TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2011 (2) TMI 1167
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....h Taluk. The appellant alleged that these two plots of land were outside the purview of the Framework Agreement (FWA) and notification issued under Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (KIAD Act). While dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge held that the acquisition proceedings in question were challenged by the writ petitioner, the appellant herein, in a previous Writ Petition No. 46078/03 which was initially accepted and the acquisition proceedings were quashed. Then on appeal, the Division Bench (in writ appeal Nos. 713/04 and 2210/04) reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Thereafter, the Division Bench order was upheld before this Court and this Court approved the acquisition proceedings. 4. Therefore, the writ petition, out of which this present appeal arises, purports to be an attempt to litigate once again, inter alia, on the ground that the aforesaid blocks of land were outside the purview of FWA dated 3-4-1997. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held the second round of litigation is misconceived inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings were upheld right upto this Court. The Division Bench in the im....
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....impugned order, it is clear that the proposed acquisition of land as notified under Section 28(1) of the Act is different from the alleged purpose, which are quite different and from the same, it is clear that the acquisition initiated is not bona fide, but the same is as a result of colorable exercise of power coupled with exercise of fraud on power and on this count also, the notification issued under Section 28(1) also ought to have been quashed." "The Government did not apply its mind to the acquisition proceedings and there is total non-application of mind by the government to the relevant facts in initiating the acquisition proceedings under the KIADB Act." "There was a total change in the stand of the opponents with regard to the 'public purpose' which was stated in the preliminary notification vis-a-vis their statement of objection filed before the Court and moreover the conduct of M/s. NICE Company in allotting certain extent of lands to the Association of India Machine Tool Manufacturers (AIMTM) to put up a big conventional centre, even before the acquisition proceedings are complete, disentitles them from supporting the acquisition of lands." "Since admittedly no indu....
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....aka and Another v. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others - (2006) 4 SCC 683, wherein the said three-judge Bench held : "The next contention urged on behalf of the landowners is that the lands were not being acquired for a public purpose. The counsel who have argued for the landowners have expatiated in their contention by urging that land in excess of what was required under the FWA had been acquired; land far away from the actual alignment of the road and periphery had been acquired; consequently, it is urged that even if the implementation of the highway project is assumed to be for a public purpose, acquisition of land far away therefrom would not amount to a public purpose nor would it be covered by the provisions of the KIAD Act."                  (Paragraph 76, page 711 of the report) 9. In paragraph 77 of the said report, it was further held : "In our view, this was an entirely misconceived argument. As we have pointed out in the earlier part of our judgment, the Project is an integrated infrastructure development project and not merely a highway project. The Project as i....
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....in vested in the State, which may need to be exercised even to the detriment of individuals' property rights so long as it achieves a larger public purpose. Looking at the case as a whole, we are satisfied that the Project is intended to represent the larger public interest of the State and that is why it was entered into and implemented all along." 12. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding of this Court, the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a new writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. That writ petition, as noted above, was rejected both by the learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear terms. 13. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the present appellant is clearly against the principles of Res Judicata as well as principles of Constructive Res Judicata and principles analogous thereto. 14. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal application as it is based on two age old principles, namely, 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is 'nemo debet his ve ari, si constet....
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....h Century B.C. and whose Smriti is now extant only in fragments :- "The plaintiff should be non-­suited if the defendant avers : 'in this very affair, there was litigation between him and myself previously,' and it is found that the plaintiff had lost his case". There are texts of Prasara (Bengal Asiatic Society Edition, page 56) and of the Mayukha (Kane's Edition, page 15) to the same effect. Among Muhammadan law-givers similar effect was given to the plea of "Niza-i-munfasla" or "Amar Mania taqrir mukhalif." Under Roman Law, as administered by the Proetors' Courts, a defendant could repel the plaintiff's claim by means of 'exceptio rei judicatoe" or plea of former judgment. The subject received considerable attention at the hands of Roman jurists and as stated in Roby's Roman Private Law (Vol. II, page 338) the general principle recognised was that "one suit and one decision was enough for any single dispute" and that "a matter once brought to trial should not be tried except, of course, by way of appeal".                      (Page 391-392 of the report) 17. The....
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....l considerations of form but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law". [See Sheoparsan Singh v. Rammanandan Prasad Singh, (1916) 1 I.L.R. 43 Cal. 694 at page 706 (P.C.)]. 21. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in breach of the principle of Res Judicata is prima-facie a proceeding which has been initiated in abuse of the process of Court. 22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam & Ors. - AIR 1965 SC 1150, has explained this principle in very clear terms : "But the question as to whether a citizen should be allowed to challenge the validity of the same order by successive petitions under Art. 226 cannot be answered merely in the light of the significance and importance of the citizens' fundamental rights. The general principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on considerations of public policy. One important consideration of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigati....
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....nally decided by the Court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the Court, regardless of the principles of Res Judicata, as has been held by this Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi and Ors. - (1998) 3 SCC 573. In paragraph 44 of the report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed by this Court and the relevant portions whereof are extracted below : "One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata..." 29. In coming to the aforementioned finding, this Court relied on the Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell. The relevant principles laid down in the aforesaid practice and which have been accepted by this Court are as follows : "This term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a mean....
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....overnment free from all encumbrances." 36. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under : "16. Power to take possession :- When the Collector has made an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances" 37. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operati....
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....gulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Others, reported in 2011 (1) SCALE 223 held that Section 11A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 44. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mariyappa and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (1998) 3 SCC 276. The said decision was cited for the purpose of contending that Section 11A is applicable to an acquisition under KIAD Act. In Mariyappa (supra) before coming to hold that provision of Section 11A of the Central Act applies to Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter "1972 Act"), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a self-contained code. The Court also held that the 1972 Act and the Central Acts are su....