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TMI Blog1969 (10) TMI 66X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... claim to Rs. 10 lacs. The relevant part of that order reads as under "I have gone through the order of the learned Claims Officer and I find that he has given a queer argument to allow Rs. 8,00,000/- to the claimant. By every method tried by him the assessment went beyond Rs. 10,00,000/- and I think he ought to have allowed Rs. 10,00,000/- as claimed by the claimant I enhance the assessment and allow Rs. 10,00,000/to the claimant." We would assume that the Claims Commissioner had been duly delegated the power of the Chief Claims Commissioner to revise the order of the Claims Officer, because no dispute was raised on this point. On the strength of the verified claim the appellant purchased two properties in Delhi at a public auction; one of them is situated in Daryaganj and the other in New Rajinder Nagar. On November 8, 1957 Shri M. S. Chaddha, Settlement Commissioner, exercising power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued to the appellant a notice under the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act, 1954 calling upon him to show cause why the order of the Claims Commissioner dated May 1, 1953 be not revised and varied. On May 23, 1958 the said officer reduced the appel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ner could not interfere with conclusions of fact and that he had, therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction in so doing. In order to examine the first submission we have to turn to the provisions of the Principal Act and of the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Act 12 of 1954 (hereafter called the Supplementary Act). The principal Act, enacted with the object of providing for the registration and verification of claims of displaced persons in respect of immovable property in Pakistan, was brought on the statute book on May 18, 1950 and was initially to remain in force for a period of two years only. Its life was extended by a further period of one year by means of an amendment in 1952. On the expiry of the third year the Displaced Persons (Claims) Supplementary Ordinance No. 3 of 1954 was promulgated pending the passage, by the Parliament of the bill which later emerged in the shape of Supplementary Act. The Ordinance was enforced on January 18, 1954. The supplementary Act was enacted, as its preamble shows, to provide for the disposal of certain proceedings pending under the principal Act and for matters connected therewith. We have specifically referred to the preamble because ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his special power of revision was conferred on the Chief Settlement Commissioner in addition to the ordinary power of revision conferred by the proviso to S. 4(3) which was similar to the power of revision conferred on the Chief Claims Commissioner, under the principal Act. The suo motu power to revise verified claims, according to the appellant's learned counsel, was designedly vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner, he, being the final authority under the supplementary Act. But this power, argued the counsel, was not intended to extend to proceedings, which could not be considered to be pending under the principal Act. This argument was sought to be founded on the Preamble of the supplementary Act. A verified claim which had been subjected to scrutiny by the Chief Claims Commissioner and bore that officer's seal under the principal Act, according to the appellant's counsel, could not be described to be a matter pending under the principal Act and a revision of such a claim could not be held to be a matter connected with a pending proceeding. The object and purpose of a preamble to a statute is well settled and at the bar before us there was no serious dispute on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... behalf of the appellant, then it would have expressed such intention in clear words. The statutory scheme also supports this view. Under the proviso to S. 4(3) the Chief Settlement Commissioner has suo motu power of revision from the decisions of the settlement Officers and under s. 5(1)(a) he has the power of revision on applications by aggrieved parties from the decisions of Claims Officers. But under s. 5 (1) (b)the suo motu power of revision does not extend to all Decisions but is confined only to verified claims though in this respect it takes within its fold all such claims and is not restricted to the claims verified only by the Claims Officers. On a plain reading of s. 5(1)(b), therefore, the Chief Settlement Commissioner's special power of revision would seem to us to extend to suo motu revision of the verified claims which had become final under the principal Act as a result of orders made by the Chief Claims Commissioner on revision., Neither any statutory bat' nor any precedent has been cited against the exercise of this power; nor has any principle been brought to our notice which would induce us to restrict the plain language of s. 5(1)(b). The submission th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hould be passed on one or the other of the following grounds, namely:- (i) the discovery of any new matter or documentary evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of or could not be produced by the claimant at the time when the claim was verified; or (ii) correction of any clerical or arithmetical mistake apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) gross or material irregularity or disparity in the valuation of the claim; or (iv) any other sufficient reason Provided that the Chief Settlement Commissioner shall not entertain or take into consideration any application or representation made to him under this rule by any claimant if such application or representation is made after the 30th day of April, 1954." It was contended that the grounds on which the Chief Settlement Commissioner revised the verified claim do not fall within the first three clauses of this rule. The fourth clause, according to Shri Gosain's argument, must be read ejusdem generis and so read this clause would also be inapplicable to the case. Reliance in support of this argument was placed on M.M.B. Catholicos and another v. The Most. Rev. Mar Poulose and others [1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous. Ejusdem generis rule being one of the rules of interpretation, only serves, like all such rules, as an aid to discover the legislative intent; it is neither final nor conclusive and is attracted only when the specific words enumerated, constitute a class, which is not exhausted and are followed by general terms and when there is no manifestation of intent to give broader meaning to the general words. The first three categories contained in r. 18, in our opinion, do not form a genus or a class with the result that clause (iv) would not attract the ejusdem generis rule for its construction. But assuming that they constitute a class or kind of objects or genus, it appears to us that grounds given by the Settlement Commissioner are analogous to clause (iii) which speaks of gross and material irregularity or disparity in the valuation of the claim. This submission must, therefore, be rejected. We now come to the merits of the order of the Settlement Commissioner. After going through the order and the material on the record, to which our attention has been drawn, we are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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