TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (7) TMI 556
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....und of non-payment of rent. The tenant had denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and even claimed title to the said property on the basis of an agreement dated 21st November, 1953 entered into between the predecessor in interest of the petitioner. The ground taken for ejectment of the tenant in the eviction petition was non­payment of rent which was only Rs. 200/- per month. As already noticed, the judgment of the Appellate Authority was set aside by the High Court vide its judgment dated 21st May, 2003 and it is this judgment of the High Court which has been assailed by way of a Special Leave Petition before this Court. The leave to appeal was granted by the Court vide order dated 13th February, 2006. 2. During the pendency of the appeal on 28th November, 2007, the sole petitioner died. From the record, it appears that no steps were taken to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased appellant for a considerable period of time on record. Somewhere on 15th April, 2010, I.A. No. 1 of 2010 has been filed along with I.A. No. 2 of 2010 praying for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal heirs on record. As is evident from ....
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....n which is the only relevant paragraph out of the four paragraph application : "That the LRs. of the applicants are residing on different addresses because the LRs. of the appellant/deceased are in service and they were not aware of the pendency of any appeal before this Hon'ble Court. However, when the letter from the counsel for Sh. Balwant Singh were received at home at Ambala that the appeal is being listed for final hearing during vacation in the month of May, 2010 then these LRs. came to know about the pendency of the appeal. Thereafter these LRs. contacted the counsel in the month of March, 2010 to find out the position of the case. When they contacted the counsel at New Delhi these LRs. the counsel was told about the death of Sh. Balwant Singh which had taken place in November, 2007. It was further pointed out to the counsel that the LRs. were not aware about the pendency of the appeal in this Court or about the requirement of law to bring the LRs. on record after the death of Balwant Singh. It is now they have come to know that the LRs. of Balwant Singh are required to be brought on record otherwise the appeal would abate." 6. It is clear from the bare reading of th....
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....licants. There is not even a whisper in the entire application as to why, right from the death of the deceased in November, 2007, the appellant did not take any steps whatsoever till 15th April, 2010 to inform their counsel about the death of the deceased and to bring the legal representatives on record. 7. The counsel appearing for the applicant, while relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C. [(1985) 1 SCC 431], Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini, [(2003) 10 SCC 691] and Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti v. Sanjeevprasad Jamnaprasad Chourasiya [(2004) 7 SCC 482] argued that this Court should take a liberal view and should condone the delay, irrespective of the above facts and in all these judgments the delay has been condoned by the Court. As per contra, the submission of the counsel for the non-applicants is that the appeal has abated and no cause, much less sufficient, has been shown for setting aside the abatement. A right accrues in favour of the respondents in appeal and it will be unfair and unjust to take away their vested right on such flimsy and baseless grounds. It is a settled position of law that a suit or an appea....
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....1964 SC 215], a three Judge Bench of this Court was concerned with an application filed under Order 22 Rule 9, CPC for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Court expressed the view that mere allegations about belated knowledge of death of the opposite party would not be sufficient. The Court applied the principle of 'reasonable time' even to such situations. While stating that the Court was not to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. it expressed the view that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9, CPC should be applied. The Court held as under : "8. There is no question of construing the expression 'sufficient cause' liberally either because the party in default is the Government or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-s....
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.... xxx xxx 12. The legislature further seems to have taken into account that there may be cases where the plaintiff may not know of the death of the defendant as ordinarily expected and, therefore, not only provided a further period of two months under Art. 171 for an application to set aside the abatement of the suit, but also made the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to such applications. Thus the plaintiff is allowed sufficient time to make an application to set aside the abatement which, if exceeding five months, be considered justified by the Court in the proved circumstances of the case. It would be futile to lay down precisely as to what considerations would constitute 'sufficient cause' for setting aside the abatement or for the plaintiff's not applying to bring the legal representatives of the dece....
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....s examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18-1-1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonatio....
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....ad an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression 'sufficient cause'. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while discussing the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma [(2008) 8 SCC 321] in its para 9 held as under : "11. The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant." 11.&em....
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....e right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. The application filed by the applicants lack in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not speci....
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....edent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;..." 14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., [1988 (38) Excise Law Times 739 (S.C.)], this Court while granting some latitude to the Government in relation to condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to explain what legal problems occurred in filing the Special Leave Petition, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. Similarly, in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal & Co., [1999 (108) Excise Law Times 331 (S.C.)], the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 502 days in filing the appeal because ....
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....ust exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and ha....
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....delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in "re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects. (v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only, when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. We may also notice here that this judgment had been followed with approval by an equi-bench of this Court in the case of Katari Suryanarayana (supra) 16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise ....