of that tax, in our opinion, has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal, especially when we keep in view the fact that discretion is vested in the appellate judge to dispense with the compliance of the above requirement. All that the, statutory provision seeks to do is to regulate the exercise of the, right of appeal. The object of the above provision is to keep in balance the right of appeal, which is conferred upon a person who is aggrieved with the demand of tax made from him, and the right of the Corporation to speedy recovery of the tax. The impugned provision accordingly confers a right of appeal and at the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng liability upon a party upon whom a legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. Any requirement for the discharge of that liability or the fulfillment of that condition in case the party concerned seeks to avail of the said right is a valid piece of legislation, and we can discern no contravention of article 14 in it. A disability or disadvantage arising out of a party's own default or omission cannot be taken to be tantamount to the creation of two classes offensive to article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all persons who make the default or omission. Observations in the case of Hannach Cohen, Exrx. of Sol Cohen, Deceased. and David E. Cohen, Intervener, Petitioners Anr. vs.Ben Industrial Loan Corporation Ors. 337 U.S. 539 lend some support to the view we have taken. Headnote 10 which is based upon the observations in the body of the judgment reads as under :- "10. A State statute which requires that in a stockholder's derivative action a plaintiff who owns less than 5 per cent of the defendant corporation's outstanding shares, or shares having marked value not exceeding $ 50,0 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Shri Narendra R. Desai, Town Development Officer of the Corporation is that only such area of the land as is occupied by the under,ground supply lines that is valued for the purposes of assessing property taxes. It is stated that for the purpose of laying supply lines, the petitioner digs trenches and lays down bricks to serve as bedding for the supply' lines. The petitioner-company, it is urged, occupies by means of the supply lines that area of land which is occupied by the bedding prepared for laying down the supply lines. Mr. Tarkunde on behalf of the petitioner-company has urged that under entry 49 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State Legislature is empowered to enact a law relating to taxes on lands and buildings. It is submitted that the State Legislature has no competence under the above entry to enact a law for levy- ing tax in respect of the area occupied by the underground supply lines. The word "land", according to the learned counsel, denotes the surface of the land and not the underground strata. We are unable to accede to the above submission. Entry 49 of List II contemplates a levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ilt upon or covered with water. benefits to arise out of land. things attached to the earth or Dermanently fastened to anything attached to the earth and rights created by legislative enactment over the street. The definition is of inclusive nature and does not exclude from its ambit the underground strata of the land. It has been argued by Mr. Tarkunde that the right to lay down supply lines under section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act is in the nature of a statutory licence and is not a right in land. Hence the right does not constitute land within entry 49 and is not taxable by the State legislature.' This submission is wholly misconceived because what is taxed under the Corporation Act is land. Section 139, as already mentioned earlier, merely fastens the liability and states that the person primarily liable to pay that tax would be the actual occupier. It is not the case of the Corporation that the right of the petitionercompany of laying and placing electric supply lines constitutes land and as such the petioner-company is liable to pay property tax. On the contrary, the liability is sought to be fastened on the petitionercompany because of the company being in occupation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the rating law is a question of fact, and does not depend upon legal title. The person legally possessed may not occupy. On the other hand, a person may be occupier either with or without the consent of the owner." Lord Herschell also relied upon the case of Rex v. Chelsea Waterworks romnany 5 D. Ad. 156 wherein a water comnany to whom the Crown granted the right to lay down its pipes was held by the Court of King's Bench to be occupier of land and liable to be rated. Lord Macnaghteo in the above case observed "Now, putting aside for a moment the reservations contained in the deed of grant, can there be, any doubt as to the position of the company for rating purposes as regards their authorized works ? The numerous cases relating to gas companies, water companies, and tramways, place the matter beyond question." Lord Davey observed in the above case "My Lords, I agree with the learned judges in the Court of Appeal that the drainage company are not owners of the soil of the tunnels of water-course. But that does not seem to me conclusive on the question of their rateability in respect of their occupation. The right of the company may be an easement or incorporeal right; bu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ely from the Government or from the Corporation. In order to attract the liability under the above clause, it is not essential that there should have been an agreement between the actual occupier and the Government or the Corporation for the holding of the premises or that the holding must be with the consent of the Government or the Corporation. The liability would accrue even if the premises vesting in the Government or the Corporation are occupied in pursuance of a statutory provision. The words "held immediately from the Government or from the Corporation signify only the party in whom the premises vest which are held by the actual occupier thereof. Contention has also been advanced by Mr. Tarkunde regarding the quantum of tax levied on and the extent of the land alleged to have been occupied by the petitioner-company for the underground supply lines. This is essentially a question of fact and would have to be agitated before the authorities concerned, including the appellate authority. As a result of the above, we dismiss writ petitions Nos. 51, 60 to 74, 87 to 91 157, 492 to 503, 533, 534 and 583 of 1972 as also writ petitions Nos. 1866 to 1877 and 2046 of 1973 with costs. On ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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