TMI Blog2009 (2) TMI 745X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rivate Limited (for short, the company ) is a Private Limited Company and engaged in the activity of manufacture of iron products. The company applied for the supply of electrical energy (2500 KVA) to the Karnataka Electricity Board (now Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation and hereinafter referred to as KPTC ). The application made by the Company was cleared by the Single Window agency and supply of electric energy 1500 KVA was sanctioned. The company is said to have deposited an amount of Rs. 8,40,000/- on 1st February, 1991 as per demand. KPTC did not commence supply of electricity as agreed upon and that necessitated the company to approach Karnataka High Court for a direction to KPTC to supply the sanctioned energy. On 16th April, 1992, the High Court directed KPTC to supply electrical energy as per sanction forthwith and subsequently, time for supply of electricity was extended by the High Court upto 21st July, 1992. KPTC raised an additional demand of Rs. 8,38,000/- from the company and further demand in the sum of Rs, 1,34,000/-. The company is said to have deposited the said amount. However, the actual supply of the power commenced in the month of November, 1992. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that expression in Section 2(1) (d). (ii) The complainant is not a consumer within the definition of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act, 1986 since it purchased electrical energy from the KPTC for commercial production. (iii) The complainant s case does not fall within the scope of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act, 1986. The expression service in Section 2(1)(o) cannot be read in a wider sense as it is circumscribed by the word facilities , thereby limiting the service only to the consumers of facilities in connection with supply of electrical energy. In other words, the dispute relating to sale and supply of electricity does not come within the ambit of service under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, 1986. If for the arguments sake, it is treated service , since it is for commercial purpose, it is excluded from the purview of sub-clause (1)(d)(ii). 7. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to some of the provisions of the Act, 1986 as were existing at the relevant time in the year 1992 which are relevant for the consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for KPTC. 8. Section 2(1)(d) defines consumer as follows:- Consumer means any person who, - ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uing or being sued. According to learned counsel, the companies incorporated were never intended to be covered by Act, 1986 as they could always pursue the ordinary remedy provided in law. The learned counsel also submitted that the word includes must be read as means . In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court namely; (1) The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. [(1976) 4 SCC 601] (2) Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Ors. [(1987) 1 SCC 424)] 12. Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99 made the following classic statement: The word include is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word include is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er law for the time being in force. This provision instead of helping the contention of KPTC would rather suggest that the access to the remedy provided to the Act of 1986 is an addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. It does not in any way give any clue to restrict the definition of the person . 18. Section 2(1)(m), is beyond all questions, an interpretation clause, and must have been intended by the Legislature to be taken into account in construing the expression person as it occurs in Section 2(1)(d). While defining person in Section 2(1)(m), the Legislature never intended to exclude a juristic person like company. As a matter of fact, the four categories by way of enumeration mentioned therein is indicative, categories (i), (ii) (iv) being unincorporate and category (iii) corporate, of its intention to include body corporate as well as body un-incorporate. The definition of person in Section 2(1)(m) is inclusive and not exhaustive. It does not appear to us to admit of any doubt that company is a person within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) read with Section 2(1)(m) and we hold accordingly. re: contention - (ii) and (iii) 19. In CST ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... supply frame uniform tariffs. (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any of the following factors, namely:- (a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required; (b) the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee; (c) the simplification and standardization of methods and rates of charges for such supplies; (d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity to sparsely developed areas. (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. (4) In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... absolute proposition as canvassed by the learned counsel is discernible from the said order. The said order is confined to its own facts which is clear from paragraph 3 that reads thus: The respondent has filed written submissions. We have perused the same. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that instead of moving the District Forum, the respondent should have moved an application under section 26(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 (for short the Act ) for referring the matter to the Electrical Inspector. 24. Learned counsel urged that the definition service is of limited nature and is limited to the providing facilities in connection with electricity. According to him, the facility is an expression which facilitates the supply of electricity to an installation and the definition of service does not cover supply of electricity. This contention of the learned counsel is founded on erroneous assumption that supply of electricity is a sale of electricity and the use of expression supply is synonym for sale . We have already noticed above, which we need not repreat, that supply of electricity to a consumer by KPTC is not sale of electricity. The e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
