TMI Blog2003 (1) TMI 693X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the period 1.8.1986 to 31.1.1987 wherefor upon service of the legal notice, a suit for possession and arrears of rent was filed which was marked as Civil Suit No.824 of 1993. The learned Trial Judge in terms of the provisions contained in Section 13(3) of the Act determined the provisional rent @ ₹ 80/- per month and by an order dated 9.9.1991 directed the respondent to deposit the arrears as also current rent in court. Admittedly, the respondent did not deposit the same within the period specified therein. The appellant herein filed an application purported to be under Section 13(5) of the Act; whereafter on or about 9.11.1993 the respondent filed an application for condonation of delay. By reason of an order dated 20.1.1994, the said application for condonation of delay was dismissed, inter alia, on the ground that the same was not filed within time. A revision application was thereafter filed by the respondent questioning the legality or validity of the said order, inter alia, on the ground that there is no law barring filing of an application for condonation of delay after expiry of the period specified for deposit of rent. It appears that a Full Bench of the Rajas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sions of the Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable in a case where the tenant could not deposit the rent within the time pursuant to the order passed under Section 13(3) of the Act. The Full Bench also held that the word shall has to be interpreted as may and it is in the discretion of the Court to condone the delay in default of payment/ deposit of rent within specified period. In that view of the matter, the order rejecting the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was set aside and the revision petition filed by the respondent was allowed. It is against the said judgment, the appellants have preferred this appeal. Two questions which arise for our consideration are, firstly, that whether the matter stands covered by the decision of this Court in M/s. B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Anr. [(1987) 2 SCC 407]; and, secondly, whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable where there is a default in depositing the rent within stipulated time by the tenant. Section 13(1)(a) of the Act enables a landlord to sue for a decree of eviction in the event a tenant has neither paid nor tender ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... visional rent as determined by the Court within stipulated period the tenant is relieved by the eviction decree. In the aforementioned backdrop, the decision of this Court in M/s B.P. Khemka s case (supra) may be noticed. M/s. B.P. Khemka (supra) arose out of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (in short the West Bengal Act ). In the said case the tenant committed default in payment of arrears of rent and the landlord brought a suit for eviction on the ground of default. While the suit was pending, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance No. 6 of 1967, which was replaced by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act 30 of 1969 came to be promulgated with effect from August 26, 1967. The Act gave a retrospective effect to the amendments by providing that the amendments made by Section 2 of the Ordinance shall have effect in respect of all suits including appeals which were pending at the date of commencement of the Ordinance. The amendments inter alia enabled tenants who were in default to apply to the court and pay the arrears of rent in instalments and thereby avert their eviction. In pursuance thereof, the tenant deposited the rent. However, he ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... made by the tenant is conferred in the court in relation whereto there does not exist any restriction. It is beyond any cavil that the question as to whether the provision is directory or mandatory would depend upon the language employed therein. [See Union of India and Others vs. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [AIR 1990 SC 981 = (1989) Suppl. 2 SCR 336]. This Court in Bhavnagar Unversity v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. Ors. [2002 (9) SCALE 102], has observed :- Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute [See also M/s Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. U.P. Financial Corporation Ors. (2002 (9) SCALE 778]. It is also a well-settled principle of law that the decision on an interpretation of one statute can be followed while interp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the M.P. Act, the Court has been conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent to any such further time, as it may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf. The power of the court under the M.P. Act is not restricted. However, discretion available to the court under the Rajasthan Act, as noticed hereinbefore is limited. Furthermore, in sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the M.P. Act, the word may has been used which is directory; in contra-distinction with the word shall employed in the Rajasthan Act. The M.P. Act provides for the power of the court to extend the time in the event sufficient cause therefor is shown which is absent in the Rajasthan Act. Furthermore, in terms thereof once the rent has been determined, the same has to be deposited within the prescribed period wherefor there exists no provision for filing an application. In Miss Santosh Mehta vs. Om Prakash Ors. [1980 (3) SCR 325 : (1980) 3 SCC 610] and Ram Murti vs. Bholanath and Others [AIR 1984 SC 1392 : (1984) 3 SCC 111], this Court was concerned with the provision of Section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which is in the following term : (1) In any proceeding for the recov ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e court had no option but to strike out the defence if failure to pay or deposit the rent is proved; under the new act the controller who takes the place of the court has a discretion in the matter; so that in proper cases he may refuse to strike out the defence. (Emphasis mine) In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesri v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta [1985 (3) SCR 825 : (1985) 3 SCC 53], this Court was concerned with interpretation of Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to Bihar Act of 1947 ) which was in the following term : 11-A. Deposit of rent by tenants in suits for ejectment If in a suit for recovery of possession the tenant contests the suit, as regards claim for ejectment, the landlord may make an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent at a rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any; and the court, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined month by month and the arrears of rent, if any, and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nju Choudhary and another vs. Dulal Kumar Chandra [AIR 1988 SC 602], this Court interpreting the provision of Section 15 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Ordinance 1982 being Ordinance No.63 of 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Bihar Rent Ordinance, 1982 ), held : Section 13 of the Act stipulates that if in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards the claim for ejectment, the landlord may move an application at any stage of the suit for an order on the tenant to deposit rent month by month at the rate at which it was last paid and also subject to the law of limitation, the arrears of rent, if any, and the court after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard may make an order to deposit the rent month by month at such rates as to be determined and the arrears, both before and after the institution of the suit, if any, and thereafter provides on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within 15 days of the next following month the court shall order the defence against the ejectment to be struck off . Therefore, there is a duty cast on the court to strike out the defence if there is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ound out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well-settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. In Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd edition, Vol.3 at p.107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p.111 it is sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in court as determined under subsection (3) from the date of such determination or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the Court. Thus, subsection (4) itself provides for limitation of a specific period within which the deposit has to be made, which cannot be exceeding three months as extended by this Court. The matter may be examined from another angle. The deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes place in complying with an order under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... others [(1996) 5 SCC 342], this Court observed : In consequence, by operation of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and limitation in filing Letters Patent appeal stands attracted. In consequence, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters Patent appeal insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded either by special or local law. Since the rules made on the appellate side, either for entertaining the appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of courts, had not expressly excluded, Section 5 of the Limitation Act becomes applicable. We hold that Section 5 to the Limitation Act does apply to the appeals filed against the order of the learned Single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The delay stands condoned. Since the High Court had not dealt with the matter on merits, we decline of express any opinion on merits. The case stands remitted to the Division Bench fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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